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At the date of the commencement of these Reports, I was in­
duced by a desire to render service to my professional brethren and 
the public, to publish the notes, which I had taken only for my own 
use, of the cases in Hilary, 1835. They first appeared in the 
Royal Gazette, and were then issued in pamphlet form. I continued 
so to publish the cases determined during that year.
In the Session of 1836, the Legislature, satisfied of the “ great 
importance of obtaining correct reports of the decisions of the Su­
preme Court,” authorized the Lieutenant Governor to appoint a 
Reporter, secured to him the copyright of his work, and granted 
an annual sum as a remuneration for his services. Under this Act 
I had the honor to be appointed, and have, from the time of my 
appointment, carefully collected and reported all the decisions of 
the Court.
Among the cases of 1835, there were several of very great and 
general importance, and as I was enabled, by the kindness of their 
Honors the Chief Justice andthe other Judges, to have access to their 
notes and written judgments; Iconsideredit only due to the liberality 
and kindness with which my efforts had been met, to re-publish the 
whole of the cases from the beginning of 1835 ; this has now been 
done, and although I have thereby incurred a heavy pecuniary 
expense, yet I shall be enabled to proceed with more satisfaction 
to myself and the public than I could by Continuing a work im­
perfectly commenced. Much delay has occurred in the printing, 
but I am now induced to hope that the work will be proceeded with 
diligently until completed, and that hereafter the numbers will be 
issued within a reasonable time after every Term.
It is proper that I should acknowledge the very great assistance 
which, during along illness, I have received from Mr. George Lee, 
as well in compiling the latter part of the cases now published, as 
in the general correction of the Press.
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IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE REION OF WILLIAM IV.
1835.
KING v. WILSON AND OTHERS.
A Grant of Land put in evidence referred to a plan annexed; a 
plan not annexed was produced by one holding Land under the 
Grant, as heir to his father, an original Grantee named therein, who had 
them in possession 25 years, and knew them in his father’s possession. 15 
years before—he had never seen the plan annexed to the Grant—the plan 
purported to be a methodical and complete delineation of the contents of 
the Grant in detail, signed by the Survey >r General;
Held that the plan was sufficiently authenticated, as the plan originally 
annexed to the Grant, to authorize the Court, prirna facie, to admit it in 
evidence as the original plan.
Letters patent granted Lands, described as extending from the point of 
departure, “ 32 chains or to a certain road, leading between certain 
Lands and the Tract described in the Grant, and thence to run a 
certain course on said road,” the road was 69 chains 50 links from the 
5rst bounds.
Held that the words of the Grant necessarily import that the alternative 
secondly mentioned, snail be the controlling one.
An admission of the Crown, upon record under the Great Seal, is 
evidence against the Crown itself.
rfipHIS was an information for intrusion on Crown Lands in Char 
-S- lotte County, tried before CHIPMAN, Ch. J. at Bar, in last 
Hilary Term.—Verdict for Defendant.
The Attorney General in the same Term obtained a Rule Nisi 
to set aside the verdict on the grounds,
1 st. That a plan, purporting to be a plan of Lands granted by 
the Crown, was improperly received in evidence, not being annexed 
to the Letters Patent.
2d. That the Locus in quo was improperly considered by His 
Honor 
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Honor the Chief Justice to be within the hounds of the Grant called 
the Chamcook Grant.
The case was argued last Trinity Term by the Attorney Gene­
ral for the Prosecution, and Mr. Street (now Solicitor General,) 
for the Defendants.
The Judgment of the Court was now delivered as follows, by 
Chipman, C. J.
This was an information for intrusion, tried before me in Hilary 
Term, 1834.
The Crown gave in evidence the Grant commonly called the 
Chamcook Grant, (under an exemplification,) with the Plan 
annexed, which Grant is as follows:
Nova Scotia.
George the Third, &c. Know ye that we, of our special grace, 
certain knowledge and mere motion, have given and granted, &c. 
unto Thomas Wyer, &c. &x.,fowr several Tracts of Land, con­
taining together in the whole 1,534 acres, in the County of Sun­
bury, in our Province of Nova Scotia, bounded and abutted, 
situate, lying and being as follows, to wit: Unto Thomas Wyer, &c. 
a plantation [then follows a description of the Tract at Oak 
Point J>ay,\ containing 500 acres, with the usual allowance 
for waste: “ Unto Thomas Wyer, Colin Campbell, and William 
Gallop, another Plantation, situate, lying and being, abutted and 
bounded, as follows, beginning at a stake and stones at a Gove bear­
ing northwest from Chamcook Island, being the northeastern bound 
of Farm Lot No. 205, on the Bay of Passamaquoddy aforesaid, 
thence to run south 63°, west thirty two chains, or until it comes 
to the road leading between Farm Lots Nos. 38 to 47, and this 
Tract; thence to run north 28° west 128 chains on said road, thence 
north 63° east 98 chains, thence (south 27° east 96 chains to the 
sea shore of said Bay, thence by the several courses of the said 
Bay, crossing Chamcook River to the bounds first mentioned, con­
taining 500 acres, allowance being made for roads, &c. : Unto John 
Jones a Plantation &c. [describing it] containing 500 acres, with 
allowance for roads: Unto William Pagan, &c. a Lot of Land 
&c. [describing it,] also the Point opposite, marked A, containing 
34 acres. And containing in all the aforesaid Tracts of Land 
1,534 acres, and hath such shape, form and marks as appears by a 
Plat thereof hereunto annexed. Given under the great seal of our 
Province of Nova Scotia. Witness Ac. this third day of August, 
1784, &c.”
The Defendants claimed under this Grant, and it was contended 
on the part of the Crown that their possessions were not within the 
limits of the Grant upon the true construction of it. The Defend­
ants claim rested upon the ground, that the true construction of the 
Grant 
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Grant was, that the first line of the Grant should, in all events, run 
to “the road leading between Farm Lots Nos. 38 to 47 and this 
Tract,” and should not stop at the end of thirty two chains,” the 
first alternative mentioned in regard to the extent of this line; 
whereas, the Attorney General contended, that the true construction 
of the Grant was, that this first line should stop at the end of the 
32 chains. The Penobscot Association Grant, the Grant which 
contained “ the Farm Lots” mentioned in the Chamcook Grant, 
was given in evidence on the part of the Defendants, and is as 
follows:
“Nova Scotia.
George the Third, &c. Know ye that we, of our special grace, 
certain knowledge, and mere motion, have given and granted &c. 
unto Stephen Roberts, &c. &c. (inter-alios Colin Campbell,) certain 
several Tracts of Land, containing together in the whole 1,900 
acres, in the County of Sunbury, in our Province of Nova Scotia, 
bounded and abutted, situate, lying and being as follows, &c.:
First—one certain Tract of Land &c., bounded and measuring 
and being the Lots from No. 1 to No. 20, both inclusive, compre­
hended within the bounds following, to wit, beginning on the sea 
shore, &c. &c.—the boundary line of lands of James Boyd, at a 
Beech Tree marked I B, &c. &c.
Secondly—one other certain Tract of Land bounded and mea­
suring and being the Lots Nos. 23, 24, 28 and 205, lying between 
the Town Plot and Common of Saint Andrews and Passamaquoddy 
Bay, bounded easterly on said Bay, southerly on said Town Plot 
and a part of said Common, westerly on the aforesaid large Com­
mon, and northerly on Land granted to Colin Campbell, Thomas 
Wyer, and William Gallop, each and every of the aforesaid four 
Lots containing 100 acres, more or less.
Thirdly—one other certain Tract of Land, bounded and measur­
ing and being the Lots from No. 38 to No. 64, both inclusive, 
and the Lots froia No. 67 to No. 76, both also inclusive, except 
the Lot No 70, and the Tracts marked in the Plan as reserved 
by the Surveyor General of the Woods, and for Fortifications com­
prehended within the bounds following, to wit: beginning on the 
eastern bank of the River Scoudic or St. Croix, on the northerly 
bounds of the Common aforesaid, and thence running on said 
bounds north 62° east, 330 rods, thence north 23° west, 358 j 
chains, thence north 62° east, 20 chains, thence north 14° west, 
179 chains, thence south 76° west, to a branch of said River, 
called Waweig, on Lands of John Jones, and thence on the banks 
of the said Branch, and the Main River to the bounds first men­
tioned, each and every of the said last mentioned 36 Lots contain­
ing by estimation 100 acres, more or less.
Fourthly- -one other certain Tract of Land, [describing it.]
Fifthly
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Fifthly—one other certain Tract &c. [describing it.] 
And sixthly—one other certain Tract &c. [describing it.] 
The aforesaid 190 Lots, Tracts of Land containing together in 
the whole 19,000 acres, allowance being made for all such roads as 
may hereafter be deemed necessary to pass through the same, and 
being all Wilderness Land, and hath such shape, form and mark 
as appears by a Plat thereof hereunto annexed &c. Habendum 
unto Stephen Roberts Lot No. one, &c. &c.
Given under the great seal of our Province of Nova Scotia. 
Witness &c. the third day of August, 1784.”
The Defendants also tendered in evidence a Plan which they 
contended was the Plan annexed to this Grant. This Plan was 
admitted by the Attorney General, subject to an exception which 
had been taken to the same Plan in an action of replevin, tried 
before me at the Charlotte Circuit, April 1833. Richard Hasluck, 
vs. Ralph Cookson; and it was agreed that my notes of the evi­
dence in regard to this Plan should be taken for the purpose of 
determining whether the Plan was admissible (vid. infra). The 
Defendants also gave in evidence a Grant, under the great seal of 
New Brunswick, to the Justices of the Peace of the County of 
Charlotte, called “ the School and Ministers Grant” and in com­
mon parlance “ the Glebe Grant,” Dated 9th November, 1787, 
which is as follows:
• “ New Brunswick.
Unto--------- the Justices of the Peace of the County of Char­
lotte for the time being, in trust for the uses hereinafter mentioned, 
a Tract of Land, situate, lying and being in said Parish of Saint 
Andrews, in said County of Charlotte, and abutted and bounded 
as follows, to wit:—beginning on the northerly bank or shore of 
Passamaqnoddy Bay, at the southeasterly corner or bounds of 
Tract of Land granted to Thomas Wyer and others at Chamcook 
River, thence running along the easterly line of the said Grant, to 
the north easterly corner or angle thereof; thence along the 
northerly line of the said Grant to Thomas Wyer and others, until 
it meets the rear or easterly line of Lots in the third Tract or 
Division of the Grant to the Penobscot Association, thence along 
the said rear or easterly line of the said Lots, northerly, 91 chains 
of 4 poles each, thence N. 77° E. by the magnet 165 chains, or 
until it meets the westerly line of Lot No. 20 in the first Tract or 
Division of the said Grant to the Penobscot Association, thence 
along the said westerly line of the said Lot south easterly, until it 
comes to the mouth of a River or Creek (at the western point or 
entrance of the same,) which discharges into a cove or inlet from 
Passamaquoddy Bay, thence along the westerly branch or shore 
of the said cove or ' det, and along the westerly and northerly 
branch or shore of Passamaquoddy Bay, following the several 
courses
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courses of the same southerly and westerly to the bounds first 
mentioned, containing in the whole 1,660 acres, more or less, with 
the usual allowance for roads and waste.” A Plan was annelid to 
this Grant which agreed with the Plan annexed to the Penobscot 
t&rant.
It appeared in evidence that the rear line of the “ Farm Lots,” 
mentioned in the Chamcook Grant (which wei^e granted in the 
Penobscot Association Grant,) and were commonly called the 
Saint Croix Lots, because they fronted on the Saint Croix (or 
Schoodic River) had been in dispute between the proprietors of the 
Chamcook Grant and these Saint Croix Lots. There was a Hem­
lock Tree Line, and an Ash Tree Line. The Hemlock Tree 
Line agreed with the actual admeasurement of “ 330 rods/’ run 
from the shore of the Saint Croix mentioned in the Penobscot 
Grant. This Hemlock Tree was found by actual admeasurement 
in the year 1829, (instead of thirty two chains, the distance men­
tioned in the-Cliamcook Grant,) to be 69 chains 50 links from the 
beginning of the Chamcook Grant on Passamaquoddy Bay; taking 
off one chain or 4 rods for “ the road,” would leave 68 chains 50 
links. The Ash Tree was 3 chains 33 links nearer the Passa­
maquoddy Bay. The Ash Tree Line was decided by the 
verdict of the Jury in the above mentioned cause of Hctsluck, vs. 
Cookson, to be the acknowledged and binding boundary as between 
the proprietors of the Chamcook Grant and the Saint Croix Lots. 
And it was proved, that the Chamcook proprietors had from the 
beginning in 1784, always considered their western boundary to be the 
rear line of the Saint Croix Lots, and that no claim on the part of 
the Crown had been advanced before the discovery made of the 
actual distance by the admeasurement in 1829. It appeared in 
evidence that the Defendants were in possession up to the Ash 
Tree Line. There was some discrepancy in the testimony of the 
Surveyors who were examined as to the running of the other lines 
of the Chamcook Grant, for the purpose of shewing the actual 
number of acres contained within the limits of this Chamcook 
Grant as held by the Defendants; but it may be stated as the gene­
ral result of the evidence, that these limits would give them double 
the quantity of acres named in the Grant. It was further proved 
that about one third of the Grant was mountain and water and 
about two thirds fit for cultivation, and that other grants in the 
same neighbourhood included in the same Patent with the 
Chamcook Grant contained a similar overplus. It was further 
proved that by stopping at the end of 32 chains, and then running 
N. 28° W. 128 chains, and then S. 63 chains 98 links, according 
to the Grant, would give more than 800 acres; but the “ Glebe 
Grant” would now intervene long before 98 chains, the distance 
on this line mentioned in the Grant, could be completed from the 
termination 
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termination of the line run from the end of the 32 chains. It was 
further proved that the Defendants had made large imnrovements 
within the space now claimed by the Crown.
I directed the Jury (according to what I had hold at Nisi Prius 
in the above cause of Haduch vs. Cookson, which still remains for 
decision by the Court in Banc,) that it was the true construction 
of the Chamcook Grant, that this Grant should in all events be 
bounded by the rear line of the Saint Croix Lots in the Penobscot 
Grant, and that I considered this construction to be much fortified 
by the Glebe Grant which was not in evidence in the case of 
Hasluck, ps. Cookson, and that they should therefore find a verdict 
for the Defendants, which they did.
A rule for a new Trial was obtained on the two grounds,
1st. That the Plan purporting to be the Plan originally annexed 
to the Penobscot Association Grant, was under the circumstances 
not admissible as such Plan.
2d. That I misdirected the J ury in regard to the construction of 
the Chamcook Grant.
The case was very elaborately argued in Trinity Term last, by 
the Attorney General for the Crown, and the present Solicitor 
General for the Defendants, and now stands for judgment, and I am 
to pronounce the judgment of the Court.
In giving judgment I shall take up the points upon which the 
rule for a new Trial was granted in their order.
1st. Was the Plan, purporting to be the Plan of the Penobscot 
Grant, admissible in evidence ?
Colin Campbell was the witness who produced the Grant and 
the Plan. He said that he found the Grant and the Plan together, 
in the same bundle with the Mill Privilege (z. e. the Chamcook 
Grant,) and the Saint Andrews Town Grant. They were left by 
his father, who is dead, and who was an original Grantee both in 
the Penobscot and the Chamcook Grant. They had been in the 
witness’s possession for 25 years, and in his father’s possession 40 
years ago. That he had-never seen the Plan annexed to the 
Grant. That this Plan had not been used on account of the dif­
ference in the meridians. That the County Plan in which the 
meridian lines were corrected, was for this reason the Plan in actual 
use.
In Mr. Starkie’s Treatise on Evidence, vol. 1, p. 170, it is laid 
down as the rule relating to the reception in evidence of documents 
of this nature “ that the authority of the document should be 
established by the only kind of proof of which it is in general capa­
ble, that is by proof that it came out of the proper repository; and 
this rule is supported by the cases cited by Mr. Starkie. Now the 
usual and proper repository or place of custody for the King’s 
Grants of Lands is with one of the Grantees who have an interest
in 
in the Fifth Year of WILLIAM IV. 9
in their preservation, and the proper place of custody for a Plan 
purporting to have been annexed to a Grant, but actually separated 
from it, is obviously in company with the Grant, wherever that 
may be. But it was objected at the Trial that there was no 
evidence that this Plan had ever at any time been annexed to the 
Grant. Upon this point it is material to remark, that the Grant 
expressly refers to a Plan thereunto annexed; it contains six seve­
ral Tracts or Blocks of Land, comprising 190 lots and 19,000 acres 
in the whole, having “ such shape, form and marks as appears by a 
Plat thereof hereunto annexed.” The Grant describes only the 
exterior lines of each block, and not the interior subc'ivision of the 
blocks into lots, the several lots being designated in the Grant only 
by numbers, thus “To have and to hold to Stephen Roberts, Lot 
number one,” and so on. F urther, there are exceptions and reserva­
tions in the Grant ascertainable only by the plan ; for instance, as 
to the third Tract (one specifically connected with the question in 
this cause,) there is an express exception from the premises com­
prehended within the bounds of that Tract, as described in the 
Grant of “ the Lot No. 70, and the Tracts \narked in the Plan 
as reserved by the Surveyor General of the Woods and for Fortifi­
cations.” Without reference to the Plan, therefore, it Is obviously 
impossible to give effect to the Grant, either with regard to the 
gift of the Crown to the individual grantees, or to the parcels 
which the Crown has excepted and reserved to itself, out of the 
Blocks or Tracts of Land comprehended within the described 
limits. Under such circumstances, a supposition that the Grant 
was issued by the officers of the Crown, without the requisite accom­
paniment of the Plan, according to the express all Jgation of the 
instrument itself, is in my mind inadmissible. Such a supposition 
would go to vacate for uncertainty a solemn act of the Crown, 
under which hundreds of persons hold their inheritance. The 
maxim of Law on the contrary is, that every man, especially 
every public officer shall be presumed to have properly discharged 
his duty. Again, when documents are offered in evidence under 
circumstances like the present, the Court will examine them for 
the purpose of ascertaining whether they bear upon the face of 
them marks of authenticity ; and in the case of Carlo vs. Lewis, 
4 Esp. N. P. C. 1, where a Plan which was admissible as coming 
from a proper custody, but upon inspection was found to contain 
only a single delineation of the limits of a Parish, drawn in an 
unartificial manner, and was not signed by any person having a 
public character or office in the Parish, it was rejected. In the 
present case, the Plan purports on the face of it to be a methodical 
and complete delineation of the contents of the Grant in detail, and 
moreover purports to be signed by the Surveyor General, the officer 
whose duty it was to authenticate it by his signature; and it was 
held 
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held in the case of Taylor vs. Cook Price R. 653, that in such a 
case the signature of a person whose duty it was to sign must be 
presumed to be of his handwriting. It was objected on the argu 
ment that this plan was not the best evidence that could be produced, 
inasmuch as the party could have produced an inspeximus of the 
Grant with a copy of the plan annexed. Now the plan was ad 
mitted in evidence as the Plan originally annexed to the Grant, 
the original Grant itself being in evidence, and if it be the Plan 
originally annexed to the Grant, it is indisputably tlie very best 
evidence that could be produced, clearly better evidence, as being 
the original document, than a copy of the Plan annexed to a copy 
of the Grant under an inspeximus, since all copies are liable to 
mistakes. The whole question turns upon this—whether the Plan 
admitted in evidence was sufficiently authenticated, as the Plan 
originally annexed to the Grant, to authorize the Court 
so to admit it as the original Plan. And for the reasons I 
have stated, we are of opinion that it was sufficiently authenticated 
for that purpose, and therefore was properly admitted in evidence.
The second question is, what is the true construction of the 
Chamcook Grant? Upon this point it is not necessary to have 
recourse to the principles which govern the construction of the 
King’s Grants, in contra-distinction from those of a private person; 
the rule with regard to the latter, being always to construe the 
words of the Grantor most strongly against himself; it being sup­
posed, that his self-interest will always bind him to be careful of his 
expressions; whereas, in the case of the King, he being considered 
the Representative and Trustee of the Public, and having no pri­
vate interests to guard, there shall be no such intendment or pre­
sumption. Nor is it necessary to enter upon a consideration of the 
authorities, which give to the words “ special grace, certain know­
ledge and more motion.” which are found in this Grant, the effect of 
reducing a royal grant to the same standard of construction as that 
of a subject ? for the Attorney General fairly, and most properly, 
put the question broadly upon the ground of intention. What did 
the King intend to grant ? What did the subject expect to re­
ceive ? This is indeed the only true and reasonable principle, and 
it has the express sanction of the highest authority. “ There is an 
incessant rule (says Lord Coke, 2 Inst. 596) for construction 
of the King’s Letters Patent, not only of liberties but of lands and 
tenements which he may lawfully grant, that they have no strict 
or narrow interpretation for the overthrowing of them sed secun­
dum commodum plenitudinem judicuntur, that is, to have a liberal 
and favourable construction for the making of them available in 
law usque ad plenitudinem for the honor of the King. Taking 
this principle for our guide, let us proceed to the consideration of 
this Grant. The premises granted are a “ plantation,” in other 
words 
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words a Tract of Land “ situate, lying and being, abutted and 
bounded as follows,” beginning &c., then proceeding to describe the 
lines which 1 shall presently consider, and making a complete am­
bit “ to the bounds first mentioned.” It is expressly, therefore, 
a grant of the land bounded by and comprehended within the lines 
which are described,—a grant by metes and bounds. The descrip­
tion goes on “ containing 500 acres,, allowance being made for 
roads, &c.’H Now this subsequent mention of the quantity con­
tained can never be admitted to control the previous definition of 
boundary by lines particularly described. Indeed, it was admitted 
by the Attorney General, that where the lines are certain, the men­
tion of the quantity of land comprehended within them, is imma­
terial. Let us then endeavour to ascertain the lines of boundary, 
truly intended by the Grant. The lines of the Grant which have 
a bearing on the present case, are contained in the following part 
of the description, viz:—“ beginning at a stake and stows, at a 
cove bearing north west from Chamcook Island, being the north 
eastern bound of Farm Lot No. 205 in the Bay of Passamaquoddy 
aforesaid, thence to run south 63° west, thirty two chains, or until 
it runs to Z/mroad, leading between Farm Lots numbers 38 to 47 
and this tract: “ thence to run north 28° west 128 chains on said 
road.” The question raised upon the intention of the Grant is this, 
whether the first line of the Grant running south westerly from 
Passamaquoddy Bay shall peremptorily terminate at the end of 
thirty two chains by measurement or -whether the other specified 
alternative shall be adopted and this Grant be extended to what 
is described as “ the road leading between Farm Lots No. 38 to 
47 and this tract.” It is obviously impossible to understand this 
description, without a reference to the “ Farm Lots” “No. 205,” 
and from “ No. 38 to 47” mentioned in it. These Farm Lots are 
described in the Grant called the “ Penobscot Association Grant.” 
This Grant bears date the same day with the Chamcook Grant, 
and in its turn has an express reference to the Chamcook Grant. 
The second tract in this Grant is described as “ bounded and mea­
suring and being the lots numbers 23, 24, 28 and 205,” bounded 
inter alia “ westerly on the large Common of Sair.t Andrews” and 
“ northerly on land granted to Colin Campbell, Thomas Wyer and 
William Gallop” (the Chamcook Grant). The third tract is bounded 
and measuring and being (inter alia) the lots from No. 38 to 64 
both inclusive, &c. &c. “ comprehended within the bounds following, 
to wit, beginni ng on the eastern bank of the River Scoodick or Saint 
Croix, on the northerly bounds of the Common aforesaid, and thence 
running on said bounds north 62° east 330 rods, thence north 28° 
west 358 J chains” &c. &c. Each of these Grants refers to a Plan 
annexed. The inspeximus of the Chamcook Grant given in evi­
dence has a copy of the Plan annexed to the copy of the Grant cer-
B tified 
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tified under the Great Seal. The original Plan of the Penobscot 
Grant was, as already remarked upon, given in evidence in com­
pany with the original Grant.
These Grants, with tlieir respective Plans, issued as they were 
on the same day, and bearing mutual reference each to the other, 
must evidently be considered irt'connexion with each other, in order 
to ascertain the true intent of the Crown in regard to the premises. 
Neither of the •Grants can be well understood without a reference 
to the Plans ; and if there be any ambiguity in the expressions of 
the Grant, the Plans which contain a visible delineation of the 
respective parcels of land which it was the intention of the Crown 
to convey are, by the Grants themselves, designated as the means 
of obtaining certainty in this respect. The Plan belonging to the 
Penobscot Grant is evidently intended to contain the more particu­
lar and complete delineation, not only of the Grant to which it be­
longs, but of the Chamcook Grant also. The necessity of referring 
to the Penobscot Plan, in order to ascertain the severalty of each 
Grantee/awrZ even the reservations of the -Crown itself has already 
been noticed in giving our opinion on the admissibility of that plan 
in evidence, ar.d it is worthy of remark with regard to the Chamcook 
Grant that in the description of the fourth tract therein granted to 
William Pagan and others, one pieee of Land is described only as 
“ the point marked A,” which makes it absolutely necessary to 
refer to the Plan, to obtain any knowledab of the piece of Land 
designated by that letter. This is a further and very strong cir­
cumstance to shew the reliance placed by the officers of the'Crown 
who prepared these instruments upon the Plans to aid and supply 
the descriptions in the Grants. Having made these general re­
marks upon the twO'Grants and Plans, I will proceed to a conside­
ration of them in immediate reference to the question now in dis­
pute. The leading impression made by an inspection of the Plans 
is that they both shew the'whole space between the wpter of the 
Passamaquoddy Bay on the Chamcook or eastern side and the 
water of the Schoodick or Saint Croix River, on the western side as 
granted land, without any intermediate vacant land. Again, both 
the plans shew a road as bounding the rear of the Chamcook 
Grant. In the Penobscot Plan this road is marked on the rear of 
the Saint Croix Lots for the whole length of the Block from No. 
38 to No. 64, inclusive, and immediately divides, or in the lan­
guage of the Chamcook Grant “ leads between” these lots from 
No. 38 to 47 and the Chamcook Tract; and in the Chamcook 
Plan the road divides or leads between that Grant and a block of 
land evidently intended to represent the whole content of the same 
Farm Lots No. 38 to 47. The Chamcook Grant describes the 
second or rear line of the Tract thereby granted as running “ north 
28° west 128 chains on said road.” The Penobscot Grant de­
scribes 
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scribes the second or rear line of this Tract as running the former 
course “north 28° west 3581 chitins" On the Penobscot Plan 
the 128 chains, the measure of the second line of the Chamcook 
Grant, and the 1358? chains the measure of the second line of the 
Penobscot Grant, are marked upon the same line, running north 
28° west. These circumstances, appearing upon an inspection of the 
Plans in connexion with the Grants, in my mind render the con­
clusion irresistible that it was the intention of the Crown, in making 
these Grants, that the Chamcook Grant was to extend to the rear 
of the Saint Croix Lots in the Penobscot Grant, leaving only the 
space of the road between them ; the rear line of the Saint Croix 
Lots being determined by the Grant without any alternative, to 
run from the termination of a line measured from the Bank of the 
river the exact distance of 330 rods on the northerly bound of the 
Saint Andrew’s Common. It is however insisted on the part of 
the Crown, that the expression in the Chamcook Grant, in the al­
ternative “ 32 chains or until it comes to the road” &c., is necessarily 
to be taken as limiting the Grant to the first mentioned alternative, 
namely the termination of the 32 chains. But in the description 
of this part of the bounds we think that the words of the Grant 
even without reference to the Plan, necessarily import, that the 
alternative secondly mentioned shall be the controlling one. The 
words are “ to run south 63° west 32 chains, or until it comes to 
the road leading between Farm Lots numbers 38 to 47 and this 
tract, thence to run north 28° west 128 chains on saidroad.” The 
second line is to run from the termination of the first; it is also to 
run on the said road ; the termination of the first line must there­
fore necessarily be on the same road along which the second line is 
to run. And how is the road defined and ascertained ? It is the 
road “ leading between" the Farm Lots No. 38 to 47 and the 
Chamcook Tract, and therefore a road bounding the Farm Lots, 
as well as the Chamcook Tract; thereby making the rear line of 
these Farm Lots or the Saint Croix Lots as they are called, which 
we have seen is a line fixed by the Grant at the distance of 330 
rode from the Saint Croix River, the medium of regulating and 
ascertaining the rear line of the Chamcook Grant, and id certum 
est quod certum reddi potest is a maxim of universal application in 
the construction of written instruments. This exposition of the 
words of the Grant exactly corresponds with the intention, which 
is so apparent on the face of the Plans. But it is said that if this 
had been the intention there was no use or propriety in inserting 
the disjunctive “ or” and the line would have been described as 
running absolutely to the road in question; and unquestionably 
such would have been the correct and accurate mode of description. 
But these Grants do not by any means exhibit in other parts of 
them the careful and accurate phraseology which one expects to 
find
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find in solemn instruments of this kind. I think it is evident that 
the framer of the Grant considered it as the fact (probably deduced 
from the imperfect surveys which had then been made of that part 
of the country) that the distance from the Chamcook shore to the 
rear of the Saint Croix Lots, as granted and laid down in the Plan, 
was 32 chains, and therefore inserted this as another circumstance 
descriptive of this line of the Chamcook Grant, without any appre­
hension that it would differ from the other alternative, namely, the 
road marked out in the -rear of the Saint Croix Lots. It is a 
common use of the disjunctive “ or” to apply it in denoting different 
expressions for the same thing as well as to denote different things; 
and if the distance in question had been 32 chains and no more 
the expression would not have been in itself improper, although an 
unnecessary and inartificial accumulation of descriptive" terms. 
Be this as it may, we think that the clear intention manifested as 
well in the context of the Grant, as in the Plans to carry the 
Chamcook Tract to the rear line of the Saint Croix Lots, and not 
to leave any vacant ungranted tract between them, must in this 
case overrule and bear down any argument drawn from 
the mention of the distance of the 32 chains^ and it being the 
acknowledged fact that this distance is a great deal more than 32 
chains, the mention of it becomes so clearly inconsistent with the 
unquestionable intention of the Grant, collected from other circum­
stances, that in construing the Grant it must be thrown aside and 
be deemed a particular that is not true. The rule of construction 
in such case is found in Com. Dig. Fait E. 4. “ If the thing de­
scribed is sufficiently ascertained, it is sufficient, though all the 
particulars are not true, as if a man conveys his house in D 
which was R. Cotton’s when it was Thomas Cotton’s, Hob. 171. If 
he demises the manor of D, which manor is in lease for such a rent, 
the demise is good, though the rent be mistaken.—Per Pofh. 2 
Cro. 34. If he demises his meadows in 3 and D, containing 10 
acres, where they contain 20 acres, all the meadows pass.”— 
Sav. 114.
It is worthy of remark, that the Plan annexed to the Chamcook 
Grant does not mention the 32 chains, nor indeed any course or 
distance, while it does, as before noticed, contain the road, and the 
rear line of the Saint Croix Lots, which corroborates the inference 
that the latter circumstances indicate the prominent and controlling 
intention of the Grant, which svas not left to be ascertained by the 
measurement of distance.
This construction of the Chamcook Grant is fully corroborated 
by the terms of the Grant to the Justices of the Peace for the Coun­
ty of Charlotte, dated 9th November, 1787, commonly called the 
Glebe Grant, one line of which is described as running “ aloi^the 
northerly line of the said Grant to Thomas Wyer and associates 
(the 
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(the Chamcook Grant) until it meets the. rear or westerly line of 
lots in the third tract or division of the Grant to the Penobscot As­
sociation, ” thereby expressly declaring in an instrument of record 
under the Great Seal, which has express reference to the Chamcook 
Grant, that the northerly line of this Grant extends to the rear line 
of the Saint Croix Lots, and it appears to us unquestionable upon 
the first principles of evidence, that an admission of the Crown 
upon record, under the Great Seal, is evidence against the Crown 
itself. It is also observable that this Glebe Grant contains an in­
stance where the alternative of a specified distance must necessa­
rily be controlled by the subsequent expression of a particular 
boundary. One line in this Grant is described as running “ N. 
77° E. by the magnet 165 chains, or until it meets the westerly 
line of lot No. 20 in said first tract or division of the said grant to 
the Penobscot Association, thence along the said westerly line of 
the said lot south westerly until it comes to the mouth of a Riner or 
Cteekf fc. Here the westerly line of Lot No. 20 being made the 
boundary, the line must obviously be extended to meet that boun­
dary, whether it exceed 165 chains or not, although the alternative 
expression is used. «No other consistent construction can, in our 
opinion, be given to the Grant.
The argument, however, was put by the Attorney General 
in another shape, and it was said that as stopping at the end of 32 
chains would give to the Granteeseven more than 500 acres of land, 
and as 500 acres is the quantity mentioned in the Grant it was the 
intention of the Grant not to go beyond the 32 chains ; it being as­
sumed and urged by the Attorney General that it was the para­
mount intention of the Crown to convey this certain quantity, viz. 
500 acres of land. Now the primary rule for determining the in­
tention of the King’s Grants, is to consider the words and references 
contained in the Grants themselves, interpreted by just rules of 
construction. In the present case the King gives and grants “a 
plantation” or tract of land “ abutted and bounded” as mentioned 
in the Grant, and this tract so “ abutted and bounded" is further 
said to contain “ 500 acres, allowance being made for roads, &c.” 
The King therefore here intends what l:e expresses, namely, a tract 
of land having the abuttals and boundaries which he sets forth and 
describes. The mention of the contents of the Grant is necessarily 
to be taken as by estimation an expression very usually inserted in 
Grants, especially (with the indefinite adjunct “ allowance being 
made for roads fc." To admit this estimation of contents with 
the unlimited “ allowance for roads as therule for determin­
ing the metes and bounds of the parcel of land granted, would be to 
violate the first principles of construing written instruments ; these 
metes and bounds can be determined only by the description ac­
tually given of them. And however the Crown may have been 
mistaken
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mistaken in the contents of the tract granted, this cannot alter or 
affect the boundaries assigned to it in the Grant, when the ques­
tion turns solely upon the construction of the Grant in regard to 
the limits actually expressed therein.
Thus far the argument in this case proceeded upon the circum­
stances of tlie case itself. But it was much insisted upon that there 
is an existing decision of this Court upon a Grant containing simi­
lar expressions 'with that now in question, which decision is in point, 
and establishes the construction now contended for on behalf of the 
Crown. The case referred to is that of Nokes dem. Simonds, vs. 
Hazen and White. In that case the material words were “north 
15° west 160 chains, or until it meets the River Kennebeckasis, 
and from thence to run westerly until it meets the N. E. bound of 
the former Grant.” And it was decided that the line running, 
north 15° west, should terminate at the end of the 160 chains, and 
should not be continued to the River Kennebeckasis, which lay at 
a considerable distance beyond. If the cases were parallel we 
should feel ourselves bound by this decision, confirmed as it was by 
repeated consideration and appearing upon record, first upon special 
verdict, and then upon a demurrer to evidence, and fully concurring, 
as we do, in the correctness of it. But the two circumstances upon 
which we found our opinion in the case now in hand did not exist 
in the case of Simonds vs. Hazeh and White. First in that case, 
the Grant did not refer-to any Plan to indicate its intention, and 
secondly the line running from the alternative point is not in that 
case described as running on or along “the River Kennebtickasis” 
which would have shewn, that the point from which it springs must 
be at that Riycr ; whereas in the present case the corresponding 
line is described as running on “ the road,” thereby indicating 
that the point from which it springs must be at the-road ; and in the 
instance before adverted to in the Glebe Grant, the line is described 
as running on the westerly line of Lot No. 20, thereby indicating 
that in all events the line immediately before described, must extend 
to the said westerly line of Lot No. 20 ; the case of Simonds vs. 
Hazenand White,therefore cannot govern or afford aprecedent for the 
present case, because it is in its circumstances essentially different.
Having formed an opinion in this case upon tlig grounds which 
I have stated, it is very satisfactory to reflect that the construction 
which we think the terms of the Grant require is in exact accord­
ance with the actual possession, held and enjoyed under all the 
Grants involved in these discussions, and it would seem with the 
received opinions in the Surveyor General’s office for a period of 
nearly half a century. The rule for a new trial must be discharged.
Note.—This was distinctly and properly the judgment of Chipman Ch. 
Justice, and Botsford J., the surviving Judges before whom the case was argued. 
This written judgment was submitted to Career J., who concurred. Parker J. 
had been Counsel in the case, and declined giving any opinion.
WIGGINS
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WIGGINS v. GARRISON AND WOOD.
Under a Writ of Replevin, a Sheriff cannot justify the taking of the 
Goods therein mentioned, unless they be found in the possession of the 
Defendant named in the Writ.
This question came up on demurrer and was argued in last Mi­
chaelmas Term, by the SoliUtor General for the Plaintiff, and 
Neville Parker for the Defendant.
The pleadings aud arguments are fully detailed in the judgment 
of His Honor the Chief Justice.’
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions. 
Chipman, C. J.
The Plaintiff’s declaration in this cause stated that the Defend­
ants on &c., at &c., seized, took and carried away certain Goods and 
Chattels, viz.: Ten joints of Timber, containing 100 sticks White 
Pine Timber, 100 sticks Red Pine Timber, and 100 sticks of other 
Timber, and converted and disposed of the same to their own use.
The Defendants pleaded the General Issue, and secondly, 
As to seizingr taking and carrying away three joints, containing 
59 sticks White Pine Timber, parcel of the Goods and Chattels in 
the first Count of the Declaration mentioned. James White and 
Andrew Garrison pleaded that at the time when &c., to wit:—on the 
14tli July, 3d Wm. 4th, a certain Writ commonly called a Writ 
of Replevin was issued out of the Supreme Court, &c., directed to 
the Sheriff of the City and County of Saint John by which Writ the 
King commanded the said Sheriff, that if George Woods should 
make him secure of prosecuting his complaint, and also of returning 
the Goods land Chattels, viz.—three joints of White Pine Timber, 
marked W X M, and containing 59 sticks, which William Turner 
had taken and unjustly detained &c. &o., that then the Goods and 
Chattels aforesaid to him the said George Woods without rlelpty he 
should catfee to be replevied, and that he should put by sureties and 
safe pledges the aforesaid William Turner, that lie should be before 
our Lord the King at Fredericton on the Saturday next after the 
second Tuesday in October, then next to answer to the said George 
Woods cf a plea wherefore he took the said Goods and Chattels, and 
them unjustly detained &c., which said Writ before the return 
thereof, viz., on the 24th July in the year last aforesaid, was direct­
ed to the said J. White, who then &c. was Sheriff of the said City 
and County of Saint John, to be executed &c., the plea then averred 
the giving ofthe replevin bond before the time when &c., and before 
the return of the Writ, viz., on the -said 24th July, and that the 
said George Woods made the said J. White, Slieriff&c., secure of 
prosecuting his complaint against the scM.'William Turner, 
and of returning the said Goods &c.:—and thereupon the said 
J. White delivered the said Writ to the said A. Garrison, to be exe­
cuted 
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cuted in due form of Law, which said Andrew Garrison, then &c. 
was Deputy of the said J. White &c. &c., and thereupon the said 
Andrew Garrison afterwards &c., to wit at &c. did peaceably and 
quietly seize and take the said Goods and Chattels named and di­
rected in the said Writ, which said Goods and Chattels just before 
the said seizure and taking thereof, and on the same day of such 
seizure had been in the possession of the said William Turner; 
but just before the said seizure and taking thereof had been taken 
by, and were at the time of the said seizure in the possession of the 
said Stephen Wiggins, who had then and there taken possession 
thereof by virtue of a sale from one Dibblee, who untruly pretended 
to be the owner of the said Goods, and the said Andrew Garrison 
being such Deputy &c. then and there replevied and delivered the 
said Goods &c. to the said George Woods, as by the said Writ the 
satid Sheriff was commanded, which said George Woods then and 
there took and carried away the same. The declaration then avers 
the return of the Writ by the said Sheriff, &c &c.
To this plea there is a general demurrer: and the question stated 
in argument on the demurrer by the Plaintiff was—that it appears 
by the plea that the writ of replevin was against William Turner, 
who ismo party to this suit, and that under such Writ the Defend­
ants took the Timber out of the possession of the Plaintiff, who it 
appears by the plea came to the possession thereof by a bona fide 
purchase from one Dibblee—and as there is no allegation in the plea 
that there was any fraud or connivance at fraud on the part of the 
said Plaintiff in his purchase, the Defendants had no legal right to 
take the Timber out of his possession under a writ of replevin against 
another party. The question was properly made to rest by each of 
the learned Counsel wlio argued this cause in the course of their 
respective arguments upon what is the exigency of the writ 
of replevin set forth in the plea for it was conceded on both 
sides and it cannot be denied that the Sheriff and his officer, who 
are not joined in the plea by the third Defendant, George Woods, 
were justified in having done what the writ commanded the Sheriff 
to do, and on the other hand are not justified but are wrongdoers 
and trespassers, if they have done what the Writ did not command 
the Sheriff to do. The words of the Writ according to the setting 
forth of the same in the plea are “ if George Woods shall make you 
secure of prosecuting his complaint and also of returning the Goods 
and Chattels, viz., three joints of White Pine Timber marked 
W X M, and containing 59 sticks, which William Turner hath 
taken and-unjustly detained as it is alleged, if a return thereof shall 
be adjudged that then the Goods and Chattels aforesaid to him the 
said George Woods without delay, you cause to be replevied and de­
livered.” It is contended on the part of the Defendants that the 
exigency of this writ is to replevy the articles named therein if they 
shall 
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shall be found within the Bailiwick of the Sheriff, and that the only- 
circumstance which the Sheriff need regard, is the identity of the 
articles which are specified and described in the writ. On the 
part of the Plaintiff it is contended, that there is a further essential 
condition contained in the writ which must occur in order to give 
the Sneriff authority, namely, that the specified articles shall be 
found in the possession of the party against whom the writ is sued 
out or in the words of the writ shall be “ detained” by such party. 
I am clearly of opinion that this latter is the true construction and 
exigency of the writ. The command of the writ is that the Sheriff 
do replevy the Goods which William Turner hath taken and un­
justly detained, the words of the writ must undoubtedly be so con­
strued as to give effect to the principles of Law applicable to the 
subject. Replevin is an action of a peculiar nature, and I find its 
peculiarities as derived from English authorities well condensed in 
Mr. Dane’s abridgment of American Law, vol. 5, p. 514: “ The 
“ action of replevin differs from all other actions in some material 
“points. 1. In other actions the party demandant is not put in 
“ possession of the thing demanded until after a trial and a decision 
“ in his favour. But in Replevin the Plaintiff is put in possession 
“ of the Chattels in dispute by the officer’s delivery before any 
“ trial, in fact in the first stage of the suit. Hence results, 
“ 2. Another material matter peculiar to this action, a return of 
“ the Chattels to the Defendant whenever in the course of the 
“ action he shews he is i< ititled to a returu; and it further results— 
“ 3. That the Defendant to have this return must in his pleadings 
“ claim a return in addition to the other matters he pleads. There- 
“ fore, 4. It follows in a manner peculiar to this action, that the 
“ Defendant is to many purposes an actor, and pleads and claims on 
“ two grounds ; he justifies the taking the Cattle damage fea- 
“ sant, for rent in arrear or for some other cause, and so far he 
“ strictly defends his conduct in the case, but when he claims a 
“ return of the Chattels to him, he acts on a general principle pecu- 
“ liar to replevin, the consequence of the delivery of the thing to the 
“ Plaintiff as above stated. In this part of the case the Defendant 
“ is an actor and takes the ground of a Plaintiff, as he undertakes 
“ to shew that he ought to recover back the personal property in 
“ dispute, and thence must make out a title to recover and have 
“ the thing delivered to him.” From the principle that in replevin 
the Defendant may claim a return of the Chattels replevied which 
return will be adjudged to him if he makes out his claim, it neces­
sarily follows, that the party from whose possession the Chattels 
are replevied, must be made the Defendant in the action ; for they 
are to be returned to the possession of the party from whom they 
are replevied, if the right be found for him. The detention of the 
Goods by the party against whom the action is brought and the writ
C is
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is sued out, is a circumstance equally essential with the taking of 
the goods by such party, to render this peculiar remedy applicable ; 
it would be palpable injustice to permit goods to be replevied from 
B, in an action brought, and under a writ sued out against A, in 
which action, B could net come in and assert his right to the goods 
found in his possession and taken therefrom by the officer, and 
have a return of the goods if he established his right thereto. The 
writ of replevin established by rule of this Court in Easter Term 
1810, under the Act of Assembly 50 Geo. 3, C. 21, appears to 
have been very carefully framed by the Judges of that day, and 
a primary object which they evidently had in view was to give the 
party against whom the writ is sued out, a day in Court, which lie 
had not under the former practice until a pluries wr't of replevin 
was issued; accordingly it was such former practice to string these 
writs, viz : the original or first writ, the alias and the pluries toge­
ther under one seal. The present writ it will be seen (upon an ex­
amination of it with reference to 2 Sellon’s Prac. Tit Replevin), is 
compounded of the command to the Sheriff to replevy and of the 
writ of pone the object of which writ of pone was to compel the 
Defendant named in the writ of replevin to appear and answer to 
the suit. Our writ of replevin, therefore, goes on to require the 
Sheriff, to put by sureties and safe pledges the Defendant named in 
the writ, that he be at Fredericton on the return of the writ to 
answer the Plaintiff of a plea wherefore he took the said Goods and 
Chattels, and them unjustly detained against gages and pledges. 
To fully effectuate this object the above mentioned rule of Court 
in case of the non-appearance of the Defendant at the return of the 
writ of replevin, goes on to authorise the Plaintiff to issue a capias 
against him, and to takejudgment by default, in case of non-appear­
ance to this capias, as in the case of Common process in otheractions. 
Ail these proceedings, and it may be added the Replevin Bond also, 
are evidently founded on the principle that the Defendant named 
in the writ of replevin, is the person from whom alone the goods 
are to be replevied, and who is to answer the Plaintiff for taking 
and detaining them, and to have a return of the goods if he shew 
himself entitled thereto. The converse follows, that if the goods are 
not found in the possession of the Defendant named in the writ, the 
writ is not applicable and cannot be executed. In this plea it is 
alleged that when the ‘officer sewed the goods under the writ of 
replevin, they were out of the possession of William Turner, the 
Defendant named in the writ, and in the possession of the present 
Plaintiff, Stephen Wiggins. This writ therefore was not applica­
ble and ought not to have been executed. It was conceded by the 
learned Counsel for the Defendant, that under the circumstances 
stated in this plea, replevin could not have been maintained against 
Stephen Wiggins, because he was not the taker of the goods, they 
having 
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having been delivered to him under a contract of sale and it 
being clear law that Replevin like Trespass lies only against 
the man who is actually or constructively the taker of the goods 
from the possession of the party who seeks to replevy them. Upon 
this principle; it was that Groves vs. Griffith cited at the bar was 
decided in this Court. And it is to be remarked that there is no 
allegation of fraud or other circumstance to make S. Vviggins a 
constructive taker of the goods. But if the proceedings set forth 
in this plea be justifiable, the present Plaintiff, Stephen Wiggins, 
is in a far worse plight than if he had been the taker, either actually 
or constructively of the goods, and replevin had been brought 
against him; in such an action he might have appeared and have as­
serted his right, and claimed a return of the goods, which he could not 
do in the action brought against William Turner, nor could he have 
stopped the proceedings of the Sheriff by claiming property and 
having the writ de propintate probanda, for it is the Defendant in 
the suit alone that can do this.—6 Bae. Abr. Tit. Replevin. 
The effect of the dictum of Lord Holt in Hallett vs. Brit. 
Cartliew, 380, urged by the learned Counsel for the Defendants, 
that the officer is justified in replevin because he is expressly com­
manded to take the goods in specie, must evidently depend upon 
what the Writ commands. I have" already stated that I think 
that the tenor of the command is to take the goods specified in the 
writ out of the possession of the Defendant named in the writ, and 
the officer will be justified in doing this although the property of the 
goods should be in another person.
It is not necessary for the decision of this question to advert to 
any other of the topics urged at the Bar.
I am of opinion that under the writ of replevin set forth in the 
plea which was sued out against William 1 urner, there was no 
authority given to. the Sheriff to replevy goods which, upon his own 
shewing in the allegations in the plea, were in the possession of 
Stephen Wiggins and out of the possession of William Turner, and 
for this reason there must be judgment for the Plaintiff.
WARD v. DOW.
Under a Writ of Inquiry the Jury gave no verdict. A second Writ was 
thereupon issued and damages assessed. Held regular.
Cleary, the Attorney for the Plaintiff, in last Hilary Vacation 
issued a Writ of Inquiry of Damages, returnable in Easter Term 
The Jury would not give a verdict for any thing in favor of the 
Plaintiff, and not being able to find for Defendant, were dismissed 
without giving a verdict. The Plaintiff’s Attorney, in Easter 
Vacation, issued another M7rit, and Damages were assessed at £20.
In 
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In Trinity Term last, Wilmot for Defendant, obtained a rule nisi 
to set aside the second Writ of Inquiry and Inquisitiou for irregu­
larity with Costs. The irregularity complained of was, that the 
second Writ of Inquiry was improperly issued without the leave of 
the Court having been first obtained. Berton for Plaintiff, showed 
cause in Michaelmas.
Per Curiam.
We think the Plaintiff has pursued the correct course, and that 
which was least expensive to the Defendant.
Rule discharged with costs.
REX v. STERLING.
A Return by Commissioners of Highways is not in itself a laying out 
of a Road within the meaning of 50 G. 3, C. 6,—the Road must be laid out 
before it is recorded.
Indictment for obstructing a Highway. Tried before Botsford, J. 
in Michaelmas Term.
On the part of the Prosecution, a Record of a Road made by 
the Commissioners of Highways of the Parish of Saint Mary’s, in 
York County, was put in evidence. The road never had been 
marked or laid out on the land, and never had been opened. Se­
veral points were taken by the Solicitor General for the De­
fendant :
1st. That it was necessary to shew not only the Record of the 
Road, but that the previous steps required by the Act, in altering 
a road, had been taken by the Commissioners, and that the Re 
cord could not be considered even prima facie evidence of the cor­
rectness of the preliminary proceedings.
2d. That the road never had been laid out and opened, and 
therefore could not be considered a highway.
3d. That before the road could be opened it was necessary that 
the compensation awarded to the owners of the land should be first 
paid.
The Points were reserved, and a Verdict entered against the 
Defendant.
The Solicitor General having obtained a rule nisi to enter a 
Verdict for the Defendant upon the Points above stated.
D. L. Robinson at this Term shewed cause.
The Court in giving Judgment, considered only the second 
point.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is an Inlictment for obstructing a Highway. The ob­
struction must be shewn upon a Highway It is not necessary to 
remark 
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remark on the doctrine of usor. It is quite sufficient to refer to 
the Act of Assembly, 50 Geo. 3, c. 6, under which these proceed­
ings were had. This return is not sufficient evidence of a laying 
out. It is not necessary for the decision of this case to prescribe 
what would be sufficient, but in the present case the return or re­
cord does not specify or particularly define through what part of 
the lands the road was intended to pass ; it is so vague that the 
intended course cannot be ascertained,—one expression is “run­
ning from point to point, as straight as the nature of the ground 
will permit.” The strong inclination of my opinion is, that in or­
der to make a good laying out under this Act. there must be some 
marking out upon the land—this may also be designated upon a 
plan. The return is only the record of the road as actually laid 
out, and the tenth section of tlie Act clearly shews that the road 
must be “ laid out,” before it is entered in writing or recorded.
Botsford, J. :
In order to sustain this Indictment, it is necessay to establish 
the locus in quo to be a highway. The Act of Assembly, before 
referred to, prescribes the course the Commissioners are to pursue ; 
their duty is plain, and following the directions of the x\ct there 
can be no difficulty; but here, instead of doing so, from some fear 
of the correctness of their own acts, as appeared by the evidence 
of one of the Commissioners, they have neglected to open the road, 
and have instituted this proceeding to test their legality. Looking 
to the return, can any person point out the exact course of the road ? 
If evidence had been adduced of the actual laying out of the road, 
I am not prepared to say the return, vague as it is, would not be 
sufficient evidence. Tne return or record is not to be made until 
the road is actually laid out.
Carter, J.:
The locus in quo must be shewn to be a highway. Even grant­
ing that the return is correctly made, it must be so definite that 
any person may go upon the land and point out the road. Here 
two persons may go from one terminus to the other by different 
courses.
Parker, J.:
The only question I will consider here is—Is the road laid out ? 
What, in the first place, is a road ? It is a piece of ground stretch­
ing from point to point and of a certain specified width. The re­
cord is not the laying out the road, but the evidence of it. Then 
is it to be evidence of an act or of an intention only ? Who can, 
by the record before the Court, point out the road ?
Verdict entered for the Defendant.
D. L. Robinson for Prosecution.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.
DICKINSON
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DICKINSON, v. BALLOCH.
Where in Assumpsit the Verdict is under £5, the Verdict is considered 
prima facie the amount of the demand for which the Plaintiff brought hi s 
action.
Assumpsit. Tried before the Chief Justice, at the Carleton Cir­
cuit, in September last.
The Declaration contained only the Common Counts.—- 
Plea—the General Issue with notice of set off.
The Plaintiff’s demand was for a large quantity of timber, for 
work and labour in driving that timber, and there were also sundry 
small items of account. By an agreement put in evidence by the 
Plaintiff, it appeared that Defendant was to make timber in the 
Woods, and Plaintiff to haul it, and have one half for so doing— 
but the first half that was harried was to belong to Defendant, and 
he was also to have the refusal of the remainder. By the same 
agreement it appeared that Defendant had paid stumpage on the 
timber, amounting to £25, one half of which was to be repaid to 
him by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had received 
much more than his half, and sought to recover payment for the 
remainder—the -evidence on this point was vague, and it evidently 
was not considered sufficient by the Jury. There was evidence 
also of work and labour, and it was questionable if the Jury did 
not set off the £12 10s. tonnage money, against that—the amount, 
if sufficiently proved, being about that sum. Two items, amount­
ing to 25s., were clearly proved. No evidence was offered on the 
part of the Defendant. The Jury found a general Verdict for the 
Plaintiff for 25s.
In last Michaelmas Term, Berton and Wilmot for the Defend­
ant, obtained a rule nisi to enter a suggestion to deprive the Plain­
tiff of costs ; they urged that the 10th Section of the Provincial Act 
of 50 G. 3, c. 17, was a literal copy from the London Chart of Re­
quests Act; and that by the decisions under that Statute, the Ver- 
di< t must be considered the amount in demand. They cited 2 
Tidd’s Prac. 994, 4 Burr. 2133, 8 East. 238,316, 1 M. & S. 393, 
6 Taun. 452, 1 Taun. 397, 2 Cromp. & Jer. 505, 4 B. & C. 769, 
1 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 580, 2d do. 58.
The Solicitor General at this Term shewed cause, and contended 
that this action did not come within the intent of the Act of 
Assembly. It was for a large and important demand, and the 
Verdict was a general one, and it could not be said that it was 
upon any particular item of the account, and further that the sum 
of £12 10s. mentioned in the agreement must be considered in the 
nature of a set off; he urged that had the Verdict been for the 
Defendant, the learned Judge would not have certified to give 
double costs, and that shewed the cause was not within the Act. 
The action could not have been tried in a Justice’s Court.
Chipman,
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Chipman, Chief Justice:
This action was for goods sold—the Verdict was for 25s. The 
cause involved matters of a large amount; there were two small 
articles proved distinct therefrom, which made exactly the amount 
of the Verdict. It has been contended on the part of the Plaintiff 
that the real matter or cause of action should be considered. The 
law is clearly settled that the sum recovered by the Verdict is to 
be considered the debt due—4 B. & C. 769, 2 C. & J. 505, 1 
Dowl. Pr. Ca. 580, 603, 704, all settle the same point—-nrima 
facia the Verdict is evidence of the debt due. In 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 
58, the Plaintiff failed in proving part of his demand from the ab­
sence of a witness, the Verdict being under £5, a suggestion 
was entered. The Law, as collected from these cases, is, that the 
amount of the Verdict is the sum in demand, and the onus’is on 
the Plaintiff to shew circumstances to take the case out of the 
rule. Here it is evident that but for the two items, before men­
tioned, the Verdict would have been for the Defendant.
Botsfokd, J.:
I entertained doubts upon a case in 8 E. 346, where Lord Ellen- 
borough remarked upon the Plaintiff having a reasonable cause to 
bring his action for a larger sum than <£5. But the Law is clearly 
settled by later decisions. The present case is stronger than 1 M. 
& S. 391, where failing on the special counts, Plaintiff recovered 
a small Verdict on a balance of large accounts. 6 Taun. 452, is 
clear also as to the Verdict being the amount of the debt.
Carter, J :
Looking at the circumstances and applying the Verdict to the 
evidence, little. doubt can be entertained tnat the Verdict in this 
case was for the two small items ; but even supposing it were other­
wise—that the Verdict was upon the larger claim, the case in 2 
Dowl. Pr. Ca. 58, and other cases, make it imperative to enter 
the suggestion. I cannot draw a distinction between this and the 
case I have mentioned.
Parker, J.:
I have looked at all the cases. There appears a perfect unani­
mity in Westminster Hall upon the subject. The Verdict s the 
general rule, not the exception. The Judge’s notes shew there 
was doubtful evidence of the larger demands, and clear proof of the 
small—and so His Honor charged the Jury. The Court must be 
satisfied that the Jury found upon the large demaud and not on 
the small, or the suggestion must be entered.
Rule made absolute.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
Berton and Wilmot for Defendant.
FOULIS
25 CASES in HILARY TERM,
FOULIS v. KINOTAR AND ANOTHER.
Arbitrators are competent to determine matters of law.
The Court will not entertain an application to disturb an award if the ap­
plicant be in laches.
Action of Assumpsit.—Referred by Rule of Court. Judgment to 
be entered on award as on the Verdict of a Jury.
The award was made on the 8th July—the first day of Trinity 
Term, 1834. In Michaelmas Term, Wright for Defendant, ob­
tained a rule nisi to set aside the award upon two grounds:
1st. The award was not conclusive.
2d. The improper conduct of the Plaintiff’s Attorney.
Cause was shewn at this Term by N. Parker for Plaintiff, and 
the Solicitor General was heard in reply.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The first point depends upon the circumstance of the Arbitrators 
having thrown out of their consideration two articles, a Cylinder 
Bottom on the one side, and certain Boiler Plate on the other, 
which they directed to be exchanged. JSTow if the.Arbitrators un­
dertook to determine the Law upon this subject, it was competent 
for them to do so, and the Court will not interfere ; but on this 
point, even if there were grounds for the application, the Defend­
ants are out of time. The award was made u.n the Sth July—the 
Defendants were aware of it before the 11 th, and if they did not 
know, had full opportunity to inform themselves of the grounds of 
it; they suffered the Trinity Term to pass, and on the 22d day of 
July gave notice of motion. The same rule as to time must pre­
vail in this case, as in motions for new trials—the award being en­
tered on the postea as the Verdict of a Jury.
As to the second point. It is stated there was misconduct on 
the part of the Plaintiffs Attorney. To support that, it should be 
clearly shewn that there was a breach of faith in entering up the 
Judgment; but the paper to-support that contains no condition 
precedent to, but is predicated upon the award. It expressly states 
the award, and merely guarantees the return of one article when 
the other shall be restored. There is not the slightest ground of 
imputation against the Attorney.
Botsford, J.:
The award is final, so far as the Arbitratorshave considered the 
accounts. It appears that the two articles they directed to be in­
terchanged, they considered not matters of account, and as they 
could determine Law as well as fact, the Court will not decide that 
they have not done right; but at any rate the Defendants are 
guilty of laches. On the 11 th July, they expressed that the award 
would be paid with the costs, although they were dissatisfied. The 
last
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last day of Trinity Term was the 19th; and not until the 22d, did 
the Defendants intimate their intention to question the award. On 
the 1st of August notice of taxation of costs was given, and 
judgment was signed on the Sth August. The Defendants should 
not have allowed the Term to pass.
As to the second point, no imputation can be cast upon the 
Attorney ; he has acted correctly and with diligence.
Carter, J.:
The award is final. It awards <£11 10s. lOd. to be paid to the 
Plaintiff, and the other articles are not considered.—As a matter 
of law the arbitrators determined the two articles were not in­
cluded in the reference, and did not consider them in making up 
the amounts of the accounts ; but under the circumstances merely 
directed an exchange.
The Attorney appears to have acted properly and honorably, 
and the Defendants are clearly in laches.
Parker, J.:
Concurred. The action was for goods sold and delivered. The 
arbitrators were to consider what goods were so ; they determined 
that the two articles could not be so considered. Some discrepan­
cies appeared in the affidavits, which however could be reconciled ; 
but it was worthy of remark, that there were in this case two De­
fendants, and two Attornies jointly acting for them—all of whom 
acted in the matter of the reference, and yet the affidavit of only 
one had been offered : the Court should have had affidavits from 
all. As to the conduct of the Attorney—when the term improper 
was applied, there should have been something to found it upon : 
there was clearly nothing. The Defendants were in laches, in not 
having moved in Trinity Term.
Rule discharged with costs.
N. Parker for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and Wright for Defendants.
HEANEY v. LYNN.
A record produced in evidence cannot be questioned at Nisi Prius.
After an acquittal, no copy of an indictment should be furnished without 
the order of the Judge or the fiat of the Attorney General.
Action for a malicious prosecution for felony. Tried before 
Botsford, J. at the Northumberland Circuit, in September last, 
when the Plaintiff was nonsuited. The question arose upon 
the production of the record of acquittal of the Plaintiff.
An order of the Judge, presiding at the Court of Oyer and Ter­
miner, having been obtained, the Clerk of that Court was sworn as a 
D witness,
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witness, and produced the record, signed by himself, as the officer 
of the Court. J. A. Street for Defendant, inquired from whence 
he obtained the record, by whom was it made up, and had it been 
compared with the indictment, &c. Berton for Plaintiff, objected 
to any question being put, and to the admission of any parol evi­
dence, to affect or impugn the record. The objection was over­
ruled, and it was stated by the witness that the record was made 
up by Mr. Harding, the Plaintiff’s Attorney, who filed it with 
him, and that he had not examined its contents with the original 
papers. Two objections were then taken :
1st. That even if the record were correct, an order of the Su­
preme Court should be obtained for its production, without which 
it could not be received in evidence.
2d. That it could not be considered a record of the proceedings 
in the criminal prosecution.
Berton contra. As to first objection, cited Leggatt v. Tollervey, 
14 East. 302, and urged that the record being properly authenti­
cated could not be questioned.
The learned Judge supported the objection, and ordered a non­
suit.
In Michaelmas Term, a rule nisi was obtained to set aside the 
nonsuit and grant a new trial, upon the grounds taken at Nisi 
Prius.
J. A. Street at this Term shewed cause.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is an action for a malicious prosecution for felony, in 
which the Plaintiff was acquitted. A record was offered in evi­
dence, produced by the Deputy Clerk, in whose custody it was. I 
am of opinion, that the record, however improperly made up, could 
not be questioned at the trial. The rule as to affording copies of 
records in such cases was made by the twelve Judges, and is a 
wholesome restraint upon actions which might tend to prevent the 
prosecution of public offenders. The Clerk acted improperly in 
authenticating a record made up by the Attorney for the purposes 
of this action. It is upon his signature the record depends; and a 
record produced from his custody, and with his signature, cannot 
be questioned. A copy of the indictment should not have been 
furnished except upon the order of the Judge, and 1 think the ap­
plication for such an order should have been made in open Court— 
nevertheless these matters cannot be looked into at Nisi Prius. 
The case of Leggatt v. Tollervey is conclusive.
Botsford, J.:
There should be an application in Court, when the circumstances 
are fresh in the mind of the Judge, for a copy of the indictment; 
but I am now satisfied that the record should not have been refused.
Carter,
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Carter, J. :
However culpable the Clerk of the Court may have been in pro­
ducing the record, it should have been received, and could not be 
questioned when produced.
Parker, J.:
The same case as this came up in Leggatt v. Tollervey, and 
clearly settles that the record cannot be refused. No copy of the 
indictment should have been furnished without the order of the 
Judge or the fiat of the Attorney General.
Berton and Harding for Plaintiff.
Street and Kerr for Defendant.
THE EXECUTORS OF GROSVENOR v. AGNEW.
If an executor declares on promises to himself, he is liable for costs.
Assumpsit. The declaration in this cause contained counts 
on promises to testator, and also on promises to the executors, 
and a count on an account stated with the Plaintiffs as executors. 
The Plaintiffs were nonsuited. The Master having refused to 
tax the Defendant’s costs—1st. Because as executors they were 
not liable to pay costs, and 2d. Because he was a party Plaintiff. 
■—Berton, at this Term, moved for a rule ni&i, to allow the Defend­
ant her costs, and that the same should be taxed by one of the 
Judges of the Court; and cited 2 Chit. Pl. 102, 110, and 9 Bar. 
& Cres. 666, Dowbiggin JdiiixJU Harrison.—Robinson, for Plain­
tiffs, shewed cause, and urged that the case cited in Bar & Cres. 
was directly contrary to all the other cases.
Per Curiam.
This case is precisely the same as the one cited at the bar, and 
as the latest decision, the Court must be bound by it.
Carter, J.:
Mentioned, that since the case of Dowbiggin f. Harrison, it was 
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Note.—In this Term there were present only His Honor the Chief Justice 
and Mr. Justice Carter.
WILMOT v. CORNWELL AND BABINO.
Judgment against two Defendants; one applied for relief under insolvent 
acts. The name of the other Defendant was not stated in the title of the 
affidavit; the affidavit was received.
An applicant for relief under insolvent acts, must satisfactorily account 
for all property he may appear to have possessed.
The Solicitor General, on a former day in this Term, applied on 
hehalf of the Defendant Cornwell, a confined debtor in Westmor­
land, for relief under the Act of Assembly, 1 W. 4, c. 43 ; the affi­
davit of the Defendant stated his inability to support himself, and 
that he had no property; it was entitled “ Wilmot v Cornwell.”
Berton contra, produced, affidavits of Plaintiff and others, wifi ch 
contradicted the affidavit of the applicant in several particulars, 
but did not shew him to be possessed of property or means of sup­
port—shewing also that Babino was a co-Defendant, and con­
tended—1st. That the applicant’s affidavits were improperly en­
titled, Babino not being named a Defendant therein. 2d. That 
the applicant’s statements being contradicted in several instances, 
were unworthy of credit, and could not satisfy the Court.
Per Curiam.
We are of opinion that although the Acts of Assembly contem­
plate the application being made in the suit, yet upon the whole, it 
may be considered a distinct judicial proceeding—one which may 
be taken not only in the Court wherein the suit is or has been pro­
secuted, but before Justices of other Courts; and it would therefore 
perhaps be giving the Acts too strict a construction to require 
greater correctness in the titles of the affidavits or application. We 
are less inclined to dismiss the application on the first ground of 
objection, as the second is so material that it cannot be got over. 
The law provides, that it must appear to the Court that the person 
has no property or means of support. The Defendant’s affidavit 
taken
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taken alone, is exceedingly loose ; no schedule of property is an­
nexed, although one is spoken of in the affidavit—nor is the pro­
perty mentioned therein sufficiently accounted for ; and the state­
ments of the Defendant are so contradicted by the affidavits pro­
duced on the other side, and so contaminated, that we can give no 
credence to them, unsupported as they are by other testimony. It 
is sufficient therefore to say that we are not satisfied, upon the 
affidavits, that the party is entitled to relief; he must satisfactorily 
account for all property he may appear to have possessed.
Application dismissed. 
Berton for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.
THE EXECUTORS OF ANDREWS v. CLARKE.
L Defendant charged in execution, discharged by one of several Plain­
tiffs, cannot be arrested a second time at the instance of a co- Plaintiff.
S. G. Andrews, one of the PXintiffs, gave notice to Defendant 
of an application for leave to issue a ca sa to arrest Defendant a 
second time, on the ground that he had been discharged from arrest 
under a former execution by fraud and collusion with DeVeber, a 
co-executor and Plaintiff;—the notice was subscribed S. G. An­
drews, acting executor.
Wilmot moved for rule nisi, which was obtained by consent of 
Defendant’s Counsel—who stated his reason for such consent, that 
the Defendant had been put to expense in preparing affidavits to 
resist the application and shew the merits of the case, which ex­
penses he could not recover, under the practice of the Court, unless 
the rule should be granted; the cause was therefore entered in the 
special paper of the Term.
On hearing a part of the affidavits in support of the rule, the 
Court determined, that the Defendant having been discharged by 
one Plaintiff, could not be again arrested at the instance of another. 
They allowed the Defendant’s affidavits to be filed in answer to 
those produced on the other side, and discharged the rule with 




A peremptory undertaking will not be discharged on account of the De­
fendant having gone out of the jurisdiction.
Wilmot moved to discharge a peremptory undertaking to try at 
this Term, and for leave to discontinue without costs, on an affidavil 
which 
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which stated that Defendant had been seen by deponent in the 
United States, where he was employed in digging a cellar ; that 
he told deponent he did not intend to return to this country; and 
deponent believed at the time he went away from the Province 
he was not worth much property.
Berton contra, contended that the affidavit was insufficient even 
to enlarge the peremptory undertaking; the absence of the De­
fendant was a circumstance of no importance, and no evidence of 
insolvency had been offered.
Per Curiam.
The Plaintiff has shewn no cause to enlarge the peremptory un­
dertaking ; the Defendant may have left property in the Province; 
or if not, a judgment against him can follow him to the place of 
his abode.
Rule absolute for judgment for Defendant.
ABBOTT v. LEDDEN.
A demand of security for costs was sent by post. Held sufficient service.
Berton moved for security for costs on an affidavit shewing that 
Plaintiff was out of the jurisdiction of the Court; and an affidavit 
of Defendant’s Attorney, stating that he had put in the Post Office 
at Newcastle, a letter addressed to the Plaintiff’s Attorney at 
Saint John, containing a demand of security and notice of this 
motion.
The Court doubted if posting a letter were a sufficient service of 
notice on the opposite Attorney, in order to obtain a stay of pro­
ceedings ; but afterwards on the authority of Aldred v. Hicks, 5 
Taun. 186, granted rule nisi, with stay of proceedings.
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PETER FISHER v. BRYCE JEWETT AND JOSHUA 
JEWETT.
When a Plaintiff has no right in point of Law to recover, a nonsuit will 
be ordered, although the objection appear upon the Record.
A Negotiable Note is such a Contract as an Infant may in Law ratify 
and confirm when lie arrives at full age, and thereby bind himself to perform.
Assumpsit on a Promissory Note, dated 22d January, 1825, for 
£22, payable in June following ; drawn by Defendants in favor of 
James Dingee, and by him indorsed to Plaintiff. Joshua Jewett 
was not served with Process. Bryce Jewett pleaded—1st. Non- 
assumpsit, 2d. Infancy, 3d. Statute of Limitations. The Plaintiff 
replied to second plea—That the Defendant before the commence­
ment of this suit, to wit, on the 1st day of December, A. D. 1830, 
attained the age of 21 years, and afterwards and before the com­
mencement, &c., to wit, on the 1st day of July, A. D. 1831, under­
took and promised, &c. ; and to the third plea—Assumpsit infra 
sex annos :—Rejoinder to Replication to second plea—That De­
fendant did not, after he attained the age of 21 years, undertake, 
&c. The cause was tried before Chipman, Chief Justice, at Bar 
in last Michaelmas Term. It was >roved on the part of the Plain­
tiff, that in the winter of 1831—2, Defendant acknowledged that 
he had drawn the Note, but stated that he was under age, and 
therefore not legally liable to pay it, but he was satisfied his father 
(the other Defendant) had the cattle, (in payment for which the 
Note was given,) and he felt bound to pay it; that he would pay 
the note as soon as the timber was down—perhaps by the 1 st day 
of July, it might be a month or two later for part of it. It was 
proved that he expressly and positively promised to pay the whole 
in the course of the season.
A nonsuit was moved for by Wilmot for Defendant, on the 
ground that an Infant can in no case be liable to the indorser of a 
note; in support of which doctrine, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 628, Tlirupp v.
E Fielder, 
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Fielder, 5 Esp. 102, Harmer v. Killing, Chitty on Bills, 16, 17, 
Trueman v. Hurst, 1 T. R. 40, 2 Barn. & Cres. 824, Thornton v. 
Tllingworth, 4 D. & R. 545, and 8 East. 330, were cited.
Fisher contra, cited 4 Esp. N. P. C. 188, Roscoe’s Ev. 256, 
246, 2 Saun. Pl. & Ev. 581.
The Chief Justice refused the nonsuit, but gave leave to move 
the Court in Banc to enter a nonsuit. A verdict was thereupon 
taken by consent for the face of the Note, £22, without interest, 
subject to the opinion of the Court, on the motion and under the 
pleadings in the cause.
A rule nisi having been obtained to set aside the Verdict and 
enter a nonsuit, the cause was argued in Hilary, and stood over 
for consideration until this Term.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
At the trial of this cause, a doubt was started—whether as the 
question might have been raised upon the Record, it should be en­
tertained on a motion for a nonsuit; but the practice is so clearly 
settled, that when the Plaintiff has no right in point of Law to re­
cover, a nonsuit will be ordered, although the objection appear 
upon the Record, that I merely advert to this doubt for the pur­
pose of disposing of it.—See 2 Tidd’s Prac. 267, (3d Ed.) 1 
Camp. 256.
The grand question which this case presents is this—Whether a 
negotiate Note made by an Infant, is such a contract as the In­
fant may in Law ratify and confirm when he arrives at full age, 
and thereby bind himself to perform; for the promise made in this 
case at full age was distinct and express, and so found by the 
Jury.
There is much vagueness and confusion in the Books in the use 
of the terms void and voidable, as applied to the contracts of In­
fants but the true character of such contracts may nevertheless 
be ascertained with sufficient precision :—thus Per Curiam, in 
Holt v. Ward, Strange 938, (1731) “The contract of an Infant 
for necessaries will bind him as necessary to his preservation ; in 
such case a single bill will bind him, though a bond with a penalty 
shall not. WTien the contract may be for the benefit of the Infant, 
or to his prejudice, the Law so far protects him as to give him an 
opportunity to consider it when he comes of age, and it is void or 
voidable at his election ; but though the Infant lias this privilege, 
yet the party with whom he contracts has not—he is bound at all 
events.” And
Per Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 
Rep. 511, “ Some contracts of Infants even by deed shall bind 
them. Some are merely void, viz. such as the Court can pro­
nounce to be to their prejudice; others, and the most numerous 
class. 
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class, of a more uncertain nature as to benefit or prejudice, are 
voidable only ; and it is in the election of the Infant to confirm 
them or not.”
In Cookshot v. Bennett, 2 T. R. 766, it was said, per Ashhurst, 
J. “ This is not like a security given by an Infant which is only 
voidable, for that may be revived by a promise aftei lie comes of 
age. In such case, he is bound in equity and in conscience to 
discharge the debt, though the Law would not compel him to do 
so; but he may waive the privilege of infancy, which the Law 
gives him, for the purpose of securing him against the impositions 
of designing persons; and if he choose to waive his privilege, 
the subsequent promise will operate upon the preceding consi­
deration.”
Lord Chief Justice Gibbs said, in Bruce v. Warwick, in error, 
6 Taun. 118, “ The Court are all of opinion that the judgment of 
B. R. is perfectly right. It has been urged that it is incumbent 
on the Defendant in error to shew that an Infant can enter into a 
trading contract; the general Law is, that the contract of an In­
fant may be avoided or not, at his own option. We are of opinion, 
that this is in the same case, as other contracts made by an Infant, 
which he may either avoid or enforce at his pleasure.” And in 
Bacon’s Abridgment, 354, it is laid down “ that the contract of 
an Infant not absolutely void, but only voidable at his own elec­
tion, is a doctrine now settled and established.”
The general rule then, without encumbering one’s self with the 
terms void and voidable, clearly is, that it shall be in the election 
of an Infant, when he arrives at full age, whether to affirm a con­
tract made by him during his infancy or not.
If at full age he does affirm and ratify the contract, he is bound 
by it.
In Southerton v. Whitlock, Strange 690, before Raymond, Ch. 
J., it was held that if goods which are not necessaries, are delivered 
to an Infant, who after full age rat’fies the contract, by a promise 
to pay, he is bound ; and he left it to the Jury whether there was 
any confirmation of the contract at full age.
In 2 Atk. 34, Lord Hardwick, Ch. J. said,—“ If an Infant 
takes up goods before he comes of age, and gives a note for it 
after he is of age, if there is no fraudr«it is good at Lawand 
by the same, in Smith v. Trench, ibid 245,—“ If an Infant who 
contracts a debt during his minority, shews his consent to it by 
confirming it after he comes of age, it shall effectually bind him, 
though it was voidable at his election.”
There a^e many other authorities to the same effect, and as a 
general rule, it is unquestionable, that a promise made by an In­
fant after he comes of age, will bind him to the performance of a 
contract, made by him, during his minority.
To
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To these general rules there are nevertheless some exceptions: 
Thus it is held that an Infant cannot bind himself even for neces­
saries by an obligation with a penalty, and that he cannot bind 
himself for payment of interest, and an obligation under a penalty 
and a contract for payment ot interest are held to be, on the face 
of them, so clearly prejudicial to an Infant, that they cannot be 
set up by a promise at full age.
In Co. Lit. 172, the distinction is taken that an Infant may 
bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, neces­
sary physic, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good 
teaching and instruction whereby he may profit himself afterwards ; 
but if he bind himself in an obligation, or other writing with a 
penalty for the payment of any of them, that obligation shall not 
bind him.
Fisher v. Mowbray, 6 East. 330, was an action of Debt on Bend, 
plea Infancy. Replication Setting forth condition of Bond, inter 
alia, for payment of interest. Demurrer and Joinder. Lord El- 
lenborough, Ch. J. said—“This goes beyond all the other autho­
rities m charging the Infant with interest, and this objection goes 
not only to the quantum of damages, but to avoid the whole secu­
rity ; for the judgment must be for the sum due on the Bond, and 
part of that sum is due for interest, for which an Infant cannot 
give security.”
In Baylis v. Dineley, 3 M. & S. 477, Lord Ellenborough said— 
“ It is clear upon the face of the instrument, that it is to the pre­
judice of the Infant, for it is an obligation with a penalty and for 
the payment of interest.”
But I do not find any decided case, or even any dictum, that an 
instrument, merely because it is by the commercial law negotiable, 
is on the face oi it so prejudicial to an Infant, as not to admit of 
confirmation when he comes of age ; and if such had been the 
Law, it is most extraordinary, that in the universal prevalence of 
such ii istruments in modern times, there should not have been an 
adjudged case to this effect; the authority of the most approved 
writers on the Law of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes is 
directly in favor of such contracts, falling within the general rule 
and adinitting of such confirmation.
The drawing, indorsing or accepting Bills by an Infant, is voida­
ble only, not void ; and if he ratify the act after he comes of age, 
it will bind him. Bayley on Bills, (Sth Ed.) 45, citing Gibbs v. 
Merill, 3 Taun. 307, and in Chitty on Bills, (8th Ed.) 23—“ As 
the contract of an Infant is only voidable, and not absolutely void, 
he may, by a promise to pay the Bill made after he attains full 
age, and before action, (2 B. & C 824,) render it as operative 
against him, as if he had been of age at the time it was made.” 
(Taylor P. Croker, 4 Esp. R. 187.)
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The dicta of Text writers such as those which 1 have quoted, 
are at the least, good evidence of what are the received rules of 
Law on the subject of which we are treating.
In Taylor v Croker, Lord Ellenborough applied the general 
rule of Infants confirming contracts, after they became of age, to 
a Bill of Exchange.
And in another late case, to which I shall presently more parti­
cularly advert, (2 B. & C. 824,) although the Judges in terms 
considered all contracts made by Infants for purposes of trade as 
absolutely void, and not merely voidable, yet they recognized the 
doctrine of the Infant when at full age, binding himself to the per­
formance of such contracts.
I am therefore of opinion, that a negotiable instrument made by 
an Infant, is not by Law distinguished from other contracts, which 
may be confirmed by him after he arrives at full age, and be there­
by rendered binding upon him ; and this being a contract not 
made under seal, a verbal confirmation is of as high authority in 
the contemplation of the Law as a confirmation in writing, in cases 
where a written promise is not expressly required by Statute ; 
and by a late Statute in England, (9 G. 4, c. 14, s. 5,) indeed, 
confirmations after full age, of promises made by Infants, must be 
in writing.
Having come to this conclusion on the general question, I will 
only add with regard to the particular circumstances of the present 
case, that I have not found in the English books any authority for 
holding, that a contract of suretyship is distinguishable from the 
general run of contracts made by an Infant, and is incapable of 
being confirmed at full age. The general rule is, and I think it 
just and reasonable, that the contracts of Infants should be deemed 
capable of being confirmed when they arrive at full age ; and I 
should not be disposed to limit the operation of this rule beyond 
what decided cases of binding authority oblige me to do.
It was argued by the learned Counsel for the Defendant, that 
the legal effect of the Note was to bear interest from the time 
when it became payable, and therefore according to Fisher v. 
Mowbray, 8 E. 330, it was utterly void against the Infant De­
fendant, and would not be made valid by a promise at full age ; 
but there is a clear distinction between cases, where there is an 
express undertaking to pay interest on the face of a written instru­
ment, and where it is only allowed by the usage of trade, as in the 
present instance. In the latter, it constitutes no part of the debt 
or contract, but is in the nature of damages which a Jury may al­
low or not, according to the circumstances of the case. Interest 
cannot be added to the principal sum due on a Bill of Exchange, 
so as to constitute a good petitioning Creditor’s debt, unless inter­
est be specially made payable on the face of the Bill: 2 B. & A. 
305, 
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305, Cameron v. Smith, and in 10 Bing 257, it is said, “ A Plain­
tiff cannot arrest for interest, unless reserved by the Bill.”
In the present case, therefore, as there is not an express under­
taking on the face of the Note to pay interest, it does not fall with­
in the range of the case of Fisher v. Mowbray, or Baylis v. Dine- 
ley, which I have referred tq, and it is to be remembered that at 
the trial, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff very discreetly 
waived all claim to interest, and took his verdict for the principal 
only.
There is still another point, on which, from the impression of the 
Judges, in Mountain v. Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 824, I at first en­
tertained some doubt, viz. whether the distinction should not have 
been founded on the special promise after the Defendant became 
of age. In that case, Bailey, J. said,—“ In the case of an Infant, 
a contract made for goods for the purposes of trade is absolutely 
void, and not voidable only ; the law considers it against good po­
licy that he should be allowed to bind himself by such contracts. If 
he make a promise after he come of age, that binds him on the 
ground of his taking upon himself a new liability, upon a moral 
consideration existing before ; it does not make it a legal debt from 
the time of making the bargain.” And per Holroyd, J.—“ The 
new promise is the sole ground of action, and not the renewal of 
the old one.” And per Littledale, J.—“ The contract of an In­
fant under such circumstances as the present, being void and not 
voidable, the promise in this case did not prove that any legal 
cause of action existed at the time when the action was com­
menced ; but infancy is a personal privilege, which the Infant may 
or may not set up, in answer to an action brought upon a contract 
made during his infancy. The constant course and settled rule 
therefore seems to be, to declare on the original contract, and if 
the Defendant pleads infancy, to state the promise made at full age 
in the replication; or if the Defendant gives infancy in evidence 
under the general issue, to give the subsequent promise in evidence ; 
and I again see no ground for a distinction in this respect, between 
negotiable instruments, and other parol contracts.” The only 
point decided in Mounten v. Illingworth, was, that the confirma­
tory promise after full age, must be made before the commence­
ment of the action.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the rule for entering a 
nonsuit must be discharged.
Botsford, J. :
I concur in opinion with his Honor the Chief Justice.
The question, whether the contract of an Infant is void or only 
voidable, must depend upon the nature and circumstances of the 
case, and in many instances must remain in doubt and uncertainty, 
until 
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until the Court shall have decided whether it he one of benefit or 
prejudice to his interest—a rule so variable may in some measure 
account for the conflicting decisions in the books, and may have 
led to that general position, that the deeds of Infants are not void, 
but only voidable, and will admit of subsequent confirmation by 
them. Lord Hardwicke- held in Harvey v. Ashby, 3 Atk. 607, 
that where an agreement appears upon the face of it to be preju­
dicial to an Infant, it is void ; but if for his advantage, then voida­
ble only. In Zooch v. Parsons, Lord Raymond’s Rep. 818, the 
semblance of benefit to the Infant was made the ground of Lord 
Mansfield’s decision, by which the surrender of a Mortgage by an 
Infant was Held to be voidable only, contrary to the opinion of the 
Court in Thomson «>. Leach, 3 Mod. 300, which made the surren­
der of an Infant by deed absolutely void. It was this rule by 
which the case of Keans v. Boycot, 2 II. Bl. 511, and Warwick v. 
Bruce, 2 M. and Sei. 205, were decided.
In looking to the facts and circumstances of the case now before 
the Court, and supposing the contract to be one rather of prejudice 
than benefit to the Infant, I had great doubt whether the present 
action could be sustained, but these doubts have been removed by 
the case of Bishop v. Chamber, in 3 Car and Payne 55, which I 
consider much in point. The Law seems settled that Courts will 
support actions against Infants, if they confirm their contracts after 
they come of age, (except in the few cases of contracts with pe­
nalties, for interest, &c.) as already mentioned.
I have considered all the cases with attention, and am of opinion 
that the rule should be discharged.
Carter, J.:
I am also of opinion that the rule for a nonsuit in this case should 
be discharged.
I shall not take up time unnecessarily, by reviewing all the cases 
on this point, after they have been so carefully gone through by 
his Honor the Chief Justice. The general rule which I deduce 
from them, is this—that if a person after attaining full age confirm 
a contract entered into during infancy, such confirmation being 
express and voluntary, and with a full knowledge of the privilege 
that the Law allows him of avoiding his former contract, such con­
firmation is one which may be enforced by Law. This rule seems 
to me so consistent with the principles of reason and justice, that 
I should not b< inclined to narrow its limits more than decided ca­
ses compel me to do. Much difficulty has arisen on this point, 
from the use of the terms absolutely void, and voidable, as terms 
of classification for the contracts of Infants. Now it would seem 
quite clear, that a contract which could be pronounced absolutely 
void, in the full extent of the meaning of those words, could not be 
confirmed by any subsequent acknowledgment or promise, and 
would 
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would be one of which the Ii fant himself could not take advan­
tage, as stated by Mr. J. Best, in Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & A. 
147. It would therefore seem reasonable, that the Court should 
only pronounce the contract of an Infant absolutely void, where 
they can pronounce from the terms of the contract itself, that it 
must be prejudicial to the Infant; and that where they cannot, 
from the terms of the contract itself, pronounce whether it is ad­
vantageous or prejudicial to him, they will leave it to his own 
election, after he attains full age, to decide whether he will avail 
himself of the privilege the Law allows him, and avoid liis contract 
or not. Consistently with this view of the case, I find the only 
cases in which it has been decided, that the contract of an Infant 
cannot be confirmed by a subsequent promise after full age, in the 
cases of an obligation with a penalty, and for the payment of in­
terest : Baylis v. Dineley, 3 M. & S. 477, and Fisher v. Mow­
bray, 8 East. 330. There the Court distinctly held that the obli­
gation was void, because on the face of the instrument itself, it 
was clearly to the prejudice of the Infant.
To apply these rules to the present case—This Note is not for 
the payment of interest; and can the Court, by looking at the 
Note, say that its effect must be to the prejudice of the Infant ? 
I think certainly not. We find then, that after he attains full age, 
being aware that he was not legally liable on account of his having 
been under age when he drew the Note, he voluntarily and ex­
pressly promises to pay it. Under these circumstances, it occurs 
to me that he is in law bound by that promise, and that therefore 
this rule must be discharged.
Parker, J.:
I am free to confess, that during the tr.al and subsequent argu­
ment, and until I had carefully examined the various cases on the 
subject of Infants’ contracts, the inclination of my mind was in 
favor of the Defendant; yet I am now happy to say* on full con­
sideration, my opinion is in accordance with that of the Chief 
Justice and the rest of the Court.
It is singular, that among the variety of cares, commencing with 
the earlier Reporters, and extending down to the present time, none 
are to be found in which the point in question has come up for ex­
press decision in Westminster Hall, although one would suppose it 
must have frequently occurred in the ordinary business of rife. 
Upon more than one occasion, however, it has been adverted to, 
and I shall cite some authorities, in which the Courts of England 
have treated contracts like the present, if not strictly speaking 
capable of ratification, yet as affording a sufficient consideration to 
render valid a subsequent promise made for their performance.
The contracts of Infants nave been divided into three classes, 
viz. good, void and voidable. The first, such as bind the Infant 
from 
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from the time of the making, requiring no affirmance or acknow­
ledgment, and admitting of no avoidance at full age, extend not 
beyond necessaries, unless indeed the general principle laid down 
by Lord Mansfield be adopted—that if an agreement be clearly 
for the benefit of the Infant at the time, 11 shall bind him. Much 
discussion Jias taken place as to the binding nature of a marriage 
settlement by an Infant, with the consent of parents and guardians, 
in which a good deal of general learning as to the acts of Infants 
may be found. 3 Atk. 610, 2 Eden. 72, 1 Bro. C. C. 105, 18 
Ves. 275, 5 P>. P. C. 570, 2 T. R. 159.
In the second class, viz. such as have no operation, being wholly 
incapable of confirmation by any promise at full age, the Court 
ha ve placed bonds made with penalties, for which a double reason 
is given, that Infants are not bound by forfeitures, and cannot be 
made chargeable with interest; Cro. Eliz. 700 & 920, 8 East. 330, 
3 M. & S. 477, Co. Litt. 172 a. 10 Bing. 257; and the rule would 
appear by the reasons given in these cases, to comprehend all con­
tracts, to the non-fulfilment of which penalties aie annexed, or by 
which interest is expressly secured, though before it is extended so 
far, a further consideration would be highly desirable.
Warrants of Attorney made by Infants have also been consi­
dered void, and set aside by the Court. W. Bl. 1133, I H. 
Bl. 75.
In two old cases, in Cro. Car. 502, and 3 Mod. 301, a rent 
charge and a surrender of lease made by Infants, were held void ; 
but from more recent decisions, it would seem that such were ca­
pable of ratification. Hudson v. Jones, 3 Mod. 301, and Zooch v. 
Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, and the cases there cited.
All contracts of Infants other than those above enumerated, 11 ave 
either by express decisions been included in the third class of 
voidable, or remain to have their department assigned to them as 
they may seem to fall, either in this or the preceding division. I 
speak of voidable contracts under one head, although some, of the 
nature of the present, might with more propriety be termed af­
firmable, as not requiring any act to repudiate them, but needing 
an express confirmation and promise at full age to render them 
obligatory. There is manifestly a great want of precision in the 
language of some of the learned Judges, as their opinions are re­
ported ; the distinction between void and voidable is often not ad­
verted to ; many contracts are spoken of as void, not because they 
were incapable of, but because they bad not received, an express 
confirmation. 1 Vern. 132, 2 M. & S. 205, and the same case in 
error, 6 Taun. 118. The language of Bayley, J. in 2 B. & C. 
821, already adverted to by the Chief Justice, is remarkable, and 
that of Mr. J. Littledale is to the same effect.
After the full review which the different cases have already un- 
F - dergone, 
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dergone, I will not take up time by again going over them. I 
come to the same conclusion as his Honor, that in whatever way 
the Courts may have expressed their meaning at different times, 
the general rule deducible from all cases is broadly this—that the 
contract of an Infant is not absolutely void, but voidable or af­
firmable at his election; the few instances of valid and absolutely 
void contracts being exceptions: 4 Bae. Abr. 354, Str. 938 & 
690, Fitzg. 175 & 275, 2 Atk. 34 & 243.
The reasons urged by the learned Counsel for the Defendant 
for making the present case an exception to the above rule, are :
1st. That the contract on which the action is brought is a ne­
gotiable instrument, and consequently liable to be enforced by a 
person not one of the original parties.
2d. That it is necessarily a contract for payment of interest.
These objections are on the face of the instrument.
3d. That the Defendant did not himself receive value for the 
Note, but signed it as a surety for his father, the other promiser 
and a co-dependant.
'lliis objection is to be gathered from the evidence. As to the 
first objection, no decision, or even express dictum has been cited at 
the bar nor have I been able to find any; nor indeed is it laid down 
in any of the text writers, that the Bill or Note of an Infant must 
be considered void, on account of its negotiability. It is not es­
sential to a promissory note that it should possess this quality, nor 
does that make it necessarily prejudicial to an Infant. It might 
indeed be a good ground for the Defendant’s availing himself of 
hi legal right, but I can see no good reason for saying he shall 
not have the option to affirm it if he please, when he comes of age. 
When the subject has incidentally come beforp the Courts, no such 
distinction as this has been drawn, and in some of the cases to 
which I shall refer as recognizing the Defendant’s liability, the 
secuiities appear to have been negotiable.
The expressions of Mr. Justice Asliurst in Cockshott v. Bennett, 
2 T. R. 766, and of Lord Ellenborough in Taylor v. Croker, 4 
Esp'. 187, have already been noticed.
In Holmes v. Blogg, as reported in 1 B. Moore 468, Copley 
seij., in arguing on the effect of Infants’ contracts, contrasting 
such as require some act to disaffirm, with those which must be 
expressly affirmed, considers engagements such as Bills of Ex­
change and Promissory Notes, which expose the Infant to losses, 
capable of confirmation, by some positive act at full age. In 
Bishop v. Chambers, 3 C. & P. 55, which was an action on a ne- 
gotia.b e note, and the pleadings were precisely the same as In the 
present case, evidence having been given of an acknowledgment 
by the Defendant and a promise of payment, some objection arose 
to the Plaintiff’s recovery by reason of an alteration appearing on 
tne 
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the face of the Note ; and Denman, of Counsel for the Plaintiff, 
was desirous that the whole,case should be left to the Jury ; Lord 
Tenterden, C. J. says—“ I will ask the Jury whether they think 
the word may is in the same handwriting as the rest of the note ; 
but the effect of the Defendant’s admission as answering the plea 
of infancy, and the plea of the Statute of Limitation is for the 
Court and not for the Jury.” A verdict was found for the De­
fendant on account of the alteration ; but so far from the promise 
being considered inoperative, by reason of the nature of the secu­
rity, no objection was made on that ground, and a rule nisi for a 
new trial was granted on the question whether the admission of 
the Defendant was.not sufficient to entitle the Plaintiff to recover 
on the account stated.
In Jeremy’s analyt. Dig. 1834, p. 100, the case of Hunt v. 
Massey is abstracted from 3 Nev. and Man. 109, as follows— 
“ Where after attaining full age, the party directed a third person 
to pay the amount of a Bill accepted during infancy, from funds in 
his hands, held that it was not necessary to declare specially, and 
that the letter; would be presumed to have been written on the 
day of its date.”
The full report has not yet reached this country, but so far as 
we can judge from this short abstract, the affirmability of such a 
contract was not questioned.
The best test-writers on Bills of Exchange and Promissory 
Nates, viz. Mr. Justice Bayley and Mr. Chitty, speak distinctly 
of such contracts, though made during infancy, becoming available 
by virtue of an express promise to pay. A very late author, Mr. 
Byles, in his Treatise on Bills, though he speaks of Infants’ ac­
ceptances and contracts made in the course of trade, as absolutely 
void, yet says, “ the moral obligation to fulfil them w’ill support 
an express promise to pay, after he is of full age and before action 
brought.”
There are cases also to shew that the promise, in order to be 
binding, must be voluntary, and with full knowledge of legal rights. 
The promise in the present case fully satisfies these requisitions, 
and I do not think the Defendant can now avai1 himself of the ob­
jection to the nature of the security, to avoid the promise he has 
so deliberately made.
The case of Cameron & al v. Smith, 2 B. & A. 305, is a suffi­
cient answer to the second objection.—The note here is certainly 
made payable at a fixed day, which arrived before the Infant at­
tained his majority, but no interest is expressed, and though in 
practice it has been customary to allow interest as a matter of 
course, after the day of payment, yet it appears clear that such is 
not necessarily payable on an instrument in that form, but allowed 
by the Jury only in the value of damages.—They are not bound 
to give it in every case, and. in the present none has been allowed.
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As to the last objection, which does not appear on the face of 
the contract, but arises out of extrinsic evidence,—It has befen ar­
gued, that although contracts of an uncertain nature as to benefit 
or injury may be affirmed, yet that the contract in the present 
case was entered into under circumstances which made it neces­
sarily prejudicial, and the Court seeing this, are bound to declare 
it wholly void.
By all the authorities, it appears that this is a question for the 
Court, and not for the Jury, and it may well be doubted whether 
the rule is not confined to those cases in which the objection ap­
pears on the face of the instrument.
In Bacon’s Abridg. vol. 4, p. 360, the rule is thus laid down,— 
“ That for the better security and protection of Infants, the Law 
has made some of their contracts absolutely void, i. e. all such in 
which there is no apparent benefit or semblance of benefit to the 
Infant —but it is evident from the subsequent passage in the 
same Book, in which the question whether the lease of an Infant 
not reserving rent be wholly void or not, is discussed, that no ju­
dicial determinations had gone to the full extent of the above rule ; 
and many sound reasons are given for holding it even for the In­
fant’s benefit, that he should be allowed when he comes of age, 
and is capable of considering over again what he has done, either 
to ratify and affirm his contracts, or to break through and avoid 
them ; this power being a sufficient protection to him against 
imposition, and the full exercise of it being essential to his freedom 
of judging for himself.
From the language of Lord Raymond in the well known case 
of Holt v. Ward, Strange 969, cited and relied on by Mr. J. Dam­
pier, in 2 M. & S. 210, the Infant has equally the power of af­
firming the contract, whether it turn out to his prejudice or to his 
benefit;—and from the manner in which Lord Ellenborough ex 
presses himself in the case of Baylis v. Dineley, 3 “Ml & S. 431, it 
would appear that he considered the face of the instrument as that 
which was to govern the Court; and it is to be remembered, in 
using these qualified terms, he refers to the words of Eyre, C. J. 
in Keans v. Boycot, 2 H. Bl. 515, which would admit of a broader 
construction.
The language of Best, J. as just cited by Mr. Justice Carter, is 
similar to that of Lord Ellenborough, and I think affords the safest 
ride for us to go by.
Taking the whole matter into consideration, I am not disposed 
to carry the doctrine of void contracts more beyond the decided 
cases than it has been extended by this rule in its qualified terms, 
and there being nothing more in the present instrument than the 
ordinary words of a promissory note, I think we may, without 
touching on any of the standing cases, or violating any principle 
necessarily deducible therefrom, treat it as the security of the De­
fendant, 
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fendant, which he might by his promise at full age, render himself 
liable to pay; and in this view of the case I do not feel bound to 
say what ought to be our decision, had it appeared on the face of 
the Note, that the Infant Defendant merely signed it as security ; 
or whether considering the relative situation of the two Defendants, 
and the nature of the consideration, the transaction was attended 
with no benefit or semblance of benefit to the Infant.
It was clearly a Note for a fair and valuable consideration ; the 
affiri lance of it at full age was voluntary and deliberate—it recog­
nized the consideration ; it was made with a full knowledge of le­
gal rights, and contained a positive promise of payment, by which 
I think the Defendant must be bound, and that the rule for en­
tering a nonsuit should be discharged.
Fisher for Plaintiff.
Wilmot for Defendant.
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A new trial will be granted where the verdict is not warranted by the 
evidence, or if irrelevant testimony were admitted at the trial, on which the 
jury may have founded their verdict.
A right to retain for agency and commission is exercisable only on the 
specific monies received for which the charge is made.
This was an action of Assumpsit for money had and received. 
Plea General Issue,—Tried before Botsford, J. at the Northum­
berland Circuital 1834. Verdict for Defendants.
In appeared in evidence that the Defendants were appointed 
Agents at Miramichi, by the subscribers to the above-named Com­
pany resident there, previous to the incorporation of the Company, 
to collect, receive and remit the amounts of the several shares to 
Quebec, where the same were required to be paid ; the number of 
shares at Miramichi was at first 97, whereof 6 were abandoned ; 
of the remaining 91, some paid the first instalment to the Defend­
ants, others remitted the money to Quebec, and some jointly gave 
Defendants Bills on Quebec for the aggregate amounts due from 
them ; part of the subsequent instalments were paid in like man­
ner ; the Defendants took promissory notes from several, expressed 
payable to them, “ Agents for the Quebec and Halifax Steam Boat 
Company,” at specified periods, “ with such sum in addition as 
might be necessary to make good the remittance to Quebec 
some of these were paid, others remained unpaid, and were handed 
over subsequently to Plaintiff’s solicitor.
When the Company commenced business, the Defendants were 
their Agents at Miramichi, and settled the disbursements there of 
the Company’s steam vessel, for which services they charged com­
mission, 
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mission, and rendered accounts stating the same at each voyage. 
A settlement between Plaintiff’s agent from Quebec and the De­
fendants, was made on the 15th October, 1833, at which time the 
Defendants rendered an account current, in which was the fol­
lowing item :
“ Agency and compensation for trouble in attending to the bu­
siness of the Association on 91 shares, at <£25 each, £2,275, at 5 
percent—£113 15s.”
The account was settled except this item, which was reserved 
for future consideration, and this action was brought to recover the 
amount so retained.
At the trial, evidence was admitted of the Defendants’ services 
as the general Agents of the Company, and the Defendants claim­
ed to retain the amount as a compensation for their services gene­
rally rendered to Plaintiffs. Ilis Honor left it to the Jury to con­
sider if the Defendants were the agents of Plaintiffs, but did not 
distinguish between their capacities as agents for the Plaintiffs and 
agents for shareholders.
In Michaelmas Term, a rule mst was obtained, to set aside the 
Verdict and grant a new trial on the following grounds :
1st. The admission of improper evidence on the part of De­
fendants.
2d. The misdirection of his Honor the Judge.
3d. That the verdict was against evidence.
The points were argued in Hilary Term, and stood over for the 
opinion of the Court until this Term.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
The question in dispute between the parties in this cause turned 
upon the right of the Defendants to retain the sum of £113 15s., 
mentioned in the account stated by them on 15tli October, 1833.
The shares mentioned in this charge, it appears from other evi­
dence, were the shares in the capital stock of the Quebec and Ha­
lifax Steam Navigation Company, (the Plaintiff in the cause,) 
that had been subscribed by persons at Miramichi, which shares 
so subscribed, amounted to the number of 91.
An obvious remark upon this charge, upon the first reading of 
it in the manner in which it is framed, is that there seems to be 
neither justice nor propriety in making the compensation for trou­
ble in attending to the business, that is, the general business of the 
Association after it was formed, to be rated by a per centage on a 
certain number of shares which contributed to form it; especially 
as it appeared from other accounts which were given in evidence, 
that the Defendants uniformly charged, and were allowed a com­
mission on all their receipts and disbursements in attending to the 
business of the Association, [after its business commenced,] at Mi­
ramichi. These commissions, thus charged and allowed, must be 
considered
in the Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV. 49 
considered as the compen&Mon for attending to the business of the 
Association after it went into operation.
There can' be no propriety in charging1 a per centage on the 
specific charges subscribed at Miramidhi, unless it be for agency 
in collecting the amount of those shares; and remitting the same 
to Quebec. And lierJ arises the question, whose agents were the 
Defendants in performing this service ? Their appointment as 
agents took place at a meeting of the subscribers at Miramiclii on 
the 12tli October, 1830, more than five months before the act of 
incorporation of the Company, and they were at that meeting 
elected by such subscribers by ballot.
Their duty under this appointment appears in the minute of a 
previous meeting of these subscribers on the 8th October’, which 
declares the object of the meeting which was to be held on the 
12th, to be “ that of appointing an Agent to the shareholders in 
“ Miramiclii, whose business it shall be to receive the instalments 
“ now due, and to take notes in his own name for the balancer, 
“ and to transmit the sum when collected, to the Treasurer at 
“ Quebec, pursuant to the resolution of the Quebed'Committee.” 
It appears from the evidence of W. Stevenson,1 that the resolutions 
of the Quebec Committee required “ £25 net per share free of all 
deductions to be paid in Quebec.” ■
■ At the above mentioned meeting on the 12tli October, it was 
resolved- “that the Miramiclii shareholders should not be liable 
“ for any more than the sum of £25 for each share subscribed, 
“ except any loss or exchange in remitting to f&iebec.”
The Notes given by the Miramiclii subscribers for their respec­
tive balances were in the following terms,—“ being balance due 
by me for — shares in the Quebec and Halifax Steam Boat Com­
pany, with such sum in addition as may be necessary to make 
good the remittance to Quebec.”
All these things shew incontestibly that it was the understand­
ing and stipulation of the Miramiclii subscribers, before the incor­
poration of the Company, that £25 per share, without any deduc­
tion, was to be paid into the hands of the Treasurer at Quebec. 
The act of incorporation passed on the 21st March, 1831, speaks 
the same language, for sec. 2 provides, that the shares shall be 
£25 each, to be paid “ into the hands of the Treasurer of the said 
Companyindeed it is evident that any deduction from the 
amount of the shares paid at Quebec would have been pro tanto a 
diminution of the- capital stock of the Company, which it is ob­
vious was inadmissible^
It is clear I think, tliat it was considered at the time the agents 
were appointed, that the collecting the amount of the shares at 
Miramiclii, and remitting the same to Quebec, should be a gra­
tuitous service on their part, so far as they should be called upon 
to 
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to perform it, for in many instances the subscribers made tlieir 
own remittances to Quebec. Nothing appears upon the proceed­
ings of the meeting of the Miramichi subscribers with regard to 
compensation for the service. Johnson, in his testimony states, 
that nothing was said about commission at the time—that he^was 
a candidate for the appointment of agent—that he expected if ap­
pointed agp^t for the Miramichi subscribers, he should be appoint­
ed general agent for the Company at Miramichi, which was his 
sole object m seeking the former appointment.
The conduct of the Defendants themselves shews clearly that 
they did not consider themselves entitled to any compensation for 
this service of collecting and remitting the shares, at least from the 
Company : In several of their letters they enclose remittances for 
shares to Quebec, and say nothing about commissions ; these re­
mittances were madp before the act of incorporation : In June, 
1831, they state an account with the Company after its incorpo­
ration, and give credit for amount received on shares, and charge 
a remittance for the full sum without making any charge or de­
duction for commission : In subsequent accounts they charge com­
mission on receipts of freight, &c., and their disbursements, for the 
Company, and still make no charge of commission on the shares ; 
and it is not until their last account of 15th October, 1833, after a 
lapse of nearly three years, that they bring forward this claim, and 
it does appear to me that they are not upon any principle entitled 
to it.
It remains to apply this view of the case to the proceedings at 
the trial. It appears to me that these proceedings were much 
complicated and perplexed, and that the attention of the learned 
Judge was for the greater part of the time kept away from the 
true merits of the case by the Defendants withholding, till a very 
late period of the trial, the production of the account of tlij 15th 
October, 1831. I think that all the evidence which was given as 
to the trouble which the Defendants were put to in attending to 
the general business of the Company, was entirely irrelevant to 
their claim for a commission on the amount of shares, as developed 
in the account of 15th October, 1833, and was therefore inad­
missible.
Moreover, the point that the Defendants were (in the business of 
collecting and remitting the shares) to be viewed entirely in their 
original character as agents of the Miramichi shareholders only, 
and therefore were not entitled to make any charge for this service 
against the Company, was not put by the learned Judge to the 
Jury so distinctly, as upon full consideration I think the case 
required.
On these grounds, I am of opinion, that the rule for a new trial 
should be made absolute.
Carter,
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Carter, J.:
This was an action for money had and received by the Defend­
ants to the use of the Plaintiffs, and the defence set up by the De­
fendants was that they were entitled to retain £113 15s., the sum 
in question, as commission, at the rate of 5 per cent, on the whole 
amount of 91 shares of £25 each, which they were employed by 
the Company as their agents to collect. To establish this defence 
it would be necessary to shew two things : 1st, that these Defend­
ants were the agents of the Company for this purpose , and as such 
agents, were entitled to a commission of 5 per cent, on the amount 
of shares received ; and 2dly, that this money claimed to be re­
tained by the Defendants was part of the money received by them 
as such agents on account of the 91 shares.
If there has been any difficulty in considering this case, it seems 
to me to have arisen mainly, if not entirely, from confusing the 
characters of the Defendants in the collection of the shares where 
tb°ir agency was confined to the 91 shares, and that in which they 
afterwards acted, when they attended generally to the concerns of 
the Company, by superintending all business connected with the 
Company and the Boat at Miramichi. From the evidence, it 
seems to me quite clear, that at the time when the agency of the 
Defendants was confined to the 91 shares, they were not the agents 
of the Plaintiffs. It is quite clear they were not originally appoint­
ed to act in that capacity by the Plaintiffs, and every thing which 
was proved respecting what took place at that time is perfectly 
consistent with the fact of their acting as agents for the holders of 
the 91 shares, while the regulations of the Company, that the 
whole and complete amount of every share was to be remitted ar.d 
made good at Quebec, is wholly inconsistent with the fact of their 
having appointed agents at Miramichi, who were to have a right 
to retain a certain proportion of each share. The fact too of the 
Defendants having rendered accounts in which commission is 
charged on disbursements made by them, and. no commission is 
mentioned on the amount of shares received, shews very strongly 
that the Defendants themselves did not consider themselves 
entitled to such commission, but that this claim was an after­
thought
With respect to the second point I have mentioned, it is quite 
clear on the evidence, that supposing it had been established be­
yond doubt that the Defendants were the agents of the Company 
for the collection of these 91 shares, and were as such entitled to 5 
per cent, commission on the amount of these shares, that the 
amount of £113 15s., for which the verdict now stands, is far be­
yond the sum which was proved to be in their hands on account of 
the 91 shares, and which alone they could in such case be entitled 
to retain.
G From
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From the confused and complicated manner in which the evi­
dence m this Case, most of it being wholly irrelevant, seems to 
have been produced, I think the attention of the learned Judge 
who tried this cause, in his direction to the jury, was not confined 
to the distinct and clear points on which the case turned, and 
therefore I am of opinion that the ride for a new trial should be 
made absolute.
Parker, J.:
I am quite of the same opinion ; this “case might indeed be de­
cided on a very narrow ground, for supposing the Defendants to 
have been entitled to remuneration for their service's from the 
Plaintiffs, they should have resorted to a set off, and not relied on 
a mere right to retain the balance in their hands.
There is no doubt that a right to reduce a Plaintiff’s demand, 
or wholly to defeat it on account of some matter connected there­
with, may in some cases be supported, and is distinct from a cross 
claim which is the subject matter of a set off or action ; the right 
to retain for agency and commission is, I think, properly exercisa­
ble only on the specific monies received on the shares for which 
the charge is made, and could not be made on the general balance 
of accounts without some particular usage of trade or distinct agree­
ment, neither of which existed in the present case. Remuneration 
for other services in the general business of the Company, has cer­
tainly no necessary connection with one part of the stock more 
than another, and ought not to have been blended with the charge 
of agency on the Miramiclii shares.
It may however be more satisfactory to decide the case dn the 
broader ground which the parties themselves have taken at the 
trial and argument: and this depends on the question, whether or 
no there was evidence to support the charge of per centage for 
agency and compensation for trouble in attending to the business 
of the association on 91 shares, in whole dr in part; and on a care­
ful consideration of all the facts, the time,‘‘nature and purpose of 
the Defendant’s original appointment; the1 Effect which sirch a 
charge would have in reducing the capital stock ; the absence of 
any evidence from which it could be inferred that such was ever 
contemplated or sanctioned by the Company, or indeed that such 
was intended by the Defendants until the unfortunate progress and 
termination of the adventure made the Company’s business less 
profitable than had been anticipated ; I think the Jury were not 
warranted in the verdict they have found ; but that the Plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover the sum of £113 15s., which the Defend­
ants had received on their account, and that consequently the rule 
for a new trial must be made absolute.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.
J. A. Street, Kerr, and Berton, for Plaintiffs. 
A. K. S. Wetmore and Wilmot for Defendants.
JOHNSTON
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JOHNSTON v. WINSLOW.
A writ of fieri facias was altered and re-issued as an alias.—In an ac­
tion of trespass against the Sheriff for taking goods under it, the writ was 
held void, and not receivable in evidence.
An exemplification of an execution stated the writ to be returnable tin 
Hilary, 1834,—the Sheriff’s indorsement “ was received 16th August, 1834.” 
Parol evidence was refused to shew the execution in the Sheriff’s hands in 
October, 1833, and that the indorsement was a mistake.
This was an action of trespass, for seizing and carrying away 
Plaintiff’s timber ; Plea the general issue.
At the trial before Chipman, C. J., at the Carleton Circuit, in 
September, 1834, the taking having been proved, the Defendant 
(who is Sheriff of Carleton) offered in evidence an exemplification 
of a judgment, and an alias writ of fieri facias thereupon issued 
against one Bishop ats Phillips, to whom it was offered to be pro­
ved, the property in question belonged ; an objection was taken by 
the Solicitor General for Plaintiff, that the wit offered was so al­
tered and interlined, that it could not be received in evidence as a 
writ; after some discussion it was admitted that the original writ 
of fieri facias had been returned by the Defendant, and had been 
altered by Mr. Hazen, the Plaintiff’s Attorney, and re-issued as 
an alias. Plis Honor determined that it was a void writ, and re­
fused to receive it as evidence.
An exemplification of another judgment and execution, Banks 
against Bishop and another, was then offered; the execution so 
exemplified was indorsed as received by the Sheriff, 16th August, 
1834 ; the trespass was committed in October, 1833 ; the Defend­
ant’s counsel offered evidence to shew that there was a mistake 
either in the indorsement of the writ or the exemplification thereof, 
that the writ was in the Sheriff’s hands at the time of the seizure, 
and that he levied under and by virtue thereof, but his Honor re­
fused to admit any evidence to contradict the record. Whereupon 
the Plaintiff obtained a verdict.
In Michaelmas Term, a rule nisi was obtained to set aside the 
verdict and grant a new trial, on the ground of the improper re­
jection of evidence at the trial.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term by the Solicitor General and 
Wilmot for Plaintiff, who contended that the Sheriff having taken 
goods out of the possession of a person not named in the writ, must 
shew that the judgment and every proceeding down to the execu­
tion, and the writ itself w'ere regular and correct, or he must be 
considered a mere wrong-doer. As to the execution, Banks v. 
Bishop, the Sheriff’s indorsement shewed that he did not receive 
it until after the trespass was committed ; and that indorsement 
being part of a record, could not be disputed.
Berton in support of the rub, as to the first writ, urged that a 
Sheriff 
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Sheriff could only be required to take reasonable precaution ; if he 
found on record a judgment, to warrant the execution, he could 
not determine what erasures or interlineations would vitiate the 
writ: it came to him under the seal of the Court, and knowing 
the property in question to belong to the person against whom the 
execution issued, he levied upon it; but even if there were an ir­
regularity in the writ, he contended it was not sufficient to make 
it a void writ—and if only irregular, then it was a sufficient justi­
fication until set aside : as to the execution, Banks v. Bishop, evi 
dence was not offered to vitiate, but io support a record:—by the 
Sheriff’s indorsement, it appeared that the execution was received 
in his office in August, 1834, the writ was returnable in Hilary, 
1834, which was an absurdity ; the evidence offered was to shew 
the mistake of 1834 for 1833, and that would have supported the 
writ, and have rendered it effective. He cited Dickson v. Fisher, 
1 W. Bl. 664 ; Watson’s Sheriff, 53, s. 4 ; 3 Wils. 345 ; 2 Bur­
row, 964 ; 15 East. 614, (d ); 3 Bac. Abr. 419, 420.
Curia advisari vult.
The Court delivered judgment at this term.
Botsford, J.:
I am of Opinion that this rule must be discharged upon both 
grounds. The writ of fieri facias having been changed into an 
alias, by the interlineation of the wcrds “ as before we have com­
manded you,”—and by the alteration of the teste and return may 
be said to be destroye I, and the alias so called with such interlinea­
tions and alterations upon the face of it, and without having been 
resealed, must be considered as a nullity in the nand3 of the 
Sheriff.
With respect to the second ground, I think the case of Dickson 
and ^isher, 1 W. Bl. 664, is decisive ; there it was held by the 
Court, “ That parol evidence ought not to be admitted to vitiate 
“ the record, and prove it to have been wrong, though it may have 
“ been admitted in order to pronounce it right.”
Carter, J.:
This was an action of trespass against the Defendant for taking 
certain timber alleged to be the Plaintiff’s property. The defence 
was that Defendant, as Sheriff of Carleton, seized the timber in 
question under two executions issued on judgments in two actions 
against a person named Bishop, and in support of this defence 
two documents were offered in evidence ;—the first which purport­
ed to be an alias fieri facias issued against Bishop, at the suit of 
Phillips, was admitted to be the original fieri facias, altered by 
erasures and interlineations into the form of an alias
In the case of Plucliart v. Greenes, 2 Keble 705, trespass was 
brought against a Sheriff and his bailiff for false imprisonment, and 
they jnsthied by warrant writ to the Sheriff. Plaintiff replied—
no 
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no writ was then taken out, to which Defendant demurred, and 
judgment was given for the Plaintiff, for “ albeit the bailiff hath a 
“ warrant, yet he is liable if there be no writ, contra if the writ be 
“ void, if delivered.”
Now, can it be said in the case before the Court;, that there was 
any writ ? In its original form it clearly was a writ of fieri facias, 
but in its altered form, where it purports to be an alias, it seems 
to me to be nothing more than a piece of parchment issuing from 
an Attorney’s office, and carries with it no authority as a writ. 
As well might the Attorney have made such alterations and inter­
lineations as would have transformed it into a cap. ad sat., and of­
fered it as a justification for the Sheriff in making an arrest.
The second document was an exemplification of a writ of fieri 
facias against Bishop at the suit of Banks, which appeared by the 
Sheriff’s indorsement not to have been received till the 16th Au­
gust, 1834, whereas the seizure which was the ground of this ac­
tion took place in October, 1833. It was proposed to shew by 
the Sheriff’s book, that the writ was in fact received on the 16th 
August, 1833, but this evidence was rejected by his Honor the 
Chief Justice as tending to falsify a record.
I see nothing in this case to make it an exception to that which 
is well known as a rule of evidence, and which is distinctly recog­
nized by Lord Kenyon in a case of Reed v. Jackson, 1 East. 357, 
where it was attempted to shew by other evidence, that a verdict 
which had been entered generally, had been so entered by mistake 
of the officer, instead of having been entered on a particular plea. 
Lord Kenyon, in his judgment, says,—“ The evidence offered by 
the Defendant went to impeach the authenticity of a record, and 
therefore was inadmissible.”
This case is a stronger one, inasmuch as the part of the r< cord 
which is sought to be contradicted, is an entry made by the very 
person who now seeks to contradict it. I think his Honor the 
Chief Justice was right in refusing to admit the evidence offered 
in both cases, and thai this rule must therefore be discharged. 
Parker, J.:
I think, on both the points which have come before the Court in 
this case, the Chief Justice was right in rejecting the evidence 
offered at the trial.
as regards the first execution, had the question merely turned 
on the effect of erasures and interlineations, ’t would have been a 
matter of consideration whether they were .n material parts, and 
at what time made; Crowther v. Wheat, 8 Mod. 243—6 < )m. Dig. 
290; but when it appeared that what was produced as an alias 
fieri facias, had in fact been the original fieri facias, which had as 
such been already in the Sheriff’s hands, I think it was properly 
treated as a nullity; and could no more warrant the Sheriff’s 
proceeding
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proceeding than if it had been a mere blank. In 2 Dowl. P. R. 
745, a summons originally issued into Middlesex, but altered to 
Surrey without resealing, was treated as a nullity.
This no doubt is a case of great hardship so far as the Sheriff is 
concerned, but if the Attorney has put into his hands to Execute 
that which1 purported to be the writ of the Court, but iii fact is not, 
he must have his recourse on him.
The nature of the Sheriff’s office exposes him to much risk ; 
nothirfg perhaps more exemplifies this, than the decision in Lake 
r. Billers, 1 L. R. 773, fully confirmed by Martin v. Podfrer, 5 
Burr. 2631, and 2 Bl. 701, that in an action by third persons 
against the Sheriff for seizing goods under execution, he must not 
only shew a good execution, but a judgment to warrant it.
Another objection in the present case, as strongly put by the 
Solicitor General, is, that there is no original execution remaining 
to warrant the award of an alias, but the first ground is I think 
sufficient.
With regard to the second execution offered in evidence by the 
Defendant, I think the indorsement made by the Sheriff of the 
time of receiving it, pursuant to the direction of the Provincial 
Statute of Frauds, 26 Geo. 3, q. 14, s. 13, was conclusive... To 
allow evidence at the trial on the part of tliQ Sheriff to contradict 
this, would in effeiff render nugatory that which the Legislature 
has provided for the better manifestation of the time of thelexecu- 
tions coining into his hands. Besides in the present case the writ 
had actually been, returned to the Court, and was with the indorse­
ment thjjreon -exemplified, as a record, which on clear principles of 
law, could not be contradicted by parol testimony.
Upon a proper application to this Court, shewing a mistake in 
the indorsement^ an amendment might, I conceive, have been al­
lowed ; 1 T. R. 782: and the, Defendant, who must have been 
aw^p. of the necessity of this evidence, should have applied before 
the trial to have the error, if such it were, corrected.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
I remain of the same opinion I expressed at the trial. The 
Sheriff, in an action by a third person, must shew himself right in 
omnibus. That which purported to be a writ was a nullity.
The second writ was a record taken from the files of the Court, 
and exemplified under the seal of the Court. I had no hesitation 
in rejecting evidence to contradict its contents. No evidence can 
be admitted to contradict a record. The rule nisi must be dis­
charged.
The Solicitor General and Wilmot for Plaintiff.
Dibblee, A. K. S. Wetmore and Berton for Defendant.
FOWLIE
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FOWLIE v. STRONACH AND ANOTHER, Administra­
tors of English.
Where a writ of enquiry is ordered to be executed before a Judge at Nisi 
Prius, the Judge sits only as an assistant to the Sheriff. The writ should 
be directed and tlie inquisition returned as in ordinary cases. A writ di­
rected to the Sheriff and Judge, and an inquisition returned under the seal 
of the Judge, held defective, and were set aside, but without costs.
This was an action of covenant in which tlie Plaintiff had 
judgment on demurrer. The Defendant obtained a rule for the 
execution of a writ of inquiry of damages in the presence of a 
Judge at Nisi Prius.
The writ of inquiry was directed to the Sheriff and the Justices 
of Assize, and commanded the Sheriff to summon a jury and the 
Justices to certify the inquisition.
The damages were assessed under this writ at Northumberland 
in September last, and the wri* and inquisition were returned as 
directed by the wrrit.
A rule nisi was obtained in last Michaelmas Term, by N. Par­
ker and Wilmot for Defendants, to set aside the writ of inquiry for 
the assessment of damages, and the return thereto, for defects and 
irregularities apparent on the face of them.
The Solicitor General and J. A.Street shewed cause inHilary T erm. 
Curia advisari vult.
In this term the Court delivered judgment.
Botsford, J.:
It appears that a writ of inquiry for the assessment of damages 
was issued, directed to the Sheriff of the County of Northumber­
land, and to the Justices assigned to take the assizes in and for 
the said County, bearing date the twelfth day of July, in the fifth 
year of His Majesty’s reign, and returnable the second Tuesday 
in October then next following; that the Sheriff was command­
ed to summon a jury to appear before the said Justices of Assize, 
who were commanded to certify the inquisition : and it appears by 
the return that the inquest was holden before the Justice of Assize, 
who signed and certified the same.
It is contended by the Counsel for Defendants, that the writ 
ought to have been directed to the Sheriff alone, who is the person 
designated by law to hold the inquest—that the Judge at Nisi 
Prius is only an assistant to the Sheriff, by whom the return ought 
to have been made. The irregularity is admitted by the Counsel 
for the Plaintiff, but it is contended that the same was waived by 
the Defendants, whose Counsel were present, and who attended on 
their behalf, before the Judge of Assize on the taking of the inqui­
sition, and by taking subsequent steps in giving notice of an in­
tended motion to this Court to set aside the inquisition, on the 
ground of improper rejection of evidence by the Judge of Assize.
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To this it is answered, that the proceedings are defective, am 
cannot be amended, cured or waived.
With respect to the writ of inquiry and the return thereto, I am 
of opi lion that they are defective—that the Judge of Assize had 
no power, neither could he derive any, under the writ of inquiry— 
that he could only act as an assistant to the Sheriff, agreeable to 
what is said by lolt, Chief Justice, in an anonymous case, (12 
Mod. 610,) “A Judge at Nisi Prius upon trial of a writ of inquiry, 
“ is only an assistant to the Sheriff, and has no judicial power.”— 
The writ of inquiry and proceedings under it being defective and 
not merely irregular, I am of opinion that they could not be waived 
by any of the steps taken by the Defendants. In Massey and 
Wilson, 5 T. P. 254, a distinction was taken between a mere ir­
regularity in the mode or time of the proceedings, and a defect in 
the proceedings themselves, that the latter kind could not be 
waived by the adverse party, though the former might; and this 
distinction was allowed by the Court
Carter, J.:
This was a motion to set aside a writ of inquiry, which had is­
sued to assess damages, (after judgment on demurrer) and the in­
quisition thereon, the action being in covenant on a lease. It ap­
peared that the writ was directed to the Judge of Assize, and not 
to the Sheriff, and that it was executed before the Judge of Assize, 
and the inquisition was under the hand and seal of the Judge of 
Assize—and that the Defendant appeared and made defence at the 
execution of the writ. It is clear that the direction of this writ 
was wrong, and that this was a case in which the Judge of Assize 
could not have power to take the inquisition.
In considering this case, I have had considerable doubts whether 
this defect n the proceedings was not one which should be taken 
advantage of by another method than a motion to set aside the 
proceedings; but on the whole, I am led to conclude that the 
whole proceedings under this writ are not irregular only, but wholly 
defective, ab initio: and that therefore the subsequent steps taken 
by the Defendants, which would clearly have been a waiver of an 
irregularity, do not waive this, which is a complete defect in the 
proceedings.
On this ground, I flunk the ride should be made absolute. 
Parker, J.:
I am quite of opinion that the Defendants in the present case 
are not entitled to any favor from the Court. They appeared by 
their Counsel at the execution of the writ of inquiry; made no ob­
jection whatever to the form of the writ or the proceeding theieon; 
went into their defence ;—it was moreover at their instance that 
the Judge of Assize was associated with the Siu riff; and under 
such circumstances, all mere irregularities must be considered 
waived; 
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waived ; and the Plaintiff is entitled to liis judgment, unless the 
defect he of such a nature as to render the whole proceeding null 
and void. I would here observe that I do not agree with the 
learned Counsel for the Defendant in his position, that in all cases 
where defects are cured by the statutes of jeoffaiis, the Court will, 
nevertheless, set the proceedings aside, if application be made be­
fore they are upon record. In all such cases, the Court must ex­
ercise a sound discretion, and in one like the present, should cer­
tainly not interfere to deprive tl.e Plaintiff of any benefit which he 
might derive from those statutes. Indeed I am of opinion that the 
Court would, if the defect were amendable, allow the Plaintiff to 
amend, although he has made no direct application for leave so to do.
My reason for thinking the ride obtained in this case must be 
made absolute, is, that the defect is of such a nature as cannot be 
waived, and would not be aided by any of the statutes of amend­
ment or jeoffail ; that if the Plaintiff proceeded to enter up his 
judgment, it must be erroneous; that seeing this, the Court will 
not allow him to incur useless trouble and expense, but in order 
that he may have his damages properly assessed, will set aside the 
writ and inqu’sition.
It is clear from all the authorities, that there is a great distinc­
tion between a defect in the proceedings and a mere irregularity ; 
the latter may be waived, the former cannot be. Sell. Pr. 100, 5 
T. R. 254, 4 T. R. 349 : Mr. Sellonsays,—“ Ihe time of taking 
advantage of any irregularity depends on the nature of the defect, 
whether it be such as vitiates the proceedings in toto so as to ren­
der them null and void, or only such an irregularity as may be 
cured or waived by some subsequent act of the parties, for there is 
a distinction between a defect in the proceedings and a mere irre­
gularity.”
In 1 Dowl. P. R. 29, Mr. J. Taunton says,—“ There is this 
difference between an irregularity and a nullity,—an irregularity 
may be waived, but a nullity cannot.”
L1 the present case, a writ of inquiry has issued, directed to the 
Sheriff and the Judge of Assize, by which the Sheriff is directed 
to summon the jury, and the Judge to make the inquiry and return 
the inquisition under his hand and seal. The action is covenant, 
in which the damages are to be assessed in the ordinary way, and 
not debt on bond with breaches assigned, for which a particular 
mode of inquiry is appointed by statute. We are to determine 
whether the writ and the proceedings thereon are a mere nullity 
or only an irregularity.
Asa rule was obtained for having the inquisition taken in pre­
sence of the Judge at the Circuit, the first point for consideration is, 
whether that circumstance makes any difference in the nature of 
the proceedings on the record. It appears clearly from all the 
H books 
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books of practice, that the writ and inquisition are precisely the 
same, whether taken in presence of the Judge or not: the Sheriff 
is the officer in either case, in whom the judicial power is vested, 
and the inquisition is returned under his hand arid seal, and those 
of the jurors. In 12 Mod. 610, Holt, C. J. said,—“ A Judge of 
Nisi Prius upon trial of a writ of inquiry, is only an assistant to 
the Sheriff, and has no judicial power.” In this Province, the 
Judges sit at Nisi Prius, under the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 
8, by which they are empowered to try causes brought to issue in 
the Supreme Court. Any other power by them to be exercised 
on the Circuit, must be derived from the established practice of 
the Court, or some special enactment.
The Sheriff, where he is not an interested person, is the known 
officer of the Court, to whom the duty of inquiry of the damages 
in ordinary cases, as well as the execution of other writs, must be 
assigned, and we have no power to substitute the Judge or any 
other person ; we can no more I conceive award a writ to the 
Judge to make the inquiry in ordinary cases, than we can autho­
rise the Sheriff to do it under the statute of Win. 3d. relative to 
bonds. The Sheriff under the writ now before us was functus 
'tfficio after returning the jury; if he appeared at the inquisition, it 
was wholly without authority, as the writ gave him none: the 
Judge and not the Sheriff has the judicial authority by the writ to 
swear the jury and witnesses, and he alone has made the return. 
I cannot but think the whole proceedings were coram non judice, 
and are consequently defective. In support of this opinion, I find 
it laid down in 6 Com. Dig. 289,—“ If writ of inquiry be executed 
before him who has no authority, it is error as in an Inferior Court 
if it is directed to the Serjeant at Mace, and is executed before the 
Mayor, who is Judge of the Court; Yelv. 69.” In the case in 
Yelverton, the Court said,—“ An inquiry before the Mayor is not 
warranted by any writ, and by consequence judgment to recover 
such damages placed before a wrong officer is erroneous.”
In Comyn, it is further said,—“ If a writ of inquiry is erroneous 
it shall not be amended, but the Plaintiff may have another 
writ.”
In 2 Wils. 378.—An inquisition taken before two under-Sheriffs 
extraordinary was set aside, the Court holding that the High She­
riff coidd appoint no more than one under-Sheriff extra.
In Blakamore’s case, 2 Rep. 310, it is held that misprision of a 
clerk to be amended did not extend to a case where the clerk mis­
takes the form of the writ.
The case of Grant v. Bagge, 3 East. 128, is important to shew 
that a writ directed improperly to an officer not accustomed to re­
ceive such, would be quashed on motion quia improvide emanavit, 
and would not justify the officer who took upon him to execute it.
In
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In the Queen v. Twdein, 1 Salk, 51, Lord C. J. Holt and Powel 
& Powys, J. say, that though a misawarding of process on the roll 
might be amended at common law of the same term, because it was 
the act of the Court, yet if any clerk at common law issued out an 
erroneous process on a right award of the Court, that was never 
amended in any case at common law.
Some cases have been cited of amendments injury process, such 
as the distringas and venire after verdict; and it has been argued 
that the statutes of jeoffail curing defects in substance as well as 
form, extend now to cases where judgment is given by default, 
confession or on demurrer, as well as those after verdict.
I have carefully examined the statutes of jeoffail, and find that 
the position is not exactly correct; by stat. 4 & 5, Ann. c. 16, it 
is true all omissions or defects which were then cured after verdict 
were equally cured by judgments of confession, default, &c.; but 
it is not until the statute 5 Geo. 1, c. 13, that defects in substance 
in judicial writs are aided ; and this is expressly confined to cases 
after verdict. But independent of this statute, there is a great 
distinction between writs of venire, &c., which do not convey the 
power under which the trial is had ; and writs of inquiry which 
are the direct authority to the officer for his proceeding.
In Crowderjy. Rooke^2 Wils. 144, where the cause was tried 
at a certain sitting, subsequent to that for which the nisi prius re­
cord, &c., were made up, the Court considered the trial as coram 
non Judice, refused leave to amend; but ex officio awarded a venire 
de novo.
Two cases have been cited from Strange’s Reports, in one of 
which, p. 878, it is said, the want of a writ of inquiry is aided by 
the statute of jeoffails ; and the other, p. 1077, where the writ of 
inquiry had been lost, and the Court made a rule for a new writ 
and inquisition fiom the Sheriff’s notes. 3oth cases are very 
loosely reported, and the first contains no statement of the proceed­
ings, nor does it inform us of the nature of the action, or how the 
damages were assessed, or the record made up. The last turned 
evidently on the ground that the proceedings had been regular, 
though the writ and inquisition were lost: and the only ground on 
which I can conceive the first to have been decided, is that the 
Court would presume that a writ had issued, and that it was a 
proper writ; but we can make no such presumption here, as we 
have the defective writ before us, and can presume no other.
In truth this is not the case of a mistake or misprision of the 
clerk, but an intentional application of a writ, provided by statute 
for one purpose, to another, for which it is not warranted ; I say 
intentional, for the Plaintiff’s Counsel at first insisted that the writ 
was proper for the purpose, and accorf'iig to the latest book of 
practice, though he is now satisfied he was mistaken.
The
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The rule to quash the writ and inquisition must I think be made 
absolute, but without costs : If we do not so interfere, what can 
the Plaintiff do ? It is not a case in which the Court could assess 
the damages, for supposing that we have the power, which may be 
questioned, when the provision of the Act 26 Geo. 3, c. 21, and 
the uniform practice in this Province are considered^ the Plaintiff 
has not called on us to do this, but has resorted to a writ of inquiry. 
Can he award a proper writ on his roll, and enter that which has 
issued ; or can he enter a different writ from that under which he 
has proceeded ? I think not: if we discharged the present rule 
obtained at the Defendants’ instance, the Plaintiff must himself 
ask it of us if he wishes to proceed. Were it necessary indeed 
the Court might I think ex officio award a new writ ; but there is 
no occasion for that being done.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
I was not present at the argument, but I fully concur in the 
opinions expressed by their Honors.
A proceeding after default is necessary to inform the Court what 
amount of damages the Plaintiff has sustained by reason of the 
premises.
A particular statute has altered the common law in some pro­
ceedings therein especially mentioned ; in those laws, everything 
is mentioned to be done according to the form of the statute, .and 
if that course is imported into other cases not specified in the sta­
tute, the statutes of jeoffails will not cure the defect. The present 
proceeding is coram non juclice, and must be set aside.
J. A. Street for Plaintiff.
N. Parker, Wilmot and J. H. Peters for Defendants.
WILMOT v. BABINO AND CORNWELL.
Applications by confined debtors are considered in the first instance 
after notice and copies of the affidavits given.
The Solicitor General moved in last Easter Term, on behalf of 
the Defendants, for relief under the insolvent Act; but after argu­
ment the Court dismissed the application (vicl. ante.) Notice was 
given to Plaintiff’s Attorney of a further application at this Term ; 
but copies of the affidavits to support the same were not delivered. 
The Solicitor General was about to call the attention of the Court 
to the former affidavits and to some further statements—Sed
Per Curiam.
This must be entirely a new application, and it does appear con­
venient that we should pursue the practice which has been estab­
lished of giving notice and communicating copies of all the appli­
cant’s affidavits to the opposite party, that he may be prepared to 
answer 
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answer them : the course lias been not to grant a rule nisi, but to 
take the matter into consideration in the first instance.
DICKINSON v. KETCHUM
In replevin, where several issues are found—some for Plaintiff and some 
for Defendant—each party is entitled to iosts on the issues determined in 
his favor.
The postea was ordered to the Plaintiff for one month to enter the judg­
ment, aud in case of his neglect to do so, then to the Defendant for the 
same purpose.
Replevin for divers quantities of timber.
Defendant pleaded as to part of the timber, non cepit.
2d. As to another part, property in himself.
3d. As to another part, non cepit.
4th. As to another part, property in himself.
And Sth. As to another part, the same.
At the trial before Chipman, Chief Justice, at the Carleton Cir­
cuit. in September last, a verdict was found on the first issue for 
Defendants. On the 2d, as to part of the timber therein mentioned 
for the Plaintiff, and as to the remainder for the Defendant. On 
the 3d and 4tli, issues for the Defendants: and on the Sth, for 
Plaintiff. A question thereupon arose as to who was entitled to 
the record, and which party should recover costs.
The Solicitor General for Defendant, obtained a rule in Hilary, 
to shew cause why the postea should not be given to the Defend­
ants. Cause was shewn at this Term by Wilmot for Plaintiff. 
Per Curiam.
Each party is entitled to costs on the issues determined in his 
favor; see 2 Bos & Puller, 368: as to taxing costs in replevin, 
see Lutw. 1190, confirmed in 4 B. & A. 43. The Plaintiff having 
carried down the record, let him have the postea for one month to 
enter up the judgment, and after that time if Plaintiff shall neglect 
to do so, the Defendant may enter up the judgment.
Wilmot for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and C. P. Wetmore for Defendant.
BATES v. LYON.
Where Plaintiff in trespass quart clausum fregit had it in his power to 
shew definite bounds, but rather defended on the uncertain lines of another 
grant, and the jury found against him, the Court refused to disturb the 
verdict.
This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, tried 
before Parker, J. at the King’s Circuit in January last. Verdict 
for Defendant. The
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The Plaintiff proceeded for two distinct trespasses on different 
grants of land, viz :■—One on what is called the Middle Land 
grant; the other in what is called the Taylor and Underhill 
grant.
In Hilary Term, the Solicitor General obtained a rule nisi to set 
aside the verdict, and grant a new trial on two grounds, viz:—First, 
that the verdict was contrary to evidence as related to the Mid­
dle Land grant; and secondly, to the charge of his Honor the J udge 
as related to the Taylor and Underhill grant.
N. Parker for Defendant, shewed cause at this term, and con­
tended as to the first point, that there was conflicting testimony 
before the jury, and therefore the Court would not interfere ; and 
as to the second point, that the question was wholly of fact, and 
within the province of the jury ; and even were it otherwise, the 
damages sought to be recovered being trifling, was a sufficient 
reason for not disturbing the verdict.
The Solicitor General, in support of the rule, urged with regard 
to the Taylor and Underhill grant, that although the trespass was 
in itself of no great importance, yet as the object of the action was 
to try a question of boundary, and the verdict would establish a 
right, the Court would on the second ground set aside the verdict. 
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This rule was obtained on two grounds; the first, that the ver­
dict was against evidence, as to the Middle Land grant, has been 
virtually abandoned by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, and 
at any rate there was conflicting testimony before the jury. On 
the second ground, with regard to the Taylor and Underhill grant, 
we are urged to grant a new trial, because it is said that the ver­
dict will establish a right.
On looking at the evidence as reported by Mr. Justice Parker, 
I am of opinion that the Plaintiff has brought his cause into Court 
in a way that will not entitle him to a new trial. He produced a 
grant in evidence, called the Taylor and Underhill grant, which 
specified certain bounds and courses. The next step on his part 
should properly have been to give evidence of the bounds designa­
ted in that grant, and if those could not be found, to have run 
lines according to the grant; but instead of that he depended on 
another old line connected with another grant. There is great 
uncertainty in the line as shewn by the Plaintiff, and he clearly in­
curred the risk of that uncertainty, and the result is that the bounds 
still remain as uncertain as ever. I am therefore of opinion that 
the Plaintiff is not entitled to ask for a new trial. If his rights 
should hereafter be invaded he can seek his legal remedy, and this 
verdict cannot be evidence against him.
Botsford, J. and Carter, J. concurred
Parker,
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Parker, J.:
This was a question of fact, depending on an immense mass of 
evidence. Three days were occupied in the trial, and in putting 
the case to the jury I stated how I thought the cause should be 
considered.
The question is not, if the Court agree with the jury, but if the 
jury had a right to determine as they have done. The Plaintiff 
came into Court in an extraordinary way. He offered a grant, 
and evidence of bounds almost indefinite, when he might have 
shewn definite bounds. The obscurity was the fault of the Plain­
tiff himself. He had the means of producing evidence to shew the 
true line of boundary, but he rather depended on the uncertainty. 
I think the jury came to a more correct decision than I did at the 
trial, and I am not dissatisfied with the verdict.
Rule discharged.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
Parker for Defendant.
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MTLHANEY v. WISWALL.
Plaintiff’s demand amounted to £30, and was reduced by payments or set 
off. Plaintiff stated the amount due him to be £7 or £8 ;—there was no 
evidence to reduce his demand below that sum; the verdict was for less than 
£5. The Court refused to deprive the Plaintiff of his costs.
A rule nisi having been obtained in this cause, to deprive the 
Plaintiff of his costs, pursuant to the Act of Assembly, 50 G. 3, 
c. 17, s. 10,cause was shewn in last Trinity Term.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions. 
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This was an action of assumpsit, for work and labour, tried be­
fore Parker, J. at the St. John January Circuit, 1835.-—Plea, Ge­
neral Issue.—Verdict for the Plaintiff for £3 4s. 6d.—The Plain 
tiff proved work done for more than six months as a carpenter 
and the amount of his account therefor was about £30 ; it was 
proved that the Plaintiff had received sundry articles from the De­
fendant, under his order, which might be considered as payments, 
to a considerable amount; and that Plaintiff had acknowledged, 
after all these nayments had been made, that he thought a balance 
of £7 or £8 only was due to him.
There was a notice of set off, but whether the evidence given by 
the Defendant was as set off or payment, did not distinctly appear. 
There was no evidence to reduce the demand below what the 
Plaintiff had stated was due to him, viz. £7 or £8, and it is not 
known upon what ground the jury did go.
The clause of the Provincial statute, 50 G. 3, c. 17, s. 10, on 
which this application is founded, is in the following terms :—“ If 
“ any action or suit shall be commenced in any other Court than 
“ the Justices Court for any debt not exceeding the sum of £5, and 
“ recoverable by virtue of this Act in the Justices Court, then, and 
“ in every such case, the Plaintiff in such action or suit shall not 
“by reason of a verdict or judgment for him, &c., have or be 
“ entitled
* This act is repealed by 4 W. 4, c. 45, and new regulations made by 77 paragraph.
I
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“ entitled to any costs whatever/’ In order then to deprive the 
Plaintiff of costs under this Act, it is essential that the debt for 
which the action is brought shall not exceed the sum of £5, and 
shall be recoverable in the Justices Court. If the original debt be 
reduced by a sec off, it is clear, and has always been held, that it 
could not have been sued for in the inferior jurisdiction, and the 
.\ct does not apply ; and it is only in case this evidence should b" 
considered as evidence of payment, and not of set off, that this ap­
plication can for a moment be sustained ; in this view of the mat­
ter it may indeed be considered to be settled as a general rule, that 
the verdict shall be taken as the evidence of the amount for which 
the action is brought.
Fitzpatrick v. Pickering, 2 Wils. 68.
Shaddick v. Bennett, 4 Barn and Cres. 769.
Drew v. Coles, 2 Tyr. 503; 2 C. & J. 505 ; 1 Dowl. P. C. 580
Jones v. Harris, 1 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 433.
Baddley v. Oliver, 1 Dowl. P. C. 598; 1 C. & M. 219.
Moore v. Jones, 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 58.
Nevertheless, it is only as evidence of the amount of the original 
debt rightfully due, that the verdict is to be received; and it is not 
conclusively binding on the Court in all cases, to deprive the Plain­
tiff of his costs, when found for the Plaintiff for a sum which is 
within the Justices jurisdiction: accordingly in Drew v. Coles, 
Lord Chief Baron Lyndhurst says,—“ It is not necessary to say 
“ that in every case the verdict shall rule as to the amount of the 
“ debt due to the Plaintiff which might have been rightfully de- 
“ manded by him, but there is no doubt that in the generality of 
“ cases it shall decide the question:” and Baron Bayley-says,— 
“ prima facie, a verdict is to be taken as evidence of what the 
“ debt was when the action was commenced.” In any case there­
fore, when the original debt proved at the trial shall exceed five 
pounds, and the jury shall think fit to bring in their verdict in res­
pect of that debt, for a sum under five pounds, and without there 
being a foundation in the evidence given at the trial, for so redu­
cing it, I do not consider that the Court is bound to receive tlie 
verdict as such conclusive evidence of the debt originally due, as 
to deprive the Plaintiff of his costs under the Act.
The case most analogous in its circumstances to the present, is 
that of Harsant v. Larkin, 3 B. and B 257. In this case, the ac­
tion was brought for measured work and labour, which a surveyor 
of the Defendant’s own appointment had estimated at upwards of 
£34 ; and upon this estimate, the balance proved to be due the 
Plaintiff was more than £9 ; the jury however, in a manner unac­
countable to the Court, reduced the estimate to £26, and thereby 
reduced the balance due to the Plaintiff to £1 2s., for which last- 
mentioned 
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mentioned sum they gave their verdict, ard the Court, under these 
circumstances, refused to deprive the Plaintiff of his costs.
Now, although the doctrine broadly laid down in Harsant v. Lar­
kin, as to the discretion of the Court in these cases, must be con­
sidered as very much limited by subsequent decisions, yet the de­
cision itself, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, has never 
been questioned, and I think affords a precedent for the determi­
nation of the present case under its peculiar circumstances. The 
Plaintiff in the present case had an original demand, which was 
proved, of £30 ; this demand had indeed been reduced,—and in 
the view I am now taking, let it be supposed that it was reduced 
by payments,—yet there was no evidence of a reduction below £7 
Under these circumstances the Plaintiff surely could not bring his 
action in the Justices Court fcr a sum under £5.
This case differs entirely from that of Dickinson v. Ballocli, 
(ante p. 24) formerly decided in this Court. In Dickinson v. Bal- 
loch, the Plaintiff had a distinct demand, amounting only to 25s., 
for which sum the verdict was given ; and although a large demand 
had been litigated at the trial, yet it was evident that if this larger 
demand only had been in question, the verdict would have been 
for the Defendant; and that the verdict was found for the Plaintiff 
only for the separate demand of £1 5s., which separate demand 
might have been sued for in the Justices Court.
The decision of this case is not of much moment as a precedent, 
as the late Act for the recovery of small debts, 4 W. 4, c. 45, 
makes improved and more complete regulations on the subject; the 
present rule for entering a suggestion must, I think, be discharged. 
Botsford, J.:
I fully concur in opinion with his Honor the Chief Justice. I 
am very much governed by the case of Moore v. Jones, in 2 Dowl. 
Pr. Ca. 58 ; although the items proved on the part of the Defend­
ant might have been in the nature of payments, yet having been 
treated as a set off by the Defendant himself, he is not now entitled 
to consider the Plaintiff’s demand as reduced by payments ; and 
at any rate it was not reduced below £5, and therefore was not a 
demand recoverable in the Justices Court.
Carter, J.:
I am of opinion that in this case no suggestion should be en­
tered.
In cases of this description it seems very difficult, if not impos 
sible, to lay down any general rule which may govern al1 cases. 
The question to be decided is whether this was an action brought 
to recover a debt not exceeding £5, and in order to determine this, 
we must consider how far the debt for which the action is brought 
is ascertained by the sum which is actually recovered by the verdict.
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If, in all cases, the Court can only look to the verdict to ascer­
tain the amount of the debt, and are bound by that, it would seem 
that this might become a motion of course, on an affidavit stating 
the nature of the action, and the amount of the verdict. That this 
is not so, the numerous cases and arguments to be found in the re­
ports of the English Courts plainly shew ; and if not so, it would 
then seem that each case must rest on its own circumstances, and 
tnat there is a discretion left to the Court to take the circumstan­
ces of each case into consideration,—to look at the evidence on 
which the verdict was founded, and the verd’ct itself, and then to 
decide the question on all these considerations jointly, and not by 
looking tc the verdict, and to that alone. The language used by 
Chief Justice Abbot, in Shaddick v. Bennett, certainly goes very 
far to the conclusion that the debt for which the action is brought 
is to be ascertained by the sum which is recovered by the verdict; 
but referring that language to the circumstances of the case, then 
under the consideration of the Court, it seems that there was no 
doubt as to the amount of the debt, or the facts of the case, but the 
only point was, whether a debt, barred by the statute of limitations, 
was to be taken to be the debt, for which the action was brought, 
or the sum admitted to be due in the acknowledgment produced, 
to take the case out of the statute. No doubt existed in the mind 
of the Court as to the propriety and justice of the verdict on the 
law and evidence of the case, and under such circumstances there 
can be no doubt that the debt is to be ascertained by the amount 
of the verdict.
So in Younger v. Kilsby, (6 Taun. 452,) Chief Justice Gibbs 
says,—“ The debt is that which is found by the verdict —but it 
does not appear that there was any reason to doubt the propriety 
of the verdict in that case.
In Tucker v. Crosby, 2 Taun. 169, the ground on which the 
Court give judgment is, that the verdict was right, which expres­
sion clearly shews that the Court conceived it within their dis­
cretion to consider the propriety of the verdict on the law and 
evidence of the case.
The language of Lord Ellenborough, in Horn v. Hughes, 8 East. 
317, leads to the conclusion that in the opinion of that very learned 
Judge the verdict was not in all cases conclusive, as to the debt 
for which the action was brought; for he says,—“ It is unneces- 
“ sary to say what we might have thought, if it had appeared that 
“ the Plaintiff had a reasonable ground for bringing ' is action, for 
“ more than five pounds, but that from the absence of a material 
“ witness, or other cause, without his default, he had failed in pro- 
“ ving lis whole demand ; but here it appears, [«. e. to the Court, 
“ as well as the jury,] that less than that stun was due at the time 
“ of bringing the action, by means of a part payment, of which he 
“ must 
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“ must have been cognizant.” This therefore was a case in which 
there appeared to the Court no reason to be dissatisfied with the 
verdict of the jury.
I come now to the case of Harsant v. Larkin. In that case the 
action was brought for £34 5s. Id., a sum fixed as the value of 
work done by Plaintiff for the Defendant, by a surveyor appointed 
by both parties; the Defendant proved payments on account, 
amounting to £24 18s., but the jury formed a lower estimate of 
the work, found a verdict of £1 2s., instead of £9 and upwards, 
which would have been the balance, tak.ng the surveyor’s valua­
tion ; there the Court took all the circumstances of the case into 
consideration, and decided that it was not a case which ought to 
have been submitted to an inferior Court, and therefore refused the 
application. The language of Justice J. Burrough seems to me 
very applicable to the case now under consideration. He says,— 
“ In all cases much may be left to the discretion of the Court upon 
“ the facts as they appear in evidence ; the intention of the Legis- 
“ lature was, that the suggestion as to costs should be applied to 
“ cases where there was a clear demand for less than forty shillings; 
“ but if we look at the facts of this case, we can have no doubt 
“ that it is not one of that description ; here is a demand for more 
“ than £34, a valuation by consent of both parties, a balance 
“ struck, particulars of demand given, and the valuer called, and 
“ though for some reason to us unknown, the jury have found a 
“ verdict for less than the balance, I am satisfied on the merits of 
“ this case, that it is not within the Act.”
The principle laid down in this case has not been over-ruled by 
any subsequent case, for in Drew v. Coles, in which this question 
was fully argued, Lord Lyndhurst carefully abstains from saying 
that in all cases the verdict of the jury should be the criterion of 
the debt justly due, and he also says, that “ in the case then before 
“ the Court, in a conflict of testimony, the jury decided that the 
“ Plaintiff was only entitled to a sum under £5, which sum he 
“ could only rightfully demand. In the same case, Justice B. 
Bayley says, “ prima facie the verdict of a jury is the estimate of 
“ what is the just debt due between the parties at the period when 
“ the action was commenced and he further says, “ if the Court 
“ could exercise a discretionary power in ordinary cases of this 
“ kind, this is not in my opinion a case in which such a discre 
“ tionary power ought to be exercised.” Justice B. Holland ex­
pressly says, that the judgment of the Court in that case will in 
no way trench upon the decision in Ilarsant v. Larkin.
The result to which a careful consideration of all the cases leads 
me, is, that the Court are not finally and universally concluded by 
the verdict of the jury, as to the amount of the debt, though I am 
quite of opinion that the discretion which rests with the Court 
should 
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should be very cautiously exercised. Looking to the facts of the 
present case as they appeared in evidence, it seems that the origi­
nal debt proved by the Plaintiff amounted to between <£20 and <£30, 
but that, by his own admission, it had been reduced to about <£7 
or £8. The Defendant proved payments, or delivery of goods in 
lieu of payment, to the amount of only £5 or £6, and the learned 
Judge who tried the cause told the jury, that as the balance made 
by deducting the amount proved by the Defendant from the origi­
nal debt, would be larger than that admitted by the Plaintiff to be 
the real balance due, they had better take the latter amount for 
their verdict; the jury however found a verdict which can be ex­
plained by neither mode of calculation, viz. for £3 4s. 6d.
Upon these facts, as they appear in evidence, though the jury 
have found a verdict for only £3 4s. 6., (an amount which it seems 
impossible to explain by any construction of the evidence,) I must 
say I am satisfied that this is not a case in which the Court should 
feel themselves prevented by the amount of the verdict so found, 
from refusing to allow the proposed suggestion, which 1 am satis­
fied is not called for by the merits of the case.
Parker, J.:
I agree with the opinion expressed by his Honor the Chief Jus­
tice and my brethren. I think we may decide this case without 
trenching on decisions either at home or here.
The Plaintiff proved between £20 and £30; the Defendant 
gave notice of set off, and proved items which perhaps might have 
been payments, but were given under set off, and it was not made 
a distinct point that they were as payments, and he put a witness 
on the stand to prove the Plaintiff’s admission that only £7 or £8 
was due to him. The Plaintiff ought not to be deprived of costs 
unless he has sued for a demand recoverable in a Justices Court. 
Now if the verdict is binding on the Court as to the amount of the 
debt due, this application, (as has been remarked) would be a mo­
tion of course ; but in all the cases, the Courts have looked at the 
circumstances and considered them, and if they have a right to do 
so, then there can be no doubt that in this case tlie rule should be 
discharged.
Lugrin and Wilmot for Plaintiff.
R. L. Hazen and R. Sands for Defendants.
CAMPBELL, Sheriff of Charlotte, v. WM. HENAN, 
MORRISON, O’NEIL, FARREL, & T1IOS. HENAN
In an action by the Sheriff upon a limit bond under 10 & 11 G. 4, c. 30, 
it is a good defence to shew that the Sheriff had received the Defendant 
again into close custody, either upon being rendered by the bail, or by the 
Defendant rendering himself in discharge of his bail.
Non
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Non damnificatus is a good plea only where the condition of a bond is 
merely to indemnify.
This was an action of debt on a bond made to the Plaintiff by 
the Defendants, conditioned for William Henan, one of the De­
fendants, then a prisoner in the Plaintiff’s custody, continuing 
within the limits of the gaol of Charlotte County.
Thomas Henan was not brought into Court.
The declaration contained only one count on the bond.
The Defendants, William Henan, Morrison, O’Neil, and Farrel, 
craved oyer, and set forth the condition of the bond, which was as 
follows, viz. :—“ Whereas the above-named Colin Campbell,' She- 
“ riff as aforesaid, hath given permission to the above bounden 
“ William Henan, a debtor confined in the gaol of the County 
“ above-mentioned, to go about and have his liberty, within the 
“ yard or limits of such gaol: Now the condition of this obligation 
“ is such, that if the said William Henan shall not go or be at 
“ large, out of the said limits of such gaol, or escape at any time 
* while he has the liberty of the same, thenfj &c., being in the 
form prescribed by the Act, 10 & 11 G. 4, c. 30, s. 13, and plead­
ed, 1st, Non est factum ;(1£d, Actio non, &c., because that after 
the making, &c., and while the said William Henan had the liber­
ty of the said limits of the said gaol, as in the said condition is 
mentioned, to-wit, on, &c., at, &c., the said Morrison, O’Neil, and 
Farrell took the said William Henan to the said gaol of the said 
County of Charlotte, and then and there surrendered and delivered 
him up to the custody of the Plaintiff as such Sheriff as aforesaid, 
in discharge of the said writing obligatory, and their liability there­
on, and the said Plaintiff as Sheriff-, qp afonexaid,\then- and there, 
receibgd and took the said William Henan into 1-is custody, as 
such Sheriff, in discharge of the said Morrison, O'Neil and Far­
rel, and committed him to the said gaol of the said County of 
Charlotte, and there kept and detained him for a long space of 
time, to-wit, for the space of two days. And the said Plaintiff 
afterwards, to-wit, on, &c., without the consent or leave of the said 
Morrison, O’Neil, and Farrell, discharged and set at liberty the 
said William Henan.
3. That after the making, &c., to-wit, on, &c., at, &c., the said 
William Henan surrendered and yielded himself to the Plaintiff, 
as such Sheriff as aforesaid, in discharge of the said writing obliga­
tory, and the said Plaintiff as such Sheriff, then and there received 
and took the said William Henan into his custody, and afterwards 
on, &c., at, &c., suffered and permitted the said William Henan to 
go and be at large, &c.
4th. That the said William Henan did not go nor was at large, 
out of the limits of, &c., nor did he escape at any time while he 
had the liberty of the same
Sth.
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5tli. That the Plaintiff hath not at any time since the making 
of, &c., hitherto been in anywise damnified ; nor hath he sustained 
any damage by reason of the said William Henan going at large 
out of the limits of the said gaol.
The Plaintiff demurred generally to the second, third, and fifth 
pleas, and took issue upon the first and fourth. The Defendants 
joined in demurrer.
Chandler in support of the demurrer.
The bond declared upon is under the Provincial Act, 10 & 11 
G. 4, c. 30, the 11th section of which empowers the Justices of 
the Peace to designate certain limits to the gaol yards ; by the 
13th section the Sheriff is empowered to permit prisoners to have 
their liberty within such limits upon a bond being given to the 
Sheriff, conditioned that the prisoner shall not be at large or 
escape, &c. *
The second and third pleas can only be sustained on the princi­
ple that the Defendants were in the same condition, as principal 
and special bail, and that the bail for the limits under the said Act 
have a power of render, which is not the case. The power which 
ivas formerly given to the Sheriff by 6 G. 4, c. 10, upon reason­
able cause to revoke the permission to prisoners to go about within 
the limits, and renew it if he thought fit, is cancelled by 10 & 11 
G. 4, c. 30, wliich contains no such provision. It would be an 
act of trespass on the part of the sureties to take the principal for 
the purpose of surrendering him, as well as on the part of the She­
riff to receive or detain him when so surrendered. The effect 
therefore of sustaining the pleas in question would be to establish 
that the illegal conduct of the parties is a sufficient answer to the 
action.
BoTSFORD, J. .
Is it not alleged that the Sheriff received him back ? If the bail 
had no right to render, it would follow that the pri ncipal had no right 
to render himself, and that the Sheriff had no right to receive him, 
or if he did, and the prisoner applied for his discharge, the Sheriff 
would have been a trespasser by detaining him. The only availaole 
defence w’ould be to shew a discharge by some instrument, or by 
some act tantamount thereto, on the principle eo ligamine quo 
ligatur, dissolvetur.
As to the fifth plea, non damnificatus, it is clearly bad upon the 
authority of Holmes and another v. Rhodes, 1 B. & P. 638, and 1 
Saun. Rep. 117, note 1. Theie is also a discretionary power 
vested in the Court to extend relief to the bail in such cases as 
they may think proper.
The Solicitor General contra.
Ifthe construction oftheActwereas contended for by thePlaintiff s 
counsel, it would render the Act of Assembly in a great measure 
nugatory, 
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nugatory, as it would be impossible for many debtors to obtain security 
for the limits, if (having obtained it) they were at once placed be­
yond the control, either of their sureties or the Sheriff. But the fail­
construction of the Act and the form of the bond contradict the po­
sition; the party shall not escape, “ while he has the liberty,” and the 
Sheriff “ is authorized and empowered to permit,” &c.; neither the 
words may of shall are used, but the Sheriff is merely empowered to 
permit debtors to go about within the Jamits; and while there, they 
are in the eye of the law as much in custody as if within the prison 
walls; and it cannot be contended therefore, that the Sheriff has no 
control over them.
A debtor is not discharged as he would be on a bail bond being 
given, when he is entirely at large; but even in that case, if he 
should deliver himself up before the return of the writ, he would be 
in custody in the same manner as if he had not been at large.
The second and third pleas are a full answer to the action; the 
Defendants, (and one of them the very debtor himself,) plead that 
the debtor was delivered up to the Sheriff, and received, taken and 
detained by him in custody. Now the condition of the bond is, 
that the debtor shall not escape while he has the liberty of the li­
mits ; the pleas aver that he escaped while in close custody after 
his surrender; how then can the Sheriff, after receiving and de­
taining the debtor as stated, and after either a negligent or wilful 
escape, turn round upon the bail.
Bonds may be discharged by things equivalent to performance, 
as here, by rendering up the debtor, a'though a question might 
have arisen if the Sheriff had refused to receive him. In Hotham 
v>. the East India Company, 1 T. R. 638, Buller, J. says,—“ If 
an act undertaken to be done is dispensed with by the other party 
it is sufficient to state it on the record.”
As to the fifth plea, no action is contemplated by the Act to be 
brought by the Sheriff unless he has sustain ed an injury. If a 
debtor escape, he may assign the bond to the Plaintiff at whose 
suit he was confined, or else it stands in effect an indemnity to him 
against any loss or damage by reason thereof.
\Chipman, C. J.—The bond is given by the lav,, and if forfeited, 
why should not the Sheriff sue on it; it only protects the Sheriff for 
enlarging the walls of the gaol. The bond is intended as a guard to 
the Sheriff in respect of damages ; he is entitled to the amount of 
any damages he may have sustained, and no more, under the sta­
tute ; then what is the quantum of damages the Plaintiff in this case 
is entitled to recover.—The bond is in effect an indemnity bond.] 
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is an action of debt on a bond commonly called a lmii> 
bond., given by the Defendants to the Plaintiff, as Sheriff of the 
K County 
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County of Charlotte, under the Act of Assembly, 10 & 11 G. 4, 
c. 30, s. 13. After recapitulating the pleadings as before stated, 
his Honor continued :—This demurrer has been argued during the 
present term, and now stands for judgment. With regard to the 
second and third pleas which may be considered together, it is not 
necessary for the decision of this case to determine, either on the 
one hand, whether the Sheriff after having given a party the liberty 
of the gaol limits upon the requisite bond being entered into, may, 
against the will of the party, replace him in closeicustody within 
the walls of the gaol; nor on the other hand, whether the party 
himself or his bail, may, against the will of the Sheriff, make a 
surrender into such close custody, The essential allegation in 
both these pleas is, “ that the Sheriff received the debtorf when 
so re-delivered to close custody, as stated in the second plea, upon 
a render by the sureties, and as stated in the third plea, upon a 
render by the debtor himself.
Being then delivered up, and received into close custody again, 
the operation of the limit bond necessarily ceased, for this bond by 
the express tenor of the condition, was only to be in force while 
the party had the liberty of the gaol limits. Upon this single and 
short ground, I am of opinion that there must be judgment for the 
Defendants on the second and third pleas.
Upon the demurrer to tlie fifth plea, I am of opinion there must 
be judgment for the Plaintiff. The plea is no answer to the con­
dition of the Bond; it admits that the condition of the bond has 
not been complied with, and alleges that the Plaintiff hath sus­
tained no damage thereby. Non damnificatus is a good plea only 
when the condition of a bond is merely to indemnify.
When the condition of a bond is for the fulfilment or performance 
of any particular thing, and not merely to save the Plaintiff from 
any damage by reason of such thing, the Defendant must set forth 
specially the performance of the condition.
Botsford, J:
I shall forbear to give an opinion as to the fifth plea, but as to 
the second and third pleas, I am satisfied they contain a full and 
sufficient answer to the condition of the bond, and therefore upon 
those pleas the Defendant is entitled to judgment.
Carter, J.:
I am also of opinion that there is sufficient in the second and 
third pleas to answer the condition of the bond.
When the escape took place the Defendant had not his liberty 
withii. the gaol limits, and the condition of the bond was only that 
he should not escape while he had such liberty.
Without deciding the question on a render by the sureties, or by 
the debtor himself, or their right to make such reader, or upon a 
taking
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taking into close custody by the Sheriff against the will of the 
debtor, it is sufficient to determine this case, that the Sheriff re­
ceived the debtor and had him in close custody.
There is also a further allegation in the second plea, upon which 
it is not now necessary to decide ; but it might have been argued 
that the escape took place by the sufferance and permission of the 
Sheriff.
As to the fifth plea I had considerable doubts, but have now a 
strong opinion that the plea is insufficient.
Parker, J.:
I quite agree in opinion with the rest of the Court. The fact, 
as substantially set out in both the second and the third pleas, 
“ that the debtor was rendered to, and received by the Sheriff in 
the gaol, and kept there in discharge of the bond until released by 
him,” is, I think, a sufficient answer to the action of the Sheriff 
thereon.
The demurrer to the fifth plea is, in my opinion, sustainable. 
Non damnificatus is a good plea to an action on a bond only where 
the condition is specifically for indemnity, for in that case it denies 
that the condition has been broken;—Carthew, 374, and 5 Mod. 
243. In the present case the plea admits a breach of the condition.
It must be remarked that the form of the limit bond has been 
prescribed by the Legislature, who would have given a different 
one, or might specially have authorized the plea of non damnifica­
tus, had they intended that the bond should not be available to the 
Sheriff, until he had actually sustained damage himself in conse­
quence of the debtor going at large.
Judgment for Defendant on the second and third pleas.
J. W. Chandler for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and A. L. and G. D. Street for Defendants.
ELLIS v. NEWTON.
Where the affidavit, oil shewing cause, contradicts the one on which the 
rule was obtained, the latter must prevail.
F. A. Kinnear, in last Trinity Term, obtained a rule nisi to set 
aside a judgment as in case of a nonsuit in this cause for surprize ; 
the rule was served on the Defendant’s Attorney on 31st August.
D. L. Robinson now shewed cause on affidavit.
Per Curiam.
The rule must be discharged ; the facts are differently stated in 
the affidavits, and in such cases the affidavit of the party shewing 
cause must prevail.
There was great laches in not serving the rule nisi at an earlijtr 
period.
GIBBS
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GIBBS v. DeVEBER.
Security for costB will not be granted, unless application be made in due 
time.
A rule nisi for security for costs in this cause was obtained by 
Wilmot in last Trinity Term.
J. W. Chandler, for Plaintiff, shewed cause,—1st. On affidavits 
which stated that the Plaintiff’s absence was only temporary.— 
Issue was joined in Trinity, 1834. The Plaintiff went to England 
in January, 1835, to seek evidence in the cause, and was shortly 
expected to return.
2d. The Defendant was too late in his aDplication, having known 
of the Plaintiff’s absence previous to last Easter Term.
Rule discharged.
JOHNSTON v. BRANSFIELD.
Two writs for the same cause of action were simultaneously issued to dif­
ferent Counties, and Defendant was arrested on both and bail entered there­
on ; Plaintiff’s Attorney immediately notified Defendant’s Attorney of the 
fact, and only filed declaration on the one writ. Held that judgment of non 
pros cannot be .igned on the other. The proper course is to apply to the 
Court for relief.
The Plaintiff sued out two writs against Defendant, returnable 
in Hilary, 1835, one to York, the other to Carleton; both were 
indorsed on oath for the same amount. The Defendant was ar­
rested in York in November, and immediately entered special bail, 
of which notice was given to the Plaintiff’s Attorney. In Decem- 
ner he was arrested in Carleton, and again entered special bail, of 
which notice was also given, lhe Plaintiff’s Attorney then ap­
prized the Defendant’s Attorney that there was but one cause of 
action, and expressed his intention to discontinue on the second 
writ. In June a declaration was filed, but the second recognizance 
remaining m force, the Defendant afterwards signed a judgment 
of non. pros.
Wilmot for Plaintiff, in Trinity Term obtained a rule nisi to set 
aside the judgment for irregularity, a declaration having been filed 
in the cause previous to the judgment.
J. A. Street for Defendant, now shewed cause, contending that 
the judgment of non. pros. applied to the writ which was set out 
in the record, and that there having been two arrests, it was not 
competent for the Plaintiff after the arrest made, and bail entered, 
to assert there was only one cause of action ; and even if such were 
the case, a judgment of non. pros, might be signed as to part of 
the action without affecting another part.—2 Ch. Arch Pr. (1835' 
893, Dordsy m Cook, 4 B. and C. 135.
Per
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Per Curiam.
The leading fact in this case is, that there is but one cause which 
has been put an end to by a judgment cf non. pros. which is irre­
gular, a declaration having been filed previous to the signing of 
the judgment. It is competent for a I laintiff to sue writs into 
different Counties, and if in this cause there has been an irregula­
rity, the Defendant has misconceived his remedy; he should have 
applied to the Court for relief. The rule was made absolute with­
out costs; and on the application of the Defendant, it was further 
ordered, that an exoneretur should be entered on the bail-piece last 
given, and that the Plaintiff shotdd pay to the Defendant his costs 
of entering such last-mentioned bail and appearance.
Wilmot for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Berton for Defendant.
CALIFF v. WILSON.
When a person having authority by law, as contra-distinguished from an 
authority in fact, abuses that authority, this abuse of the authority makes 
every thing under it void.
Trespass for taking and carrying away Fish Nets, &c.
The Defendant pleaded,—1st. The General Issue; and 2dly, 
justified the taking as an overseer of the fisheries, for that the said 
net was set contrary to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, 8 
G. 4, c. 11, and averred that the said nets were not claimed within 
five days, and were thereupon sold as forfeited, pursuant to the 
said Act. Flamtiff replied, that the nets were claimed within the 
time limited, on which issue was joined.
The cause was tried at the August Circuit in Charlotte, and a 
verdict given for the Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant, moved for a rule nisi to set aside 
the verdict and grant a new trial, on the ground that trespass was 
not sustainable, inasmuch as the original taking by the Defendant 
having been legal, there was not proved any such subsequent act 
as would make the Defendant a trespasser, ab initio.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
There were in this case two issues,—1st. The General Issue. 
2d. That the Plaintiff did not appear to claim the nets within the 
time limited by law. Both these issues have been found in favor 
of the Plaintiff, and it thereby appears on the record, that the De­
fendant after, and notwithstanding the claim of the goods made by 
the Plaintiff, sold them ; if this is not such an act as would make 
the Defendant a trespasser, ab tnitiu^ the Defendant can move in 
arrest of judgment; but the case is so clear that it not necesoarv 
further to agitate the question.
It
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It is clear that when a person having authority by law, as con­
tra-distinguished from an authority in fact, abuses that authority, 
this abuse of the authority makes every thing done under it void. 
It is not, however, a mere negative abuse of the authority that will 
have this effect. There must be some positive act, not a mere 
non-feasance; some direct invasion of property, to make the whole 
proceeding void, and the party a trespasser, ab initio. What then 
is the present case ? The law provides that if the nets seized are 
not claimed in a certain time they shall be forfeited and sold;—in 
tics case they were claimed within the time limited by law, and 
therefore no forfeiture was incurred; the Defendant nevertheless 
went on to sell and deliver the nets as if they were forfeited. This 
was a direct invasion of the property of the Plaintiff, and made the 
Defendant a trespasser, ab initio, and all his proceedings void. The 
case of the estray, reported in 1 T. R. 12, Oxley v. Watts, is 
directly in point.
The seizure here was originally lawful, but became unlawful by 
reason of the subsequent sale, when not forfeited according to law, 
and the Defendant is therefore rightfully mulcted in all the dama­
ges arising from his proceedings.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Carter, J.:
If there was anything in this objection, it appears on the record, 
and the Defendant might have demurred, or moved for a nonsuit, 
or may move in arrest of judgment, but clearly there is no ground 
for an application for a new trial.
1 agree with his Honor the Chief Justice, that there is nothing 
in the point taken by the learned Counsel; the illegal sale was an 
act which made the party a trespasser, ab initio, and rendered him 
liable for all the damage the Plaintiff sustained in consequence of 
such sale. In Cornyn’s Digest, Tres. C. 2, are two cases of acts 
which make a man a trespasser, ab initio, which seem applicable 
to the present case. “ If a purveyor who takes my cattle for the 
“ King’s honour—sells them.”
“ If a man has authority given by statute, and does not pursue, 
“ or abuses his power; as if a man having authority by statute, 2 
“ W. and M., to sell a distress for rent if it be not replevied within 
“ five days after notice! he sells it without notice given.”
In both these cases the original taking was legal, but the sub­
sequent sale was illegal, and therefore the man was a trespasser, 
ab initio.
Parker, J.:
I agree with his Honor the Chief Justice and my brethren. This 
was an action of trespass to personal property. The Defendant, 
it was proved, took, carried away, and disposed of the Plaintiff’s 
goods 
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goods. The defence set up was such as could ouly be available on 
a special plea of justification. This justification was so leaded, 
and an issue joined thereon, which being found for the Plaintiff, 
destroys this defence. The only other issue was the general issue, 
denying the fact of the taking, ar.d which was necessarily found 
for the Plaintiff on the evidence. I think the verdict was clearly 
right on both the issues, and ought not to be disturbed.
Rule refused.
PINE AND ANOTHER v. M‘LACHLAN.
The Court will, in their discretion, allow a party to amend his declara­
tion, on payment of costs.
The Defendant demurred to the Plaintiff’s declaration. De­
murrer books were delivered to the Court, and the cause^entered 
in the special paper for argument.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant, moved for leave to amend his 
declaration on payment of the costs of the demurrer ; 1 Arch. Prac. 
479. The Solicitor General suggested that the rule, as to amend­
ments at the present stage, was not general, but applicable only to 
special demurrers.—Sed
Per Curiam.
This is a matter in the discretion of the Court, and we think the 
Plaintiff should have leave to amend on payment of costs.
BLACK AND OTHERS v. KIRK.
Where a Judge has reported the material question in a cause to be the 
construction of a deed, under which Plaintiff seeks to recover for use and 
occupation, the case is clearly within the exception of the Act 50 G. 3, c. 17.
R. L. Hazen obtained a rule nisi in Michaelmas, to enter a sug­
gestion to deprive the Plaintiffs of costs, under the Act of Assem­
bly, 50 G. 3, c. 17. The action was assumpsit. The declaration 
contained counts for use and occupation; for wharfage and slippage 
of vessels, and the common money courts.
At the trial before Carter, J. at the St. John Circuit in June, 
the Plaintiffs obtained a verdict for £4. Carter, J. now reported 
the cause as an action brought to try the right to a wharf and part 
of a slip in the City of St. John, and the wharfage appurtenant 
thereto. The Plaintiffs proved their title to the premises under 
the will of the late Hon. John Black ; and also put in evidence a 
conveyance made by the said John Black to L. Donaldson, of ad­
joining premises, which the Defendant had occupied under Do­
naldson. It was proved that the Defendant’s vessels, while lying 
at Donaldson’s wharf, had extended oyer the Plaintiff’s property 
and 
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and that the Defendant had received the wharfage dues of othei 
vessels similarly situated. Notice had been given to him of the 
Plaintiff’s claims. The defence rested on the construction of a 
particular clause in the Deed of Black to Donaldson, which his 
Honor corceived to be clearly in favor of the Plaintiffs; and that 
as they had made out their title to the freehold of the property, so 
partially occupied as aforesaid, they were entitled to recover ; and 
directed the jury accordingly. That the amount of damages was 
not very material, the action being brought to try the right, and so 
specifically stated in the bill of particulars. His Honor considered 
that the freehold had been in question.
N. Parker shewed cause at this Term. The action was of an 
intricate nature, in which damages were not the object, but the 
settlement of an important right; it was tried by a special jury, 
and certified as a proper cause for a special jury; the amount of 
the demand, if insisted on, would have exceeded £‘25, and besides 
the title of the freehold was expressly in question. He cited Drew 
v. Fletcher, 1 B. & C. 283; Axon v. Dallimore, 3 D. & R. 51.
R. L. Hazen, in support of tlie rule, urged that the Plaintiffs’ 
case did not affect the freehold ; the Defendant did not claim that; 
the question was more in the nature of a right of way claimed by 
Defendant over the Plaintiffs’ property. An easement, 12 E. 162. 
The action was for money had and received, in which the title to 
the freehold could not be tried; the Plaintiff called for and gave in 
evidence the Defendant’s deed, but the Defendant made no ques­
tion as to the freehold, and called no witnesses.
The difficulty or intricacy of the case formed no sufficient objection 
to its trial before the Inferior Tribunal, if by its amount it was con­
fined to it by the A ct of Assembly. Keay v. Rigg, 1 B. & P. 11. 
Botsford, J.:
Referred to Double v. Gibbs, 1 Dowl. Pr. C. 533, and Sandby 
v. Miller, 5 East. 194. Holden v. Newman, 13 East. 160, was 
also referred to.
Per Curiam.
The Act of Assemble 50 G. 3, c. 17, excepts from the jurisdic­
tion of Justices of the Peace, actions wherein the freehold of lauds 
may in any way come in question. The learned Judg J has re­
ported the material question to have been the construction of a 
deed under which the Plaintiffs’ right to recover for the occupation 
of then: land was disputed, and he considered the freehold in ques­
tion ; the case is therefore clearly within the exception of the Act.
Parker, J. having been concerned in the cause when at the 
bar, gave no opinion.
Rule discharged with costs.
N. Parker for Plaintiffs.
R. L. Hazen for Defendant. DOE
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DOE EX DLM DUNCAN v. CHRISTOPHER.
Where no verdict has been given, a nonsuit will not be granted by the 
Court above, on a point reserved at the trial.
THIS was an action of ejectment, tried before Parker, J. at the 
Gloucester Assizes in September. At the trial, a motion for non­
suit was over-ruled, but leave was given to move in banc upon 
the point reserved, and the case went to the jury. After the jury 
had retired, a juror was taken suddenly ill, and it being considered 
by a physician, who by direction cf the Court had visited hiri in 
the jury room, that his illness was of an alarming nature, and re­
quired immediate medical aid, the parties not being able to come 
to any agreement, his Honor discharged the jury.
J. A. Street at this Term moved for a rule nisi, for a nonsuit 
on the point reserved at the trial.—Sed
Per Curiam.
The point cannot new be considered ; there is no verdict to set 
aside ; the cause has not in fact been tried, but stands as a remanet.
Rule refused.
FLAHERTY «. SAYRE.
Unless the husband be directly interested in the subject matter of the 
suit, the wife is a competent witness for either party.
THIS was an action of trover, tried before Carter, J. at the 
Westmorland Assizes in September last.
The Plaintiff offered in evidence a bill of sale to him of the pro­
perty in question, made by John Smyth and William Smyth. 'I re 
instrument was attested by two witnesses, one of whom was proved 
to be out cf the Province, and evidence was given of his hand­
writing ; the other witness was the wife of John Smyth before 
mentioned.
The Plaintiff proposed to give evidence of her hand-writing, but 
it appearing that she was within the Province,
J. Stewart, for Defendant, objected to the evidence as inadmis­
sible ; the witness ought to be produced.
A. Stewart contended, that the witness being the wife of a per­
son immediately interested in the event of the suit,. was incompe­
tent, and could not be examined, if produced ; and he submitted 
that the deed was sufficiently proved by the evidence of the hand­
writing of the other subscribing witness ; that it was unnecessary 
to go further, as it appeared that Mrs. Smyth, at the time of her 
attestation, was incompetent; the deed was therefore the same as 
if the name did not appear on the face of it. He cited 5 T R. 
271, Swire v. Bell, and Roscoe’s Evidence, 68.
E. B. Chandler
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E. B. Chandler and J. Stewarl submitted that the incompetency 
of the witness was occasioned by the interest of her husband, 
through whom the Plaintiff claimed title to the property, and they 
had it in their power, by releasing the husband, to make her com­
petent—knowing her to be interested, the Plaintiff had made In r 
a witness, and could not now object to her competency. 3 Camp. 
195, Honeywood v. Peacock. The deed could not be read without 
the testimony of the attesting witness.
Carter, J. was of opinion that the witness should be pro­
duced.
The Plaintiff not being able to produce the witness, and the bill 
of sale being the foundation of their action, they became non­
suited.
The Solicitor General at this Term moved for a rule nisi to set 
aside the nonsuit for the improper rejection of the testimony. No 
notice of the motion had been given to the Judge.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
The rule requiring notice of motion to be given to the Judge, 
appears not to have been fully understood, and therefore as Mr. 
Justice Carter has his notes in Court, we will hear this motion ; 
but it is to be distinctly understood that the rule requiring notice 
to the Judge of motions for new trials, is to apply to all cases, 
whether the points be reserved or not.
The Solicitor General, in addition to the arguments used at the 
trial, urged, that if the wife had not been a witness, then the proof 
necessary to establish the deed was completed,■ that she being in­
competent at the time of the execution, the attestation by her was 
a nullity. It was unnecessary for the Plaintiffs to bring or pro­
duce the witness, if in fact she would have been objectionable when 
produced. The learned Counsel took a distinction between this 
and the case if the wife had been the only witness, then there 
would have been no evidence to establish the deed ; at the trial 
moreover, evidence of the vender’s hand-writing was offered. He 
cited the case mentioned at nisi prius, and also 1 Star. Ev. 103,337.
On a subsequent day the Court refused the rule.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The ground of the incompetency of a wife as a witness, is the 
interest of her husband in the subject matter of the suit; but it did 
not appear in the present case that the husband had any interest 
in the suit. His Honor mentioned a case in 1 Strange, 504, cited 
in Bac. Abr. Tit. Ev. A., where in an action for goods sold, a wife 
was admitted to prove the goods delivered on the husband’s credit, 
and observed that this case was much stronger; the husband in 
the case in Strange might have been subject to a legal demand in 
consequence of the wife’s evidence; it did not appear that even 
this 
in the Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV. 85
this would be the effect in the present case. If this objection to 
the wife’s competency should be sustained, a wife never could be a 
witness to prove the signature of her husband.
The Solicitor General and A. Stewart for Plaintiff.
J. Stewart and E. B. Chandler for Defendant.
MARTINDALE & WIFE v. MURPHY & WIFE.
In defamation for calling a woman a whore,—Held a sufficient induce­
ment to aver that Defendant intended to impute unchastity, without averring 
a specific offence.
This was an action on the case for defamatory words spoken by 
the Defendant’s wife of the wife of the Plaintiff, tried before Parker, 
J. at the last Northumberland Circuit, to which the General Issue 
was pleaded, and a verdict given for the Plaintiff on the third 
count, with £32 damages.
The declaration contained the usual averment of good character, 
and that the words were spoken with the intent to impute unchas­
tity,—the expressions charged were very gross, but the material 
words were,—“ She is a d—d strumpet, and J. P’s whore 
there was no inuendo explanatory of the words.
J. A. Street, for the Defendant, moved in arrest of judgment, 
and contended that the words were not actionable in themselves, 
nor had the Plaintiffs put such a construction on them in their de­
claration as would make them actionable, and there was no allega­
tion or proof of special damage. The Act of Assembly, 31 G. 3, 
c. 5, which had been referred to at the trial in support of the action, 
applied only to certain specific offences, viz., incest, adultery, and 
fornication, neither of which were necessarily comprehended un­
der the term unchastity, as that term would equally apply to the 
adultery of the heart, which was in the Scripture considered as 
much a crime as the commission of the act itself; unchastity might 
be imputed without any charge of the offences to which the Act of 
Assembly refers ; and the declaration, n order to sustain the action, 
ought to have charged a specific imputation of adultery or forni­
cation.
Per Curiam.
Under the Act of Assembly, a charge of this nature is clearly 
objectionable in this Province, if the words are such as to impute 
the offences thereby made actionable in the temporal courts. The 
words in this declaration, calling a married woman a strumpet and 
J. P’s whore, admit of no ambiguity or doubt. Unchastity is a 
general term, like theft, which may include various particulars. 
To call a man a sheep stealer, thereby meaning to impute theft, is 
an analogous case. There is nothing in the inducement (supposing 
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it to be material,) which can be take n to contract or abridge th« 
natural and commonly received import of the words spoken.
Rule refused.
IV CarmarfifoT Plaintiffs.
Street Kerr for Defendants.
CLARKE v. ROBINSON.
The Court will not set aside a verdict to enable Defendant to set up a 
release from Plaintiff, given prior to the trial, where it appears that the me­
ritorious cause of action is in the wife, and the defence is unconscionable.
Assumpsit. Tried before Parker, J. at Northumberland, in 
September last. Verdict for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street, for Defendant, moved on affidavits, for a rule nisi, 
to set aside the verdict. The affidavits stated that a release had 
been Bxecuteu by the Plaintiff previous to the trial, and that he 
had not authorized the bringing, of the action. The release was 
annexed to the affidavits, and contained a certificate that the 
Plaintiff bad not authorized the bringing of the action ; this was 
dated 19th August, 1835. It appeared that the Plaintiff formerly 
resided in this Province, but had left it some years ago, and was 
now living in the United States, separated from his wife, who had 
been left by him at Miramiclii.
This action was instituted by her for wages due her from De­
fendant for services performed subsequent to her husband’s depar­
ture. When the case was put at issue, the Defendant went to the 
residence of the Plaintiff at Calais, in the State of Maine, and pro­
cured a full release. The Defendant’s affidavit further stated that 
he was prevented by illness from getting to Miramiclii in time for 
the trial, and that he did in fact arrive the evening of the day on 
which the case was tried.
It was urged that although the action was for the .services of the 
wife, yet being in the name of the husband, who alone was entitled 
to the money, if recovered, his release and acknowledgment were 
sufficient to induce the Court to interpose and prevent his having 
the benefit of a verdict, which had been obtained in consequence of 
the return of the Defendant having been delayed by illness. An 
application had bean made at nisi prius to put off the trial on an 
affidavit of the Defendant’s Attorney, which however was admitted 
to be insufficient.
The following authorities were cited---8 Taun. 206 ; Cov. and 
Huglied, lit Illg; 10 Mod. Rep. 202; 2 Chitty’s Arch. Pr. 
927 ; 2 Salk, 618; 3 Taun. 484 ; Pratt. Dig. 629.
Per Curiam.
This is an application to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court, 
to 
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to re-open a cause for the purpose of admitting an unconscionable 
defence. The Plaintiff had abandoned his wife—she was compelled 
to seek her own livelihood, and earned an amount by her industry, 
to recover which she instituted this action necessarily in the name 
of her husband; the Defendant did not attempt to meet her claim 
on any just or meritorious ground, but went out of the Province in 
quest of the Plaintiff, in order to procure a release, which would 
cut up by the roots the demand against him ; had he been in time, 
probably in law, the release, if pleaded puis darien continuance, 
would have been a bar to the action, but having failed in that, he 
is not entitled to the least favor ; he has not shewn that any actual 
adjustment of accounts or fair settlement took place between him 
and t’ne Plaintiff, upon which the discharge was founded; he has 
no right to appeal to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court.
Rule refused.
End and Wheeler for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Kerr for Defendant.
HOLMES L. CLARKE.
Where personal property of the Defendant is in the actual possession of 
Plaintiff under an agreement, the latter may maintain trespass against the 
former for the forcible taking.
This was an action of trespass, tried before Parker, J. at the 
Carleton Assizes in September.
The declaration contained several counts for trespass, quare 
clausum fregit, and others, de bonis asportatis.
An agreement was put in evidence by the Plaintiff, by which it 
appeared that the Defendant had let to the Plaintiff the premises 
in question for the years 1834 and 1835, and vqSAianted “ to fur­
nish a team for the use of the farm in a subsequent part of the 
instrument it was mentioned that “Defendant should have the 
mare to ride when not employed on the farm.” The Defendant 
reserved a part of the house and farm to himself, and had a right 
of access over every part of it.
It appeared that the Defendant was dissatisfied at the Plaintiff’s 
manner of working the farm, and had declared that if he did not 
furnish more labour, he, the Defendant, would not allow him to 
remain on the place or use the team.
It was proved that there was a team of horses on the farm be­
longing to the Defendant which the Plaintiff had been in the habit 
of using in ploughing and other farming operations.
On the 7th of May, the Plaintiff and his son took the horses of 
this team from the barn, and were getting them ready to put to 
rhe plough, when the Defendant interfered with much violence, 
and took them from them, and returned them to the barn.—The 
other 
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other trespasses complained of were abandoned, and the Plaintiff’s 
case rested upon this alone.
The Solicitor General and Berton moved for a nonsuit, on the 
ground that the horses in question were the property of the De­
fendant, in his barn, and in his possession ; and that the fact pro­
ved did not amount to an act of trespass, but a breach of contract. 
The Plaintiff had not such an exclusive possession of the horses as 
would support trespass.
PARKER, J. over-ruled the objection, but reserved the point for 
the consideration of the Court in banc. Tin; learned Judge left it 
to the jury to consider whether the team of horses in question was 
that which, by the terms of the agreement, was to be furnished by 
the Defendant; stating it as his opinion, if that were the case, that 
the Plaintiff had at the time such a possession as would enable him 
to maintain trespass even against the Defendant himself for forcibly 
taking them away. His Honor confined the attention of the 
jury, in assessing the damages, strictly to the act of trespass, 
and the injury immediately resulting to the Plaintiff thereupon.— 
A verdict was returned for the Plaintiff with £4 damages, to set 
aside which, and enter a nonsuit,
The Solicitor General now moved for a rule nisi; he contended 
that the act of the Defendant was only a refusal to allow the Plain­
tiff to use his (the Defendant’s) horses, or to furnish a team ; and 
that if the Plaintiff had thereby sustained damage, his remedy was 
by action on the agreement, and not for trespass.
[Chipman, C. J.—If the Plaintiff had been ploughing, could 
Defendant have taken the horses from the plough.]
If the horses were engaged in ploughing, then the presumption 
would have been that the Defendant had allowed them to be taken 
for the day; but as it was, when the Plaintiff was about to take 
them, the Defendant stopped him. The property was in the De­
fendant, and even if the Plaintiff had a right to take the horses 
without reference to the Defendant, his right was only that of a 
tenant in common, and would not sustain trespass. 1 T. R. 658. 
Chipman, Chief Justice :
Had no doubt upon the question. By the agreement, the De­
fendant let to Plaintiff his farm for two years, and agreed to pro­
vide a horse team ; the import of the expression was that the 
Plaintiff should be put in possession of the team for the use of the 
farm. The subsequent part of the agreement explained any am­
biguity as to the intention*of the parties, and provided that the 
Defendant should have the use of the mare, when not engaged at 
farming, for riding; the definite article implied a specific team 
provided. The question put to the jury was, whether the horses 
were the team provided for the use of the farm. In point of fact 
they 
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they were not in the stable, but were in the Plaintiff's hands for 
actual use on the farm, when the Defendant took them. I thiuk 
a clear case of possession was proved, and that the verdict should 
not be disturbed.
BOTSFORD, J. :
The agreement produced was a lease of a farm on shares, in a 
way very common in the country. The Defendant reserved a 
part of it; all the rest was let to the Plaintiff on certain conditions. 
The Defendant had a qualified right to the mare to use her for 
riding, when not engaged on the form.
The verdict establishes that the horses were furnished under the 
agreement, and it appears that they were in actual use—when they 
were taken they were in the possession of the Plaintiff, and the 
Defendant had no right to take them.
Carter, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
I thought at the trial, and so stated, that it would have been 
better if the action had been on the agreement, as thereby the ma­
terial matters in dispute between the parties would have been set­
tled, which were necessarily excluded from consideration in this 
action, and I took much pains to confine the attention of the jury 
strictly to the particular act of trespass proved. There was direct 
evidence that a team of horses was on the farm, which the Plain­
tiff had been in the habit of using in the farming operations, to the 
exclusive possession of which for that purpose I considered him 
entitled under the agreement, at the time they were taken away 
by the Defendant.
The jury have by their verdict established the point that the 
horses were in the Plaintiff’s possession under the agreement, and 
I think there is no ground to disturb it.
Rule refused.
Beardsley and Wilmot for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General, Berton and Needham, for Defendant.
BRANSFIELD v. BISHOP, WHITE, & Two Others.
In an action of trespass for taking Plaintiff’s ox,—Held that Defendant’s 
admission that he had killed the ox and ought to pay for it, was not suffi­
cient to make him a trespasser without proof of the trespass.
Trespass for taking cattle, tried before Parker, J. at the Carle­
ton i Circuit in last September.
There was evidence that the Plaintiff’s oxen had been at differ­
ent times employed in the work of the several Defendants, and 
that one of the oxen while ploughing for White had been seriously 
injured, and afterwards died. But supposing these to have been 
acts 
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acts of trespass, there was nothing to shew a connection between 
the Defendants, except a declaration made by White, that “ they 
had killed the ox, and ought to pay Bransfield for him.”
At the close of the Plaintiff’s case, the learned Judge required 
the Plaintiff’s Counsel to elect against which of the Defendants 
he would proceed.
Berton, for Plaintiff, elected to proceed against Bishop, and 
claimed also to be allowed to proceed against White, because his 
admission was sufficient to connect him with any other Defendant. 
This not being objected to by Robinson, the Defendants’ Counsel, 
was allowed, and the other two Defendants were thereupon ac­
quitted.
On the part of the Defendants, evidence was given that the 
Plaintiff’s agent had the cattle, and had used them in the service 
of the Defendants respectively, and some evidence of his authority 
from the Plaintiff was also given.
His Honor directed the jury that they might find against the 
two Defendants jointly, or against either of them individually ; if 
jointly, then only for the trespass proved against Bishop ; ar.d left 
it to them to consider if the cattle were in the possession of the 
Plaintiff’s agent, and if he had authority to use or permit them to 
be used, or if the Defendants were ignorant of his want of autho­
rity ; stating it as bis opinion, that the Defendants’ act in using 
the cattle by permission of the Plaintiff’s agent, was not a trespass, 
if the oxen had been left in the agent’s possession, and the Defend­
ants were ignorant of his want of authority so to employ them.
Verdict for Defendants.
Berton, for Pla' itiff, moved to set aside the verdict, as being 
against evidence, and contended that the admission of White was 
conclusive against him, and without reference to the other De­
fendants, entitled the Plaintiff to a verdict against him.—Sed 
Per Curiam.
White’s admission might be sufficient to charge him with the 
value of the ox; but connected with the other evidence, is not suf­
ficient to make him a trespasser. It is consistent with his admis­
sion to suppose that he hired or obtained the oxen from the autho­
rized agent of the Plaintiff, and if so, and the ox were injured, the 
Plaintiff’s remedy would not be by action of trespass.
Parker, J. intimated that he had submitted the cause to the 
jury against both Defendants, in the manner already stated, at the 
instance of the Plaintiff’s Counsel, ■which was not objected to on 
the other side; but he thought it had been left much more broadly 
than even the Plaintiff’s case justified.
Rule refused.
Berton and Needham, for Plaintiff.
L. Robinson for Defendants. FERGUS
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FERGUS v. M'INTOSH.
Costs of a commission to examine witnesses are, under 5 W. 4, c. 34 
costs in the cause.
Chandler moved on affidavit to have the expenses of issuing a 
commission to examine witnesses and in taking the depositions, 
allowed in the costs of the cause.
Per Curiam.
Let the costs of the commission and depositions be made costs 
in the cause ; under the late Act of Assembly such expenses are 
made part of the costs.
L. Robinson—Am Cur mentioned a case, Barlow v. The Saint 
John Marine Insurance Company, in Easter, 1830, where on mo­
tion the Court ordered a review of the taxation, and the Master to 




6 Wm. 4, Cap. XIV.
An Act to provide for reporting and publishing the decisions of 
the Supreme Court.
Passed 8th March, 1836.
i TfATHEREAS it is an object of great importance to obtain 
v ▼ ‘ correct reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court
‘ in cases heard and determined in the said Court—
I. Be it therefore enacted by the Lieutenant Governor, Legisla­
tive Council and Assembly, That His Excellency the I. ieutenant 
Governor or Commander in Chief of this Province for the time 
being, by and with the advice of His Majesty’s Executive Council, 
is hereby authorized to appoint some suitable person, learned in the 
law, to be a Reporter of the opinions, decisions, and judgments, 
which may from time to time be given, made and pronounced, by 
the Supreme Court of Judicature in this Province, or the Judges 
thereof, in, upon or respecting causes pending or that may here­
after be pending therein ; and that it shall be the duty of such Re­
porter, by his personal attendance, or by any other means in his 
power, to obtain true and authentic reports of such opinions, de­
cisions and judgments ; and such Reporter shall publish not less 
than two hundred copies of the same in pamphlets, after each 
Term of the said Court.
II. And be it enacted, That the sole liberty of printing and re­
printing, and publishing such reports, shall be and the same is 
i-erebv vested in and secured to the author and compiler thereof, 
his heirs and assigns ; and if any person shall print, repr nt or pub­
lish any such reports, without the consent of the author and com­
piler or proprietor thereof, he shall be liable to an action on the 
case, at the suit of such proprietor, in which action such proprietor 
shall recover double the damages he may have sustained by any 
such infringement of the copy rieht hereby secured to him.
III.
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III. And be it enacted, That in addition to any profits that may 
arise from the publication and sale of such reports, such Reporter 
shall receive annually from the Province Treasury the sum of fifty 
pounds, to be paid by warrant of His Excellency the Lieutenant 
Governor or Commander in Chief for the time being, on the cer­
tificate of the Chief J ustice of the said Court, that such Reporter 
has diligently performed the duties by this Act required of him for 
the year for which such allowance may be claimed.
IV. And be it enacted, That this Act shall be and continue in 
force for three years and no longer.
BY AUTHORITY.
CIVIL APPOINTMENT.
George F. S. Berton, Esquire, to be Reporter of the de­
cisions in the Supreme Court.
Royal Gazette
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WIGGINS v. WHITE, GARRISON AND WOODS.
Persons wlio jointly manufacture timber, which it is agreed shall be divi­
ded between them, are not partners, but tenants in common, or joint owners, 
and each has only a right to dispose of his own share.
Quere.—If any and what a<'ts of a tenant in common or joint owner of a 
chattel, other than a destruction of the property, will enable his co-tenant 
to maintain trespass or trover ?
THIS was an action of trespass, for taking a quantity of timber, 
tried in last Trinity Term before Chipman, C. J. ;—the verdict 
was for the Defendants. A rule nisi to set aside the verdict hav­
ing been obtained, the rule was argued in Michaelmas Term, and 
in this Term the Court pronounced their opinions.
The facts and circumstances of the case and the arguments of 
Counsel are fully detailed in the opinions of the Court, and are 
therefore omitted here.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The only question which, I thinkrtshould be deci’ed under the 
present circumstances of this case, is that which arises upon the 
construction of the following agreement, made between the De­
fendant Woods and one George A. Lockwood, and producedin 
evidence on tlie part of the Plaintiff :—
“ This agreement made and entered into this day, between George A. Lock- 
“ wood of the one part, and George Woods of the other part, witnessetli; the 
“ said Woods is to make one thousand tons white pine timber on Little River at 
“ the Grand Falls—pay the stumpage, to pay half, and the si<id Woods to
“ advance,) and make said timber in such a place as not to have more than two 
“ miles to haul on an average—each to find equal hands in cutting all main oads 
“ through the timber and clearing the stream sufficient to drive said timber— 
“ and said Lockwood is to haul said quantity of one thousand tons for one half on 
“ the brow. Each party to find equal hands and supplies to drive, raft and take 
“ the same to marke t. Said Woods to take all defective timber when re-exami- 
“ ned at Saint John, and said Lockwood to take any timber that may remain in 
“ the woods of the said quantity:—should he fail in hauling the whole quantity— 
“ and should he be kept idle for want of timber to haul, his time to be paid for 




“ GEO. A. LOCKWOOD.
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“ each bind themselves uniu the other in the penal sum of five hundred pound* 
“ of lawful money of New-Brunswick.
(Signed)
“ Dated the 18th day of Oct. 1831.
“ Witness present,
(Signed) “John Grant.”
The parcel of timber which was in question in this cause, had 
been made by Woods and hauled by Lockwood, under this agree­
ment. It was rafted and carried to market at Saint John, under 
circumstances which it is not at present necessary to advert to ; 
and there it was taken by the Defendants Garrison and Woods 
from the Plaintiff, who was in possession thereof, having derived 
his title thereto from Lockwood. The Defendant Garrison was 
proved to be the Deputy of the Defendant White, he being the 
Sheriff of the City and County of Saint John, and Garrison was 
considered by the witness who spoke to this transaction, as acting 
in his capacity of Deputy Sheriff. This taking constituted the 
trespass complained of in this action.
The view taken of the agreement at the trial, on the part of the 
Plaintiff, was that it constituted a partnership between Woods and 
Lockwood in the timber made and hauled under it—that Lock­
wood had a right, as partner, to dispose of the partnership property 
—that the sale by him, from which the Plaintiff derived his title, 
operated as a valid transfer of the whole property in the timber in 
question, and that the Defendants were trespassers in taking the 
same from the Plaintiff.
On the part of the Defendants, it was contended at the trial, that 
Woods, as the maker of the timber under the licence from the 
Crown, which licence they gave in evidence, had originally the 
sole property in him, which had never been changed ; that Lock­
wood, by hauling the timber, gained no property therein, but only 
a right to receive, as a remuneration for his labour in hauling the 
same, a certain portion of thi timber, and that, until Woods had 
allotted to him a specific part of the timber, as payment for his 
services in this respect, no property in any of the timber vested in 
him : that no such allotment having been made, the sale by Lock­
wood did not alter the property in the timber, which remained iD 
Woods, and he, therefore, had a right to take his own property 
out of the Plaintiff’s possession.
On the argument for a new trial, a new view of the agreement 
was presented by the learned Counsel for the Defendant, and it 
was contended by him, that if "Woods was not the sole proprietor 
of the timber in question, and if Lockwood had any right of pro­
perty therein by virtue of the agreement, such right of property in 
Lockwood was at most that of a tenant in common, and not thar 
of a partner—that as tenant in common, Lockwood had only a 
right 
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right to dispose of his own undivided share, and, therefore, that the 
sale by him, under which the Plaintiff derived his title, operated 
only as a transfer of the property in one undivided moiety of the 
timber, the property in the other undivided moiety still remaining 
in Woods.—Woods being, in this view of the case, a tenant in 
common with the Plaintiff, it was contended that the latter could 
not maintain trespass against Woods for the bare act of taking 
the timber, the common property of both, from the Plaintiff’s 
possession.
Upon a review of the agreement, I am,-.'.in the first place, of 
opinion, that it cannot be maintained that Lockwood had not, by 
his acts under it, gained any property in the timber in question. 
The most material stipulation on this point, is the following,— 
“ said Lockwood is to haul said quantity of one thousand tons for 
“ the one half on the brow.” It is further stipulated that “ each 
“ party shall pay one half the stumpage (the expression it w’ould 
seem in common use among lumberers, for the purchase money of 
the timber paid to the proprietor of the land, in this case, the 
Crown.) And further, that each party is to find equal hands in 
cutting main roads and clearing the stream, and equal hands and 
supplies to drive, raft and take the timber to market.
The expression, “ for the one half on the browf necessarily 
imports that the hauler is to have the property in one half on the 
brow. The price stipulated for this property being not merely the 
hauling, but his liability to pay one half of the stumpage, and to 
provide for an equal share of the other expenses and labour speci­
fied in the agreement.
It is clear from the subsequent part of the agreement, that it 
was not intended that there should be a division of the timber on 
the brow. Each party is to bear equally the expense of conveying 
the whole timber from the brow to market, and it is not until the 
timber reaches Saint John that a division is contemplated; and 
upon the division, Woods is to take all defective timber, and Lock­
wood to take any timber that may remain in the woods. An un­
divided moiety is therefore clearly the nature and extent of Lock­
wood’s property and interest in the timber on the brow under the 
agreement; the property and interest in the other undivided 
moiety being in Woods.
Each of the parties to this agreement, thus having the property 
in one undivided moiety of the timber on the brow ; the next ques­
tion is, whether under the stipulations of the agreement, this com­
mon interest constituted a partnership between them.
In the case of Cooper v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 37, it is laid down by 
Lord Loughborough, C. J. that “in order to constitute a partner- 
“ ship, a communion of profit and loss is essential. The shares 
“ must be joint, though it is not necessary that they should be 
N “ equal. 
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“ equal. If tlie parties be jointly concerned in the purchase, they 
“ must also be jointly concerned in the future sale, otherwise they 
“ are not partners.”—Let us look, then, at the agreement in the 
present case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it contains 
this essential condition of a community of profit and loss. The 
parties, it is true, are as we have seen, to be jointly interested, 
each in an undivided moiety, in the timber on the brow ; they are 
to be jointly concerned in carrying the timber from the brow to the 
market. But when the timber reaches the market at Saint John, 
it is not to be sold or disposed of for their common profit or loss ; 
but on the contrary, as we have seen, a division is to take place 
according to the particular stipulations of the contract, and each 
party would thereupon have the separate profit or loss upon his 
own individual lot; and this circumstance it is, which is conclu­
sive, to prevent the relation of partners arising between the parties 
to this agreement, and to confine the nature of their common in­
terest, to that of a mere tenancy in common, in the chattels which 
are the subject of it. Nor is this a mere technical distinction with­
out a substantial difference. It is a general rule of the law of 
partnership, that each partner has a power, singly to dispose of the 
whole partnership effects; but a mere tenant in common, where 
the relations of partners does not exist, has a right only to dispose 
of his own share. And I apprehend, that it would be entirely at 
variance with the intent of this agreement, to consider it as giving 
to each party a right to dispose of the share and property of the 
other party, in the timber in which they had this undivided inter­
est and possession. Upon the whole, I am clearly of opinion, that 
the parties to this agreement, Woods and Lockwood, were tenants 
in common, not partners, in the timber, which is the subject of this 
suit, as it lay on the brow.
And here I think we should stop for the present, and let the case 
go to a new trial, in order that the facts may be investigated, un­
der this view of the rights of the parties which wrns not taken on 
either side at the former trial. Such further investigation is, I 
think, essential to the ends of justice, for the attention neither of 
the parties nor of the Judge, at that trial, having been directed to 
this view of the subject, the examination of the facts with reference 
to what now appear to be the true bearings of the case, was im­
perfect. This view of the case, moreover, might have elicited par­
ticular questicns proper for the distinct consideration of the jury ; 
as for instance, whether there was before the sale by Lockwood, 
under which the Plaintiff claims, a severance of the tenancy in 
common, and a vesting of the exclusive property in the lot of tim 
her in question, in him,—and if this were not the case, and the 
tenancy in common continued quite down to the taking of the tim­
ber by the Defendants, whether there were circumstances attendant,
upon 
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upon this taking, which would give one tenant in common a right 
to maintain an action of trespass against his companion. As there 
is to be a further investigation of the case, I abstain from expres­
sing any opinion whatever upon the effect of any evidence bearing 
upon these points at the former trial.
For the reasons I have stated, I think the rule for a new trial 
should be made absolute.
Botsford, J. :
The question in this case must be governed by the agreement 
made between Woods and Lockwood, by the terms of which, 
Woods undertook to make one thousand tons of white pine timber, 
and Lockwood was to haul the same for one half on the brow ;— 
the former was to be at the expense of making the timber, the lat­
ter to contribute his work and labour in hauling it; both were to be 
equally concerned in making roads and clearing the stream suffi­
ciently for driving the timber ; the stumpage, (so called,) was to 
be paid by both, but in the first instance to be advanced by Woods ; 
the timber was to be rafted and taken to Saint John at their joint 
expense, and when re-examined at that place, Woods was to take 
all the defective timber, and Lockwood all the timber that might 
have remained in the woods.
By this agreement it would appear that the timber was to have 
been divided between them at St. John, and not to have been sold 
on their joint account; they were not to share with one another in 
the profit or loss—each party was to have a distinct share or moiety 
of the timber, and they were not jointly interested in the future 
disposition or sale of it. There was not that community of profit 
and loss which was held by Lord Loughborough, in Cooper v. 
Eyre, (1 II. Bl. 37,) as essential to constitute a partnership. I 
am therefore of opinion that Woods and Lockwood were not part­
ners in this transaction, but tenants in common and joint owners 
of the timber on the brow, each entitled to one undivided moiety 
or half part thereof.
As it is clear that one tenant in common cannot lawfully dis­
pose of the whole property held by him in common with another, 
but only of his own share or interest, it consequently follows that 
Lockwood could not sell more than his own undivided moiety or 
share of the raft in question to Dibblee, and that the Plaintiff who 
derived his right to the timber from Lockwood, through Dibblee, 
cannot be in a better situation, but must be considered as the pur­
chaser of one undivided moiety of the raft, which Lockwood owned 
as tenant in common with Woods, whose right to the other undi­
vided moiety had never been legally divested.
It is equally clear that one tenant in common cannot maintain 
trespass or trover against a co-tenant. In Coke Lit. 199 and 323, 
it is laid down, that “ if one tenant in common take all the chattel 
personal, 
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personal, the other hath no remedy by action, but may rake them 
again.”—In Brown v. Hedges, (1 Salk, 290 , it was resolved, 
“ one joint tenant, tenant in common or parcener, cannot bring 
trover against another because the possession of one is the poi ses­
sion of both.”
In Barnadiston v. Chapman, (4 E. 121,) it was said, that when 
one tenant in common doth not destroy the thing in common, but 
only takes it out of the possession of the others and carries it away, 
there no action lies by the other tenant in common.”
The case cf Graves v. Sawcer, in Sir J. Raym. Rep. 15, is to 
the same point.
Although the authorities deny the right of one tenant in com­
mon to maintain trespass or trover against a co-tenant, there are 
some circumstances which have been alluded to by his Honor the 
Chief Justice, which make it necessary that this case should be 
sent to another jury for further consideration.
Carter, J.:
As this case stands before the Court, the Plaintiff, Wiggins, 
must rest his case entirely on the interest of Lockwood, in the 
timber in question.
In order, therefore, to decide the case, it is necessary to ascer­
tain clearly, what that interest was, wider the agreement put in 
evidence by the Plaintiff.
In the course of the argument, three positions have been taken 
with respect to this point,—1st. That Lockwood never had any 
property whatever in the timber, but was merely to receive a cer­
tain proportion in lieu of wages. 2d. That Woods and Lockwood, 
under the agreement, became partners in the transaction, and 
therefore a sale by Lockwood of the whole or any part, was good 
against Woods ; and 3d. That Lockwood and Woods were, under 
the terms of the agreement, tenants in common in the timber, and 
Lockwood, by a separate sale, could only transfer his own interest 
in the timber.
With respect to the first position, viz. that the sole property in 
this timber was from first to last in Woods, it seems to me impos­
sible to read the agreement, and for a moment think that such 
could have been the intention of the parties, or the legal effect of 
the words of the agreement; it seems to me quite clear, from that 
agreement, that, at all events, on the brow, there was a joint pro­
perty in Woods and Lockwood in the timber which had been 
hauled ; the stumpage money was ultimately to be paid jointly— 
the labour of cutting roads and clearing the stream was to be pro­
vided jointly, as also the labour of driving, rafting and carrying 
to market; indeed, the whole expense and labour of getting the 
timber and carrying to market was to be joint, with this exception, 
that
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that the whole of the making of the timber was to be done by 
Woods, and the whole of the hauling by Lockwood.
Smith v. Watson, (2 B. & C. 401,) is an authority to shew that 
under the terms of this agreement, there was a joint interest in the 
timber. In that case it was decided that an agreement that a 
broker, instead of brokerage, should receive a proportion of the 
profits arising from the sale of goods purchased by hiift for a mer­
chant, he at the same time bearing a proportion of the losses, did 
not vest in the broker any share in the goods so purchased, or in 
the proceeds. In that case, Mr. Justice Holroyd says,—“ If 
Sampson, (the merchant,) had in terms agreed that Gill, (the 
broker,) should have that proportion of the property itself, it would 
no doubt have become the joint property of the two.” Then comes 
the question, was the interest of the parties under this agreement 
a partnership or joint tenancy by which one can dispose of the 
whole property ; or, a tenancy in common, under which each can 
only dispose of his own undivided moiety. The case of Barton v. 
Williams, (5 B. and Aid. 395,) cited in the course of the argu­
ment, quite satisfies me that under this agreement Woods and 
Lockwood were tenants in common of the timber on the brow ; 
the agreement contains no provision for that which is an essential 
ingredient in the formation of a partnership between two persons, 
inter se, viz. a participation in the profits and losses of the whole 
transaction—it contains no provision for a joint sale of the timber, 
or any division of the proceeds of such sale.
For these reasons, it appears to me, that under the agreement, 
Woods and Lockwood were tenants in common of the timber on 
the brow; and it therefore becomes unnecessary to consider any 
argument founded on the doctrine of Mr. Justice Best, in Barton 
v. Williams, in which he denies the right of each partner to dispose 
of the whole partnership property, in the case of a partnership in a 
particular instance, and confines it to partnerships in trading con­
cerns generally. It follows from this that unless a division of the 
property took place before the sale to Dibblee, Lockwood by that 
sale could only transfer his own rights to Dibblee, and therefore 
Dibblee would become tenant in common with Woods, and the 
same would follow with respect to Dibblee’s assignee, the Plaintiff 
in this action. This view of the case however, being one which 
was not considered at the trial, but which has been wholly sug­
gested since, I quite agree that the case had better go back to a 
jury, in order that it may be fairly and properly decided.
Parker, J.:
I quite agree from the evidence reported to us by his Honor the 
Chief Justice, that the Defendant, W oods, was tenant in common 
of the timber in question with Lockwood, under whom the Plaintiff 
derives his right. I think also as a general proposition, it cannot 
be
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be disputed, that one tenant in common, joint tenant or partner, 
cannot maintain trover or trespass against another for the common 
property. There is one exception however, in the case of tenants 
in common, equally clear as the rule itself, namely, where there 
has been a destruction of the property ; and it is a matter worthy 
of very serious consideration, whether any and what other acts—■ 
which so far as the interest of the parties is concerned, are equiva­
lent to a destruction—can come within the limits of this exception. 
I had intended to have said more on this point, but as further re­
marks in the present state of the case would be considered extra­
judicial, I forbear ; I fully concur with his Honor the Chief Justice, 
and my brothers, that the case should go to a new trial, and for 
the reasons which have been stated by his Honor.
Rule absolute to set aside verdict.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
N. Parker for Defendant.
CAMPBELL v. WILSOX.
A verdict was taken for the Plaintiff for ,£1000, “ subject to the award 
of arbitrators, to he agreed upon.” Plaintiff’s expressed intention was to 
secure a verdict;
The reference was, “of all matters in the cause.” The arbitrators al­
lowed the Defendant half the price of a vessel, sent by him and another to 
the Plaintiff to sell, without any evidence of a sale by him.
Held, 1st. Under the submission as explained by affidavits, an award for 
the Defendant was bad ; the power of the arbitrators was confined to the 
quantum of damages.
Unless it appear distinctly on the rule that arbitrators may change a ver­
dict, they shall not be held to have any such power.
2d. The Defendant’s right of action, if any, on account of the vessel, was 
for a breach of duty in the Plaintiff as his agent, and for unliquidated da­
mages ; the claim was therefore inadmissible, either as payment, or set off, 
and, having been allowed by the arbitrators, vitiated the award.
A rife nisi was obtained in this cause in last Michaelmas Term, 
by the Solicitor General, for the Plaintiff, to set aside an award 
made in favour of the Defendant, on the grounds stated in the affi­
davits recited in the opinion of the Court.
The cause was argued at this Term.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is an application to set aside an award upon two grounds.
1st. That the arbitrators made an award, and found a balance 
in favour of the Defendant, when they were only authorized by 
the submission, to reduce the verdict entered at nisi prius for the 
Plaintiff.
2d. That the arbitrators took into their consideration a matter 
not referred to them
As
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As to the first grcund,
Kinnear, the Plaintiff’s Attorney, states in his affidavit, “ that 
during the sittings at nisi prius, a proposition was made by N. 
Parker, the Counsel for the Defendant, to arbitrate, which he, 
(Kinnear,) refused to accede to, but said he would agree to take a 
verdict for the amount claimed, subject to the award of three arbi­
trators, chosen in the usual way:; and at the same time remarked 
that he supposed the Defendant would not consent, as he claimed 
to owe the Plaintiff nothing; that Deponent’s it tention was to 
secure a verdict for the Plaintiff, and that the arbitrators should 
only have power to settle the amount of damages, thinking the 
practice was so ; that on the last day of the sitings, Mr. Parker 
mentioned that the Defendant agreed to the Plaintiff's proposal, 
and a memorandum was drawn up by Mr. Parker, wlierehy it was 
agreed, that a verdict should be taken by consent, for £1000, sub­
ject to the award of three arbitrators to be mutually agreed on,” &c.
As the statement in this affidavit is not contradicted, nor ex­
plained in the affidavits on the other side, it must clearly be taken 
to have been the original understanding and agreement, that at all 
events there should be a verdict for the Plaintiff, and that the 
power of the arbitrators should be confined to the quantum of 
damages.
An agreement or consent rule was afterwards drawn up in a 
more extended form, and signed by the Plaint ff’s Attorney and 
the Defendant, whereby after reciting the terms of the first agree­
ment, and that a verdict had been thereupon entered for the Plain­
tiff, the parties agreed to nominate James Keator, E. DeW. Ratch- 
ford, and Angus M'Kenzie, as the arbitrators ; and that their award, 
or the award of any two of them, should be entered on the postea, 
as the verdict of the jury, and judgment thereupon with costs to 
be taxed, &c.
Now, although tills consent rule is more full and particular in 
its expressions than the original memorandum, yet no intention ap­
pears on either side to vary the meaning and substance of this 
original memorardum.
If this rule had formed the original agreement between the par­
ties, and were to be construed by its terms alone, without reference 
to any extrinsic matter, I think a strong argument might be raised 
upon the clause, “ that the award should be entered on the postea 
as the verdict of the jury? that it was intended to subject the 
verdict itself to the award of the arbitrators ; but it is by no means 
clear that such would have been the effect of it. The practice of 
entering a verdict at nisi prius, previous to the submission to arbi­
tration, has not by any means been so usual in this Province, as 
that of referring to arbitration generally, upon the condition that 
the award should be entered on the postea as the verdict of a jury, 
and 
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and therefore the effect of such previous entry of a verdict has not 
been much considered by the profession. But in construing rules 
of reference, where a verdict has been entered at prius, I 
should be disposed to hold most strictly in all future cases, that 
unless it appeared distinctly on the face of the rule, that the arbi­
trators should have power to change the verdict so entered, and 
cause a verdict to be entered for the opposite party, they should 
not be held to have any such power. Where such power may be 
intended to be given, it will be very easy to express it.
Under the circumstances of this case, as stated in the affidavits, 
I think that upon the first ground, the rule must be made absolute 
to set aside the award.
The second point, that the arbitrators considered a matter not 
referred to them, is equally clear to set aside the award. The 
action is assumpsit; the plea was the general issue, with which a 
notice of set off was given, as stated at the bar, in general terms.
The submission was of all matters in the cause, not of all mat­
ters in difference between the parties, and it was not competent to 
the arbitrators to enter upon and consider any matter which would 
not have been receivable in evidence on a trial.
The subject matter which they improperly considered was the 
value of the brig Active, alleged to have been sent by Wilson the 
Defendant, and one Mackie, to the Plaintiff, to sell on their ac­
count. This evidence could have been made admissible, only, by 
proving a sale of the vessel to have been made by the Plaintiff. 
It was agreed, indeed, that the property in the vessel was jointly 
in Wilson and Mackie, and therefore was not a proper matter of 
set off by Wilson alone. But it is to be observed that the letter 
of instructions sent with the vessel, contemplates separate shares 
in the proceeds when sold. The essential defect is, that there is 
no evidence of the sale.
The expression in the affidavit of the arbitrator is, that only one 
half of the value of the vessel was allowed to Wilson; the affida­
vits do not state that the vessel was sold, or that any evidence of 
sale was given before the arbitrators. I take it for granted then, 
that there was no evidence of any such sale ; and if the vessel was 
not sold according to the instructions, the Defendant’s right of ac­
tion, if he had any, would be for a breach of duty in the Plaintiff 
as his agent, and for unliquidated damages, which could not be 
considered either as a payment or a set off, and admissible in evi­
dence in this cause.
Botsford, J.:
I do not think, under the circumstances of the present case, the 
arbitrators were empowered to find for the Defendant. I am not 
clear, that apart from the undertaking which must be considered 
to have existed, the arbitrators would have been justified by the 
strict
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strict terms of the rule in so doing.—I agree with his Honor the 
Chief Justice, that on both points the rule should be absolute. 
Carter, J.:
I had doubts as to the terms of the consent rule, and I think 
from the terms of it I can see a line of argument which would en­
title the arbitrators to find for the Defendant; but under all the 
circumstances, I am of opinion the award should be set qside, and 
in, future, parties should state clearly and distinctly the powers 
they intend to vest in the arbitrators.
On the second point also, I think the award should be set aside. 
It is clear the arbitrators have considered the value of the ship as 
estimated by the owners ; and it is equally clear that no evidence 
was produced beiore them of any sale, or the proceeds of any sale : 
it is quite consistent with all the evidence that Wilson and Mackie 
are still the owners of the ship
Parker, J.:
I agree also, that the award must be set aside, on both the 
grounds taken ; and as the cause is of some amount and importance, 
I will take the liberty of stating my opinion at some length.
1st. As to the form of the rule,—With this much of the argt. 
ment of the Defendant’s Counsel I agree—that were we called on 
to decide the case, on the mere literal construction of the rule, my 
present impression is, that as the terms are general, and there is 
no restriction on that point, it would authorize a verdict to be en 
tered for the Defendant ; and for damages in his favour, if under 
his set off he were legally entitled to a balance. Again—-if it had 
appeared that the Defendant’s Counsel, when the proposition for ; 
reference was made, on the basis of a verdict being entered for the 
Plaintiff, did not understand this condition, in the same manner as 
the Plaintiff’s Attorney has sworn that he did; or afterwards, 
when the rules were entered into, he had conceived it agreed on 
both sides, that the arbitrators were to have power to alter the 
verdict into one for the Defendant; the Court ought not, I think, 
to go out of the strict construction of the rule. Further—if it were 
a matter of clear established practice, that a rule in the form of the 
present would authorize a verd.ct for Defendant, whatever might 
have been the understanding of the Plaintiff’s Attorney on the. 
subject, I think nothing but a case of misconduct on the oilier side 
in obtaining it, would warrant the Court in disturbing it. But 
considering this an unsettled point of practice, there being in fact 
other forms of rules in the books so expressed as to be clear of the 
present objection, (see 5 East. 139. and 1 Taun. 151,) and finding 
that what is distinctly sworn to on the Plaintiff’s side as to tlie 
condition of the reference, has not been contradicted or varied by 
any counter affidavit; the Court ought in my opinion, to take all 
the circumstances into consideration, and having done so, are bound 
o in 
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in the present case to set the award aside, which is, in fact, only 
placing the parties in the same position as they were when the re­
ference was assented to. In so doing, I would observe that there 
is no comparison between the extent of injury which the Defendant 
sustains, in having this award set aside if right, and that which 
would be inflicted on the Plaintiff in upholding it, if wrong.
I am well aware that a form of rule might have been adopted, 
which would have secured to the Plaintiff a judgment in Lis favour, 
without any question ; and for that reason, I think he was bound 
to make out a clear and strong case, to induce the Court to go out 
of the terms of the rule.
2d. A s to the award itself—I heartily concur in the expediency 
and propriety of giving effect to awards, whenever we can do so 
with justice ; but, I conceive, in order to induce parties to resort 
to this domestic tribunal, which (in many cases, and particularly 
those between merchants,) is enabled to settle differences more 
satisfactorily than Courts and juries can do ; it is necessary, care­
fully to examine their proceedings when properly brought before 
the Court, and not less important to set them aside when manifestly 
wrong, than to support them when right. Nay, I think it essen­
tial, that such a control should be exercised, particularly as to 
references at nisi prius, where the award is to take the place of a 
verdict, in order that parties who have legal rights, may feel con­
fidence and security in resorting to this mode of settling them. 
And no case calls more for the consideration of the Court, than 
one in which it is to be determined from the evidence before the 
arbitrators, whether a matter in difference, on which they have 
acted and decided, was or was not included in the submission of a 
particular cause.
The material objection to the present award on the merits, is 
that the arbitrators have allowed the Defendant the value of one 
half the brig Active, (a certain deduction from vessel and cargo 
excepted ;) that they have done this is admitted ; and also that it 
was objected to by the Plaintiff;—their power to do it therefore 
rests solely on the point of the notice of set off in the ordinary form, 
properly including this as an item of charge, recoverable in an ac­
tion of common assumpsit. Was this so recoverable ? It cer­
tainly was, if the vessel were sold by the Plaintiff; it certainly 
™as not, if no such sale took place. It is not said there was any 
direct evidence of a sale, but it is insisted, that the facts afforded 
a sufficient presumption thereof, and that in the absence of any 
account, the arbitrators had a right to charge the Plaintiff with 
the value. In order then to determine whether the matter was 
submitted or not, we must examine the facts as brought before us ; 
and giving full credit to all that has been stated on the Defendant’s 
side in support of the award, I taink sufficient has not Deen shewn 
to 
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to justify the presumption on, which alone the question depends. 
It is important to observe that the nature of the property was such 
as to require certain forms and rules in the transfer, which would 
make the proof of sale of a snip easier than that of other personal 
property; and that it has not been shewn that the Plaintiff was 
vested with authority to make a legal transfer in regular form un­
der the Registry Acts. In the absence of any evidence to shew 
that the vessel was in fact sold at all, regularly or irregularly, of 
any legal power to transfer in the Plaintiff, of her ever having 
passed out of the possession of John Mackie the master, and other 
part owner, of her not being in existence at the present day, and 
the Defendant still vested with the legal right of owner, which 
would continue even if this award were to stand; I think the ar­
bitrators were not justified in presuming a sale, in order to charge 
the Plaintiff with the value under the set off. Something was 
said in the argument of its being a payment; but a payment is a 
satisfaction of an adverse demand ; and, if the Defendant were en­
titled to any credit as an overpayment, the difference, if allowable 
at all, could only come in as a set off, but independently of this, 
there was nothing to shew that the vessel was to be a payment in 
specie, although the proceeds of sale might be so.
It has keen further urged upon us by the Defendant’s Counsel, 
that arbitrators are not bound by the same strict rules as govern 
Courts and juries, and that they might, if it appeared to them, on. 
the evidence, that the Plaintiff had deprived the Defendant of his 
property, allow him the value of it in this action, if he were enti­
tled to recover it in another form of action. I need hardly advert 
to the different effect which a recovery in tort, and a recovery in 
this suit, would have on the property in the ship ; and on this part 
of the case it is sufficient to say, that before arbitrators should be 
allowed to take into their consideration a demand not properly 
cognizable in the form of action submitted, it ought to be clearly 
shewn, either that the party originally agreed, or subsequently as­
sented to their so doing ; and that the facts were such as would 
entitle the party to recover in another action ; none of which have, 
in my opinion, been made out in the present case. I mean not 
to impute any intentional misconduct to the arbitrators, who are 
admitted, on all hands, to be highly respectable and intelligent 
merchants ; but it would have been more satisfactory, as they did 
not trust to their own judgment, but took legal advice, (from which it 
is to be inferred that they meant to proceed according to law,) if they 
had communicated to the Plaintiff’s Attorney, and now set out in 
the affidavits, the opinion they received and the questions pro­
posed ; for, as the case is presented to us, they certainly went be­
yond their powers, and their award must be set aside.
Rule absolute.
The Solicitor General and F. A. Kinnear for the Plaintiff.
N. Parker for the Defendant. SHAW
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If a tenant in common, owz the consent of his co-tenant, sell more than 
his own share of the common property, he shall be considered in respect 
thereof to have acted as the agent of his companion, and monev had and re 
ceived may be maintained against him.
Queue.—Tf the sale were without the consent of his companion, if such 
action would be maintainable ?
This was an action of assumpsit, tried before Chipman, C. J. 
in last Michaelmas Term. The Plaintiff charged in his particu­
lars, inter alia, a sum of money had and received by the Defend­
ant to the Plairtiff’s use, as to which item,
It appeared in evidence that the Plaintiff and Defendant worked 
together in getting timber in the winter of 1833—4 ; each furnished 
his own team, hired his own men, and procured his own supplies ; 
they had no joint accounts ; the timber was all put on the same 
brow, and rafted promiscuously in four joints. There was no evi­
dence of any agreement as to the manner of working, or dividing 
the timber. When the timber was rafted, each took two joints ; 
those taken by the Defendant contained the greatest quantity of 
timber. Plaintiff and Defendant met at Fredericton, on their way 
to St. John, to sell their timber, and some discussion took place in 
the presence of a third person, T. R. Robertson, as to the timber, 
when Grant said, “ Shaw is to have half the whole timber at St. 
John,” and also, “ he is to half one half of the proceeds of the 
timber.”—The surveyor who measured the timber being called to 
prove the quant' ties contained in the several joints,
Wilmot, for the Defendant, objected—that the Plaintiff and De­
fendant were partners in the transaction, and therefore one could 
not sue the other until a division and settlement took place ; and 
secondly, that the conversation in the presence of Robertson, 
amounted to a special agreement as to the disposal of the timber, 
which should have been specially set out in the declaration.
Berton, contra, contended that the parties were not partners in 
the transaction, and that the conversation proved, rendered Grant 
liable to the Plaintiff for money had and received, on proof of the 
sale of the timber.
\Chipman, C. <7.—The relationship between the parties is that 
of tenants in common; and the question is, whether if one tenant 
in common have, or dispose of more than his share of the common 
chattels, his companion can maintain money had and received 
As at present advised—1 think he cannot.]
Berten, for Plaintiff then submitted that the evidence should be 
received, (as the point was new and important,) subject to a mo­
tion to reduce the verdict; which being acceaed to,
It was proved that the two joints taken by the Plaintiff, 
contained 
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contained 90 tons and 27 feet of timber and those taken oy the 
Defendant, 109 tons and 12 feet; and that the Defendant sold the 
timber taken by him to one Hammond. The amount of the Plain­
tiff’s claim for his proportion of the excess was agreed at £10 14s., 
and he thereupon had a verdict for £33, to be reduced to the sum 
of £22 6s., if the Court should be of opinion that this claim was 
not sustainable in tl s action.
Wilmot, in the same term, in moving for a rule nisi to reduce 
the verdict, took the following grounds :
1st. That the parties were tenants in common, and therefore 
the Plaintiff’s claim was not sustainable at law.
Smith v. Orieil, 1 East. 368 ; Martin v. Knowlys, 8 T. R. 145 ; 
Bovil «. Hammond, 6 B. & C. 149, and 9 D. & R 186.
2d. That money had and received could not be maintained, 
inasmuch as it had not been shewn that the Defendant had re­
ceived money for the timber.
Nightingale v. DeVeme, 5 Burr, 2582, and 2 W. Bl. Rep. 
684 ; Harvey I. Archbold, 5 D. & R. 500 ; 3 B. & C. 626, and 
R. & M. 184.
3d. The conversation in the presence of Robertson, if it amount­
ed to any thing, constituted a special agreement, and was not 
evidence under a count for money had and received. Defendant 
was to account or del_ yer one half the timber.
Borton, for the Plaintiff, on a former day in this Term, shewed 
cause.
The Plaintiff and Defendant were tenants in common, each had 
a distinct property in an undivided half of the common chattel, 
and neither had any right to convert the whole to his own use. It 
was not necessary that an absolute destruction of the common pro­
perty should take place, but a sale of the whole property by one 
tenant in common would equally constitute a conversion, and con­
sequently trover would be maintainable. Barton v. Williams, 5 
B. & A. 395, and the party might, 'f he pleased, waive the tort, 
and sue for money had and received. Willes, 209 ; Markin v. 
Knowlys, 8 T. R. 146, 1 Chitty on Pleading, 45 ; Evans v. Ben­
net, 1 Camp. 299 ; by the sale the joint interest was determined ; 
but apart from so broad a position, the conversation in the present 
case constituted the Defendant the agent of the Plairtiff; under 
that agreement he had a right to sell, and having sold, must be 
presumed to have sold for money, and was liable for money had 
and received. Wells v. Ross, 7 Taun. 404 ; Spratt v. Hobhouse, 
4 Bing. 178; Longchamp v. Kenny, 1 Doug. 137.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is a motion to reduce the verdict of the jury uader the fol­
lowing circumstances:—The Plaintiff and Defendant were tenants 
in 
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in common of timber at Fredericton, when a conversation took place 
in the presence of the witness, Robertson. The timber was then 
undivided ; each had two joints ; those of the Defendant contained 
the most timber. The witness proved that Grant said, ‘ ? one half 
the timber was Shaw’s, and should be delivered accordingly at St. 
John.” He also said, “ one half of the value of the timber was 
to be Shaw’s.”
The action is for money had and received ; and a question has 
been raised, if this action can be maintained between these parties, 
for the value of one half the overplus quantity of timber sold by 
the Defendant, the whole amount of which overplus was £21 8s.
It was contended by the Counsel for the Plaintiff, that if one 
tenant in common sell a larger portion of the common property 
than would fall to his share,fan assumpsit should be raised, and he 
should be made to account for the overplus to his co-tenant, and 
that the proceeds of the sale would be money had and received in 
his hands to the use of his co-tenant, to the amount of the share 
of the latter.
The authorities certainly go far to substantiate this position, but 
it is r.ot necessary in the present case to decide that point. The 
conversation in Fredericton was quite sufficient to convey an au­
thority from Shaw to Grant to sell the timber. In that conversa­
tion it must be considered to have been agreed between the parties 
that Shaw should have one half of the value of the timber: and 
this necessarily implies an assent on the part of Shaw that the 
timber should be sold by Grant.
It was proved that Grant did sell, and thereupon under the au­
thority of Wells v. Ross, 7 Taunt, 404, he must be taken to have 
sold for money. He therefore received Shaw’s share of the pro­
ceeds as his agent, and is liable in an action for money had and 
received to the use of Shaw.
Bct^sford, J :
I am of the same opinion.—Grant took the timber to St. John 
as agent for Shaw, and sold it to Hammond, and thus as agent is 
clearly liable to the action for money had and received.
Carter, J.:
I think the conversation with Robertson amounted to an autho­
rity to constitute Grant the agent of Shaw.
The sale of the timber took place, and under the authority of 
Wells v. Ross, money had and received well lies.
It is not necessary to decide the other point, whether if a tenant 
in common sells the joint property, money had and received will 
lie by his co-tenant for his share ; but if the case in Willes is good 
law, there can be no doubt upon the point. Chief Justice Willes’ 
expression is very clear, and is certainly recognized by Lord Ken-' 
yon in 8 T. R.
Parker,
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Parker, J.:
Whether the Plaintiff would be entitled to recover tlie sum in 
question, in this form of action, if the sale of the timber had been 
made by the Defendant witlwut the consent of the Plaintiff, I will 
at present offer no opinion, as I think the other ground is quite 
sufficient to sustain this verdict. The parties were tenants in 
common, and as such, each had a right to dispose only of his own 
share ;—if, then, the Defendant sold the Plaintiff’s share with his 
assent, which the evidence shewed, he may be fairly considered to 
have received the purchase money of such share as agent for the 
Plaintiff, and is liable to him for the amount, as money had and 
received. I cannot see any difference between a case of this sort 
and a sale of sole property ; and I am glad that this decision settles 




SPENCE v. STEWART, impleaded with THOMPSON.
On nul tiel record, pleadel^to debt on recognizance of bail entered in the 
Charlotte Common Plea§, and issue joined^ the Court on the trial con­
fined their consideration to the single point, “ whether the record produced 
corresponded with the record set forth in the pleadings.”
An allegation under a videlicet, that a writ was sued out on a particular 
day, does not necessarily import that the day stated is the MB of the writ.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This was an action of debt on a recognizance of bail entered 
and acknowledged in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the 
County of Charlotte. The Defendant pleaded, first, nvl tiel, record 
of the recognizance of bail. Secondly, nul tiel record of the judg­
ment set forth in the declaration. Thirdly, no ca. sa. issued on 
the judgment. The Plaintiff replied to the two first pleas respec­
tively, “ that there is such a record,” &c., which she prays may 
be inspected, &c. To the first plea she replied, that after the re­
covery of the judgment, &c., and before the commencement of this 
suit, to-wit, on the 8th day of September, 1830, a ca. sa. was sued 
out, which she sets forth. To the replication to the third plea, the 
Defendant rejoined, nul tiel record of the ca. sa. to which rejoinder 
the Plaintiff sur-rejoined “ that there is such a record of the ca. sa. 
which she prays may be inspected,” &c. Upon these pleadings, 
the cause came on for trial by the record by the Court at the last 
Term, and the tenor of the several records put in issue was brought 
in by writ of certiorari, returned from the Inferior Court of Com­
mon Pleas for the County of Charlotte.
The Defendant’s Counsel at the trial made no objection to the 
record 
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record of the recognizance and judgment on the two first issues: 
On the issue arising from the third plea, he objected, first, that the 
ca. sa. did not pursue the judgment, the judgment being for £567 
19s. 2d. debt, and £8 J 7s. lOd. costs, and the writ of ca. sa. set 
forth in the rejoinder, and sent up under the certiorari, being for 
£72 9s. debt, and £8 17s. lOd. costs. Secondly, that by com­
paring the teste of the r«. sa. with the indorsement on the writ, it 
appears to be tested on a day after it issued, viz. on the 17th Sep­
tember. With regard to these objections, whatever might have 
been the result of the first, if properly brought before the Court, 
the second is a matter of irregularity, of which advantage could 
be taken only by motion in the Court below, and neither of them 
can avail on this issue, which depends on the single point—whether 
the record produced corresponds with the record set forth in the 
pleadings. And this is to be ascertained by inspecting the record 
brought in, which is so much a matter of mere comparison, that it 
appears to be the practice in the Court of King’s Bench in Eng­
land, that this inspection should be made by the Master, (2 Tidd’s 
Practice, 744.) It is alleged in the replication, that after the re­
covery of the judgment, and before the commencement of this 
action, v’z. on the eighth day of September, 1st Wm. IV., the 
Plaintiff sued out a writ of ca. sa., by which said wit, &c. setting 
forth the writ,—and the record produced corresponds with this 
writ thus set forth. The writ produced bears teste it is true on. 
the seventeenth day of September, 1st Wm. IV., but I do not con­
sider that the time of suing out the writ therein alleged, especially 
as the allegation is under a videlicet, necessarily imports the day 
of the teste of the writ. In the actual setting forth of the writ in 
the subsequent part cf the plea, the return of the writ is set forth, 
but the teste of the writ is not set forth, and there is no variance 
between the writ thus set forth and the writ produced. I am 
therefore of opinion, that the writ produced supports the plea on 
all the issues now under trial by the Court, and that upon these 




The only question we are called on to decide in the shape in 
which this case is presented, is whether or not there is a variance 
between the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, set out in the repli­
cation and the writ itself as sent up by the Court below. If the 
8th September mentioned in the allegation necessarily ’ mported 
the teste of the writ, which on inspection appears to be the 17tli 
September, I am inclined to thir k the variance would have been 
fatal on nul tiel record, but on looking at the allegation, it appears 
to 
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to me that tlie material part of it is that the writ of ca. sa. was 
sued out after the recovery of the judgment, and before the com­
mencement of the suit, and the date is merely put in under a 
videlicet as matter of form, and does not at all import the teste of 
the writ. I am of opinion therefore, that the replication is sup­
ported, and judgment must be for the Plaintiff.
Parker, J.:
In my view of this case, the duty now assigned to us, is merely 
that of trying three distinct issues, which have been joined by the 
parties on these pleadings ; and for the proof of which, certain re­
cords of another Court, having jurisdiction in the matter, are ap­
pealed to. On the first and second no question is now made. On 
the third the issue is not made up on the plea and replication, but 
substantially on the replication and rejoinder ; and in my opinion, 
the objections urged by the Defendant’s Counsel do not properly 
arise in the present state of the record. As to the first objection, 
the issue is not whether a ca. sa. was duly sued out on the judg­
ment, but whether a particular ca. sa., as averred in the replica­
tion, was in fact issued and returned ; and if it appear bj inspec­
tion of the record of the Inferior Court that this was done, the 
averment is proved. It is true the ca. sa. set out does not follow 
the judgment, it being for a much smaller sum ; but that objection 
is, I conceive, completely waived by the course the Defendant has 
taken. Let us for an instant suppose the parties before us giving 
in their pleadings ore terms. The Plaintiff first says, the Defend­
ant owes me £567 19s. 2d., as he was special bail for one Ebenezer 
Tuttle, at my suit, against whom I obtained judgment in the Char­
lotte County Common Pleas, and who was not rendered according 
to the undertaking of the bail. Defendant answers:—No ; I am 
not liable ; for though I did become special bail, and though you 
did recover judgment as you allege, no ca. sa. against Tuttle was 
duly issued or returned. The Plaintiff, not making an issue of 
this, replies :—A ca. sa. was sued out on that judgment against 
the principal on the 2d September, returnable, &c. for £72 9s. 
debt, and £8 17s. lOd. damages ; the same was delivered on the 
said 2d September to the Sheriff of Charlotte, and was returned by 
him non est iqventus, as by the said ca. sa. and return, duly filed 
of record in the said Inferior Court, will more fully appear. On 
this, several courses were open to the Defendant; I will not say 
which would have been the most advisable, but it is clear, if he 
simply deny that such a ca. sa. was issued and returned, he puts 
the case on that fact. That he has done in his rejoinder; the 
Plaintiff sur-rejoins and produces the record of a ca. sa. from the 
Inferior Court, which on inspection is found to correspond with his 
replication, and we are bound to pronounce the allegation proved. 
As the pleadings stand, 1 agree with his Honor the Chief Justice, 
p that 
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that the point of variance with regard to the teste, is not brought 
distinctly up. Had the whole writ been set out in the replication, 
or on oyer in the rejoinder, it might perhaps have been taken ad­
vantage of ; but as it is a question of practice of another Court, I 
have doubts whether even then we should be bound judicially to 
notice, that the day of issuing! must necessarily mean the teste, in 
opposition to the real time. See Sandon v. Proctor, 7 B. & C. 800, 
and the case there cited. As the case stands, there must be
Judgment as to all the issues, that the Plaintiff hath perfected 
the record.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant.
RAYMOND AND ANOTHER v. LUKE.
If a cause be referred to three arbitrators, with a stipulation that any two 
may make an award ; and two of them meet, without notice to the third, 
and make an award, such award is irregular.
This cause was referred by rule of Court to three arbitrators, 
‘ the decision of whom or any two of whom should be final.’
Weldon moved to set aside an award made by two of them, on 
the following grounds, as stated in the affidavit of the third arbi­
trator :—
The three arbitrators met and completed the examination of 
evidence ; they met to consider and make up their award. One 
dissented from the opinion of deponent and the other arbitrator, 
and left them, declaring his intention to act no further in the re­
ference. Deponent and the other deliberated further, and ad­
journed with an understanding that they would have another 
meeting, of which their absent companion should have notice.
Deponent was not further consulted, the other two brought to 
him an award they had made up and signed, and requested him to 
sign it also, which he refused to do.
He cited 2 Vern. 19, Ruton v. Knight; 2 Chitty’s Gen. Prac­
tice, 119 ; and Goodwin v. Sayres, 2 Jac. and W. 249.
A rule nisi having been obtained, Chandler now shewed cause.
The rule submitted the cause to the decision of three persons, or 
any two of them. All attended and heard the evidence ; they de­
liberated upon the case, and afterwards two made their award, and 
it was no ground to disturb it, that the third arbitrator dissented 
from it.
\Chipman, C. J.—Ought they not to be altogether, or notice be 
given to the absent person, until they agree to disagree ?]
They had finished their deliberations, and merely went to the 
dissenting arbitrator to execute the award.
Weldon,
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Weldon, in support of tlie rule, was stopped by the Court.
Per Curiam.
The doctrine laid down in Goodman v. Sayres, that if two arbi­
trators out of three meet alone, excluding the third, or not giving 
him notice, it is irregular, and will vitiate the proceedings, must 
govern this case.
Here it appears when the three arbitrators last assembled, a 
further meeting- was contemplated, and such a meeting was in fact 
held by two without notice to the third. The rule must be held 
strictly, that every arbitrator who takes upon himself the burden 
of the reference, and consents to act, must be present, or have no­
tice of the meetings of his co-arbitrators. It is impossible to say 
what arguments might be used by the absent person to change 
the opinions of the others.—It would strike at the root of all just 
judgment to suppose that an arbitrator, before the final decision of 
the question, had so made up his mind as to exclude argument.
Rule absolute.




From, the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of 
Westmorland.
A general release to an interested person, “excepting a certain judg­
ment in the releasor’s favour,”—Held sufficient to make such person a com­
petent witness, it not appearing that the judgment related to the matter in 
question.
The Defendant in error, sued the Plaintiff in error in the Court 
below, in an action of special assumpsit. The cause was tried in 
that Court in November, 1831.
It appeared in evidence at the trial, on the part of the then 
Plaintiff that the then Defendant (the Plaintiff in error,) was 
owner of a vessel, and engaged with the Plaintiff to carry certain 
goods for freight from New Horton Flats to the city of St. John. 
The goods were accordingly shipped ; Edward Buck was master 
of the vessel, which sailed on her purposed voyage, .and proceeded 
to St. John; that the said Edward Buck did not there deliver the 
goods to the Plaintiff, but sold and converted them to his own usi
The Defendant thereupon in his defence offered and produced 
the said Edward Buck as a witness in his behalf, to prove both the 
carrying and delivery of the goods according to the agreement;
Whereupon the Counsel for the Plaintiff insisted that Buck was 
not
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not a competent witness for the Defendant to prove the matters 
proposed, by reason of his interest as master of the vessel in the 
question at issue ; whereupon the Defendant’s Counsel produced a 
release, duly executed by the Defendant to the said Buck—releas­
ing him “ from all and all manner of debts, dues, demands, claims, 
sum and sums of money due, or owing by or from him the said 
Edward Buck to the said Defendant, and all manner of action and 
actions, cause and causes of action, from the beginning of the 
world to the day of the date, except a certain judgment in the In­
ferior Court of Common Pleas in the County of Westmorland, in 
the said Defendant's favourand insisted that such release resto­
red the competency and rendered Buck a competent witness for 
the purposes proposed ; but to this
The Plaintiff’s Counsel replied, that the release was insufficient 
to restore the competency—and the Justices delivered their opinion 
that the said Edward Buck was not a competent witness; and 
that such release did not restore or make him a competent witness 
on behalf of the Defendant; and thereupon refused and rejected 
his testimony, and with that opinion and direction left the cause to 
the jury, who gave their verdict for the Plaintiff for £15 2s. 6d. 
damages.
A bill of exceptions having been tendered and allowed, the pro­
ceedings were brought into this Court by writ of error.
D. B. Chandler for Plaintiff in error:
The competency of the witness could be restored by release ; 1 
Phil. Ev. 125 ; Rose. N. P. Ev. 96-7. Whenever a witness can 
be released, he is made competent by the release, and any objec­
tion goes only to his credibility. The question therefore is as to 
the sufficiency of the release. The instrument tendered was suffi­
cient to release the witness from any liability to the owner of the 
vessel; the cause of action as between the releasor and releasee, 
(if any) had already accrued and was complete, and therefore was 
discharged by the release. Bac. Abr. Rel. 2.
The Solicitor General for Defendant in error:
The witness may be released, but it must be by such an instru­
ment as will remove any liability he may be under by reason of 
the subject matter in which he is to be a witness ; nor was it ne­
cessary for the owner of the vessel to wait until action brought 
against him or until he had suffered loss by the conduct of the 
master ; his right of action had already accrued, but the question 
must turn upon the sufficiency of the instrument. In this release 
a , adgment is excepted, and for aught that appears, the action in 
which that judgment was obtained may have related to the very 
cause in which his testimony was required ;—[Chipman, C. J.: If 
so. the witness was competent without a release.]—but that 
judgment 
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judgment may have been by confession, with a defeasance relating 
to this action and its event, or it may have been an interlocutory 
judgment; and taking into consideration the position of the parties 
and the want of explanation, it is fair to presume that tlie witness 
was not fully released. General words in a release shall be quali­
fied by special words. Stark. Ev. 1291.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The true criterion of exclusion is, if the verdict to be given in 
the case in hand, can be evidence for or against the witness, in 
any subsequent trial; and if the owner of the vessel had already 
recovered a judgment, then the verdict would no longer affect the 
witness. The point before the Court is narrowed to the import of 
the terms of the exception in the release, and upon that I entertain 
no doubt; the worcls of the exception are, “ except a certain 
judgment,” &c. ; these words import a final judgment, and even 
if it were for this cause of action, it would not be a necessary con­
sequence that it was conditional or subject to the determination of 
this action. It is said there might have been fraud or collusion 
between the releasor aod-the releasee ; that might have been shewn, 
but cannot be presumed. Then it is urged that the judgment ex­
cepted may have been only interlocutory, but we are not to pre­
sume this against the natural import of the term. It was open for 
the party objecting to have shewn by evidence that the judgment 
was merely interlocutory; we will adhere to the natural meaning 
of the language, especially in a release, where everything must be 
taken most strongly against the releasor, the effect of which would 
be to extend the general words, and to narrow the exception.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.
Carter, J.:
The only ground to render the release inoperative, is to suppose 
the judgment excepted was an interlocutory judgment—or that 
being a final judgment, it related to this cause of action, and was 
affected by fraud or collusion : either of these circumstances might 
have been proved, but we should carry the doctrine of presumption 
much too far, in the absence of any evidence, to support either 
supposition.
Parker, J.:
There can be no question that the witness Buck was incompe­
tent without, but could be made competent by, a sufficient release. 
It is said the release does not cover all demands, but excepts a 
judgment which might relate to the present cause of action;— 
nothing however of that kind appears on the face of the instrument, 
and, prima facie, the judgment has no relation to the cause of 
action in the present case. The party objecting, might have had 
the witness sworn on his voire dire, and have shewn the relation 
which 
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which the excepted judgment had, if any. Not having done so. 
he could not, I think, call upon the Court to make thatjpresump- 
tion, so as to destroy the effect of the release.
Judgment for Plaintiff in error.
Chandler for Plaintiff in error.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.
REILLY v. GILLAN.
An award will not be disturbed, because the witnesses were examined 
without being sworn, although the rule of reference required them to be 
sworn, if the party objecting to the award were present, and consented to 
such examination.
In last Michaelmas Term, Robinson, for Plaintiff, obtained a 
rule nisi to set aside an award made by the arbitrators to whom 
the cause was referred. The terms of the submission were that 
the witnesses should be examined on oath. The Plaintiff’s affida­
vit, on which the rule was granted, stated that the witnesses, con­
trary to his expressed wish and protestation, were examined with­
out being sworn, and that the Plaintiff’s wife, from whom he lived 
apart, was also examined, contrary also to his protestation and 
remonstrance.
The Solicitor General, for the Defendant, now shewed cause, 
and produced the affidavits of two of the arbitrators, which directly 
contradicted the statement of the Plaintiff as to swearing the wit­
nesses. The Plaintiff’s own witnesses were first examined, and 
without being sworn. The Plaintiff was present at the examina­
tion of his wife, and did not object, and the arbitrators expressly 
swore, that her testimony was immaterial, and without it, their 
award would have been the same as they had made.
Per Curiam.
The Plaintiff must be considered as having consented to the 
examination of the witnesses without their being sworn, inasmuch 
as his own witnesses were first examined in that manner. The 
wife could not properly be examined without the consent of the 
Plaintiff; he was present however, and did not object to it; and, 
as it appears by the positive statement of the arbitrators, that her 
testimony did not alter their opinion, and that they would have 
made the same award without it, there remains no reason for dis­
turbing the award.
Rule discharged.
D. L. Robinson for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General for Defendant.
DOUGLAS
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DOUGLAS ^HANSON.
Plaintiff before action brought, rendered Defendant an account amount­
ing to .£63, reduced by credits therein to less than £20; Defendant did 
not admit the balance.
Plaintiff sued for the whole amount, and recovered a balance of £16 15s. 
3d.; Defendant at the trial gave in evidence the account rendered, and 
sought further to reduce the balance,—Heid that Plaintiff was entitled to 
full costs,
J. W. Chandler, for the Defendant, jobtained in Michaelmas 
Term last, a rule nisi for taxing the Plaintiff’s costs, on the scale 
of the Inferior Courts, according to the practice of the Court when 
the action is brought for a sum under £26^ on an affidavit of (S'. 
G. Andrews, the Defendant’s Attorney, which stated that the 
action was common assumpsit,—was tried at the last Charlotte 
Circuit, and a verdict obtained by the Plaintiff for £11.
N. Parker, for Plaintiff, now appeared to shew cause. 
Botsford, J.:
Reported the case, by which it appeared that the action was 
brought for goods sold and delivered, amounting to £63 14s. 6d. ; 
that prior to the action, the Plaintiff had rendered an account of 
the above to the Defendant, in which account were contained sun­
dry credits, amounting to £46 19s. 3d., making the balance £16 
15s. 3d. ; that the Defendant had admitted the correctness of the 
debit side, but disputed that of the credit side ; and instead of re­
lying on the account as stated and settled, had given a notice 
and particulars of set off, amounting to £78 18s. 6d., on which 
he went into evidence.
The action was brought before the passing of the Act 4 Wm. 4, 
c. 41, establishing a summary practice in the Supreme Court.
The Court were clearly of opinion that there was no ground for 
the motion, as the Defendant had made it necessary for the Plain­
tiff to proceed for his whole demand; and the Defendant had no 
pretence now to set up the account as stated and settled, which he 
had refused to abide by.
Rule discharged.
N. Parker for Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler for Defendant.
DOE EX DEM HOWE v. MEALLY.
An attachment against a witness for contempt, in not attending on a sub­
poena, must be applied for at the term next after the contempt committed.
The Solicitor General moved for an attachment against Duston 
Woodbury, a witness subpoenaed in this cause at the Charlotte 
Circuit in August last. The witness attended, and afterwards 
absented nunself,—he was called on his subpoena.
On
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On reference to 3 Chitty’s Gen. Prac. 834, and 3 Bing. 223, 
Thorpe v. Graham,—tlie Court refused the application, it not 
having been made at the first term after the Circuit.
PALMER, FOSTER AND SIX OTHERS v. LONG.
When a number of persons jointly agree with another as to any particu­
lar matter, the agreement or contract can only be rescinded or put an end 
to by the consent of all.
Indebitatus assumpsit, for work and labour in and about De­
fendant’s ship; the declaration contained the common counts: 
Plea, general issue, and notice of set off; but Defendant not hav­
ing complied with a Judge’s order for particulars, was precluded 
from going into evidence of his set off.
On the part of the Plaintiffs, a special agreement between the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant was proved, by which it appeared that if the 
Defendant failed in paying either the first or second instalment of a 
certain sum therein mentioned, the Plaintiffs should be at liberty to 
quit, and rescind the whole contract: holding the Defendant answer­
able for the work done. It was proved that the Plaintiffs worked for 
the Defendant under that agreement, and the Defendant failed in 
making payment agreeably to the contract,—that it was rescinded 
by the parties about the 24th July, 1832,—that work had been 
done about the Defendant’s ship from February to July, and some 
extra work, which jointly formed the subject matter of the action.
The defence was, that before action brought, the Defendant had 
settled with six of the Plaintiffs acting on behalf of all, who gave 
the Defendant a discharge of all claims, both under the special 
agreement and for work and labour done. An agreement dated 
28th July, 1832, signed by the Defendant and six of the Plaintiffs, 
was given in evidence, which specified “ that the special contract 
“ had been and was given up, and rendered null and void ; that 
“ the Plaintiffs were to be paid monthly tvages during the said 
“ time the said Plaintiffs had been at said work, according to the 
“ account of their time kept by Mr. John Lobey ; that the 
“ Plaintiffs renounced all claim upon the ship, and gave her up to 
“ the Defendant, who agreed to accept her, and pay the Plaintiffs 
“ for the time they had been at work at her.” A letter written 
by Robert Lobey, and signed by Lobey on behalf of the said six 
Plaintiffs, was proved to have been sent by two of the Plaintiffs to 
the Plaintiffs’ Attorney, (notice to produce had been given,) de­
siring “ that all proceedings against the Defendant might be stop- 
“ ped on a certain contract for building Defendant’s ship, as they 
“ had settled with Defendant all differences relative thereto,” also 
cautioning him “not to commence any action in their names 
“ against 
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“ against Defendant at the instance of Palmer, as they would not 
“ recognize any such proceedings, and to transmit his account, 
“ the amount of which they would pay.” It was proved that 
Pelmer and Foster, the two remaining Plaintiffs, did not agree to 
these arrangements, but that the papers were executed during 
their absence, and against their will; that neither the contract nor 
its contents were sent to the Attorney ; that Palmer and Foster 
had never been paid their proportions of the work and labour, and 
that the amounts due them remained unpaid by the Defendant;— 
the amounts due the other six Plaintiffs Lad been paid. The ob­
ject of the Defendant in taking possession of the special contract, 
was to prevent them or any of the other Plaintiffs from bringing 
an action thereon.
Chandler, in support of motion for nonsuit, contended, that as 
this was a partnership concern, the agreement of 28th July, 1832, 
coupled with the letter to the Attorney cf the Plaintiffs, was a 
discharge of Plaintiffs’ claim, and that, therefore, no action could 
be sustained ; 5 Stark. 1068 ; Roscoe Ev, 184 ; 12 East. 317 ; 1 
Stark. R. 102 ; 2 Camp. 561 ; Gow on Partnership, 141, 202.— 
And further, that the papers of 28th July, 1832, operated as a 
severance of Plaintiffs’ claim under the special contract, and vested 
a separate right of action in each ; that the payment of the then 
respective shares to six of the Plaintiffs, could not be deemed a pay­
ment to the other two, and therefore that Palmer and Foster could 
recover their respective proportions by actions in their own names.
Stewart, in reply, contended, the agreement of 28th July, 1832, 
was a mere arrangement for the payment, and although probably 
rescinding the special contract, yet did not destroy the joint inter­
est of the Plaintiffs ; that the Plaintiffs did not declare on the 
special contract, considering it as rescinded, but that they resorted 
to the indebitatus assumpsit, which the law implied with the De­
fendant, for their joint work ; that the special contract was merely, 
therefore, used for the purpose of ascertaining the proportion and 
mode of payment of the eight joint contractors ; that the testimony 
of Defendant’s witness shewed that Palmer and Foster had not 
been paid. As to the letter, it was a mere direction to the Plain­
tiffs’ Attorney to suspend proceedings ; it might be made a ques­
tion between the Plaintiffs and their Attorney, but could not affect 
Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendant—it could not be considered 
a release or discharge to Defendant, and evidenced no statement 
or payment by Defendant. It was not pretended that the six 
Plaintiffs who were paid their monthly wages, settled for Palmer 
and Foster ; the receipts being after action brought, were evidence 
co reduce the damages, and they only shewed payments of i n divi­
dual proportions according to the agreement of 28th July, 1832.— 
The authority adduced was a case where a debtor had agreed to a 
q severance
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severance of the joint debt between joint creditors, which, although 
it vested a separate right of action in each, did not preclude the 
creditors bringing one joint action ; but the debtor w’ho assented 
to a severance, was estopped by his own act from asserting a joint 
debt. 2 Saun. Pl. & Ev. 714 ; 3 B. & C. 421.
CARTER, J. suggested that the parties had better agree that the 
Plaintiffs should take a verdict for a certain sum, reserving the 
points for the opinion of the Court above, on a motion for a nonsuit, 
which was agreed to, and the Plaintiffs had a verdict for £20.
A rule nisi, to set aside the verdict, was obtained in Michaelmas 
Term, and the points were argued at this Term by Chandler for 
the Defendant, and the Solicitor General for the Plaintiff;—the 
Court gave judgment at the close of the argument.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
It does not appear that any time is wanted for consideration in 
this cause.
A joint contract was entered into by eight persons with the De­
fendant for building a ship, and six of those eight persons after­
wards agreed with the Defendant to put an end to the former con­
tract. Now, if the contract had been put an end to, these eight 
contractors would have been entitled to an action on the quantum, 
meruit;—but the question is, if the joint contract were put an 
end to.
It is clear, that when a number of persons jointly agree with 
another as to any particular matter}" llu number of those persons 
can end the agreement or contract, unless all consent. Here the 
agreement to put an end to the- original contract was made by 
only six of the eight joint contractors ; and I do not consider they 
had a right to destroy the remedy of the other two.
Then as to the receipts: there might be reasons why the other 
two did not consent to the agreement; the settlement made may 
not have been a fair one, and unless they had ail agreed to rescind 
the relation of partnership, as I have before said, that relationship 
must have continued. Then the joint contract remaining in force 
when these receipts were given, the receipts must be considered 
under the particular circumstances of the case. The substantial 
matter of these imports that the six who agreed to rescind, had 
been paid according to the time they had worked, and the Court 
will look to the substantial effect of them ; having been given, 
therefore, under the agreement, they are to be receiv ed only pro 
tanto to reduce the whole amount of the claim of all the eight.
No injustice can be done by this view of the subject. These 
parties, although they sue jointly, recover only the balance, de­
luding the payments ; and the apportionment of that balance is a 
matter for them to settle among themselves.
If
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If the names of parties be Improperly used, they may apply to a 
Court of Equity to prevent it ut inter se, but that does not affect 
the rights of joint parties as to others. Great injustice would be 
done by allowing Long, by an agreement with six of the Plaintiffs, 
to defeat the joint claims of the other two.
Botsford, J.:
I take the same view of the subject. An agreement was made 
between eight persons, the Plaintiffs, and the Defendant, to build 
a ship. Under the agreement, they performed labour on the ship ; 
afterwards, on the 28th July, 1832, six of those persons, leaving 
out Palmer and Foster, agreed with Long to rescind the agreement, 
and made a settlement for the amount cf their labour respectively, 
and on the same day a letter was addressed to the Plaintiffs’ At­
torney, directing him to stop proceedings. They appear to have 
combined with Long to settle, and perhaps for the purpose of 
throwing out Palmer and Foster. There is fair ground to infer 
connivance for that purpose; and I think another inference is, 
that proceedings had been already commenced in this action ; the 
instructions in that letter were to stay proceedings. Now, eight 
persons having contracted, six could not rescind the agreement, 
without tlie approbation of the other two. Is it not just that the 
other two should use the names of the eight to recover the amounts 
due to them ? The receipts are only evidence pro tanto.
If Palmer and Foster had brought separate actions, the receipts 
might, and, I think, would have stopped Long from setting up the 
joint contract; but it does not, therefore, follow, that the balances 
due cannot be recovered in the action by the whole eight.
Carter, J. concurred.
Parker, J. having been formerly engaged in the cause at the 
bar, gave no opinion.
Rule discharged.
The Solicitor General, Stewart and Weldon for Plaintiffs.
E. B. Chandler for Defendant.
KEYS v. FLINN.
Under very peculiar circumstances the Court set aside a verdict for the 
Plaintitf—the weight of evidence heing in favour of the Defendant, and the 
verdict evidently the result of a compromise.
This was an action of assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered, 
and money had and received, tried before Parker J. at the last 
Northumberland Circuit, in which a verdict having been returned 
for two hundred pounds, in favour of the Plaintiff, a rule nisi was 
obtained by J. A. Street, in Hilarj Term, to set the verdict aside, 
and 
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and grant a new trial, on tlie grounds of the same being contrary 
to evidence and the Judge’s charge.
Cause was shewn in this Term by Wilmot for the Plaintiff.
The circumstances of the case were very peculiar ; there 
■was evidence on the part of the Plaintiff, of considerable pro­
perty having been transferred by him to the Defendant; and 
of a large sum of money being paid into the Defendant’s hands 
for Plaintiff’s account; the Defendant gave evidence of several 
payments made by him for the Plaintiff—he also endeavoured 
to impeach the testimony of the Plaintiff’s principal witness, 
but principally relied on declarations both written and verbal, 
made by the Plaintiff; one, even as recent as the day before the 
trial, that the Defendant owed him nothing, and that the suit was 
not carried on by his directions. These declarations were attempt­
ed to be accounted for by the Plaintiff’s mental imbecility, of 
wLicli there was some, though not very clear evidence. It was 
late in the Evening before the evidence was concluded,. at which 
time the learned Judge proposed an adjournment to the next day, 
but the jury, most of whom were talesmen, stating that they could 
not attend at that time without great inconvenience, the Counsel 
on both sides agreed to waive the privilege of addressing the jury, 
and united in a request to the Judge, to sum up the cause without 
hearing Counsel, to which his Honor very reluctantly consented, 
deeming it a case which peculiarly called for their assistance in 
closing, as it was opened very briefly. In charging the jury, his 
Honor read over to them the whole evidence, and left the case 
rather favourably for the Defendant, considering, that even if the 
Plaintiff’s witness were entitled to credit, the Plaintiff’s declara­
tions would be a sufficient answer to the action, unless it appeared 
that at the time of making them he was, from imbecility of mind, 
or otherwise, the dupe of the Defendant; and his Honor adverted 
to the circumstance, that he had particularly called tlie attention 
of the Plaintiff’s Counsel to the importance of giving distinct evi­
dence on that head, which he offered to receive after the Defend­
ant’s case had closed. If these declarations were got rid of, and 
the Plaintiff’s witnesses were believed, the state of the accounts 
between the parties shewed a balance in his favour of about £400, 
or over. Another question arose as to whether the whole transac­
tion between the parties was not entered into with a view to de­
fraud the Plaintiff’s creditors ; and his Honor stated his opinion to 
the jury, that if such were the case, the Plaintiff ought not to re­
cover, there being nothing to shew that the creditors were at all 
concerned in carrying on this action.
The jury retired between 11 and 12 o’clock, and were out the 
whole night, and part of the next day, before they could agree, 
and 
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and then brought in a verdict of £200, which would not accord 
with the evidence on either side.
Under the very peculiar circumstances of this case, (of which it 
is not necessary to give a more particular detail at present,) the 
Court made the rule for a new trial absolute on payment of costs, 
considering it a proper case for investigation before another jury ; 
especially as the weight of the testimony was in favour of the De­
fendant ; the Plaintiff’s declarations t tat the Defendant was not 
indebted to him, having been established by several witnesses, and 
the state of his mind, (if that afforded a sufficient answer to these 
declarations,) admitting of more satisfactory evidence, than was 
given at the former trial. The amount of the verdict also appear­




J. A. Street for Defendant.
DOE EX DEM KINNEAR v. WISWELL.
A peremptory undertaking will not be enlarged merely on the ground, 
that when the cause was called on at the Circuit, a witness who resided in 
the town was not in Court, and that therefore the record was withdrawn.
The Solicitor General moved to enlarge a peremptory under­
taking of the Plaintiff to proceed to trial in this cause, at the last 
St. John Circuit, on an affidavit which stated that the cause was 
entered for trial, and the Plaintiff’s witnesses who were resident at 
St. John, were not in attendance when the cause was expected to 
come on—the Attorney sent for them, but two of them could not 
be found; expecting them to come into Court, the Plaintiff’s 
Counsel moved for trial, and withdrew the record after eight of 
the jury were sworn, solely from the absence of the witnesses.
N. Parker, for Defendant, urged—that the absence of witnesses 
under such circumstances, might be a sufficient cause to discharge 
a first rule for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, but was wholly 
insufficient to enlarge a peremptory undertaking.
Chipman, Chief Justice—absent.
Botsford, J.:
Very little ground is stated, no reason appears for the absence 
of the witnesses. The undertaking ought not to be enlarged.
Carter, J.:
It appears the witnesses were in St. John, and the only ground 
of the application is, that they were not in Court when the cause 
was called on.
Parker,
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Parker, J. :
This matter is important as a point of practice. Parties and 
their witnesses must learn the necessity of a punctual and regular 
attendance. No sufficient reason has been given for the non-at­
tendance of the witnesses in the present case, to justify the Court 
in opening the peremptory undertaking. The rule for a nonsuit 
must be made absolute.
MOULTON v. DIBBLEE.
Service on a clerk is insufficient, unless at the office or dwelling house 
of the Attorney.
Robinson moved to make absolute a rule nisi, for judgment, as 
in case of a nonsuit, on an affidavit of the se rvice of the rule on 
one Hammond, the clerk and agent of Needham, the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney.
Per Ccriam.
The rule, if served on a clerk, should have been served at the 
office or at the dwelling house of the Attorney, which is not stated 
in the affidavit to have been done.
Rule refused.
Exparte. TEE ST. JOHN WATER COMPANY.
An application for a warrant to assess the amount to be paid for certain 
lands required by the Company was refused, it not being shewn that the 
corporation deemed the lands absolutely necessary.
N. Parker moved for a warrant to be issued to the Sheriff of 
St. John, to summon a jury to assess and ascertain the sum or 
annual rent to be paid for certain lands of the Hon. Ward Chip­
man, upon and through which the Company were desirous of ma­
king reservoirs, and carrying pipes and conductors.
The application was founded upon an affidavit, stating that a 
committee of the Company had applied to the owner cf the land, 
who had declined to sell the land, or to name an arbitrator to de­
termine the value. The Company were incorporated by Act of 
Assembly, 2 W. 4, c. 26, the 15th section of which Act authorizes 
the Company “ to draw water from, erect reservoirs on, and to 
“ carry pipes or conductors through (when such shall be deemed 
“ absolutei" necessary for the conveyance of water to the city by 
,n the said corporation,) the private property of individuals, whose 
“ lands may lie at the source or in the line, the said corporation 
“ shall think it expedient to convey the water from, or through,” 
&c.; and then provides that the corporation shall first pay for the 
use 
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use of the same, or any damage to tlie owner, which, in case of 
disagreement, shall he determined by arbitration ; and if the owner 
shall decline making such agreement, or appointing an arbitrator, 
“ then the said corporation may make application to the Supreme 
“ Court, (stating the grounds of such application,) and such Court 
“ is empowered to issue a writ or warrant,” &c.
Carter, J.:
How does it appear to be absolutely necessary to carry the water 
through the lands required ? Tlie committee do not themselves 
swear that the lands are necessary—they should report to the 
corporation. The corporation must adopt their act, and determine 
the necessity, and such determination must be made to appear by 
the oath of the committee, or directors, or other persons. I do not 
express this as a judicial opinion, but throw it out as the least 
terms the Act will admit of—it is sufficient in refusing this appli­
cation, that it is not made to appear that the corporation deem the 
lands absolutely necessary.
Parker, J.:
I am also of opinion that sufficient grounds have not been laid 
for the interference of the Court. It does not appear that the cor­
poration have, as yet, decided on the necessity of obtaining the 
land, which must at all events be done ; but I am rather under 
the impression that the Legislature, in directing thfe grounds of the 
application to be stated, intended that the Court should also be 
satisfied of the necessity, before exercising its authority. I men­
tion this now, as the corporation may consider it expedient to ap­
ply to the Legislature for an alteration in the Act, if the powers 
already granted are not deemed sufficient. The present motion 
certainly cannot be sustained.
Note.—The Chief Justice, and Botsford, J. did not sit during this ap- 
plication.
HATTON v. FLAHERTY.
A judgment signed on the 16th October, the rule nisi having been enter­
ed on th< 13th—was held irregular, the four day rule not having expired.
THIS cause stood for trial at the St. John Circuit, in June, 1835, 
when by the consent of the Attornies, a verdict for £520 15s. 
was entered for the Plaintiff, “ subject to be reduced by the award 
of Angus M‘Kenzie, — —, — •—, or any two of them.”
Angus M'Kenzie, the only arbitrator named, was nominated by 
the Plaintiff; the Defendant was to name another, and the two 
were to choose a third, “ their award to be final and binding upon 
the parties, if made and ready to be delivere d on or before the first 
day of October, and the said verdict, or such reduced amount as 
the 
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the first arbitrators might award, to be entered on the postea, and 
judgment thereon to be entered up with costs to be taxed of the 
then next Michaelmas or any subsequent Term.”
The Defendant’s Attorney was under an impression that the 
first day of Michaelmas Term was the time appointed for making 
the award ; on the 8th day of October he applied to the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney, and offered to. appoint an arbitrator and proceed ; the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney declined doing so; and on the first day of 
Michaelmas Term, the 13th of October, entered a rule for judg­
ment on the postea, and on the 16th the roll was brought in, and 
final judgment signed for the amount of verdict and costs.
On a subsequent day in the same Term, the Solicitor General, 
for the Defendant, obtained a rule nisi for setting aside the judg­
ment upon two grounds:
1st. Th at the judgment was signed before the expiration of the 
four day rule.
2d. That the Plaintiff was not entitled to enter up judgment for 
the amount of the verdict without a special application to the 
Court.
Cause was now shewn by F. A. Kinnear, for the Plaintiff.
The Defendant would not, within the time limited, appoint an 
arbitrator, and therefore the Plaintiff was entitled to act upon the 
verdict which had been entered for his protection and benefit. Evans 
v. Davies, 3 Dowl, P. C. 786 ; Doe d. Fisher v. Saunders, 3 B. and 
Ad. 783 ; Hall v. Phillips, 9 Bingham, 89.
Per Curiam.
The argument of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff might 
have been a good ground of application to the Court, to call upon 
the Defendant to shew cause why the verdict should not stand; 
but without agitating the second point, the rule must be made ab­
solute on the first; the judgment is irregular, having been signed 
too soon. The Court strongly recommend a new arbitration. 
The Plaintiff has a right to pursue his own course, but he should 
be exceedingly well advised before he ventures again to enter up 
his judgment, without an application to the Court.
Rule absolute.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and L. Hazen for Defendant.
HILARY TERM, 6th Wm. 4th.
1836.
GEUEKAL HUMS.
I. It is Ordered, That in future the Clerk of tlie Pleas do keep 
a paper to be called the Motion Paper, in which shall be entered 
all motions of which notice may have been given ; such entries to 
be made on or before the first day of each Term, and to stand in 
the said paper in the order in which they may be made; and the 
matters contained in such Motion Paper shall come on to be heard 
on the second day of the Term, before the Special Paper is gone 
into.
II. It is further Ordered, That if notice of any motion, and a 
copy of the affidavit or affidavits on which it is intended to be 
grounded, shall be served upon the opposite party, his Attorney or 
agent, as the case may be, fourteen days before the Term at which 
the motion is intended to be made, a rule absolute may be made 
in the first instance, if the Court shall see fit; and in all such 
cases the cause shall be entered on the Motion Paper.
III. It is further Ordered, That no motion shall be made for 
judgment as in case .of a nonsuit, pursuant to the Statute 14 G. 2, 
c. 17, without notice having been first given thereof to the Plain­
tiff, his Attorney or agent, as the case may be, together with a 
copy of the affidavit on which the same is grounded, at least four­
teen days before the Term at which such motion is intended to be 
made, and without entering the same on the Motion Paper.
IV. It is further Ordered, That on motion made in open Court 
pursuant to the said entry, and on due proof of the service of no­
tice, and copy of affidavit as directed by the preceding rule, the 
Defendant shall be entitled to a rule absolute for judgment as in 
case of a nonsuit, unless the Court, on just cause and reasonable 
terms, shall allow a further time for the trial of the issue, or unless 
the Court should tl fink fit to enlarge the time for shewing cause 
to the next Term.
V. It is further Ordered, That no judgment of non pros shall 
be signed for want of a declaration, replication, or other subsequent 
pleading, until ten days next after a demand thereof shall have 
been made in w riting upon the Plaintiff, his Attorney or agent, as 
the case may be.
R VI.
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VI. It is further Ordered, That demurrer books be delivered 
to the Judges on or before the first day of the Term, at which the 
demurrer is to be argued ; the books for the Chief Justice and 
senior Puisne Judge to be prepared and delivered by the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney, and the books for the two junior Judges by the Defend­
ant’s Attorney ; and that the same rule do also apply to other 
cases in which paper books are required by the practice of the 
Court to be delivered to the Judges.
VII. It is further Ordered, That a copy of the bill of particu­
lars of the Plaintiff’s demand, and also of the Defendant’s set off, 
(if any) shall be filed by the Plaintiff’s Attorney with every 
record of Nisi Prius at the time of entering the same.
VIII. It is further Ordered, That it shall not be necessary to 
issue more than one summons for attendance before a Judge upon 
the same matter ; and the party taking out such summons, shall, 
if the Judge see fit, be entitled to an order on the return of the 
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KERR v. CONNELL.
A licence to cut a certain quantity of timber from lands described in the 
licence and to remove the same, does not convey an interest m lands within 
the statute of frauds, or give any property in standing trees.
Such licence gives the licensee no right to timber cut within the descri­
bed limits, by a stranger, without authority ;
Timber so cut, remains the property of the owner of the land : against 
every other person, the possession of the timber and the labour bestowed 
upon it gives the maker, although a wrong doer, the right to it.
If two persons expend labour in cutting and hauling timber under an 
agreement that such timber is to be got on the halves, they are tenants in 
common—and neither can convey as against the other more than his undi­
vided share.
TrilS was an action of trover, to recover damages for a quantity 
of timber claimed by the Plaintiff, and taken and converted by 
the Defendant. At the trial before Parker, J. at the Carleton 
Circuit in September, 1835, it appeared in evidence on the part 
of the Plaintiff, that a licence issued in December, 1834, from the 
Crown, to one William J. Bedell, “ to cut two hundred tons of 
white pine timber from crown lands there'" described, and to re­
move the same/’ This licence was procured by the merchant 
Bedell, for the benefit of the Plaintiff, who was a lumberer. The 
Defendant had a licence at the same period, to cut Lirch timber 
on the same land, and in like manner had placed it in the hands 
of the lumberer for whom he had procured it, one Walton. Walton 
employed a person named Price, to hew birch timber for him 
(Walton,) under Connell’s licence ; and it was agreed that if Price 
should find any pine timber, he should make and hew it, and pre­
pare the roads for hauling; that Walton should haul it, and that 
it should he shared between them when hauled to the brow. Price, 
under this agreement, commenced making birch timber, and also 
manufactured sixteen sticks of pine timber, which were hauled 
part of the way to the brow by Walton. At this time the Plain­
tiff forbade Price to make any more pine timber, and at the same 
time paid him for his labour in making the sixteen sticks, and 
bought 
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bought from him his right thereto, and hauled the said sixteen 
sticks to the brow ; they were rafted in the spring by the Plaintiff, 
and carried down the river to a place where the Plaintiff had’other 
timber. In the night the fastening of the timber was cut, and a 
part of the timber carried away; eight sticks of it, which were the 
subject matter of this action, were afterwards found in the posses­
sion of the Defendant, who stated that he had purchased them 
from Walton, and refused to deliver them to the Plaintiff.
A nonsuit was moved for by Berton, for the Defendant, on the 
following grounds, viz : •
1st. That the licence to Bede1! could not be transferred by parol, 
inasmuch as an interest in lands was vested in the licensee, within 
the statute of frauds ; and being an instrument under seal, it could 
not be assigned except in a similar manner.
2d. That the licensee derived by the licence only a right to cut 
trees to be made into timber, and had no right to timber already 
cut and made by others.
3d. That Price was only a servant of Walton, to be paid in kind 
for his work and labour, and had no right in the timber to sell, or 
if he had, his right was only as a tenant in common to one half 
the timber.
The learned Judge reserved the points, and gave leave to the 
Defendant to move for a nonsuit. The Plaintiff obtained a verdict 
for the value of the timber.
Berton, for the Defendant, moved, in last Michaelmas Term, 
and obtained a rule nisi, to set aside the verdict and enter a non­
suit. In support of the first point, he urged that the licence from 
the Crown, which gave metes and bounds to the land comprehend­
ed therein, vested in the licensee an interest in lands within the 
statute of frauds, and therefore, if assignable at all, was not so by 
parol. 6 E. 502, Crosby v. Wadsworth ; 2 Bos and Puller, 452, 
Waddington v. Bristow ; 3 Taun. 38, Emmerson v. Heelis. The 
Court in gran ting the rule, excluded this point, and determined 
that the licence vested no interest in the lands within the statute 
of frauds.
Cause was shewn by the Solicitor General in Hilary Term.
The licence under which the Plaintiff claimed the timber, was 
obtained by Bedell expressly for the benefit of Kerr, as was shewn 
by his declarations in evidence. That fact was further substan­
tiated by the document being in the possession of the Plaintiff; 
the ms inner of obtaining it agreed with the common custom of the 
country, and even, if in the opinion of the Court, the licence should 
be considered not transferable, yet Bedell must be taken to have 
been only an agent, acting for the Plaintiff, his principal. 1 Camp. 
337, Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy. As to the right in the licensee 
to 
i
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to timber already cut, Walton and the Defendant liad no right to 
any but birch timber ;■—if, then, Price, even under his agreement 
with Walton, cut pine timber, no right thereto was vested in Wal­
ton ; and it having been transferred by the maker to the Plaintiff, 
his right to it could only be questioned by the Crown ; and even 
as between the Plaintiff and the Crown, he having paid stumpage 
for a certain quantity of timber, of which this was to be reckoned 
a part, and having paid for the manufacture thereof, was, even as 
against the Crown, the owner of the timber.
Berton, in support of the rule :—
The licence issued to Bedell, and nothing appeared therein to 
shew that he acted for the Plaintiff; the stumpage money was 
paid by him—the licence was to him, and to him alone—and no 
other person could claim in his own right under that licence. The 
Plaintiff rested his claim to the timber on his right under Bedell’s 
licence ; if, then, the licence gave him no right, his claim to the 
timber was unsupported. And again, even supposing the timber 
to have been got under Bedell’s l.cence, it would be fair to pre­
sume that Kerr was but the servant of Bedell, and if so, any 
action should have been by Bedell, and not by the Plaintiff.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This was an action of trover for a quantity of white pine timber, 
in which a verdict was given for the Plaintiff, with leave reserved 
at the trial for the Defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. The 
main question discussed on this motion has been, as to the Plain­
tiff’s property in the timber in question. The facts, as deduced 
from the evidence given and the finding of the jury, may be stated 
as follows:—
On the 18th December, 1834, the following licence was issued 
from the Crown Land Office, to W. J. Bedell :
“ Application No. 1207, Licence No. 845, for 200 T. Tonnage.
“X12 15s. paid.
(L. S.) “ By Ilis Excellency Major General Sir Archibald
“ Campbell, Baronet, G. C. B. Lieutenant Governor 
Archibald Campbell. “ and Commander in Chief of the Province of New
“ Brunswick, &c. &c. &c.
“ Upon application made to me by William J. Bedell, of the Pa- 
“ rish of Fredericton, in the County of York, in the Provhice of 
“ New Brunswick, and recommended by the C immissioner of Crown 
“ Lands and Forests, who has hereto set hi i hand and seal, I do 
Mark. “ hereby grant Licence unto him the said William J. Bedell, to cut,
K “ subject to the Regulations heretofore published, and under the
“ terms and conditions in those Regulations contained, Two Hun- 
“ dred Tons White Pine Timber, from ungranted and unapplied for 
“ Crown Land, situate on the East side the River Saint John, to be 
“ bounded South by the line run by Deputy Garden, East by the 
“ Monauat, North by Smith’s Brook, and West by the Grante l
• “ Land
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“ Land, and to remove the same. The said William J. Bedell is not 
“ to cut any Timber without the limits before described, nor cut any 
“ more than the quantity herein specified, on pain of having the 
“ whole seized. This Licence to continue in force (unless legally 
“ suspended) until the first day of May next ensuing the date hereof, 
“ and no longer, after which time no timber is to be cut or hauled 
“ out under pretence thereof.
(L. S.) (Signed) “ THOMAS BAILLIE,
“ Commissioner of Crown Lands and Forests.
“ Given under my Hand and Seal at Fredericton, the 18th day of 
“ December, in the fifth year of the Reign of His Majesty King 
“ William the Fourth, and in the Year of our Lord OneThou- 
“ sand Eight Hundred and Thirty Four.
“ By His Excellency’s Command,
(Signed) “WILLIAM F. ODELL.
“ Deputy Surveyor Maclauchlan. .
This licence was placed in the hands of the Plaintiff by the li­
censee Bedell, to get the timber under it; and if the licence could 
be assigned by the licensee to another person, and be transferred 
by words and delivery onlyji it was not contended that it was not 
sufficiently transferred by Bedell, to the Plaintiff : It appeared in­
deed that the licence was procured by Bedell for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff, according to what was stated to be a common custom,-— 
Bedell being a merchant, dealing in timber, and Kerr the Plaintiff 
being a lumberer. The Defendant Connell, had a licence to cut 
birch timber on the land described in the above licence to Bedell, 
and this licence was in like manner put by the Defendant, who is 
also a merchant, into the hands of one Walton, a lumberer, to get 
the timber under it. One Price was employed by Walton to hew 
the birch timber under the latter licence, and it was agreed be­
tween Price and Walton, that if Price found any pine timber upon 
the ground, they (Price and Walton) should get it to the halves, 
on the brow. Price was to cut, hew, and swamp it, and Walton 
to haul it out to the brow. The pine timber in question in this 
suit was cut and made by Price, and hauled part of the way and 
yarded by Walton under this agreement. In this state of affairs 
the Plaintiff interfered and claimed the timber under his licence, 
(i. e. the above licence to Bedell,) forbidding any more pi^.e timber 
being cut by Price, and bought from Price all his right to this tim­
ber, paying him for the labour he had expended upon it. The 
Plaintiff then hauled the timber to the bank or brow, from the 
place where Walton had yarded it. There were in all sixteen 
sticks of this pine timber, and the Defendant Connell, under a 
transfer from Walton, took possession of eight sticks ;—this action 
was brought for these eight sticks. The Plaintiff founded his right 
of property in this timber upon the above licence to Bedell—and 
it is advisable in the first place to inquire into the nature of the 
right 
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right which the licence conferred upon the licensee named in it, 
supposing him to have been the person who actually exercised the 
right which the licence gave : for if it should appear that the li­
cence vested no right of property to the timber in question in this 
cause in the person to whom it was expressly granted, it will be 
unnecessary for the Court, in giving judgment, to go into the ques­
tions which have been mooted, as to the power of the licensee to 
assign the licence, no such power being expressed in tlie licence ; 
or whether the Plaintiff might, under the circumstances, be consi­
dered as the principal in the licence, and Bedell only as the agent 
in procuring it.
The nature of a licence is explained by L. C. J. Vaughan, in the 
case of Thomas v. Sorrell—Vaugh. 351, in the following manner :
“ A dispensation or licence properly passes no interest, nor alters 
“ or transfers property in any thing, but only makes an action 
“ lawful, which without it had been unlawful. As a ’icerice to go 
« beyond the seas, to hunt in a man’s park, to come into his house, 
“ are only actions, which, without licence, had been unlawful. 
“ But a licence to hunt in a man’s park and to carry away the 
“ deer killed to his own use, to cut down a tre in a man’s ground 
“ and to carry it away the next day after to his own use, are li- 
“ cences as to the acts of hunting and cutting down the tree, but 
“ as to the carrying away of the deer killed and tree cut down, 
“ they are grants. So to licence a man to eat my meat, or to fire 
“ the wood in my chimney to warm him by, as to the actions of 
“ eating, firing my wood, and warming him, they are licences ; but 
“ it is consequent necessary to those actions that my property be 
“ destroyed in the meat eaten, and in the wood burnt, so as in 
“ some cases by consequent and not directly and as its effect, a 
“ dispensation or licence may destroy and alter property.”
A reference to the terms of the licence in the present instance 
will best explain its meaning. It is “Zocz/7” and “to remove f 
subject to the conditions of the licence,—“ two hundred tons white 
pine timber” from ungranted and unapplied for Crown land, situate 
as described in the licence. A licence in these terms clearly 
amounts to a grant cf the timber which may be cut and removed 
according to the terms of the licence, but of no more. It conveys 
no title whatever to any timber which is not cut and removed by 
virtue of the licence. The case of Basset v. Maynard, Cro. Eliz. 
819, in which a question arose as to the sale of a quantity of wood 
to be taken at the vendee’s election, is so apposite to the present 
case, and so fully supports the position I have just stated, that I 
will cite it at large.
“ Action sur trover and conversion of certain loads of wood. 
“ Upon a special verdict, the case was,—Six Thomas Palmer was
“ seized 
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“ seized of a great wood, and bargained and sold to one Cornford, 
“ and his assigns, as many trees as would make 600 cords of 
“ wood, to be taken by the assignment of Sir Thomas Palmer. 
“ Coinford assigns over his interest to the Plaintiff. Afterwards, 
“ Sir Thomas Palmer granted to the Defendant so much of his 
“ wood as would make 4000 cords of wood, to be taken at the De- 
“ fendant’s election. The Plaintiff afterwards, by the assignment 
“ of Sir Thomas Palmer, cut down the trees in question, to make 
“ 600 cords; and the Defendant claiming them by virtue of his 
“ grant, took them. It was found that there was sufficient wood 
“ left for the Defendant to make his 4000 cords, et si, &c. Upon 
“ this verdict, it was moved, that here was not sufficient title 
“ found for the Plaintiff. For first, it is not found that the bargain 
<c and sale was for any sum of money, nor upon any consideration. 
“ Sed non allocatur. For it is intended to be so, being found by 
“ the verdict. But if it had not been so found, it might peradveu- 
“ ture have been otherwise, as Dyer, 91, is.
“ Secondly, it was alleged, that this grant to the Plaintiff is 
“ void ; for until the assignment made by Sir Thomas Palmer, no 
“ interest vested in Cornford himself, so as he could not make any 
“ grant thereof over. But all the Court held the grant to be 
“ good ; for being made to h n and his assigns, he may make an 
“ assignee, which shall enure as a nomination to one, who is to 
“ have by the appointment of Sir Thomas Palmer ; and it may 
“ well vest in him, as the interest also. And here he hath no in- 
“ terest before the assignment made by Sir Thomas Palmer ; inso- 
“ much as if Sir Thomas Palmer will not assign it in convenient 
‘‘ time, he himself might take them ; and therefore he may assign 
“ this interest, as 44 Edw. III. pl. 43, is. But admitting the 
“ grant to the Plaintiff had been void, yet Popbam said that the 
“ action was maintainable ; because by the cutting down of them, 
“ he had possession and a good title against the Defendant and 
“ every stranger ; and being cut down, it was not lawful for the 
“ Defendant to take them: for if one sells 1000 cords of wood, to 
“ be taken at the vendee’s election, and afterwards the grantor or 
“ a stranger cuts down some of the wood, the vendee cannot take 
“ that which is cut down, but he ought to make his grant good, out 
“ of that which is growing. As if estovers were granted unto liim, 
“ to be taken in a great wood, and the owner of the wood cuts 
“ down some’of the wood, the grantee cannot take that which is 
“ ent down, but he must take his estover out of the residue. And 
“ if all be cut down, he hath not any remedy, but an action upon 
“ the case. So here, although the Plaintiff hath not a good title, 
“ yet his having possession of them, being cut down, suffeeth.—■ 
li Quod Gawdy et Clinch concesserunt—wherefore it was adjudged 
“ for the Plaintiff, 5 Co. 24 v.”
In
in the Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV. 139
In the present case, the timber was not cut under Bedell’s li­
cence, but by persons altogether unconnected with it, and so ad­
verse to it, that they were forbidden by the Plaintiff to proceed. 
If the argument adduced on the part of the Plaintiff, that the li­
censee under Bedell’s licence had a right to avail himself of Price’s 
acts in cutting pine timber on the land included within the licence, 
by paying him for his labour in so doing, were acceded to, it would 
make the licence to convey a general authority from the Crown 
to compound for any trespass committed in cutting white pine tim­
ber on the land described in it—an inference, which requires only 
to be stated, to shew its utter inadmissibility. I am clearly of 
opinion that not a shadow of title can be derived under Bedell’s 
licence to the timber cut by Price, which is the subject of this ac­
tion. In whom then was the property in this timber ? I answer 
that the property undoubtedly remained in the Crown, the timber 
having been cut on Crown lands without authority. But it is for 
the Crown to enforce its own rights. Against every person but 
the King, the possession of the 1' tuber and their labour bestowed 
upon it, gave to Price and Walton the right to it, and the nature 
of their relative rights is to be determined by their own agreement. 
Each of them had expended labour on the timber under the agree­
ment, and by that agreement, as the timber was to be got to the 
halves, they were tenants in common, each of one half; and 
neither of them could convey as against the other, more than an 
undivided moiety. The sale from Price to the Plaintiff, therefore, 
conveyed to him Price’s interest only, (i. e. an undivided moiety,) 
and the Plain! iff became a tenant in common with Walton or 
Walton’s assigns, when Walton conveyed his share. Walton’s 
interest in the timber was transferred to the Defendant, who thus 
became a tenant in common with the Plaintiff—and as it is the 
general rule, to which this case does not afford an exception, that 
a tenant in common cannot maintain trover against his companion, 
I am of opinion, that upon this ground, the rule for entering a 
nonsuit must be made absolute.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Carter, J.:
To maintain this, which is an action of trover, the Plaintiff must 
shew some right of property in the subject of the action. This he 
has attempted to do in two ways ; first, he claims a right to the 
timber in question under a licence from the Crown; the licence 
which he offers in evidence in support of this right, appears to be 
a licence from the Crown to W. J. Bedell, to cut (subject to cer­
tain regulations winch do not appear in evidence) two hundred 
tons of white pine timber, from Crown lands described therein, and 
to remove the same ;—now it appears mos* clearly from the 
s evidence, 
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evidence, that the white pine timber, which is the subject of this 
action, was not cut under the licence, either by the Plaintiff, or by 
Bedell; but was cut by a person named Price, without any autho­
rity or right whatever. The case of Bassett «. Maynard, already 
cited from Cro. Eliz. 819, is a direct authority, to shew that this 
licence could give neither the Plaintiff nor Bedell any right to 
timber so cut; and so far as this case is concerned, ; will be suf­
ficient, on this ground alone, to decide that the Plaintiff has failed 
in establishing any title to the timber in question under the licence.
On the second ground on which the Plaintiff rests his title, I 
think he has also failed : claiming this timber by a transfer from 
Price, he cannot have a better title to it than Price himself had. 
As far as all three parties are concerned, from the agreement 
between Price and Walton, they would become joint owners of 
the white pine timber cut by Price—then Walton transfers his 
share to the Defendant, and Price his share to the Plaintiff—the 
Plaintiff and Defendant would thus become joint owners of the 
timber, and therefore an action of trover would not lie by one 
against the other.
For these reasons, I think the rule for a nonsuit must be made 
absolute.
Parker, J.:
It is impossible for the Plaintiff to establish his right to recover 
n this action, by virtue of the agreement made with Price, unless 
he can make out a title to the timber in question from the Crown 
under the licence given to Bedell. At the time of such agreement, 
the timber (setting aside the Crown rights) was either in the sole 
possession of Walton, or in the joint possession of Price and Wal­
ton, under a previous agreement made between them, for the pur­
pose of being hauled from the woods to the brow of the river upon 
shares—an agreement which constituted between them the relation­
ship of tenants in common ;—it is clear then that Price, at the 
time of his delivering the timber to the Plaintiff, had neither the 
right of property nor exclusive possession ; and as the Defendant 
stands in Walton’s shoes, if the Plaintiff cannot shew a title inde­
pendently of Price’s act, he must fail.
One very material question which was suggested at the argu­
ment by his Honor the Chief Justice, whether the licence was as­
signable at all, was not mooted at the trial; but the two which 
have been argued, namely, whether the licence from the Crown to 
cut so many tons of pine timber, would give the licensee a right to 
take pine timber cut by a stranger ; and whether the interest in 
the licence could pass by a parol assignment, were urged by the 
learned Counsel for the Defendant; and as it was admitted on all 
hands that they were most important in a general point of view, 
as 
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as they affected the great staple trade of the country, I was glad 
to reserve them without giving* an opinion, and the case went to 
the jury on the questions of fact as to the identity of the place and 
the timber, which they found, and very properly so, in favour of 
the Plaintiff ;i for there could be little or no doubt, that the timber 
which Connell, the Defendant, avowedly got from Walton, was 
part of the same which had been cut by Price within the limits of 
the berth described in Bedell’s licence.
I should remark also, that I stated to the jury, that allowing a 
parol assignment to be valid, I thought there was quite sufficient 
evidence to presume an assignment in this case ; and this seemed 
rather conceded by the Defendant’s Counsel; but then, part of the 
evidence, namely, Bedell’s declarations, were distinctly objected 
to, and received by me, also subject to the opinion of the Court; 
and the entire question is, I think, fairly open for discussion if the 
case required it.—As to the first point reserved, on a full consi­
deration and review of the authorities, I entirely concur with his 
Honor and my brothers, that the licence gave no property in the 
standing trees, and would not enure as a grant until the trees were 
selected and cut by the licensee, or under his authority; that the 
property in the pine timber so cut by Price, was, and stih is, for 
aught that appeared in evidence, vested in the Crown, and conse­
quently neither the Plaintiff 'ilor Bedell could maintain trover for 
it, against the person who has a right to the possession, as against 
Price and those claiming under him.
The case of Thomas v. Sorrell, from Vaughan, 351, (which has 
been already cited,) puts in very clear terms the nature of the 
rights which the parties derive under these licences. There is a 
manifest distinction in the form of the instrument between a licence 
to cut trees within certain prescribed limits to make a specified 
quantity of timber, and a bargain and sale or grant of particular 
trees, or all the trees on a particular spot of ground ; on this point 
the case of Dewclas & al. v. Kendall & al., in Yelverton, 188, is 
well worth noting. It would appear indeed, by the cases, that a 
demise of all the trees, though with liberty to cut, would not trans­
fer the property until cut—there must be an actual sale or grant. 
See 14 Vin. Abr. 83 & 84 ; Stukely v. Butler, Hob. 174, 6 ; also 
Cheltham v. Williamson, 4 East. 469 ; Still v. Butler, Cro. Eliz. 
434; Russell v. Maynard, Cro. Eliz. 819; Raebban v. Jessup, 3 
Wils. 333 n. ; Woodson v. Newton, Str. 777, and Smith v. Sur- 
nam, 9 B. & C. 573.
As to the several other objections which have been raised, the 
view which we have taken of the principal question, renders it un­
necessary to give an opinion; but I beg my present silence may 
not, as the case now presents itself, be considered in consequence 
of any thing which fell from me at nisi prius, as agreeing to the 
position, 
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position, that the present Plaintiff was clothed with the rights- 
which Bedell derived from the Crown licence. It is well also to 
observe, that there was nothing in this case to make it an excep­
tion to the general rule respecting tenants in common, and that 
any presumption of severance of the tenancy would make against 
the Plaintiff, as, for anything that appeared, he retained possession 
of a moiety of the timber, and his claim went to the whole.
Rule absolute.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
A. K. S. Wetmore and Berton for Defendant.
DOE EX DEM WILT v. JARDINE.
A deed, whereby the releasor released to the releasee, his heirs and as­
signs, all his right, title, interest and claim to certain lands, to have and to 
hold the same, to him, his heirs and assigns, for ever; the same having 
been duly executed, proved and registered, pursuant to the Act of Assembly, 
26 Geo. 3, c. 3, is a good conveyance of lands, within the meaning of the 
10th section of the said Act.
This action of ejectment was tried before Carter, J. at the Kent 
Circuit in August. 1835. The lessor of the Plaintiff established 
a prima facie case, under a grant from the Crown to him of the 
land in question, bearing date 17th June, 1830. The following 
deed was given in evidence for the Defendant, and formed part of 
his title, viz :—
“ Knoi all met by these presents, that I, John Wilt, of Liverpool, in the 
“ County of Kent, Yeoman, for and in consideration of the sum of two hundred 
“ pounds, of lawful money of New Brunswick, to me in hand paid by Robert 
“ Jardine and John Jardine, of the same place, Merchants, at or before the seal- 
“ ing and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, 
“ have remised, released and quit claimed, and do by these presents remise, re- 
“ lease and quit claim unto the said Robert Jardine and John Jardine, their heirs 
“ and assigns forever, all my right, title, interest and property, claim, in and to the 
u following demised premises, viz. a certain lot of land, applied for by me to Go- 
“ vernmeni, situated on the South side of the Richibucto River, in the County 
“ aforesaid, in the rapids of the main river aforesaid, with all and singular the 
“ appurtenances thereunto belonging, to have and to hold the same premises, 
“ unto the said Robert Jardine and John Jardine, their heirs and assigns, forever. 
" In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this fifteenth day of 
“ October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty.
(Signed) “ JOHN WILT. [L. S.J
“ Signed, sealed and delivered
tf in presence of
(Signed) “ Peter Stubs.”
“ Kent, > “ Peter Stubs, of Liverpool, in the County aforesaid, Esquire, maketh 
to-wit. S “ oath and saith, that he, this Deponent, w>as present, and did see 
“ the within named John Wilt sign, seal and execute the foregoing deed freely 
“ and voluntarily, for the use and purposes therein mentioned, and that the name 
“ John Wilt, set and subscribed fis the Grantor aforesaid, is of the proper hand-
“ writing
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“ writing of the said John Wilt, and that the name Peter Stubs, set and subscri- 
“ bed as the subscribing witness thereto, is of the proper handwriting of this 
“ Fefonent. (Signed) “ PETER STUBS.
“ Sworn to at Liverpool aforesaid,
“ in the County aforesaid, this
(( 27th day of October, 1830,
** Before
(Signed) u Geo. Pagan, Reg. Deeds, &c.”
“ Registered in Book B. pages 442 and 443, this twenty-seventh day of Oc- 
“ tober, 1830, and is number 208 in said Book.
(Signed) “ GEO. PAGAN, County Reg.”
J. A. Street, for the Plaintiff, contended, that the deed being 
merely a release, required some previous right or interest in the 
releasee in the land released, upon which the deed might operate, 
and no such right or interest having been shewn, the deed was 
inoperative.
The learned Judge ruled, that the deed was sufficient to pass 
the fee simple in the land mentioned in it, and under his direction 
in this respect, a verdict was found for the Defendant.
In last Michaelmas Term, a rule nisi, to set aside the verdict 
and grant a new trial, was obtained.
J. A. Street, in moving for the rule, took the following points :
1 st. That no deed would operate as a conveyance of land in this 
Province, except such as would operate by the common law, or 
under the statute of uses and Enrollments in England.
2d. That the deed from John Wilt to Robert and John Jardine, 
under which the Defendant claimed title, would not operate either 
as a feoffment at common law, or as a bargain and sale under the 
Statute of uses.
4 Cruise Dig. 48, 49, 107, 115 ; 1 Cruise Dig. 354 ; 1 Shep. 
Touchst. 165, 202 ; 2 do. 113.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term.
E. B. Chandler for Defendant:—
1st. The deed was not offered as a release at common law. It is 
a good feoffment, and, having been recorded under the Act of As­
sembly, has all the effect of a feoffment in England, with livery 
of seisin.
To constitute a feoffment at common law, or by statute, no pre­
cise words are necessary.
By the common law, a grantor might go upon land, and express 
and declare the estate intended to be conveyed ; and under the 
statute, it is only necessary that the intention of the parties should 
be expressed in writing. 4 Bl. Com. 310, 311 ; 4 Com. Dig. 285. 
The word give, ratty be sufficient to constitute a feoffment. 2 Bac. 
Abr. 602. The registry under the Act of Assembly is in place, 
and dispenses with the necessity of livery and seisin. The 10th 
section 
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section of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, provides, that all bargains and sales of 
lands, &c., and all grants and conveyances whatever, which shall 
be entered and registered at full length, as required by the same 
Act, shall be good, effectual and available, to all intents and pur­
poses, for the passing and transferring such lands, &c., and the 
estate and possession thereof, without livery of seisin, or other act, 
deed or ceremony whatsoever.
Then the question is, whether this deed is a good charter of 
feoffment at common law. The material circumstance necessary 
in such an instrument is, the declaration of the quantity and du­
ration of the estate.
2ndly. The deed operates as a bargain and sale under the 
statute of uses, as connected with the Act of Assembly.
No precise form of words is necessary to constitute a bargain 
and sale. 1 Bac. Abr. 686. Tit. Bargain and Sale. Any words 
sufficient at common law to raise a use, will enure as a bargain 
and sale. Then wbat words will raise a use ? Any, which shew 
the intention of the parties. 7 Com. Dig. 572-3. Tit. Uses. D. 1.
3dly. The deed may, with the aid of the Provincial statute, 
operate as a release—the Act supplying the place of a lease. Lan­
guage cannot be more conclusive than are the words of the Act.
[Carter, J.—Is not a previous estate necessary to support a 
release ?]
It has been held in the West Indies—in Antigua, St. Vincent, 
and Jamaica—under their registry acts, that a recorded convey­
ance requires not livery of seisin. 2 Blythewood, 222 ; 3 Bythew, 
165 ; 7 Bythew, 149.
The Solicitor General followed on the same side.
The situation of these parties is of a peculiar nature. The party 
who made this deed is now attempting to avoid its effect, and turn 
out of the possession of the land the persons to whom it was given : 
it is an attempt on the part of the lessor of the Plain! iff to defeat 
his own deed, made for a valuable consideration. Unless, then, a 
very clear case in point of law is made out, the Court will not as­
sist him. The question is not within any of the authorities cited 
on the other side.
By the common law, an entry on the land and actual livery of 
seisin, were necessary, but these are not necessary here. 'The 
lease for a year was necessary to do away with livery of seisin, all 
which is wholly unnecessary by the provisions of the Act of As­
sembly. The deed, shall enure according to the uses, intents and 
purposes therein expressed, is the language of the Province law. 
What, then, are the uses, intents and purposes of this deed ? There 
can be no doubt on this point; the habendum expresses that the 
grantees shall hold to thera, their heirs and assigns, forever. The 
intention 
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intention of the parties being clear, the deed, by the Act of As­
sembly, must take effect.
The Solicitor General was stopped by the Court, who directed 
the attention of the Counsel on the other side to the Act of As­
sembly, on which they considered the question must turn.
J. A. Street in support of the rule :—
The question then is, whether this deed is a good conveyance 
under the Act of Assembly, or, in other words, is it such a deed, 
as, under the terms of the common law, restrained by the statute 
of frauds, would<lcreate a feoffment. The 10th section of the Act 
enacts, that all deeds duly recorded, &c., shall be sufficient with­
out livery* of seisin ; and comparing this with the statute of uses 
and inrollments, it is clear that our Act is founded upon those 
statutes: the question, therefore, is resolved wholly into the point 
above stated. A deed which will amount to a bargain and sale, 
is a good feoffment; but here there are neither such words as will 
raise a use or a covenant to stand seised. If it contained the words 
grant, bargain, and sell, or any equivalent words, it would be suf­
ficient under the Act of Assembly. A release may enure by way 
of nutter le droit—enlargement, or extinguishment; in either of 
whicl cases, it is founded on the privity of estate between the 
parties ; here the parties are strangers, without any privity of es­
tate or interest in the release, upon which to found this release— 
therefore, it cannot operate as a release ; and being without words 
of conveyance, or such as will raise a use or covenant to stand 
seised, it cannot operate as a feoffment, and therefore cannot be 
considered a good conveyance within even the extensive meaning 
of the Act of Assembly.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
Referred to the deed as set forth above in the statement of the 
cause, and then proceeded :—
The learned Judge ruled at the trial that this deed was sufficient 
to pass the fee simple in the land mention® in it, and under his 
direction in this respect, the verdict was found. A rule for a new 
trial was obtained on the ground that this deed was not good as a 
release at common law, there being no antecedent interest in the 
land in the person to whom the deed was made, upon which the 
release might operate. It was further contended, that it could not 
operate as a feoffment at common law, nor as a bargain and sale 
under the statute of uses ; and much learning on all these points 
was brought forw ard on both sides, in the course of the argument. 
I am disposed to rest my judgment entirely on the Act of Assem- i 
bly, 26 Geo 3, c. 3, s. 10, which was evidently intended to lay 
down 
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down a broad rule to regulate the transfer of lands in this Province, 
without reference to particular forms or modes of conveyance.— 











“ All bargains and sales of any lands, tenements, and heredita-f 
ments, by deed indented or deed poll, and all grants and con- ; 
veyances whatsoever, made by writing, and duly signed, sealed, ■ 
and delivered, and acknowledged by the grantor or grantors, 
bargainor or bargainors, in such grants, sales and conveyances, 
&c. &c. # # which shall be entered and registered at full
length, &c. &c. * shall be good, effectual and available
to all intents and purposes. whatsoever, for the passing and 
transferring such lands, tenements and hereditaments, and, the 
estate and possession thereof, to the bargainee and bargainees,
“ grantee and grantees therein named, according to the intents, 
uses and purposes in* such deeds and conveyances^ expressed, 




“ All grants and conveyances whatsoever,” if “ made by wri­
ting,” and duly “signed,” “ sealed,” and delivered,” and “ac­
knowledged,” and “ registered,” shall be available “ to dll intents 
and purposes whatsoever,” for the passing and transferring of lands, 
“ according to the intents, uses and purposes in such deeds and 
conveyances expressed.” A subsequent Act, 52 Geo. 3, c. 20, 
makes all conveyances duly acknowledged “ or proved” under 
the provisions of any Act of Assembly, to be equally good and 
available. It was argued on the part of the Plaintiff, that a con­
veyance, to be good under this Act, must tally with some technical 
form of conveyance known to the law of the mother country. If 
an inquiry into this point were necessary in every instance, it 
would certainly tend to frustrate the evident object of the Act, 
which, as I have already suggested, is to facilitate and simplify the 
conveying of lands. This object is pursued in this part of the Pro­
vincial statute by declaring that every conveyance, (to which term 
I give in this place its popular and ordinary signification of an act 
for the transferring of lands,) made by writing, and accompanied 
by the other requisites mentioned in the statute, shall ne effectual 
for the transferring the lands to which it applies, according to the 
intents, uses and purposes “ expressed” in such conveyance, with­
out livery of seisin or any other act or ceremony whatever. An 
American writer of high legal reputation, Mr. Dane, in his Abridg­
ment of American Law, (vol. 4, p. 7,) well describes the general 
notion of a conveyance.—“ Strictly sneaking,” says he, “ lands, 
“ being immoveable, never can be conveyed, transferred, handed 
or delivered over from man to man, in the sense a hat, a horse,
“ or 
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“ or other moveable thing is. Still, in the eye of the law, land 
“ passes from the grantor to the grantee. In fact, the grantor re- 
“ linquishes his right and possession, consents the grantee shall 
“ have them, and he assumes the right and takes possession, by 
“ entering on the land as his own. This is the substance, what- 
“ ever may be the form of conveyance.”
The spirit of the Act of Assembly coincides with modem autho­
rities, which all concur in construing deeds in such a manner as 
will best effectuate the intention of the parties, without regard to 
technical forms. Thus Lord Mansfield, Cowp. 599 :—“ The rules 
“ laid down in respect of the construction of deeds are founded in 
“ law, reason, and common sense : that they shall operate accord- 
“ ing to the intention of the parties, if by law they may : and if 
“ they cannot operate in one form, they shall operate in that, 
“ which by law will effectuate the intention. But an objection is 
“ made in this case, which, it is said, takes it out of the general 
“ rule and the doctrine of the authorities cited : and that is, that 
“ in the release in question the word ’•grant' is not made use of. 
“ But that the intention of the parties was to pass all the right and 
“ title of the Plaintiff in these premises, is manifest beyond a doubt,” 
And Lord C. J. Willes, 2 Wils. 75, 73 :—“ By the word ’intent,' 
“ is not meant the intent of the parties to pass the land by this or 
“ that particular kind of deed, or by any particular mode or form 
“ of conveyance, but an intent that the land shall pass at all 
“ events, one way or other.” ® “ Although formerly accord-
“ ing to some of the old cases, the mode or form of a conveyance 
“ was held material, yet in later times, when the intent appears 
“ that the land shall pass, it has been ruled otherwise ; and cer- 
“ tainly it is more considerate to make the intent good in passing 
“ the estate, if by any legal means it may be done, than by consi- 
“ dering the manner of passing it, to disappoint the intent and 
“ principal thing, which were to pass the lands.” * * # Lord 
Hobart, (who was a very great man) in his reports, fo. 277, says : 
—“ I exceedingly commend the Judges that are curious and al- 
“ most subtle, astuti, to invent reason and means to make Acts 
“ according to the just intent of the parties, and to avoid wrong 
“ and injury, which by rigid rules might be wrought out of the 
“ Act —and my Lord Hale, in the case of Crossing and Scuda­
more, 1 Vent. 141, cites and approves of this passage in Hobart.
By the deed now in question, John Wilt, for the pecuniary con­
sideration mentioned in it, remises, releases, and quit claims, unto 
Robert Jardine and Jchn Jardine, their heirs, and assigns, for 
ever, all his right, title, interest and claim, to the premises des­
cribed in the deed, to have and to hold the same to the said Robert 
Jardine and John Jardine, their heirs, and assigns, for ever. Is 
T it 
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it not manifest, beyond a doubt, that the grantor meant by this 
instrument to relinquish all his right and interest in the land des­
cribed in it to the grantees ; to consent that they should have the 
land, to pass and transfer the same to them ? Is not this the in­
tent and purpose distinctly expressed in the instrument ? The 
instrument is in waiting, it is duly signed, sealed, delivered, proved 
and registered, according to the provisions of the Acts of the As­
sembly—and shall it not be available under the same Acts of As­
sembly to pass and transfer the land, according to the ,•intent and 
purpose thus expressed in it ? To hold the contrary would make 
nugatory the Acts of Assembly, and would be a manifest perver­
sion of justice. I think the rule for a new trial must be dis­
charged.
BOTSFORD, J. :
I concur fully with his Honor the Chief Justice, and am also of 
the opinion that the deed in question is a good bargain and sale 
within the statute of uses.
Blackstone, in speaking of a bargain and sale of lands as a spe­
cies of conveyance, introduced by the statute of uses, says, that it 
“■-is a kind of real contract, whereby the bargainor, for some pecu- 
“ niary consideration, bargains and sells, that is, contracts to con- 
“ vey the land to the bargainee, and becomes by such a bargain a 
“ trustee for, or seised to the use of the bargainee, and then the 
“ statute of uses completes the purchase, or as it hath been well 
“ expressed, the bargain first vests the use, and then the statute 
“ vests the possession.”—2 Bl. Com. 838.
All the books agree, that whatever words upon valuable consi­
deration, would have raised an use of any lands at common law— 
the same would amount to a bargain and sale within the statute of 
uses. The legal estate in the soil was not transferred by that 
mode of conveyance. No livery of seisin was therefore necessary. 
The intention of the parties was the leading principle; and any 
instrument declaring that intention, was allowed to be binding in 
equity.
It is laid down by Lord Chief Justice Holt, in Jones v. Morley, 
in speaking of the several ways to declare uses:—“ If there is no 
“ transmutation of the possession, as by fine, feoffment or recovery, 
“ the declaration will be sufficient without consideration or deed. 
“ But if there is no transmutation of possession, then there must 
“ be some obligatory agreement or valuable consideration. If an 
‘J agreement is, that A, for so much money paid, snail have the 
“ land, this will raise an use.”
It was admitted by Sir William Jones, in his argument in Scu­
damore v. Crossing, that the consideration of money has been held 
so strong, as to carry an estate of fee simple in an use without 
words 
in the Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV. 149
words of inheritance;—and in reference to Fox’s case, (8 Co. 185) 
said, that the consideration of money, there expressed, carried 
that case.
With respect to the construction of deeds, the intention appears 
to have been the governing principle. In Wilkinson v. Tranmore, 
it was said by Willes, C. J. :—“ Although formerly, according to 
“ some old cases, the mode or form of a conveyance was held ma- 
“ terial, yet in later times, when the intent appears that the land 
“ shall pass, it has been ruled otherwise; and certainly it is more 
“ considerate to make the intent good, in passing the estate, if by 
“ any legal means it may be done, than by considering the manner 
“ of passing it, to disappoint the intent and principal thing, which 
“ was to pass the land.”
It is laid down in 6 Bythewood, 441, that “ the operative words 
“ in a bargain and sale at common law, and a bargain and sale 
“ under the statute of uses, are the same ; but they are essential 
“ to neither, as any other words of conveyance would answer the 
“ same purpose.”
In Shove v. Pincke, 5 T. R. 129, it was said by Lord Kenyon : 
—“ It never has been held necessary that the word grant should 
“ be used in a grant, it being sufficient if the intention to grant be 
“ manifest by a deed —and by Buller, J. that the words “ limit 
and appoint,” operate as a grant.
In the case of Goodtitle v. Bailey, Cowp. 600, the words “re­
nounce, remise, release, and quit claim,” which are the words 
adapted to a release, were held to operate as a grant, it being the 
intention of the parties to pass all the right and title of the Plain­
tiff in the premises.
As to the deed in question, the consideration being for money, 
and the words sufficient to shew that it was the intention of the 
bargainor to sell all his right and title in the premises, to the bar­
gainee, his heirs, and assigns, it would, under the authorities cited, 
have been sufficient at common law, and before the statute of uses, 
27 H. 8, c. 10, to have passed the use in the land—consequently, 
the same is a good conveyance of bargain and sale within that Act. 
Carter, J ■
The question in this case is, whether the lessor of the Plaintiff 
divested himself of the land in dispute by a former deed, which 
deed he now seeks to set aside.
The only words of conveyance used in this deed are the words 
“ remise, release, and quit claim,” which are undoubtedly the 
operative words generally used in a deed of release—and it cannot 
be for one instant disputed, that as a release, cannot create an 
original estate—but can only effiarge an existing estate—and in 
this case no such existing estate appeared in the parties to whom 
this
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this deed was made, the deed would not operate strictly as a 
release.
It is well said by Lord Mansfield in the case of Goodtitle v. 
Bailey, Cowp. 597, “that deeds shall operate according to the 
“ intention of the parties, if by law they may: and if they cannot 
“ operate in one form, they shall operate in that which by law will 
“ effectuate the intention.” In Osman v. Sheaffe, 3 Lev. 372, 
cited in 2 Saun, 97 (a) it is said “ that the Judges of late years 
“ have had greater consideration for the passing of the estate, which 
“ is the substance of the deed, than the manner how, which is the 
“ shadow.'1'’ Looking at this deed, nothing can be plainer than 
the intention of the party to convey the land—the evidence shewed 
that a bona fide consideration was given for it, and the jury nega­
tived any fraud in the transaction. Under these circumstances, 
and under the authorities I have mentioned, and others which are 
to be found in the books, I should have been inclined to think the 
Court, independently of the Provincial statutes, might have given 
effect to this deed, and prevented the lessor of the Plaintiff from de­
feating his own solemn act. I understand from Mr. Justice Par­
ker, that in a late case, the Court of King’s Bench decided that 
these words were not sufficient to create a feoffment with livery of 
seisin. It is unnecessary, however, to decide the case on this, 
which would have been at all events, doubtful ground—for it ap­
pears to me perfectly clear, that helped by the Act of Assembly 
26 G. 3, c. 3, this deed would operate as an absolute conveyance 
of the land therein mentioned. I cannot assent to the position 
taken in argument by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, that 
the provisions of that Act apply only to deeds of conveyance, founded 
on the statute of uses. The words of the 10th section seem to rae to 
be as general as possible, and to have been studiously intended to 
comprehend all deeds of conveyance, and to prevent strict and tech­
nical objections, which, if not provided against, might often have 
worked great injustice and fraud, when from the circumstances of 
the Province, that strict attention to legal forms in the transfer of 
real estate could net be supposed to exist; taking the words of the 
10th section of the Act of Assembly, this deed appears to me to be 
a conveyance of land made in writing and duly signed, sealed, 
delivered, acknowledged, and registered—and is therefore good and 
effectual, for the transferring of the land therein mentioned, for the 
intents and purposes therein expressed. This conclusion > one to 
which I come most willingly, for had I felt myself bound by the 
strict rules of law to hold this deed inoperative—I much fear that 
justice would not have been done between these parties.
Parker, J.:
The argument of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff who seeks 
to sustain this rule is as follows:—No deed will operate as a con­
veyance 
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veyance of land in this Province, except it be sucli a conveyance 
as would operate by the common law, or under the statutes of uses 
and inrollments in England : the deed of the lessor of the Plaintiff 
to Robert and John Jardine, under which the defendant holds, 
would not so operate in England, and therefore not in this Province.
The second proposition is, I think, true ; and I have not arrived 
at this conclusion without a full investigation, though perhaps such 
an inquiry, in the state of our law, is more curious than useful.
It was argued that the deed would operate as a feoffment, the 
registry supplying the place of livery of seisin; as a bargain and 
sale ; and as a release at common law. I was rather inclined to 
think it would operate as a feofljnent, but I have found a very re­
cent case, Doe d. Dearden v. Maden, 4 B. and Ad. 880, in which 
it was holden that the -words “ reftiistfj'elease, and forever quit 
claim,™ .although accompanied by a warranty, were not sufficient 
to make the deed operate as a feoffment; but as there was suffi­
cient evidence in that case of an anterior possession, it was held 
to operate as a conveyance by way of release. The effect of the 
habendum, in the case before us, might give room for further ar­
gument, but it is not necessary to enlarge on this at present.
For a bargain and salefiit appears to me that there are not suf­
ficient words—the precise words bargain and sell are not requisite, 
but there must be equipollent words, which remise, release, and 
quitclaim can hardly be considered; they have not as yet been so 
far as I can discover, though many other terms have, which may 
be found in2 Inst. 6^2; 2 Com. Dig. 198; 1 Vent. 141, &c.
There was no previous estate or possession on which it could 
operate as a release by the law of England. The registry under 
the Act of Assembly could not supply the place of the deed for a 
year, in the ordinary conveyance of lease and release. I cannot 
think the word deed, as used in the concluding part of the 10th s. 
of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, has this meaning ; but is to be construed as a 
word ejusdem gennris, with those in the context and not as a deed 
of conveyance. The vendor was in the actual possession when tlie 
deed was executed, and for some time afterwards, and there was 
nothing whereon to found a presumption of any prior estate in the 
releasee. Something might be said on the ground of estoppel under 
the authority cited from Cowper, 597; but I think the case so 
clear under our Act of Assembly, that it is not necessary to call in 
aid the general reasoning of Lord Mansfield, which may not pos­
sibly be as clearly supported on strict legal, as it undoubtedly is, 
on equitable grounds. It is impossible, I think, to read the 10th 
sec. of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, and the 2d sec. of 52 Geo. 3, c. 20, with­
out being satisfied of the intention of the Legislature not to bind 
us to the same forms of conveyancing as are used in England.
Indeed
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Indeed I conceive the object of the Legislature clearly was to pre­
vent such questions as these arising, and to set up a standard for 
ourselves by which the validity of a deed duly registered might be 
tested; leaving, however, the English law to stand so far as it 
might be applicable and be consistent with our local regulations.
The first proposition of the Plaintiff cannot, therefore, in my 
opinion, be sustained; but it still.remains to shew that the deed iu 
question will operate as a conveyance under our Act. What then 
are the requisites which our Acts prescribe for a valid transfer of 
land? I need not repeat the sections—but construe them thus— 
a writing duly signed, sealed and delivered by the vendor, by 
which, for a lawful consideration, the intention and purpose to con­
vey to the„ vendee, are sufficiently manifested; the same being 
duly acknowledged or proved, and duly registered in the registry 
office of the County in which the land lies.
Can any one with our Acts before him look at this deed, and 
have any reasonable doubt as to its availability, and according to 
the argument, if it has not this full operation, it passes no legal 
estate at all ? None of the forms aje wanting, and the intention of 
the Plaintiff’s lessor to transfer all his right and title to the land 
therein described, is as clear as noon day. He had under the grant 
from the Crown an estate in fee simple, and that estate he has 
passed. The inclination of the Courts in England has always 
been to give effect to the intent of parties, as far as the rules of 
law would admit. Lord Ellenborough states this very strongly in 
4 East. 475. In the case I have already quoted from 4 B. and 
Ad., the Court considered the words remise, release and quit 
claim, as clearly manifesting the intention of the grantor to pass 
an interest’n the soil; but here we have also in the habendum 
clause, words which satisfy the precise definition of an estate in fee, 
“ To have and to hold the said premises unto the said R. J. and 
J. J. their heirs and assigns for ever.”
“ Tenant in fee simple” says Littleton, “ is he which hath lands 
to hold to him and his heirs for ever.” “ If a man would purchase 
lands or tenements in fee simple, it behovetli him to have these 
words in his purchase, To have and to hold, to him and to his 
heirs.”
I perfectly agree with his Honor and the rest of the Court that 
the rule must be discharged.
J. A. Street and Kerr for Plaintiff.
E. B. Chandler and TV. Chandler for Defendant
DOE
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DOE EX DEM HANNINGTON v. M‘FADDEN.
The statute of uses, 27 H. 8, c. 10, and tlie statute of mrolluients, 27 H. 8, 
c. 16, extend to, and are in force within, this Province.
This action of ejectment was tried before Carter, J. at the Kent 
Circuit tn September last.—On the part of tlie Plaintiff and as 
part of his title, a deed poll by vv'ay of mortgage of tlie locus in quo, 
from Francis Boucher to the lessor of the Plaintiff was offered in 
evidence. This deed had not been acknowledged, proved or re­
gistered, pursuant to the Act of Assembly. Boucher derived title 
hy a conveyance from one Jerva, which bore date previous to 
Boucher’s deed to Hannington, but was acknowledged pursuant to 
the Act of Asse/nbly on the 28th May, 1835, long subsequent to 
the date of the deed from Boucher to Hannington. This deed was 
received in evidence as1 H regHt^red deed without other proof.
J. A. Street and Welclon, for the Defendant, objected that this 
deed from Boucher to Hannington, was insufficient to pass the 
estate it purported to conjrpyj without livery of seisin, and that as 
to Boucher’s title, the date of the acknowledgment must be taken 
as the date of the deed, and therefore Boucher’s title arose subse­
quent to the conveyance to Hannington.
It was answered by R. B. Chandler and William, Chandler, that 
the deed was prima faiie sufficient, and could only be defeated by 
a registered deed to a subsequent purchaser: and that if it could 
not take effect under the Act of Assembly, it iiygjit operate under 
the statute of uses; that Boucher’s deed must be held to have been 
made at the time it Lore date, and the acknowledgment related 
back to that period.
J. A. Street objected, that the statute of uses did not extend to 
this Province, and even if it did, the statute of inrollments must 
also extend, and by the latter statute the operation of this deed 
would be prevented, it not having been inrolled.
It was ruled by his Honor J udge Carter, that if the deed depended 
on the Provinc ial laws alone, it was inoperative, but that under 
the statute of uses, which his Honor considered applicable to this 
Province, it might operate, and that such operation was not pre­
vented by the want of inrollment, as (in the opinion of his Honor) 
the statute of inrollments was not applicable, and therefore did not 
extend to this Province.
On the part of the Defendant, several deeds were put in evi­
dence and parol testimony was offered to shew that the land, which 
was described in the earlier conveyances as lot No. 4, was the 
same which was intended to be conveyed to the Defendant by the 
last deed by a different description—this evidence was rejected by 
his Honor. The lessor of the Plaintiff obtained a verdict, and in 
Michaelmas term.
J. A. Street
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J. A. Street moved for a rule nisi, to set the same aside, and 
grant a new trial, on the several points raised at the trial. The 
lessor of the Plaintiff claimed title through Jerva and Boucher. 
The conveyance to Haimington was a deed poll of bargain and 
sale by way of mortgage, which purposed to have been made by 
Boucher on the 24th February, 1817. This deed must stand in­
dependent of the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3. By section 6 
of that Act, the manner in which a deed should be proved, or ac­
knowledged and registered, was directed—by the 10th section of 
the same Act, it was provided that all deeds and conveyances 
made, executed, proved or acknowledged, and registered according 
to the terms of the Act, “ shall be good, effectual, and available, 
“ to all intents aud purposes whatsoever, for the passing and trans- 
“ ferring such lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and the estate 
“ and possession thereof to the bargainee and bargainees, grantee 
“ or grantees therein named, according to the intents, uses, and 
“ purposes in such deeds and conveyances expressed, without 
“ livery of seisin or any other act or deed, or form or ceremony 
“whatever.” And by the 11th section, deeds and conveyances 
so executed, acknowledged, and registered, and copies thereof duly 
certified, “ shall be allowed in all Courts where such deeds and 
“ conveyances, or copies shall be produced, to be as good and suf- 
“ ficient evidence as any bargains and sales inrolled in any of the 
“ Courts of Westminster, and the copies of the inrollments thereof 
“ are in any Courts of Great Britain.” The deed before the Court 
could not be assisted by the Act of Assembly, not having been 
“ proved or acknowledged, and registered.” The question was for 
the first time presented to the Court, whether a deed under such 
circumstances, was a good conveyance in this Province without 
proof of actual livery of seisin. The learned Judge had ruled at 
nisiprius that it was a good conveyance under the statute of uses 
-—but that statute could not be separated from the statute of inroll­
ments—both were passed in the same year—their operation com­
menced at the same time—they were in effect incorporated, and 
formed one statute, and it was for the Court to determine, if they 
extended to this Country, or if the machinery of the latter statute 
was not in its nature so local as to confine the operation of both to 
the Mother Country. If it should be held that both were in opera­
tion here, then the deed before the Court net having been enrolled 
was not effectual—and again, conveyance by deed of bargain and 
sale, was a creature of the statute of uses, and that statute as res­
trained by the statute of inrollments applied only to indentures ; 
but it was evident from the terms of the Provincial Act 26 G. 3, 
c. 3, that the statutes of uses and inrollments had been viewed by 
the Provincial Legislature as inapplicable, and therefore they had 
appointed a more simple mode of acknowledging, or proving and 
registering 
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registering conveyances. No mode of transferring land could be 
good, except that pointed out by the Legislature. If property 
could be transferred independently of the Act of Assembly, feoff­
ment was the only common law mode, and that must be accompa­
nied by livery of seisin. In support of this point the following 
authorities were cited, Adams on ejectment, 281 ; American Jurist, 
No. 5, 151 ; Presscot v. Nevers, 5 Mason Rep. 326 ; 1 Shepherd’s 
Touch, 54, 223, 507, 508; Chitty’s Notes to statute of uses; 2 
Bl. Com. 327, 336; Attorney General v. Stewart, 2 Merivale, 163 ; 
Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr, 2500; 1 Atk. 544.; Sugden on Powers, 
7, 10; 4 Com. Dig. 28, 105, 115, 123.
As to the deed conveying the locus in quo to Boucher, that was 
only proved by the certificate of acknowledgment and registry en­
dorsed thereon—that certificate bore date the’28th May, 1835, 
long subsequent to the date of the mortgage*deed from Boucher to 
Hannington. At what time then was this deed delivered,—at the 
date of the deed or of the acknowledgment ? The instrument was 
only effectual by its delivery, and there was no proof of its delivery 
at the date. The acknowledgment was that the grantor executed 
the deed for the purposes therein expressed, and not that he execu­
ted it twenty years before the time of the acknowledgment. 4 
Cruise Dig. 29; Com. Dig. Tait. Coke 264 ; 1 Phil, on Ev. 534 ; 
i Starkie’s Ev. 332; American Jurist, No. 26, 426; Dallas 
Rep. 384.
As to the evidence offered by the Defendant, wl icli was rejected, 
it was tendered to explain an ambiguity in the description of the 
land, not to contradict or alter the effect of tlie deed, and for that 
purpose was inadmissible. 1 Phil. Ev. 527, 528, 534 ; Peake's 
Ev. 113; 6 T. R. 671;' 3 Star. Ev 1018, 21. 24 ; 1 Shep.Touch. 
247, 76, (n) b. 87; 1 Barn, and Aid. 247, 699; 1 T. R. 701 : 
8 D. & R. 594.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term
N. Parker for the Plaintiff:—
The statute of uses and the statute of inrollments were distinct 
and separate Acts of Parliament, and in determining their exten­
sion, the former should be viewed without reference to the latter; 
and should it be considered as a general regulation, applicable to 
the Colonies, it must be in force here, whatever might be deter­
mined as to the statute of inrollments. The statute of inrollments 
contained provisions which were essentially local; deeds were Ly 
that statute required to be entered and inrolled at estmnister; 
could a deed of land in this country be so entered and jnrolled ? 
If it were necessary for a party to plead an inrollment, he must 
state the Court in which the deed was inrolled. Cro. Jac. 2:4—
Saund. 250—2 Saund. 12—Could he plead a deed duly entered 
V and
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and inrolled in the Supreme Court of New Brunswick? and even 
if such an inrollmerit could he made or pleaded, it would he inef­
fectual by the operation of the Province Law—it would be held 
fraudulent as against a subsequent purchaser, unless registered in 
pursuance of the ?ict of Assembly.
In England there was a particular officer, the clerk of the in­
rollments, but no such officer was known here.
The Provincial statute 26 G. 3, c. 3, shewed by its terms that 
the Legislature did not contemplate that the statute of inrollments 
could apply or have any operation here, else why take the English 
practice as an example for admitting copies as evidence?
Assuming that the statute of inrollments did not extend to this 
Province, could the two be separated ? he contended that they 
could—that the statute of uses was such a general regulation, as 
was applicable to the Colonies, that it was complete in itself, and 
could be, and was effectual without assistance from the other sta­
tute—it had been held to extend in the old Colonies. 4 Kent, 
Com. 432, 4 Danes Abr. 214.
The next question was, if the deed from Boucher was a suffi­
cient conveyance within the statute of uses; it had sufficient words 
of conveyance to create a feoffment at common law, and it had 
been held what Was good as a feoffment at common law 'would 
raise a use.
Another point worthy of consideration arose from the relation of 
the parties, Boucher and Hannington as mortgagor and mortgagee. 
Boucher was in possession at the time of making the deed, and 
the rule of law was that the possession of the mortgagor was the 
possession of the mortgage?—if a time were appointed for the re­
demption of mortgaged premises, and it was not expressed that the 
mortgagor should remain in possession, it was tacitly implied. If 
Boucher had declared subsequent to the deed that he held as 
tenant to Hannington, or as mortgagor in possession, it would have 
been sufficient proof of livery of seisin—if then his parol declara­
tion would have been sufficient, so solemn an instrument as a deed 
must be good, 1 Powell, 155, 157, 3 Powell, 1034—Doe v. 
Macey, 8 B. & C. 767.—Doe. v. Mason, 3 Camp. 7 ; and could 
only be defeated by a conveyance to a bona fide purchaser, for a 
valuable consideration, duly registered according to the terms of 
the Act of Assembly. The deed from Jerva to Boucher, when re­
corded, related to the period of its date—it was acknowledged to 
have been executed for the purposes therein mentioned; Boucher 
moreover was in possession at the time of making the mortgage 
deed to Hannington.
E. B. Chandler, followed on the same side. If the statute of 
inrollments ever extended to the Colonies it was virtually repealed 
by the Act of Assembly, 26 G. 3, c. 3. A deed of land in this 
Province
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Province inrolled at Fredericton or Westminster, would be avoided 
by a deed duly registered. 1 Bac. Abr. Tit. bargain and sale. E. 
The Act of Assembly did away with the statute of inrollments, 
and itself only relates to subsequent purchasers for valuable con­
sideration .
As to the admission of parol evidence contended for by the 
Counsel for the defendant, if the position could be maintained, the 
protection afforded by the Registry Act, would be at an end. 
When parol evidence had been admitted, the deed had been con­
sistent with the evidence when given. Rose. Dig. 11. 5. T. R. 
564, 13 Star. Ev. 1025—1028.
J. A. Street, in support of the ride. The statute of uses as 
contended for on the other side did not exist, and never had existed 
in England. The statute law only applied to Colonies as part of 
the common law : the two statutes were contemporaneous, and if 
colonists brought with them the provisions of one it could only be 
as restrained or affected by the other, and unless both were appli- , 
cable, neither could apply—the statute of uses so far as related to 
bargains and sales of freehold was in effect repealed by the statute 
of inrollments.
The question whether a man could dispute his own deed did not 
arise here.
It could not be contended that a mortgagee could stand on a 
better footing with respect to a deed, than if the instrument had 
been an absolute conveyance.
[Chipman, C. J.—This is not ejectment between mortgagor and 
mortgagee.]
The Counsel was stopped on this pcint. As to the deed from 
Jarva to Boucher which was recorded the day previous to the de­
mise in this cause—
[Chipman, C. J.—The 10th section of the Act of Assembly 
will help this; the date is to be taken as the time of delivery, un­
less the contrary be shewn.]
In this term the Court delivered their opinions.
Ci-iipman, Chief Justice:
The first question which arises in this case is on the operation 
and effect of an unregistered deed produced in evidence, and proved 
by a witness en the part of the Plaintiff. The deed is a deed poll 
in the folio wing terms:—
“ Know all men by these presents, that I, Francis Boucher, of Buctush, in 
“ the County of Westmorland, and Province ofNew Brunswick, (Farmer.) for 
“ and in consideration of the sum of fifty pcg-ids of lawful money of the said Pro 
“ vince, received to my full satisfaction of Wiliam Hannington, Junior, of She- 
“ diac in the Province of New Brunswick, (Trader.) the receipt whereof 1 do 
“ hereby acknowledge, have granted, bargained and sold, and by these presents 
“ do 
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“ do give, grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto him the said William 
“ Hannington, his heirs and assigns, two certain lots; or parcels of land, situate 
“ lying and being on the north side of Buctush River, containing in the whole 
“ one hundred and fifty acres, be the same more or less, as laid down in the grant, 
“ bounded on the east by lands in the possession of Charles Cormier, and on the 
“ west by lands in the possession of Girouard, (the said lots being now in the 
“.possession of the aforesaid Francis Boucher.) To have and to hold the said 
“ lots or parcels of land, together with all the buildings, improvements, and ap- 
“ purtenances thereunto belonging, unto the said William Hannington, his heirs 
“ and assigns for ever. Provided nevertheless, that if the said Francis Boucher 
“ shall pay or cause to be paid to the said William Hannington, his heirs or as- 
“ signs, one certain note ofhand for fifty pounds, bearing date the twenty fourth 
“ day of February, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, .vith lawful inte- 
“ rest thereon, and that on or before the twenty fourth day of February, that 
“ will be in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and nineteen ; then 
“ the within deed, being given for the security for the payment of the within 
“ named sum, to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue. In wit- 
“ n’ess whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this twenty fourth day of 
“ February, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, and in the fifty-seventh 
“ year of His Majesty’s reign.
his 
“FRANCIS BOUCHER, X 
mark.
“ Sealed, signed and delivered in presence of) 
“William Hannington, Senior.
his [>-
“ Tannis Law Collet, X 
mark” J
The learned Judge at the trial ruled that this deed, although not 
acknowledged or proved and registered according to the provisions 
of the Provincial Registry Acts, was sufficient to pass the estate 
which it purported to convey, liable, however, to be defeated by a 
registered deed to a subsequent purchaser of the same land for va­
luable consideration. The opinion of the learned Judge upon this 
point was objected to on the part of the Defendant, and formed the 
principal ground upon which the rule nisi for a new trial was ob­
tained. This rule for a new trial has been elaborately and ably 
argued by the learned Counsel on both sides, and presents, for the 
first time, to my knowledge, within this Province, a very impor­
tant question relating to the conveying of lands. On the one 
hand, it was contended on the part of the Defendant, that the deed 
which I have recited, not being accompanied by livery of seisin, is 
net sufficient to pass a freehold at common law, and that allowing 
it to be sufficient for this purpose by the operation of the statute of 
uses, (27 II. 8, c. 10,) still, if the statute of uses is held to extend 
to this Province, the statute of inrollments (27 H. 8, c. 16,) must 
be held to extend also; and this latter statute would prevent any 
inheritance or freehold from passing under this deed, it being a 
bargain and sale and not indented and inrolled according to the 
provisions of the statute. On the other hand, it was contended on 
the part of Plaintiff, that the statute of uses did certainly extend 
to 
in the Sixth Year of WILLIAM IV. 159
to this Province, and the deed was therefore sufficient by the opera­
tion of this statute to pass the estate, which it purported to con­
vey, and that the statute of inrollments was not in force in this 
Province, and the deed therefore stood unaffected by this latte, 
statute.
It was further contended on the part of the Plaintiff, that if the 
statute of inrollments had ever extended to this Province, it was 
virtually repealed by the Provincial Registry Act. The question, 
what Acts of the Parliament of the another country shall be held 
to extend to a Colony, is undoubtedly one of the most grave ques­
tions which can occupy the attention of a Colonial Judicature, and 
may be in many cases one of considerable perplexity. The rule 
laid down by Blackstone, (1st Com. 107) is that “Colonistscarry 
“ with them only so much of the English law as is applicable to 
“ their own situation, and the condition of an English Colony ; 
“ such for instance as the general rules of inheritance ; and of 
“ protection from personal injuries.” The same doctrine in sub­
stance is maintained by Lord Mansfield, (Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr. 
2500 ; Campbell v. Hall, Lofft. 710,—24 Howell, State Trials, 
289.) In the case of the AttorneyiQeneral v. Stewart, 2 Mer. 
143, in which the question was, whether the statute of mortmain 
(9 Geo. 2, c. 36,) extended to the Island of Grenada, Sir William 
Grant, the Master of the Rolls, also adopts substantially the same 
rule, and makes the determination of the point to depend upon this 
consideration, “ whether it be a law of local policy, adapted solely 
“ to the country in which it was made, or a general regulation of 
“ property equally applicable to any country, in which it is by the 
“ rules of English law that property is governed.” He comes to 
the conclusion that the mortmain Act is quite inapplicable to Gre­
nada or any other Colony, because “ in its causes, its provisions, 
“ its qualifications, and its exceptions, it is a law wholly English, 
“ calculated for purposes of local policy, complicated with local 
“ establishments, and incapable, without great incongruity in the 
“ effect, of being transferred, as it stands, into the code of any other 
“ country.”
The two statutes now under consideration, the statute of uses 
and the statute of enrollments, having been passed in the reign of 
Henry the Eighth, long before the planting of any of the American 
Colonies, no question arises upon the time of their being passed, in 
reference to the period of any Colonial settlement; and the only 
matter for consideration, with respect toueach of them, will be, 
whether it be applicable to the Colonies, or, in the words of Sir 
William Grant, whether it be “ a law of local policy” adapted 
solely to the particular circumstances and condition of England, or 
whether it be “ a general regulation of property equally applicable 
“ to any country in which it is by the rules of English law that 
“ property 
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“ property is governed.” With respect to the statute of uses, by 
the operation of which the person who has the use, that is, is 
entitled to the profits and benefit of land, is held to be in the posses­
sion of the land itself, the provisions of it are so,mingled with the 
whole body of the English law of real property, that no doubt <»n 
exist as to ts aj ..licability jn every country, where that law forms 
the basis of jurisprudence. Lord Bacon describes it as “ the sta- 
“ tute which of all others hath the greatest power and operation 
“ over the heritages of the realmand it was, very generally, if 
not universally considered to have been in force in the old Ameri­
can Colonies. 4 Kent’s, Com. 1st Ed. 283, 452, 477, 482; 1 
Dane’s Abr. 9th do. 362. I cannot entertain a shadow of doubt 
that the statute of uses is in force in this Province.
The remaining question is, whether this statute is so in force, 
without its concomitant, passed in the same session of Parliament— 
the statute of inrollments. In order to decide this question, we 
must examine the statute of inrollments for the purpose of ascer­
taining whether this be a general regulation of property, applicable 
equally with the statute of uses, to any country where the law of 
England prevails. This statute provides,—“ That no manors, 
“ lands, tenements, or other hereditaments shall pass, alter or 
“ change from one to another, whereby any estate of inheritance 
“ or freehold shall be made or take effect in any person or persons, 
“ or any use thereof to be made, by reason only of any bargain 
“ and sale thereof, except the same bargain and sale shall be made 
“ by writing, indented, sealed and inrolled in one of the King’s 
“ ■Courts of Record at Westminster, or else within the same County 
“ or Counties where the same manors, &c. so bargained and sold, 
“ lie or be, before the Custus Rotulorum and two Justices of the 
“ Peace, and the-Clerk of the Peace of the same County or Coun- 
“ ties, or two of them at the least, of which the Clerk of the Peace 
“ to be one, &c. &c.”
Mr. Hargrave, in his notes upon Coke Littleton, (Coke Litt. 
48, a. n. 3,) explains the objects of the statute of inrollments in 
the following terms:—“Those who framed the statute of uses 
“ evidently foresaw, that it would render livery unnecessary to the 
“ passing of a ‘ freehold,’ and that a freehold of such things as do 
“ not lye in grant, would become transferable by parol only, with- 
“ out any solemnity whatever. To prevent the inconveniences 
“ that might arise from a mode of conveyance so uncertain in the 
“ proof, and so liable to misconstruction and abuse, it was enacted 
“in the same session of Parliament, that an estate of freehold 
“ should not pass by bargain and sale only, unless it was by inden- 
“ ture inrolled,—see 27 H. 8, c. 16. The objects of these provi- 
“ sions evidently were-—first, to force the contracting parties to as- 
“ certain the terms of the conveyance, by reducing it into writing;
“ secondly, 
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“ secondly, to make the proof of it easy, by requiring their seals 
“ to it, and consequently the presence of a witness; and lastly, 
“ to prevent the frauds of secret conveyances, by substituting 
“ the more effectual notoriety of inrollment, for the more ancient 
t‘«ne of livery.” These three objects of this statute, namely, 
the ascertainment of the intent of a conveyance by the reduction 
of it to writing, the facilitating the proof of it, and the preventing 
of frauds by the notoriety of inrollment, are evidently applicable to 
any country, where the statute of uses and the English law of real 
property are in force.
The only difficulty in the way of extending this statute to a 
Colony, arises from the designation of the places in which the in­
rollment is required to be made ; and if there should be no esta­
blishment in a Colony corresponding with those in England, desig- 
nateil'in the Act for makingTlie inrollment, I agrefe that it would 
not be practicable to transfer the operation of this Act to such a 
Colony. The Act requires the inrollment to be made “ in one of 
the King’s Courts of Record at Westminster,” or else within the 
County where the lands lie “ before the Gustos Rotulorum, and 
“ two Justices of the Peace, and the Clerk of the Peace of the 
“ same County or Counties, or two of them.” Now as this Pro­
vince is divided into Counties in like manner with England, and 
as in each County there is a Gustos Rotulorum and a Clerk of the 
Peace, and Justices of the Peace, also, with like official powers as 
in England, it is quite practicable to carry the Statute into effect, 
so far as respects inro!lmefit§ in the Counties. With regard to in­
rollment in the King’s Courts of Record at Westminster, Lord 
Coke’s comment upon this part of the statute is as follows, (2 
Inst. 674,) —“ In any of the King’s Courts of Record at West- 
“ minster, that is, in the King’s Bench, the Chancery, the Com- 
“ mon Pleas, and the Exchequer— s.nd though the words be, “ at 
Westminster,” for that at the time of the making of this Act, 
“ these Courts were there ; yet if these be adjourned into another 
“ place, the inrollment may be in any of these Courts, for the in- 
“ rollment is confined to the Courts wheresoever they be holden.” 
The Supreme Court in this Province has by the express terms of 
the Commissions to the Judges, all the powers of the three supe­
rior Courts of common law in Westminster Hall; and there is also 
in the Province a Court of Chancery with jurisdiction and powers 
similar to those cf that Court in England. We have therefore 
within the Province all the local establishments, constructed upon 
the plan of English institutions, wnich are necessary for carrying 
the statute into effect.
The practice of inrollment morever, is not one which originated 
with the statute of inrollments. It is required in the statute, not 
as a new proceeding, then for the first time established, but as one 
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of familiar occurrence, which the statute makes imperative with 
regard to deeds of a certain description, namely, bargains and sales 
of estates of inheritance and freehold. In 14 Vin. Abr. 443, tit 
inrollment, citing 2d Lilly’s Prac. Reg. 67, a definition is given of 
the term, and “ inrollment of a deed” is stated to be “ the entering 
“ of it fairly upon the records of one of the King's Courts of Record 
“ at Westminster, or at the Quarter Sessions of the Peace.” So 
that inrollment of a deed, ex vi termini, independently of the' sta­
tute, imports an entry of the deed upon the records of the Courts 
named in the statute ; this practice of inrollment being evidently 
an incident to these Courts at common law. Another circum­
stance which strongly marks, that the inrolling of deeds is a pro­
ceeding at common law, entirely regulated by the Courts them­
selves, and not originating with or derived from this statute, is, that 
the statute contains no provision for deeds being acknowledged be­
fore they are inrolled ; and yet it is laid down in Coke, Litt. 225, 
6, that no deed can be inrollcd unless duly and lawfully acknow­
ledged. And in Lilly’s Practical Register, as cited in Jacob’s Law 
Dictionary, title, “ inrollment^ it is stated, that “ every deed be- 
“ fore it is inrolled, is to be acknowledged to be the deed of the party 
“ before a Master of the Court of Chancery, or a Judge of the 
“ Court wherein inrolled, which is the officer’s warrant f >r inrolling 
“ the same.” And in 1 Salk. 3S9, there is a general rule of the 
Court of King’s Bench “ that all deeds shall be acknowledged on 
“ the plea side in this Court and not on the -Crown side; and that 
“ the acknowledgment shall be in open Court.”
It appears from the case of Worsely ©. Filisker, 2 Rolles Rep. 
119, cited in 14 Vin. Alu. 443, that the inrollment office in the 
Court of Chancery was not erected until the I6tli Eliz., many 
years after the passing of the statute of inrollments—hence it fol­
lows, that the existence of a special office in the Courts for the 
purpose of inrollment, is not a necessary preliminary to the opera­
tion of the statute.
The business of inrollment being then an incident at common 
law to the Courts mentioned in the statute of inrollments, and a 
matter regulated by the Courts themselves, when Courts are esta - 
blished in a Colony with powers and incidents at common law, 
identical with the powers and incidents of the Courts in England, 
mentioned in the statute, all difficulty in the application of the 
statute for the want of local establishments to carry it into effect, 
vanishes.
The extension of statutes to this Province, which are in terms 
confined to the Courts of the mother country, is not by any means 
without precedent, as is obvious from two very familiar instances, 
namely, 1st. the Stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, sec. 20, authorizing the as­
signment of bail bonds, which is expressed to apply to persons 
arrested 
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arrested by any process “ issuing out of any of His Majesty’s 
“ Courts of Record at Westminster,”—and 2dly, the stat. 14 Geo. 
2, c. 17, authorizing judgments as in case of a nonsuit; which in 
like manner is expressed to apply to suits in the King’s-Courts of 
Record at Westminster, the Court of Great Sessions in Wales, and 
the Courts of the Counties Palatine—and yet each of these statutes 
is daily acted upon in this Province, and must be considered as 
fully incorporated with our Provincial code.
Upon full consideration of this point, in the aspect in which I 
have now presented it, I have come to the conclusion that the 
statute of inrollments being a contemporaneous modification of the 
statute of uses, equally applicable in principle with the statute of 
uses to any country in which the law of England is in force, and 
there being in this Province local Courts with powers and inci­
dents at common law for carrying the statute of inrollments into 
effect, the statute of inrollments equally with the statute of uses 
extends to, and is in force within this Province.
As to the fact of the statute of inrollments having been consi­
dered to be in force in the old Colonies, Chancellor Kent, in that 
part of his commentaries in which he treats of conveyances, ex­
presses himself as follows:—
“ Conveyance by lease and release was the mode universally in 
“ practice in New York until the year 1788,—the revision of the 
“statute law of New York in 1788, which re-enacted all the 
“ English statute laws, deemed proper and applicable, and which 
“ repealed the British statutes in force in New York while it was 
“ a colony, removed all apprehension of the necessity of inroll- 
£ ment of deeds of bargain and sale, and. left that short, plain 
“ and excellent mode of conveyance to its free operation : the con- 
“ sequence was, that the conveyance by lease and release, which 
“ required two deeds or instruments instead of one, fell immediately 
“ into total disuse, and will never be revived.” (4 Kent’s Com, 
1st edit. 452.)
From this passage, it is evident that the statute of inrollments 
was at least apprehended to have been in force in the Province of 
New York, and that this apprehension was so strong in its prac­
tical effect, as to cause the universal prevalence in that Province, 
of the conveyance by lease and release. There is a case, I under­
stand, in one of the Massachusetts reports, in which it was assumed 
that the statute of inrollments had never been in force in that Pro­
vince. This case will be remarked upon by another member of 
the Court. It was argued on the part of the Plaintiff, that even 
if the statute of inrollments was in force at the time of the erec­
tion of the Province, it was repealed by the Provincial Registry 
Act, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, the provisions of which Act, it was con­
tended, were inconsistent with the statute of inrollments. 1 do not 
w perceive 
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perceive any inconsistency in the two Acts, the provisions of which 
very well stand together. Tlie Provincial Registry Act, (S. 1,) 
provides that deeds may be registered, and that unregistered deeds 
shall be adjudged frau( ulent and void against subsequent purcha­
sers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, whose deeds shall 
be registered. And the 10th section of the same Act provides, 
“ that all conveyances made in writing, and signed, sealed and de- 
“ livered, acknowledged and registered, according to the provisions 
“ of that Act, shall be sufficient to pass estates in lands, according 
“ to the intent of the deed without livery of seisin, or any other 
“ act or ceremony whatever.” As compared with the statute of 
inrollments, the effect of the first section of the Provincial Registry 
Act would undoubtedly be that a bargain and sale, although in­
rolled according to the provisions of the statutes of inrollments,would 
not, any more than a deed of feoffment at common law, accompanied 
by livery of seisin, be good against a registered deed to a subsequent 
purchaser for valuable consideration, unless registered according to 
the provisions of the Registry Act. But this section leaves un­
touched the provision of the statute of inrollments, that no estate 
of inheritance or freehold shall pass at all from the bargainor to the 
bargainee, unless the requisites of that statute are complied with. 
The Provincial statute in this respect is similar in its enactment 
to the English Registry Acts ; I refer particularly to the stat. 8 
Geo. 2, c. 6, for establishing a registry in the North Riding ol York, 
from which statute it would seem that many of the clauses of the 
Provincial Act were copied. Yet so far from this statute being 
considered as repealing the statute of inrollments with regard to 
the North Riding of York, the latter statute is expressly recited in 
the twenty-first section of it, which makes bargains and sales regis­
tered according to its provisions, of equal validity with bargains 
and sales inrolled according to the statute of inrolhuents—so the 
tenth section of the Provincial Registry Act, the words of which 
are affirmative, and the effect of it enlarging, undoubtedly makes 
a bargain and sale, in respect to which the provisions of that Act 
have been complied with, sufficient to pass an estate of freehold or 
inheritance, although it be not inrolled according to the statute of 
inrollments ; but it leaves untouched all bargains and sales with 
regard to which its own provisions have not been complied with. 
Such being the operation of the Provincial Registry Act, if the 
statute of inrollments be not in force, there is no law in this Pro­
vince, even at this day, to prevent an estate of freehold or inheri­
tance from passing under the statute of uses, by writing alone 
without seal, as the statute of frauds requires a writing only, not a 
deed under seal.
It was further argued on the part of the Plaintiff, that the rela­
tion of mortgagor and morgagee having been established by the 
deed 
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deed in question between the parties to it, it is not competent for 
any person holding under the mortgagor, as the Defendant does, to 
invalidate it. Upon this ground of argument it need only be re­
marked, that if the deed be not sufficient to pass the estate which 
it purports to convey, tl.e relation of mortgago: • and mortgagee was 
never established.
Upon the whole I am of opinion that the deed upcn which this 
discussion lias arisen, net having been acknowledged or proved, 
and registered according to the provisions of the Provincial Regis­
try Act, and being a bargain and sale not indented and inrolled 
according to the statute of inrollments, is not sufficient to pass the 
estate of inheritance which it purports to convey ; and therefore 
upon this ground, if the point had been reserved at the trial, with 
leave to move to enter a nonsuit, anonsuit must have been entered ; 
but this not having been done, a new trial must be ordered.
There was another ground upon which the motion for a new 
trial was argued, and that was, the improper rejection of evidence 
by the learned Judge who tried the cause. It is unnecessary to 
say more on this point, than that.I am of opinion that the evidence 
was properly rejected.
Botsford, J. •
I entirely agree in the opinion expressed by his Honor the Chief 
Justice.
Carter, J.:
The material question on. which tliis'case depends, ig the vali­
dity of the deed of mortgage from F. Boucher to W Hannington, 
Jun,, because if it be determined that this deed is invalid, the les­
see of the Plaintiff has failed to make out such a legal title as will 
enable him to recover in an action of ejectment.
The view which I took of this point at the trial certainly was 
this,—that the deed was inoperative if it depended on the Provin­
cial laws alone, but that it Alight operate under the statute of uses, 
which I considered applicable to this Province, and that such ope­
ration was not prevented by the want of inrollment, as I considered 
the statute of inrollments did not extend to this Province On 
full consideration of the case and the arguments which have been 
adduced on both sides, I think that on the last point, viz. as to 
the extension of the statute of inrollments to this Province, the 
opinion I expressed at the trial was wrong. I confess I had very 
great doubts on this point, and have felt much difficulty in coming 
to a decision upon it; the point being one perfectly new, and on 
which there is no direct authority, and hardly any decision winch 
may be an authority by analogy. After the elaborate judgment 
which has already been given, I do not think it necessary to go at 
any great length into all the bearings of tins question, but shall 
state, 
166 CASES IN TRINITY TERM,
state, very briefly, the reasons which bring me to the conclusions 
at which I have arrived. I take it, that of the statute law of Eng­
land, which existed at the original settlement of this Province, so 
much is in force here as is adapted to the circumstances of the 
Province, and is not local in its nature and provisions. On this 
principle there can be no doubt that the statute of uses must be in 
force here ; and there seems to be authority in the passage cited 
from Dane’s Abr. to shew that in Colonies similarly circumstanced, 
this statute was considered in force. How, then, does this princi­
ple affect the statute of inrollments ? It cannot be said that the 
policy of this statute is local, that policy being to give publicity to 
deeds of bargain and sale of freehold property, which, but for this 
statute, might have been, under the statute of uses, of a private 
nature. This object is one which is equally applicable to this Pro­
vince. Nor is this object fully effected by the Registry Acts, so 
as to render the statute of inrollments unnecessary ; for besides 
this cons’ deration, that if the statute of inrollment formed part of 
the English law which extended to the Province at its first settle­
ment, it would still operate, uffess repealed by some Provincial 
enactment. The Registry Acts do not fully effect this object— 
because a deed of bargain and sale, so far as it depends on them, 
is good against all but subsequent purchasers for valuable consi­
deration without any registry or inrollment; whereas, by the sta­
tute of inrollments, it is absolutely void if not inrolled within six 
months after the date. Wherever, therefore, the statute of uses 
will extend, it appears to me that the policy of the statute of in­
rollments will also extend. Is there, then, any thing in the provi­
sions of that statute which shews that it is local ? On first con­
sidering this, it certainly appeared to me that the provision that 
the inrollment of deeds of bargain and sale should be made in one 
of the King’s Courts of Record at Westminster, shewed that the 
statute would only apply to that country over which those Courts 
had jurisdiction. But on consideration, I think that this provision 
is not so purely local as the words, strictly taken, would imply ; 
because, if it were so, an inrollment in the Court of King’s Bench, 
when sitting in any other part of England than Westminster, would 
not be good. Yet we have Lord Coke’s authority in the 2d Inst. 
673, 674, that such inrollment would be good. The meaning of 
the words seems to be, that the inrollment must be in one of the 
King’s Courts of Record, viz. the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, 
or Exchequer. For this Province, this Court is undoubtedly the 
King’s Court of Record, combining the powers and authority of 
the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer; and therefore 
an inrollment of a deed of bargain and sale in this Court would, I 
think, meet the provisions of tne statute of inrollments as applica­
ble to this Province. For want of such inrollment, I am of opinion 
the
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the deed in question is void, and therefore the Plaintiff failed in 
making out a legal title, and on th. ground I think there should 
be a new trial.
On the other question, with respect to the rejection of the parol 
evidence, tendered on the part of the Defendant, to shew that the 
land intended to be conveyed by the deed from Casey and Jerva 
to the Defendant, was the land described in the former deed as lot 
No. 4y I have seen no reason to alter the opinion I expressed at 
the trial.
Parker, J.:
I entirely concur in the judgment which has been pronounced on 
the principal point reserved in this case, namely, whether a legal 
estate in fee of lands ir this Province w'ill be considered to have 
passed by deed of bargain and sale, on the mere proof of the signing, 
sealing and delivery by the bargainor. It is important as involving 
the question of the extension and adaptation of the English statute 
lawr, in deciding which wre have no very definite rule to guide us, 
that Colonists take with them the statute law to a certain extent 
(as well as the common law) is clear; and when we consider the 
state of the common law' w'hich recognized no valid transfer of the 
legal estate in land, of freehold or inheritance, beside that by feoff­
ment w’ith livery of seisin; the period at which the statute of uses 
and w'ills, 27 H. 8, c. 10, wras passed, and the general nature of its 
provisions, w'hich, intending to carry into effect at lawviXwk Courts 
of equity had already enforced, were certainly as applicable to the 
condition of new Colonies, as to that of the mother country, I can­
not doubt of the extension of that statute to this Province. If ad- 
ditional reasons were required to confirm this opinion, they w'ould 
be found in the general understanding of the Legislatures and 
Courts in the former North American Colonies, and of the most 
distinguished American jurists of the present day.
If, then, the statute of uses extends, it must be admitted that a 
statute passed in pari materiA during the same Session of Parlia­
ment, must extend also, unless its provisions be w'holly local or inap­
plicable to our Colonial situation, or unless there be something in 
that or some other English statute limiting its operation to the 
realm of England : and as it remains in force there, it must also be. 
in force here, unless actually or virtually repealed by some Act of 
the Provincial Assembly.
That the intention of the statute of inrollment (notwithstanding 
the manner in which it has been evaded by the contrivance of lease 
and release) was to control the operation of the statute of uses in 
the transfer of real estate, we know from the concurring testimony 
of the best writers near the time, and since. It is difficult to 
select from among them ;—I will quote Lcrd Bacon’s observation, 
and that of a late Judge.
Lord
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Lord Eacon, in his Elements, 2d Tract, p. 66, after commenting 
on the statute of uses, proceeds as follows :
“ But the Parliament that made that statute did foresee that it 
“ would he mischievous that men’s lands should so suddenly, upon 
“ the payment of a little money, be conveyed from them, perad- 
“ venture in an ale-house or a tavern upon strainable advantages, 
“ did therefore gravely provide another Act in the same Parlia- 
“ ment, that the land, upon payment of this money, should not 
“ pass away, except there were a writing indented vnode between 
“ the said two parties, and the said writing also within six months 
“ inrolled in some of the Courts at Westminster, or in the shire 
“ rolls in the shire where the land lieth, unless it be in pities or 
“ corporate towns, where they did use to inroll deeds, and there 
“ the statute extendeth not.”
Mr. Baron Graham, in 3d Price, 507, says .—“ The history of 
“ inrollments is well known.—The preamble of the 27 H. 8, c. 
“ 10, details the inconveniences which arose from the effects of the 
“ clandestine nature of the doctrine of uses, and it was intended 
“ that those inconveniences should be obviated by the Act, requir- 
“ ing deeds of bargain and sale to be inrolled in some Court of re- 
“ cord, thereby supplying that notoriety from the absence of which, 
“ in such modes of conveyance, so many mischiefsj were said to 
“ have arisen.”
That we have not the same authority for the extension’of this 
statute as there is for the other, is not surprising, when we consider 
the fact that registration of deeds was provided for among the 
earliest Acts of all the Colonies. There was an ordinance of the 
Governor and Council in Nova Scotia, passed in 1752, for this pur­
pose, ratified and confirmed by the general Assembly in their first 
Session, 32 Geo. 2, c. 2, (when that which is now New Bruns­
wick formed part of Nova Scotia;) and a registry is provided for 
tnose who choose to take advantage of it, by one of our first Acts 
after this Province was erected ; and when the facility with which 
registry may be made, without any limitation as to time, under 
our Registry Acts, and the priority which they clearly give to 
registered conveyances are considered, it is less to be wondered at 
that the present question should not have arisen before, than that 
it should now be agitated.
I quite agree that these Acts were passed for the regulation of 
registered deeds, leaving unregistered conveyances on the same 
footing as they were before, and no farther interfering with them, 
than was requisite to give that effect to the registry which the Legis­
lature contemplated ; and that although registry, if complied with, 
would supersede the necessity of inrollment, it no more operated 
as a repeal of the statute of inrollments here, than the invention 
of 
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of lease and release did in England. Tne assertion that the con­
veyance by bargain and sale inrolled is out of use in’ England, is 
not quite correct, as may be seen by many instances in the books 
at different periods. The establishment of registry offices in some 
of the counties in England did not repeal the statute of inrollments 
as to them—the registry of bargains and sales, is by the Act 
made as effectual and available as .inrollment, but the deedjmay 
still be inrolled, and must be registered or inrolled.
The fact stated by Mr. Chancellor Kent in the 4th vol. of his 
commentaries, p. 482, already referred to by his Honor the Chief 
Justice, is very strong to evince the opinion of the profession in 
New York; for there appears no other sufficient reason for the 
general use of the double conveyance to pass the freehold or fee 
there, and elsewhere, than the restraining effect of the statute of 
inrollments upon the one simple deed. I should incline to think 
that while using the terms “ apprehension of the necessity of in­
rollment, &c.,” Mr. Chancellor Kent meant to include registered, 
and not merely unregistered bargains and sales, as registration 
seems to ha4e been almost universally practised in New York. 
Until a short time since I had been under the impression that in 
the neighbouring colony, (now State of Massachusetts,) the ques­
tion of inrollment had not arisen in consequence of one of their 
early Acts, in the reign of William 3d, having provided a simple 
mode of conveyance ; but I find by a case reported in 5 Tyng’s 
Mass. Rep. 64,' that of Marshall v. Fisk, which occurred in the 
Supreme Court of that State in 1809, that the statute of inroll­
ments has been held not to extend to that country; and that the 
delivery of a deed of bargain and sale was sufficient to convey real 
estate until the Colonial Ordinance of 1641. Their Registry 
Act of 1783, I perceive, provides, “ that no conveyance of a free- 
“ hold in, or a lease for a longer term than seven years of any 
“ land, shall be good and effectual in the law to hold such land 
“ against any person, but the grantor and his heirs, unless the 
“ deed of conveyance be acknowledged and registered in the 
“ County Records.” It is not stated in that case, nor am I aware 
at what particular period of their history, in what manner or on 
what grounds it was determined, that the statute of inrollments 
did not extend to Massachusetts; but without questioning the pro­
priety of their decision, I think a sufficient distinction may be 
found between the institutions of the old colony and Charter Go­
vernment of Massachusetts, and our own, that would render a 
statute wholly inapplicable there, which might nevertheless be 
very suitable to us; for the rule is not so general that we must in 
order to give effect to a statute here, determine that it is applica- 
to the state and condition of all colonists. Statutes may extend, 
but yet be without any operation until there are institutions in a 
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Colony to which their provisions are applicable. The very origin 
and constitution of the superior Court of Massachusetts gave it 
probably a different character from that of this Province, and may 
have formed the ground of their decision. If I recollect rightly, 
Governor Hutchinson says, the writs in their early days, did not 
run in the King’s name.
The Registry Acts of that Colony would appear to have followed 
the decision, and were perhaps consequent upon it, (though of this 
I can speak with no certainty,) but I will for a moment consider 
how far our Registry Act is reconcileable to the notion, that the 
statute of uses extends without the statute of inrollments. By 
the former of these statutes the land would pass without any deed 
or even writing. A writing however, was rendered necessary by 
the statute of frauds, and both in Nova Scotia and New Bruns­
wick, the provisions of this statute were introduced among the 
earliest of the colonial Acts, so that the transfer without writing 
may be considered as not having existed ; but still we have the 
possession transferred to the use without deed; but supposing even 
a deed to be necessary, no further act would be requisite. Then 
comes the Registry Act, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, which by an express 
section, the 10th, provides, “ that all bargains and sales of any 
“ lands, tenements, and hereditaments by deed indented or deed 
“ poll, and all grants and conveyances whatsoever, made by writ- 
“ ing, and duly signed, sealed and delivered, and acknowledged 
“ by the grantor or grantors, <^c. which shall be entered and 
“ registered at full length, by the register in the public office, 
“ <fc., shall be good, effectual and available to all intents andpur- 
“ poses whatsoever, for the passing and transferring such lands, 
“ &c., and the estate and possession thereof to the bargainee and 
“ bargainees, grantee and grantees therein named, according to 
‘ the intents and uses, and purposes, in such deeds and convey- 
“ ances expressed, without livery of seisin, or any other act or 
“ deed, or form or ceremony whatever.” This section being con­
fined to deeds acknowledged by ths grantor or bargainor, a further 
Legislative revision was made, (52 Geo. 3, c. 20, sec. 2,) giving 
the same effect as above to all deeds, grants and conveyances, 
duly acknowledged or proved, and duly registered; which Legis­
lative provisions were unnecessary, indeed almost absurd, if, as 
now contended by the Plaintiff’s Counsel, the legal seisin would 
pass by the deed alone ; and unregistered transfers are governed 
only by the statute of uses and frauds. I think no one can care­
fully read the two sections I have quoted, without being of opinion 
that the Legislature considered the law as it stood, without such pro­
vision, would restrain lands from passing according to the intent of 
parties by mere deeds of bargain and sale, or simple grants and 
conveyances, though duly registered according to the Act, and 
therefore 
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therefore an express clause was necessary to give proper effect to 
the registry. For, without this, conveyances would probably have j 
been made here as in the old State of New York, by lease and 
release ; thus subjecting the parties to the unnecessary trouble and 
expence of this double form, for the very same purpose which ori­
ginated it in England, viz. evading the statute of inrollments.
There is, 1 should observe, a great difference between the word­
ing of our Act, and that of the Massachusetts Act of 1783 ; the 
words of our Act are words of extension, those of the other, words 
of restriction ; well suited to the different state of the law produced 
by the reception or rejection of the statute of inrollments.
However it is said (and the position was first taken by the Coun­
sel for the defendant as a ground for the statute of usesnot extend­
ing,) that as the statute 27 H. 8, c. 16, provides only for inroll­
ment in the Courts at Westminster, or by certain officers in the 
several Counties; no inrollment made in this Province would be 
valid, and that we are driven to the alternative of rejecting the sta­
tute altogether, (as was done in Massachusetts) or allowing the 
inrollment at Westminster to be good. That the inrollment of deeds 
at Westminster would be unsuitable to1 the state and condition of 
settlers in an American colony, can hardly be denied; but be this 
as it may, I quite concur with the rest of the Court in thinking, 
that without resortingto the alternative just mentioned, and “ with­
out any great incongruity in the effect,this Act is capable of being 
transferred to our code, to an extent sufficient to give it application, 
if not to tlie whole ; my opinion being that the Supreme Court as 
part of its constitution possesses the power of inrollment, which 
was not indeed conferred on the Courts at Westminster by the 
statute, but existed by the common law ; and was in use long be­
fore the reign of Henry Sth. We have intrinsic evidence of this 
in the statute itself, which gives no new ministerial power, ap­
points no officers, or fe£s for the inrollment in the King’s Courts, 
but refers to it as a power already exercised, and this probably to 
some extent, as would seem from a statute, 6 Richard 2d, c. 4, 
which provides that the exemplification of the inrollments of such 
deeds, as had before“ihen been inrolled in the Rolls of Chancery 
and either Bench and Exchequer, and had been destroyed in the 
late insurrection or otherwise eloigned, should be as Valid as the 
deeds themselves.
Lord Coke’s exposition, 2 Inst. 673, has been already noted. 
The principal reason given by the Courts in deciding that certain 
statutes do not extend, will not apply to the present case, while 
some have been considered in force, and others constantly acted 
on. which are liable to nearly the same object’on as this.
The statute of mortmain, .(which, by the bve, was passed after 
the establishment of numerous Colonies, without naming them,) 
X and
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and certain other statutes mentioned by the Master of the Rolls in the 
case, 2 Merivale, 143, are inapplicable either in their object, or 
provisions, to the situation and condition of Colonies. So it is said 
oy Lord Mansfield in 4 Burr, 2500, as to the statutes 12 Rich. 2d, 
c. 2, and 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, that being positive regulations of 
police, they are not adapted to the circumstances of a new Colony, 
and therefore no part of the law of England which every Colony, 
from necessity, is supposed to carry with it at its first plan­
tation.'
The statute of frauds has been held not to extend to Barbadoes or 
Bermuda, for tlie reason that they were settled before the pas­
sing of that Act, 2 P. Wm. 75, 8 Ves. 487.—For the like reason 
it was held in the Pennsylvania Courts in 1754, not to extend there. 
1 Dallas 1.
His Honor the Chief Justice has already referred to some in­
stances of the adaptation of English statutes to our Provincial es­
tablishments ; I will mention one or two others.
Exemplifications of the King’s letters patent under the Great 
Seal of the Province, are of daily occurrence in the Courts, yet 
exemplifications are not evidence at common law, but made so by
3 & 4 Edw. 6, c. 4, and 20 Eliz. c. 6, which speak only of the 
Great Seal of England.
By stat. 34, Ed. 3, c. 16, traverses of offices found before es- 
cheators and certified into the Chancery shall be tried in the Court 
of King’s Bench ; yet it can hardly be doubted that the Supreme 
Court has authority to try such traverses in this Province.
The stat. 29 Car. 2, c. 5, for issuing commissions to take affi­
davits is in terms to the Judges of the Courts of King’s Bench, 
Common Pleas and Exchequer, and expressed to be for the greater 
ease and benefit of all persons in the taking of affidavits, to be 
made use of and read in Elis Majesty’s Courts of King’s Bench, 
Common Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminster. Yet this is the 
only original authority for the commissions issued by this Court, 
the validity of which has never been questioned, indeed has been 
repeatedly recognised by the Legislature. Commissions to take 
bail stand precisely on the same footing, depending on the statute
4 W. & M. c. 4.
The stat. 5, Eliz. c. 26, empowering the Queen’s Courts in the 
Counties Palatine to make inrollments was referred to by the 
Plaintiff’s Counsel, for the purpose cf shewing the limited exten­
sion of the stat. 27 Hen. 8, c. 16, but will not, I think, bear out 
his argument; for these were Courts of local jurisdiction within the 
realm in existence at the time the statute passed, and the Act not 
having mentioned them, was considered not to embrace them, on 
the same principle which decides that Statutes passed after the 
settlement of a Colony do not extend to it, unless named therein.
The
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The statute of Car. 2d. for commissions to take affidavits, was 
in the same manner extended to the Courts of the Counties Pala­
tine, by specific enactment.
Another branch of the argument rested on this being a mortgage 
deed; but as this is not a proceeding to recover the amount se­
cured on the mortgage, but to obtain possession of the land ; I do 
not very well see how the proviso inserted in the deed of bargain 
and sale, for the benefit of the mortgagor, is to give it a more ef­
fectual operation to pass the estate, than if no such proviso were 
inserted and the deed were absolute. The statute of inrollments 
does not make the deed void qua deed, but merely says that lands 
shall not pass by bargain and sale, unless by deed indented, sealed 
and inrolled. Lord Ellenborough in 3 East. 442, says,—J a deed qua 
“ deed certainly requires no inrollment to give it validity, that is 
“ not a thing which arises from, or is connected w ith the nature of 
“ the instrument itself.” So had this mortgage contained a co­
venant for the repayment of the money, without doubt an action 
thereon would be maintainable without registry or inrollment: but 
beside that, it is by no means clear that this is a case between 
mortgagor and mortgagee, to which the maxim could properly ap­
ply ; and allowing even the parties to stand in that relation, the 
Plaintiff does not fail in this case by reason of a better or prior 
title to the mortgage deed, set up by the Defendant, but in con­
sequence of his own omission he has brought his ejectment before 
comDleting his legal seisin.
If satisfied as to the law, it is not for Courts to regard conse­
quences ; but the only effect of our decision this day wifi probably 
be to enforce the registry, and not the inrollment cf conveyances, 
and in that respect cannot fail to have a salutary operation. As 
there must be a new trial on this point, I shall decline at present 
saying any thing on the other, not being quite satisfied that I 
clearly comprehend the purpose for which the parol evidence was 
tendered.
Rule absolute.
N. Parker, E. B. Chandler and W. Chandler for the Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Weldon for the Defendant.
READ v. SMITH AND OTHERS.
A plea in trespass justifying an entry upon land to re take timber of the 
Defendant, carried there by a sudden rise of water, in a river in which it 
was being floated ind carried to market, —Held bad, because it was not 
shewn that the Def< ndants were not in fault, by having used their best en ■ 
deavours to prevent the timber coming upon the Plaintiff’s land.
Semb.—An entry for such purpose and an injury to the herbage, and a 
subversion of the soil occasioned by the hauling and removal of timber, are 
acts 
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acts which cannot be justified by any averment of care and diliger:'-.* t» 
prevent the timber getting on the Plaintiff’s land.
Trespass.—Tlie Plaintiff declared that tlie Defendants, &c. on, 
&c. broke and entered a certain meadow of the Plaintiffin Bathuist, 
&c. and with feet in walking, and with cattle trod down, crushed 
and spoiled the grass and herbage—and cast and threw divers logs 
thereupon, and with the said cattle and the said logs tore up and 
subverted the soil, &c.
The Defendants pleaded,
1st. The General issue—and each Defendant separately plead­
ed the following special plea, viz.—
Actio, non, &c.—because he says, that he, the said Benjamin 
D. Smith, before and at the said several times when &■ was 
seized and possessed cf and of right entitled to a quantity of pine 
timber and other timber lying in the big Nepisiguit river, above 
the said meadow, or close in which, &c. which said timber the said 
Defendant Benjamin D. Smith, was about bringing or floating 
down the said Nepisiguit river to Bathurst to market, when the 
said river became very much flooded by an unusual flow of wa­
ter, which sudden flood or rise of water in the said river, with the 
winds and natural current of the said river, caused the said timber 
to be floated and driven about, and the said close or meadow being 
also inundated and overflooded by the said great rise or flood of 
water in the said river, the said timber was against the will of him 
the said Benjamin D. Smith, and to his great injury and damage, 
floated and driven by the said flood, wind, and current, from the 
possession of the said Benjamin D. Smith, in, and upon the said 
close or meadow of the said Plaintiff, the said meadow being then, 
and ever since unfenced and unenclosed ; and the said timber was 
there left upon the said meadow of the said Plaintiff’, by the reced­
ing of the waters of the said river, without the power of the said 
Benjamin D. Smith to prevent it; and the said Benjamin D. Smith 
having occasion for the said timber, and being under the most ur­
gent necessity of taking the said timber to market to fulfil his 
contracts and engagements, and having no other means or way of 
obtaining or removing the said timber from off the said meadow or 
close, and knowing that the said timber would be much more in­
jurious to the said close or meadow by remaining tliereon, than 
by being removed from the said close or meadow, at the said seve­
ral times when &c. entered into the said close or meadow, in the 
said declaration mentioned, and with only so many oxen as were 
necessary for the purpose, and with as little damage as possible to 
the said close or meadow, removed, and caused to be removed and 
hauled from off the said close or meadow, the said timber of the 
said Benjamin D. Smith, which had been so floated and driven 
thereon 
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thereon as aforesaid, as he the said Benjamin D. Smith lawfully 
might for the cause aforesaid ; and in so doing, he the said Benja­
min D. Smith, with his feet in walking, and with the said oxen 
unavoidably a little trod down, trampled upon, consumed, and 
spoiled the grass then growing, and being in the said close in 
which, &c. and subverted, damaged, and spoiled a little of the soil, 
sod, and sward of the said close or meadow, and the said oxen, at 
the said several times, when, &c. in passing and re-passing along 
the said close in the act of hauling off the said timber, by stealth 
and morsels, and against the will of the said Benjamin D. Smith, 
ate up, and depastured a little of the grass there then growing 
on the said meadow or close, which are the said several supposed 
trespasses in the said declaration mentioned, and whereof the said 
Plaintiff hath above thereof complained against the said Benjamin 
D. Smith, and this he the said Benjamin D. Smith is ready to 
verify, wherefore he prays judgment, if the said Plaintiff ought to 
have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him.
To this special plea the Plaintiff demurred generally, and the 
Defendants severally joined in demurrer. The cause was argued 
in last Hilary Term.
End in support of demurrer:—
The Defendants by their plea admitted the freehold and posses­
sion of the close to have been in the Plaintiff,—they admitted also 
the act of trespass, and justified the acts complained of, because 
their timber had been against their will, floated by a sudden rise 
of the river upon the close of the Plaintiff—and because they were 
under urgent necessity of taking the timber to market, and because 
the close would have been more injured by the timber remaining 
there than by its removal.
This plea could only be supported as an excuse arising by ine­
vitable necessity ; see 20 Vin. Abr. 526. The Defendants assert­
ed that their timber which they had placed in the river to be car­
ried to market, had been floated upon the Plaintiff’s land, but 
they had not averred that they were able to take care of their pro­
perty even under ordinary circumstances, and having placed it in 
the river they were bound to take care of it, and prevent injury to 
others even by accident. It was not averred that the Nipisiguit 
was a navigable river,—7 E. 207; 3 Bl. Com. 210.
[Parker J.—referred to Anthony Hanney, 8 Bing. 186.]
The Solicitor General in support of the plea :—
The question was whether the fact stated in the plea did not 
justify the Defendants going on the Plaintiff’s close,—the neces­
sity was inevitable. The plea stated that the timber was carried 
by a sudden and violent flood. The Defendants, it appeared, were 
unable to prevent its being carried on the Plaintiff’s land ; and 
had 
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had they suffered it to remain there, after they could have remo­
ved it, the owner of the close would have had a right of action 
against them. Com. Dig. Tit. Pleader ; 8 Bing. 186.
Berton, in reply :—
There was a distinction between an unavoidable accident and 
accident occasioned by carelessness or want of attention ;—it was 
the act of the Defendants which placed the timber in the river, and 
they should have averred their endeavours to prevent its going on 
the Plaintiff’s land, and their ability, under ordinary circumstances, 
to have done so ; and even had all that been averred, it might be 
doubted if it would have been a justification, or if it would not 
rather have been a fact in mitigation of damages ;—their plea ad­
mitted a subversion of the soil. Had the Plaintiff opposed the en­
try of the Defendants, they could not have justified using force. 
Had the timber floated across the Plaintiff’s land, to land in the 
rear, could the Defendants have justified passing across from the 
Plaintiff’s land with oxen and teams, and thereby tearing up and 
destroying his meadow to save and retake their timber ?
The Defendants should have tendered amends for the injury 
they had done, and if the Plaintiff had refused such amends, the 
circumstances would have been for the consideration of a jury, un­
der the general issue, in mitigation of damages.
In this Term the Court gave judgment in favor of the de­
murrer.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is a case of demurrer to a plea—the action is trespass quare 
clausum fregit. Each of the five Defendants has pleaded separate­
ly the same plea in justification,—
To which several pleas the Plaintiff has demurred. The de­
murrer raises the question as to the right of one man to enter upon 
the land of another, for the purpose of taking his own property, 
being upon such land. The late case of Anthony v. Haney, 8 
Bingham, 186, decides, that such an entry cannot be justified singly 
from the fact that the goods were upon the land, but that the cir­
cumstances must be shewn, under which the property came upon 
the soil of another. The validity of the justification will of course 
depend upon the nature of these circumstances. I have not found 
any modern cases upon this point. I cite the following from 20 
Vin. Abr. 506
“ If A take my horse and carry him to the land of B, it is not 
“ lawful for me to enter into the land and take him. But if A 
“ feloniously steals my horse and carries him into B’s land, then 
“ I may justify my entry into the land and retake him.” 2 Rolls. 
“ Rep. Higgins v. Andrews.”
“ If
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“ If A takes wrongfully the goods of another and carries them 
“ into his own land, the owner may take them thence, but not out 
of the land of a stranger.—lb.”
“ If trees are thrown down by the wind, it is no trespass to en- 
“ ter the land into which they are thrown down to take them. 
“ Lat. 13, per Crew, C. J. in case of Miller v. Hawery.”
“ But if a man cuts trees on his own land which fall into ano- 
“ ther man’s land, and goes and he takes them, trespass lies.” 
Per Crew, C. J. Lat. 13, citing 6 Edward 4, 7.”
“ If trees grow in my hedge hanging over another man’s land, 
“• and the fruit of them falls into the other’s land, I may justify 
“ my entry to gather up the fruit, if I make no longer stay there 
“ than is convenient, nor break his hedge. Lat. 120, per Dode- 
“ ridge, J.”
“ It is not lawful to do a tort to another to ease myself—per 
Jones, J. M. Miller v. Hawery. Lat. 120.”
From the case of the trees blown down by the wind, and the 
fruit falling from a tree overhanging another’s land, it is to be in­
ferred that if the goods come upon the land of another by mere 
accident, without any fault in the owner of the goods, the owner 
may justify an entry to take his goods. There is a case of an 
estray cited in Espinasse’s treatise on the law of nisiprius, to the 
same effect.
“ Trespass will not lie against the owner of an estray, for taking 
“ him off the lands of the lord of the manor who had seized him, 
“ without paying for his keeping, for the owner had the property, 
“ and the lord may have case for the keeping, though he might 
“ have detained him till paid. Lady Hutton v. Coles, Cumber- 
“ land, Sum. Ass. 1667,”
In Com. Dig. title “ Pleader,” 3 M. 31, it is laid down as 
follows—
“ It is no plea if the accident was by a voluntary act or neglect 
“ of Defendant—as if a man lets a falcon go at a pheasant in his 
“ own land, and pursues it into the land of another, trespass lies 
“—Lat. 13. If he cuts down a tree which falls into another’s 
“ land, and he enters to remove it. Lat. 13.”
So in Popham 161, as cited in 8 Bing. 190, the case of the 
lop ,ings of the trees, is put upon the same principle. “ Per
Crew, C. J. A man cuts thorns, and they fall into another 
“ man’s land, and in trespass he justified for it, and the opinion 
“ was that notwithstanding this justifical on, trespass lies, because 
“ he did not plead that he did his best endeavours to hinder their 
“ falling there.”
From these authorities I think it is clear, that where there has 
been 
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been any fault or neglect on the part of the owner of the goods, 
he cannot justify entering on the soil of another to take them, and 
he is bound to shew that there has been no such fault or neglect 
on his part.
The plea in the present case states—“ that the said river became 
“ very much flooded by an unusual flow of water, which sudden 
“ flood or rise of the water in the said river, with the wind and 
“ natural current of the said river, caused the said timber to be 
<£ floated and driven about, and the said close or meadow being 
“ also inundated and overflowed by the said great rise or flood of 
“ water in the said river, the said timber was against the will of 
“ the said Defendant, and to his great injury and damage, floated 
“ and driven by the said flood, wind and current, from the pos- 
“ session of the said Defendant, in and upon the said close or mea- 
“ dow of the said Plaintiff, the said meadow being then and ever 
“ since unfenced and unenclosed,” which last circumstance of the 
meadow being unfenced is in the present case quite immaterial. 
The pleas do not state that the Defendants used any endeavours 
to guide the timber as it floated on the water, and to keep it with­
in the channel of the river, and away from the Plaintiff’s land. 
They appear to have bestowed no care upon it, but to have aban­
doned it altogether to the action of the winds and water. This is 
a fault on their part, which under the authorities I have cited, I 
think, is of itself decisive that they cannot justify their entry on 
the Plaintiff’s land to take the timber—and on this ground I think 
the several pleas are certainly bad. I am not indeed prepared to 
say that even without this fault on their part, they could have jus­
tified the trespasses complained of, in entering upon the Plaintiff’s 
land without liis will, and hauling the timber off with oxen, which 
upon their own shewing, necessarily subverted and injured the soil. 
There should in such a case, have been a previous request to ent”r 
and they must at all events have been liable for auy damage done 
to the land ; for if the timber came upon the land without the fault 
of the Plaintiff, be should not suffer any loss thereby, and it being 
the Defendant’s property, it was their affair to take it away with­
out doing wrong to the Plaintiff, for “ no man shall do a tort to 
another to ease himself.’’ In Anthony ffl Haney, 8 Bing. 186. 
L. C. J. Tindal expresses himself as follows:—
“ If the occupier of the soil refuse to deliver up the property or 
“ to make any answer to the owner’s demand, a jury might be 
“ induced to presume a conversion from such silence, or at any 
“ rate the owner might in such case enter and take his property, 
“ subject to the payment of any damage he might commit."
But however different circumstances might vary the rights and 
remedies of the parties, 1 am of opinion that it is sufficient for the 
decision of this case, that the Defendants have not shewn that they 
were 
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were not in fault, by having used their best endeavours to prevent 
the timber coming upon the Plaintiff’s land, and that upon this 




The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Anthony v. 
Haney, 8 Bing. 186, seems to me to establish that there may be 
circumstances which will justify a man’s entering upon the land 
of another to take thence his own property. That case further 
establishes, that every plea which attempts to justify a trespass on 
such ground, must state the peculiar circumstances on which the 
party rests his right to enter. In all cases where such a justifica­
tion is pleaded, it behoves the Court to look very narrowly into the 
circumstances stated in the plea, and to take care, lest (in the 
words of C. J. Tindal,) “ too wide a door be opened for parties to 
attempt righting themselves without resorting to law.”
It seems to me that in a plea of this description it should clearly 
appear on the face of the plea, that this coming of the Defendant’s 
property on the Plaintiff’s land, was, not only not caused by any 
act on the part of the Defendant, but was owing to circumstances 
against which he could not have been reasonably expected to take 
precaution. Now this plea does not state that any precaution was 
taken to secure this timber, or that it was under the care or charge 
of any person ; it merely states, that the timber was lying in the 
big Nipisiguit river, (which river is not stated to be a navigable 
river, nor one in which the Defendant’s timber might rightfully be.)
If we were to decide that the owner of timber allowing it to lie 
in a river, (which is of course subject to a rise of water, at parti­
cular seasons,) without taking any precaution to prevent his tim­
ber from floating on another’s land, may after the timber has been 
so deposited on that land, and without the permission of the land 
owner, enter and recover the timber, I tlunk we should be estab­
lishing a principle not warranted by law, and which would have a 
bad effect throughout the country.—This principle I think we 
should establish, if we held this plea sufficient, and I am there­
fore of opinion, that the Plaintiff must have judgment.
Parker, J.:
To what has been already said on the defect apparent in the 
pleas in this case, which is the main ground of the judgment 
pronounced by their Honors the Chief Justice and Mr. Jus­
tice Carter, I shall add nothing except my perfect concurrence in 
the doctrine, that to a justification of the nature of the present, it 
is an essential allegation that the Defendant did all in his power 
to prevent the property getting on the close of the Plaintiff; but 
Y there 
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there is another, and what appears to me a more material ground 
of objection coming fairly up for the consideration of the Court 
on this demurrer, on which I shall take the liberty of making a 
few remarks.
I would premise by saying, that the only foundation I can find 
in any direct decision of the Courts for the general doctrine stated 
in the text writers and digests, and occasional dicta of Judges as 
to the right of one man to enter without permission on the lands 
of another in order to recover his goods, which have accidentally 
get there, are in two ancient cases of the time of Edward 4th ; 
those which have already been referred to from Viner’s abridg­
ment, viz. that cited from the year book, 6 Ed. 4, 7, by Crew 
C. J. in Miller v. Fawdry, Latch 13, of the tree blown down; 
mentioned also in Brock’s abridgment, pl. 310, as cited in 
20 Vin. Abr. 437 ; and the case of the fruit falling, quoted 
also in Viner, as an opinion of Doddridge, J. in Miller v. 
Hawery, Latch 120; but which appears by the report of the same 
case in Popham, 161, to be a case in the year book, 8 Ed. 4, and 
to which there is this qualification given in Latch, that the hedge 
must net not be broken.
We have not in this Province the year books to refer to, but 
probably the abridgments (the cases are cited also in Cornyn and 
Bacon) contain all that is material. It would appear indeed from 
Bac. Abr. Tit. Trespass F. that Miller v. Fawdry, decided the 
right of entry to take the fruit, but that is not so; that was not an 
action of trespass quare clausum, fregit, but trespass for chasing 
sheep in which the nice question was discussed, whether your dog 
in chasing your neighbour’s sheep off your land could go an inch 
beyond the line without making such chasing a trespass; the case 
of the fruit is certainly referred to by the Judges as good law. 
With respect to the two decisions In the year books, it must be 
observed that they are both in terms confined to a right, which I 
may without impropriety style a reciprocal right, between two ad­
joining proprietors to be exercised each on the border of his neigh­
bor’s land; that they have not been expressly affirmed or even 
much considered in any recent case, and that no direct decision has 
extended the common law principle, beyond that which is neces­
sary to their support. It is not, however, material to the present 
case, that it should be so limited in its application, for we are not 
bound now to decide whether the mere entry for a purpose like that 
before us would or would not be a trespass, if the accident had been 
unavoidable, and the entry unattended by damage; although that 
seems by the margin of the demurrer book to be the point which 
the Plaintiff was mainly desirous of raising on this argument. 
The declaration complains of real damage sustained by subversion 
of the soil and sward, and destruction of the grass ; and the pleas, 
admitting 
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admitting the damage, attempt to justify the acts complained of, 
and assert a right to enter on the close, though such entry neces­
sarily and unavoidably occasioned damage to the Plaintiff, and 
this Without any previous notice, request or demand, any tender 
of amends, or liability to make compensation for the damage actually 
done. Now no case has been cited, nor can I believe, be found 
where a justification has been sustained to this extent. The 
plea in the late case from 8 Bing, was considered clearly bad on 
very general grounds, and it will be noted that judgment was 
there given immediately without hearing Counsel in support of the 
demurrer ; but I can see nothing in hyiiat fell from the Court on 
that occasion to justify an eptry producing actual damage ; indeed 
the concluding expression of Lord C. J. Tiudal, that the owner 
might enter to take his property, when the occupier Refused to de­
liver it, subject to the payment of any damage he might commit, is 
rather against than in favor of the position ; for if he is liable to 
this payment, how is it to be recovered but in an action of tres­
pass ? The Plaintiff would not surely be put to his action on the 
case, and no contract could be presumed. The Defendant in the 
case before us must go the whole length of contending for the light 
to do damage without making compensation, for as was said in the 
case of Ball v. Herbert, 3 T. R. 253, if the right were but a qua­
lified onej, the plea should have been adapted to it. That was an 
action of trespass, in which the Defendant justified under a gene­
ral claim of right to tow on the banks of a navigable river, on which 
the Plaintiff’s land bounded ; Lord Kenyon then said—“ The De- 
“ fendant claims a common law right without making any com- 
“ pensation ; if he has only a qualified right he should have adapted 
U his plea to it; for if he were to obtain judgment it would ascer- 
“ tain his right to the extent claimed on this record, namely, a ge- 
“ neral right without making any compensation.'’'’ Ashurst, J. 
gave his opinion to the same effect ; though on this particular 
point Mr. J. Buller reserved his opinion, concurring, however, in 
the general judgment of the Court ,pgainst the right.
It will I think tend to elucidate this case when the ground on 
which a way of necessity depends is considered; it lias been ar­
gued as if necessity gave a way, but it is clear from the note of 
Mr. Sergeant Williams, to Pomfret v. Rycroft, 1 Saund. 322, 
that a way of necessity must arise from prescription or grant; this 
is fully recognized in 2 Bing. 83, 2 Peak, 153, 8 T. R. 50.
Two cases are mentioned in 3 Com. Dig. p. 58, of a right of 
way to a wreck,.-of which a man has a grant, and to a navigation ; 
but the first of these stands evidently on the King’s prerogative, 
and the latter it has been expressly decided, is not a right at com­
mon law, but warranted only by particular custom.
In the case of Ballard zj. Harrison, 4 M. & S. 387, confirming 
that
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that of Taylor v. Whitehead, Doug. 745, it was decided that if a 
private way, which was the only road to the land were impassable, 
it would not justify going on the land adjoining, for (as was then 
said) “ it does not follow that a man can go over his neighbour’s- 
“ land, because he hath no otherway to his own.” There is ano­
ther case in 1 Siderfih. 251, cited by Sir John Strange, in argu­
ment in 1 Wils. 107, which tends to shew how very unstable a 
ground that which is called necessity is—it is as follows—“ where 
<41 a man has a right of common, and the soil happens to be so over- 
“ flowed that he cannot enjoy it, without digging trenches to drain 
“ T, yet if he does dig trenches to drain it, the owner of the soil 
“ may bring trespass.” The case in Wilson is worth noting in 
support of the position that, though the right of entry may exist 
yet breaking the soil will be a trespass, and that compensation for 
the damage is properly recoverable in an action of trespass, where 
there is no contract or agreement. I have also here much pleasure 
in recommending to the attention of any persons who may be 
placed in a similar situation with the Defendants, the very good 
advice given by Mr Chitty in his late work on the general prac­
tice of the law, vol. 1, p. 568 ; hb does not, as will be seen, treat 
the right of entry as so clearly ascertained, even in a case of pure 
accident, as to recommend the unqualified assertion of it, but 
points out a much more prudent course of acting. As to the ne­
cessity of a previous demand or request, there is a case from Fritz. 
Abr. cited in Com. Dig. (the new edition of Hammond) which 
has not I think, been mentioned, 6 Com. Dig. Tit. Pleader, 3 M. 
39. “ It is not a good justification that J. S. was possessed of a
“ piece of timber which was placed in the locus in quo by a tem- 
“ pestuous wind, and that Defendant entered as a servant to carry 
“ it away, because it does not appear but that the timber might 
“ have been purposely exposed to the wind in such a manner as to 
“ make the wind blow it into the Plaintiff’s close ; because it does 
“ not appear to have been fetched away at a proper time, because 
“ it does not appear that the timber belonged to J. S. when it was 
blown over, and because it does not appear that Plaintiff was
i requested to permit the removal.—2 F. 183.”
On the whole I am of opinion that the acts complained of in 
his case could not be justified, had the pleas even averred that 
the utmost care and diligence were used to prevent the Defen­
dant’s timber getting on the Plaintiff’s land; and I entertain so 
nluch doubt as to the mere right of entry in a case like the pre­
sent, as to wish the subject may come under the consideration of 
the Legislature, who in establishing a right (if it be essential to 
the business of the com dry that such should exist,) may put the 
exercise of it under proper restrictions. The provision in the statute 
of limitations 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 5, as to involuntary trespasses 
may 
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may afford a useful precedent for their consideration. There is, 
I should observe, a special Act in the State of Massachusetts 
passed in the year 1793, which then included the present neigh­
bouring State of Maine, authorizing the owner to remove timber 
which has been floated on the lands of another, on paying or ten­
dering such reasonable damages as may be occasioned by the re­
moval ; which is also deserving of attention.
For the reasons above assigned, I concur in opinion that Uhere 
must be judgment for the Plaintiff on these demurrers.
End and Berton for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General, J. A. Street and Kerr for Defendants.
CURRY & ORR, Administrators of CADWALLADER 
CURRY v. HIBBARD.
In assumpsit on promises to intestate, a note made by him, and after his 
death indorsed by the payee to Defendant, cannot be pleaded as a set oft’; 
no mutuality between the Plaintiff’s claim and Defendant’s set off existed 
in the life time of intestate.
Assumpsit on promise to intestate in his life time.
Pleas.—1st. Non Assumpsit.
2d.—Actio non, because he says that the said Cadwallader Curry 
in his life time, to wit, on, &c. at, &c. made his certain promissory 
note in writing, bearing date, &c. whereby he, the said Cadwalla­
der Curry, in his life time, then and there promised to pay on de­
mand to one John Copely, or order, the sum of £25, and interest, 
for value received, and which said promissory note, he, the said 
John Copely, afterwards and after the death of the said Cadwalla­
der Curry, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, 
on. &c. at, &c. indorsed and delivered to the said Defendant.
To the second plea the Plaintiffs demurred, and the Defendants 
jc ..red in demurrer.
Parker, in support of the demurrer :—
The Provincial statute of settoff, 26 G. 3, c. 18, enacts—“that 
“ where there are mutual debts between the Plaintiff and Defend- 
“ ant, or if either party be sued as Executor or Administrator 
“ where there are mutual debts between the testator or intestate, 
“ and either party, one debt may be set against the other.” The 
Defendant’s plea must rest upon this act, and the only question is, 
if the facts stated by the Defendant come within its terms—evi­
dently they do not—the act applies to mutual debts between the 
testator and intestate. Here the Defendant has stated that the 
promissory notes sought to be set off were indorsed to him by the 
payees after the death of the intestate.
Berton,
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Berton, for Defendant
The debts sought to be set off have not arisen or been created 
since the death of the intestate. Their-arose in the life time of the 
intestate, by his making the promissory notes mentioned in the 
Defendant’s second plea ; a debt existed then between the intes­
tate and the payee of those notes. The indorsement to the present 
Defendant created no new debt, but transferred the existing debt, 
and placed the present Defendant for all purposes in the place of 
the indorser.
Parker, in reply, was stopped by the Court.
Per Curiam.
The Act of Assembly is clear and explicit, and in actions by 
administrators, extends only to mutual debts between the intestate 
and the Defendants ; by the Defendant’s ave rment in his plea, he 
became possessed of the promissory notes pleaded as set off, after 
the death of the intestate. No mutuality existed between the 
Plaintiff’s claim and the Defendant’s, in the life time of the intes­
tate ; the plea is therefore bad, and there must be judgment for 
the Plaintiff on the demurrer.
N. Parker for Plaintiffs.
J. W. Chandler and Berton for Defendant.
TRINITY TERM, 6th Wm. 4th.
1836.
It is Ordered, That the notice to appear in ejectment shall not 
he made in future for the return day in the second week of the 
Term ; but for the Term generally, on the Tuesday or Saturday 
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Exparte. GOVE, a Concealed Debtor.
The Court has no power under 26 Geo. 3. c. 13, to grant a supersedeas 
of a warrant of attachment, issued against the goods of a concealed debtor, 
unless it appear that all the creditors consent thereto.
Proceedings were taken under the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 
3, c. 13, against Gove, as a concealed debtor, in August last, and 
a warrant of attachment issued, under which his books and effects 
were seized.
D. L. Robinson applied, by consent of the petitioning creditors, 
for a supersedeas of the warrant; the object was to enable the 
debtor to get possession of his books, and collect the debts due to 
him.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
Does the Act give the Court power to supersede a warrant in 
such a case ? It does not appear that the parties consenting are 
all the creditors ; the Court derive their authority from the Act of 
Assembly, and can only exercise the powers thereby vested in 
them. The Act is very defective ; it requires the debtor applying 
for a supersedeas to settle with all his creditors, and points out no 
means of ascertaining them.
Rule refused.
REX v. THE SHERIFF OF GLOUCESTER.
Where a capias is issued against two, if the Sheriff returns “ cepi corpus.” 
it shall be taken to apply equally to both Defendants. Delay sufficiently 
accounted for is not a cause for setting aside an attachment against a Sheriff’ 
if he have not been prejudiced by such delay. A rule nisi was granted 
without opposition, which was however immediately afterwards discharged 
on cause being shewn ; and the Court allowed costs.
In the case of Call v. Murphy & Butler,-—the following circum­
stances appeared from the affidavits produced in this cause.
A writ of capias ad respondendum to the Sheriff of Gloucester 
was sued out in this cause, returnable in Trinity Term, 1835, 
2 
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indorsed for bail, for £35.—-The Sheriff arrested Butler. Murphy 
never was arrested. The writ was returned “ Cepi Corpus, fees 
£1 13s. 3d.C In October following a rule was served upon the 
Sheriff to bring in the bodies of the Defendants. Bail was there­
upon put in for Butler, and he was rendered in discharge of his 
bail. In Hilary Term an order was obtained in the cause for an 
attachment against the Sheriff “ for not bringing into Court the 
body of Matthew Murphy, one of the Defendants, at the suit of 
Anthony Call.” The attachment was not sued out in Hilary Va­
cation ; the Coroner who resided near to the residence of the She­
riff having removed from the County, and there being no other 
within fifty miles of the County Town. In Trinity vacation, ano­
ther Coroner having been appointed, a writ of attachment was issu­
ed in pursuance of the order made in Hilary Term, returnable at 
the present Michaelmas Term.
Notice was given to the Plaintiff of a motion for a rule nisi, to 
set aside the attachment for irregularity and surprise, and copies of 
the affidavits were served.
The Solicitor General moved for a rule nisi to set aside the at­
tachment for irregularity ; the application was made by the Sheriff, 
and at his expense for his own indemnity, and without collusion 
with either of the Defendants.
1 st. It was irregular to issue an attachment against the Sheriff 
after so long a delay. A party applying for and issuing an attach­
ment should be in all respects correct. The rule it appears was 
Issued in Hilary, and no proceedings were taken thereon until af­
ter Trinity, upwards of five months ; Rex v. Sheriff of Surry, 9 E. 
467. A party armed with the process of the Court to enablte him 
to enforce payment from the Sheriff was bound to proceed with rea­
sonable dispatch. Rex v. Sheriff of London, 3 Bos. and Pul. 
151, 7 T. R. 452.
2d. The Sheriff’s return of cepi corpus being in the singular 
number, applied only to one Defendant, instead of ruling the She­
riff to bring in the bodies of the Defendants.
Berton, for the Plaintiff, stated, that he appeared to shew cause 
against the rule nisi, instanter ; but suggested that the rule should 
be entered in order, that if discharged, the Plaintiff should be enti­
tled to his costs.
(The rule nisi was entered to set aside the attachment for 
irregularity.)
Berton, for the Plaintiff, contended that the delay in issuing the 
writ of attachment was fully explained. The cases cited in ob­
taining the rule were not analagous to the present. In the cases 
cited from 9 E. and 7 T. R. the Sheriff was damnified by the de­
lay, and in the case in Bos. and Pul. the Plaintiff had negotiated 
with 
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with the Sheriff’s officer; besides, circumstances in this 
country and in England differed materially, and much greater 
delay was justifiable here than would be permitted there. In 
England, rules to plead were four day rules, here twenty days 
were given.
The Sheriff could not protect himself by an ungramma­
tical return. He was directed to take the Defendants ; his re­
turn should be held to apply to each individually, and if he did 
not so intend it, but had acted under a mistake, he should have 
applied to the Court for relief, when served with the rule “ to bring 
in the bodies.”
Per Curiam. ,
Cepi corpus is a very informal return. The Sheriff should 
have made his return in English, “ I have taken the body of But­
ler, or the bodies of the Defendants, as within I am commanded.” 
The return must be intended a complete return, and must be taken 
to apply equally to both Defendants.
There is quite sufficient reason shewn for the delay in issuing 
the attachment, the Sheriff not having been prejudiced.
The Solicitor General urged that the Plaintiff was not entitled 
to costs ; he appeared, having received notice and copies of the 
affidavits, and should be considered as having opposed the motion 
in the first instance, and was not therefore entitled to costs.— 
Merrifield’s Atty, on Costs, 295.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
The party has a right to ask the Court if the applicant has made 
out a sufficient prima facie case ; if the Court think not, they re­
fuse the rule, and the party takes nothing by his motion. But I 
can see no reason why the rule nisi should not be entered and ar­
gued instauter. In the present case the Defendant obtained the 
rule on argument,—it is discharged, and must follow the usual 
course.
Parker, J.:
I think the object of giving notice and copies of affidavits is to 
enable the party to come forward in the first instance and oppose 
the application ; and there can be no reason for a party to bo d the 
affidavits in his hand until a rule be granted, and then ask leave 
to shew cause instanter. I fully concur, however, that as the rule 
nisi was entered to set aside the proceedings for irregularity, and 
has been discharged, it should be with costs.
Rule discharged with costs.
Weldon and Berton for the Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and Carman for the Defendants.
ROBERTSON,
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ROBERTSON, Assignee of CAMPBELL, Sheriff of 
Charlotte v. CURRIE, WYER & J. CAMPBELL.
In an application of obligors of a limit bond to tlie Court for relief upon 
the ground that the Defendant left the limits, agreeing with the Plaintiff to 
pay all costs—it must expressly appear that Defendant complied with the 
agreement by first paying the costs.
In this action, which was on a limit bond against the Defend­
ant Currie, the principal, and Wyer & Campbell, his sureties, for 
an escape of the former,—the Solicitor General applied for relief 
on behalf of the sureties, to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court 
under the Act of Assembly, 6 Wm. 4, c. 41, s. 13, inter alia, 
providing that “ the Court where the action is brought, may by 
“ rule or rules of the same Court give such relief to the obligors in 
“ the said bond as is agreeable to justice and reason, and that the 
“ said rule or rules of the said Court shall have the nature and 
“ effect of a defeasance of such bond the motion was founded on 
the affidavits of the sureties, stating that Currie had been taken in 
execution for <£600,—Defendants were his sureties,—that a settle­
ment was negociated, and that Currie left the limits under a full 
belief that the execution was settled and discharged—that property 
had been assigned to Parkinson & Roberts, agents of Plaintiff, and 
that the said agents had placed the same in Plaintiff’s hands.
\Chipman, C. J.—Does not the Act provide that the sureties 
may render their principal ?]
Solicitor General—It is doubtful if that can be done after a 
breach of the bond.
It was further alleged that there was collusion between Plaintiff, 
Parkinson and Roberts ; that Plaintiff had instructed Parkinson 
and Roberts, if a certain bill of lading of deals were given them, to 
discharge Defendant on his paying all costs ; that such bill of la­
ding had been given, and that the Plaintiff held property of the 
Defendants for more than the debt, but it was not expressly stated 
that the costs were paid.
Per Curiam.
Why have the sureties not Currie’s affidavit that the costs were 
paid ? The presumption is, that he could not swear to that;—the 
sureties then have not made out a case for the equitable jurisdiction 
of the Court— it is not agreeable to justice and reason, that where 
the principal and his sureties are all I’ ble together, the latter 
shor d be discharged when the principal himself does not swear 
that he has complied with Plaintiff’s offer by paying tlie costs.
The Solicitor General took nothing by his motion.
JARVIS
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JARVIS v. MILLER.
Where the Sheriff levies on real property, and omitting to advertise the 
same, and offer it for sale, returns that “ the lands remain unsold for want 
of buyers,” such omission is a breach of duty on his part, and the return a 
false return. The Sheriff is bound to proceed on a fieri facias, and is not 
at liberty to wait for a Venditioni exponas. Although no actual damage be 
shewn, the Sheriff is, nevertheless, liable for his breach of duty in not pro­
ceeding under the writ,—but the Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages 
only, unless ■actual injury be proved.
This was a special action on the case against the Defendant, 
as Sheriff of County’bf York, for a false return of a writ of .’/®| 
facias, and for a breach of duty in the Defendant, in not having 
sold land levied upon, and in not having advertised lands levfied 
upon for sale.
At the trial before Parker, J. at the Saint John Circuit in Ja­
nuary last, it appeared (by exemplification), that in Trinity Term, 
5, Geo. IV. the Plaintiff obtained judgment against one Flaglor, 
for £17 12s. 4d. An award of fieri facias, refundable in Hilary 
Term following, with the return thereto of nulla bona, and conti­
nuances afterwards by vicecomes non misit breve were entered on 
the roll.
An exemplification was also in evidence of a JI. fa. upon said 
judgment, dated in Trinity Term aforesaid, and returnable in Hi­
lary after; returned nulla bona. Also of another writ of fidri 
facias issued on the 20th August, 1834, returnable in Hilary, 
1835. On this was indorsed by the Sheriff (the Defendant), “ Re­
ceived 2'5th August, 1834,” and the following return, “ Levied on 
lands and tenements which remain unsold for want of buyers.”
The Solicitor General objected that the continuances on the 
roll were not sufficient; the executions awarded should have been 
produced or exemplified also. It appeared also that the Sheriff 
was directed to proceed under the execution, at which time, he 
stated that the land was mortgaged to its full value. No evidence 
of the value of the land was given.
Parker, J.:
Ruled that the evidence could not be rejected : he considered 
the allegations on the record which had been exemplified were 
binding on the Court as to the facts therein stated ; and moreover 
that it did not lie in the Sheriff’s mouth to dispute the regularity 
of the writ which he had received and returned.
At the close of the Plaintiff’s case, a nonsuit was moved for on 
the following grounds :—
1st. In order to maintain the action the Plaintiff should shew 
that the Sheriff’s return was false. In this case, there was not 
sufficient time between the issuing and return to have sold the 
lands, and therefore the return was proper, that the lands were le­
vied upon and remained unsold, and even if there had been, yet, 
2d.
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2d. An action would not lie against the Sheriff for not selling 
under a fieri facias,—he was not bound to sell until compelled 
a venditioni exponas, and
3d. No action would lie for not advertising; supposing the Sher’ff 
bound to sell under fieri facias, no action would lie against him 
until after the lapse of sufficient time to have enabled him to sell.
The learned Judge was of opinion, that as the declaration ex­
pressly averred the return of the Sheriff to have been made on the 
return day of the execution, and charged him with not selling the 
land, and returning the proceeds at that time, the Plaintiff could 
not recover on that part of the allegation, there not being sufficient 
lime to make the sale. He was also inclined to think for the same 
reasons the action would not lie for the false return ; but he con­
sidered that the Sheriff had been guilty ol a breach of duty in not 
advertising the land for sale, as directed by the Act of Assembly ; 
that he was bound to proceed on the fieri facias without waiting 
for a venditioni exponas, even though the sale could not be com­
pleted before the return day ; and that there was a sufficient sub­
stantive cause of action to entitle the Plaintiff to a verdict, although 
he had failed in making out his whole charge. The learned Judge 
was also of opinion that the Plaintiff had not made out a case for 
more than nominal damages ; and he recommended to the parties 
to consent to a verdict being entered for the Plaintiff for one shil­
ling, with leave to the Defendant to move to set it aside and enter 
a nonsuit on any of the points which had arisen. This was at 
length assented to, and a verdict taken accordingly ; the Plaintiff 
having leave also to move to increase the damages to the full 
amount of the execution, if the Court should think him entitled 
thereto.
In Hilary Term, the Solicitor General moved for a rule nisi to 
set aside the verdict, and to enter a nonsuit :—
The execution put in evidence ; and upon which the Sheriff 
was charged was a first writ of fieri facias. The judgment was 
signed in 1824, the execution issued in 1834 ; and appearing a 
first writ on a judgment of ten years standing, this was not a mere 
irregularity, but the writ was absolutely void. The law presumed 
a judgment satisfied if no execution be issued within a year and a 
day, and Plaintiff had no right to issue execution until he had 
sued out scire facias, and ootained judgment thereon. There 
was nothing to support this execution ; if the Plaintiff depended on 
the execution issued at the time of signing the judgment, then 
this should have been an alias or pluries. By the record it ap­
peared that if any other executions were issued they had not been 
returned, the continuances were vic. non mi. breve; it was irregu- 
gular to issue a second or subsequent execution until the former 
was 
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was returned. The Plaintiff in seeking damages for a false re­
turn, should shew that he had a right to issue the execution of the 
false return to which he coniDlains. Roscoe’s Ev. 537 ; 2 Tidd’s 
Pr. 1055 ; 2 Chit. R. 203; Star. Ev. 1344.
The return made by the Sheriff was a good and proper return. 
Supposing the Sheriff bound to sell property levied upon under a 
fieri facias, yet in the present case there was not sufficient time 
between the issuing and return of the execution, to have enabled 
him to do so. The Province law regulating the sale of lands un­
der execution, required the property to be advertised six months 
before sale ;—time was necessarily expended in seeking for and 
levying on the property ; he was bound to return the execution on 
the return day—if he had proceeded to advertise the land for sale, 
the day of sale would have been subsequent to the return day, and 
the execution might have been taken from him.
The Sheriff was not bound to sell under a fieri facias—he had a 
discretionary power either to proceed under the fieri facias, or 
wait the issuing of a venditioni exponas.
[Chipman, C. J. The Act of Assembly directs that every Sheriff to 
whom any writ of fieri facias or other writ sliallbe directed, shall, for 
want of personal estate of the debtor, “ seize, sell, and dispose of the 
real estate the question is, if this Act does not intend that the 
Sheriff shall seize, and sell, and complete the execution under the 
writ.]
[Carter J.—Is it not as compulsory to sell as to seize ?] 
The Sheriff was only bound to act according to the exigency of the 
writ, the practice in regard to which was not altered by the Act 
of Assembly. The Plaintiff could have proceeded to compel a 
sale under a venditioni exponas. Keightley vs. Birch, 3 Camp. 
520—Clullerbuck vs. Jones 15 E 78. 3 B & Aid. 204. Impey’s 
Sheriff 342. 1 Star. R. 381.
The allegation as to the Sheriff not having advertised was, that 
the Sheriff “ did not proceed to advertize and sell, and had not the 
money at the return of the writ.” The question arose upon this, 
if the Plaintiff could in this maintain his action for a part of his 
breach, viz: the not having advertised. lie contended that the 
Plaintiff could not in any case, so sever a distinct allegation, but 
in the present case, even if the allegation could be so divided’; it 
gave the Plaintiff no right of action—if he was not bound to sell 
under a fi. fa. clearly he was not bound to advertise; but even 
although bound to sell, he was not liable to an action previous to 
the expiration of six months after his levy, for not having adver­
tized. The notice of sale was for the benefit of the debtor—it 
might be that he had secured to the Sheriff the payment of the 
money, or had consented to the sale of the land at the expiration 
of six months from the levy; could the Sheriff then be liable in 
the 
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the mean time for the not doing an act which might thus have 
been rendered unnecessary. No right of action accrued to the 
Plaintiff until he was injured, and he sustained no injury by the 
mere circumstance of the Sheriff not having advertised the lands 
for sale. Another point was also attempted to be taken, that as 
it appeared that Flaglor had only an equity of redemption in the 
lands levied upon, which was not liable to execution, the Sher­
iff could not proceed to sell; but the Court considered the Sheriff 
estopped by his return, from setting up this excuse ; which rested 
merely on his assertion, and had been proved at the trial.
Cause was shewn in Trinity Term.
F. A. Kinnear, for the Plaintiff:—
The only levy on real property was the advertisement for sale. 
Proof therefore of not having advertised was also proof of not hav­
ing levied.
If there was not time to have sold before the return day, the 
Sheriff should have made a special return, or have applied to the 
Court to enlarge the time for returning the writ. Under a ft. fa. 
the Sheriff was bound to proceed to sell, and had no right to wait 
fora venditioni exponas. Jacobs r. Humphries, 2 Cr. & Mee. 
413 ; Bales V. Wingfield, 2 Nev. & Man. 831. The return was 
evidently false—before a sale the Sheriff was bound to advertise—■ 
he had not advertised, how then could he say the property re­
mained unsold for want of buyers, 1 Ch. Pl. 428 ; 7 B & C. 489 ; 
9 Bing. 745. The Sheriff admitted that he had not advertised 
the land for sale, and stated his opinion as to ther mortgages upon 
it—the admission should be taken most strongly against the De­
fendant—the qualification by his opinion was for the consideration 
of the jury. The return implied that the land levied upon was 
of the value of the execution.
As to the executions, they were regularly continued on the roll; 
if there was any irregularity in the writ under which the Sheriff 
levied, an application might have been made to set it aside, but it 
was not competent to the Defendant to set up such irregularity as 
a defence. 2 Arch. Prac. 88.
Solicitor .General.—If the Sheriff had improperly delayed to 
proceed, he might be liable, but he had a discretionary power, and 
if he properly exercised that, the mere fact of not having sold pro­
perty would not subject him to an action ; the only question, as in 
Bales v. Wingfield, was, if the Defendant had acted bona fide ;— 
the circumstances here shewed the exercise of a sound discretion.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Carter, J. :
This is an action on the case against Defendant as Sheriff of the 
County 
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County of York, for a false return to a writ of fieri facias de bonis 
et terris, issued by the Plaintiff on a judgment recovered by him 
against one Flaglor. It appeared in evidence that the period of 
six months, necessary under the provisions of the Act of Assembly, 
for the completion of the sale of lands by a Sheriff under a fieri 
facias, could not have elapsed between the delivery of the writ and its 
return—and it further appeared by his own admission, that the 
Sheriff had not advertised the land for sale, as directed by the Act of 
Assembly—but that he had levied on land and stated it remained 
unsold for want of buyers. Under this state of the facts, the ques­
tion which arises for decision is whether this return is in point of 
law false. It seems to me that by the provisions of the 26 G. 3, 
c. 12, it is the duty of the Sheriff to advertize the lands taken in 
execution under a wit of fieri facias. I think in this case, the 
Sheriff by neglecting to do this act, has been guilty of a breach of 
duty. It does not however, become necessary to decide whether 
for that neglect of duty he is liable under this declaration, because, 
under the circumstances of the case it is clear to me, that the re­
turn is false. One position advanced by the Defendant’s Counsel, 
viz.—that it is discretionary with the Sheriff, to sell under ‘s fi. fa. 
and that the writ of venditioni exponas, is the only comnulsory writ 
for that purpose, is wholly at variance with the judgment of Lord 
Ellenborough, in Doe v. Donston, 1 B. & Aid. 230, and with that 
of Bayley, B. in Jacobs v. Humphrey, 2 Cr. & M. 413, where he 
says, “ The Sheriff ought to act without a venditioni exponas, and 
that writ is only to give him alacrity”—another argument advan­
ced for the Defendant was, that tire Sheriff could not be bound to 
advertize in this case, because he could not complete the sale of 
the land before the return of the writ. This might possibly have 
some weight, if the Sheriff had no power to sell after the return of 
the writ—from the case of Doe v. Donston, already cited it would 
seem that the Sheriff might have sold after the return of the wr it. 
I rest the decision of this case on the ground of the Sheriff having, 
by his own admission, made a false return ; having neglected to 
take any step pointed out by law towards making a sale of the 
land—he returns that he has levied, and that the lands remain un­
sold for want of buyers. This return is in terms false according 
to the facts proved, and is certainly false in substance. As to the 
hardship on the Sheriff, no argument can be raised on that, as it 
was open to him to have made a special return of the circumstan­
ces, or to have applied to the Court for relief. I think the verdict 
for nominal damages was right, and that therefore, this rule should 
be discharged and the verdict should stand.
Parker, J.:
I have thought a good deal on this case since the trial, and con­
tinue of opinion that none of the objections which have been urged 
Al can 
196 CASES IN MICHAELMAS TERM,
can avail to deprive the Plaintiff of the verdict which was then 
entered for him. It appears to me that there is a sufficient grava­
men alleged; sufficient provided; and that, although the proof 
may not have come fully up to all parts of the allegations, enough 
is proved to entitle the Plaintiff to recover in this form of action.
As to the legal liability, and the duty of the Sheriff, I think it 
abundantly clear from a number of cases—
1st. That the Sheriff is in general liable to an action if he ne­
glect his duty, though no specific damage may be proved ;
2d. That the Sheriff is bound to proceed on a fieri facias; and 
is not at liberty to wait for a venditioni exponas. If he seize real 
estate, it is his duty to advertize it for sale, as directed by the Acts 
of Assembly. In support of the above stated points, it is enough 
to refer to the following cases:—
Barker v. Green, 2 Bing. 317 ; Airetonu. Davis, 9 Bing. 740; 
Ca: lisle v. Parkins, 3 Stark. 163 ; Jacobs v. Humphrey, 2 C. & M. 
413; Bales v. Wingfield, 2 N. & M. 831 ; Smith v. Johnson, 
2 C. M. & R. 350; Godfrey v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413.
In the last cited case, Lord C. J. Tindal thus expresses himself 
—“ It has been thrown out on behalf of the Defendant that no action 
“ lies for negligence unless the Plaintiff shew special damage; but 
“ that proDOsition is wider than the law warrants, for in an action 
“ of tort arising out of a breach of contract or neglect of a duty which 
“ the law imposes, nominal damages are sufficient to entitle Plain- 
“ tiff to judgment: this is the rule of law, and it has been recently 
“ recognized and acted on in Marzette v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 
“415.” In one case indeed, that of Moreland v. Sheriff of Lon­
don, 1 Stark. 388, it was held that the Plaintiff could not recover 
against the Sheriff for not levying on fieri facias—but the reason 
distinctly assigned is, that the writ had not been returned. Lord 
Ellenborough then said,—“ The Sheriff should have been ruled to 
“ return the writ which the Court would have required to be a 
“ legal return, and if false the Plaintiff would have been entitled 
“ to his action.”
3dly. I am of opinion, that although there was not between the 
delivery of the writ to the Sheriff, and its return, a sufficient time 
to enable him to sell real estate; this circumstance did not justify 
him in not advertizing, and certainly would not warrant the return 
that the lands were unsold for want of buyers ; although it might 
have afforded a good excuse for his not returning the writ till the 
expiration of the six months required for advertising; or justified 
an application to the Court for an extension of time ; or indeed the 
Sheriff, if he had advertised, might have returned the exact truth. 
He was not in fact called on for the return until the period had ex­
pired, although the averment in the declaration is, that the return 
was 
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was made on the return day, which appeared to me unnecessarily 
to narrow, though it did not entirely subvert, the Plaintiff’s ground 
of action. On this point, the cases collected in the note of Mr. 
Sergeant Williams to 2 Saund. R. 47. 1. may be referred to. In 
Jeanes v. Wilkins, 1 Ves. Sen. 195, one question arose as to the 
validity of a sale, and conveyance made by a Sheriff of leasehold 
premises under a fieri facias, subsequent to the return day, which 
is expressly treated by Lord Chancellor Hardwick as a question of 
law—he says, “ I am of opinion that it did convey the estate of 
“ this term to the purchaser, although the sale was made after the 
“ expiration of the return of the writ, and no necessity for a writ 
“ of venditioni exponas, which, though a proper writ is not of ne- 
“ cessity, being rather to compel the Sheriff, when guilty of laches, 
“ to do what he has authority to do, than to give him a new au- 
“ thority.” His Lordship then cites Ayre v. Aden, Cro. Jac. 73, 
and subsequently adds, “ the sale, though after the expiration of 
ft the return was good, and the common course of proceeding shews 
“ this ; the Sheriff not being bound to make a return of the writ 
“ of execution unless the party requires it.”
The opinion expressed by Lord Ellenborough in Doe v. Donston, 
1 B. & Aid.’230, and that of Lord Holt in Clark v. Withers, there 
cited, may also be referred to.
4th. I think as the Sheriff received the writ and made a return 
to it, he is liable to an action if that return be false ; and that the 
return here was in fact false as the Defendant (whatever reasons 
he may have had) was not warranted in returning, that the land 
was unsold for want of buyers, when he had never advertised and 
offered it for sale. The case of Bernard v. Leigh 1 Stark. N. P. 
C. 43, which was not cited at the trial, is very much in point. 
That was an ac on against the Sheriff for a false return of goods 
remaining unsold pro defectu emptorum. Lord Ellenborough there 
held the Sheriff liable, not because he had not a good excuse for 
acting as he did ; but because the return he made was not true in 
fact. “ The Sheriff,” he says, ih might have applied to the Court 
“ for time to make his return on account of the special and un- 
“ foreseen circumstances of the case, and the Court would proba- 
“ bly under such circumstances have enlarged the time, but here 
“ he has returned what is not true, that the goods remained in his 
“ hands for want of buyers ; the sum offered indeed was not ade- 
“ quate to their value, but they remained unsold not for want of 
“ buyers, but because they had been put into the hands of a rogu- 
“ ish broker.”
5th. Although in neither of the counts is the breach specifically 
confined to the not advertising or false return, but states also, that 
the 'sheriff did not proceed to sell, (which for want of time he 
could not do before the return day) yet it appears to me the alle­
gation 
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gation is divisible, and proof of either would sustain the count. 
The general doctrine laid down in the best writers, particularly 
Mr Starkie, (1 St. Ev. 382,) deducible from several cases, which 
I need not enumerate, is that part may be rejected in this form of 
action, if enough remain to embrace the substance and legal essence 
of the charge, which there certainly does in the present case.
6th. With respect to the point which was reserved at the trial as 
to the regularity of the fieri facias, I am quite of opinion, on look­
ing into the books of practice, and the decided cases on the sub­
ject, that the fieri facias here was regularly issued, although seve­
ral years had elapsed since the judgment; a fieri facias having 
been duly issued, returned and filed, within a year after the judg­
ment ; and that continuances by vic. non misit breve were properly 
entered on the roll, and were not controvertible ; and that the very 
nature of these continuances shews that it is not necessary, as was 
contended by the Solicitor General, to have intermediate writs 
actually issued and returned. It would further seem settled that 
even if this fieri facias had regularly issued, the Sheriff could not 
dispute the regularity of it, especially after having received and 
acted on it. 1 Sell. Pr. 515, 2 lb. 189, 2 L. R. 1096, 1 Salk. 273, 
6 Esp. N. P. C. Ill, 4 Bing. 278, 2 M. & S. 565, 2 B. & Ad. 257.
The only point remaining for consideration is whether the Plain­
tiff’s rule to increase the damages should be made absolute ; and I 
cannot think he is entitled to this, as he gave no evidence of actual 
damage ; or of the value of the property seized. I stated my opi­
nion that a case was made out for nominal damages only ; Bales 
v. Wingfield, which I have already cited from 2, N. & M, 431, 
has confirmed me in that opinion. It is true the amount of da­
mages was a question for the jury, and had it been left to them, 
they had the power to give more than a mere nominal sum, but 
some of the jury were reluctant even to give a verdict for the 
Plaintiff at all, after the parties had assented to my proposition.
The Plaintiff’s counsel did not indeed wish to rest on the esti­
mate of the jury, except that estimate were fixed at the amount of 
the execution, and the jury directed accordingly, which I could not 
assent to. There is an obvious difference between a seizure of 
goods which the Sheriff takes into his possession, and of real 
estate under the Acts of Assembly, of which he has no possession, 
though it is hardly necessary to advert to this, for even in the case 
of goods, some evidence has generally been given of the value in 
order to fix the amount of damages.—7 here was nothing appa­
rently to prevent the Plaintiff giving evidence of the value in the 
present case.
I entirely concur in thinking that as well the Plaintiff’s ride to 
increase the damages, as that of the Defendant to set aside the 
verdict and enter a nonsuit, must be discharged.
Chipman,
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Chipman, Chief Justice :
Not having been present during all the arguments in this case, 
I have given precedence to my brethren, in whose opinions I fully 
concur, and I will only add a few words to shew what I think is 
the true import of the Act of Assembly now in question.
This Act (26 Geo. 3, c. 12, sec. 2) among other things pro­
vides, “ that every Sheriff or other officer, to whom any writ of 
“ fieri facias or other writ shall be directed, &c. shall seize, sell 
“ and dispose of so much of the houses, lands, real estate, and 
“ hereditaments of the Defendant or Defendants as shall be suffi- 
“ cient to satisfy the monies from him or them due, and on such writs 
“ payable.” It is clear from the express terms of this enactment 
that the duty of selling and disposing under the writ, is as impe­
rative on the Sheriff as the seizing, and that he is bound to sell the 
lands, under the same writ by virtue of which he seizes them.
The next section provides, “ that before any sale shall be made 
“ by any Sheriff or other officer, of the houses, lands, real estate, 
“ or hereditaments of any person or persons, he shall first advertise 
“ the time and place of such intended sale, at least six months before 
“ he shall make the same, &c. and then shall sell the same to the 
“ highest bidder.” This section prescribes regulations as to the 
manner of selling. By it the Sheriff is bound to advertise the 
property seized, and also the time and place of the intended sale, 
in order to give buyers notice of it. In the present case the Sheriff 
never advertised at all, nor even offered to sell the land ; how then 
could he return that it remained unsold for want of buyers, when 
he never gave them an opportunity to come in and purchase ? It 
was his duty to advertise and offer the land for sale in the manner 
pointed out in the law, and in that manner only—by neglecting so 
to advertise and offer for sale the property seized he was guilty of 
a breach of duty, and the return, that “ the lands remained unsold 
for want of buyers,” was in point of law a false return. As to the 
damages, every person on whom the law casts a duty is liable for 
a breach of it, but if no actual damage be shewn, he is liable only 
to nominal damages—here the Plaintiff has given no evidence of 
damage. I think, therefore, that as well the rule for increasing the 
damages as that for entering a non-suit ought to be discharged.
Rule discharged.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
Solicitor General for Defendant

CASES IM HILARY TEIUI,
IN THE
SEVENTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF WILLIAM IV.
Note.—Botsford, J. was absent during this Term.
DOYLE v. TAYLOR AND ANOTHER.
■ Where goods in the possession of B, in which A has an undivided inter­
est, have, without A’s authority, been delivered by B to C, who retains the 
possession of them,—Held that A cannot maintain assumpsit against B, for 
goods sold and delivered, nor money had and received, to recover the value 
of A’s interest in such goods, there being no proof of a sale from B to C.
Semb.—If a sale had taken place, though without A’s authority, A might 
afterwards affirm the contract and maintain assumpsit against B, for his 
share of the proceeds; and in such case the produce of the sale is the cri­
terion of value.
This was an action of assumpsit tried before Carter, J. at the 
sittings after last Hilary Term.
The following facts appeared in evidence :—The Plaintiff had 
acquired by purchase from the makers, Dunn & Groves, a quan­
tity of timber lying in the woods ; a part of this he hauled into the 
river Tobique—he also made at the same place a further quantity 
of timber. In 1834-5, one Gill was engaged to haul the timber 
remaining in the woods on shares, receiving one half the timber he 
should haul for his labour, and it was agreed that in order to dis­
tinguish the timber hauled by Gill, from that which was already 
hauled, he (Gill,) should mark each stick he hauled with a notch. 
The timber remained on the brow, and in the stream, during the 
year 1835, and the following winter the Plaintiff and Gill worked 
together again ; Plaintiff making and Gill hauling the timber; 
during this winter the latter was to have fifty-five tons out of every 
hundred for hauling.
In the spring of 1836, the timber came down the stream. At 
the mouth of the Tobique, the old timber which Gill had hauled, 
(distinguished by the notches upon it) was separated from the un­
notched, and the whole was put into joints containing from twenty- 
four to twenty-eight sticks each. At this time the whole was 
seized
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seized by the Crown Officer for non-payment of tonnage duties, 
and was brought down to Fredericton—there were sixteen joints 
of old and eight joints of new timber, containing 741 tons; six 
joints of the old were unnotched : the duties having been paid, the 
timber was given up by thejCrcwn to the Piaintiff and the De­
fendants, (the latter, as entitled to Gill’s share,) to be divided be­
tween them according to their just rights ; the Plaintiff received 
out of the whole quantity 3481 tons, the remainder was taken to 
St John, and there delivered for Defendants to Rankin, a merchant, 
whose mark was subsequently seen upon the timber. The timber 
was worth 23s. per ton. The Plaintiff claimed as his separate 
property one quarter of the whole, as contained in the six joints of 
old unnotched timber, half of the remainder of the old timber, and 
forty-five tons for every hundred of new timber.
The Solicitor General, for the Defendants, moved for a nonsuit. 
There appeared no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and 
the Defendants—no contract between them could be implied; Gill 
and Doyle were tenants in common, and the timber the Defendants 
got, they received as G 'Il’s share; there was no proof of a sale of 
the timber, er of mopey received by t’^e Defendants ;—if the Plain­
tiff could support an action, he should have sued in trover.
The learned Judge overruled the motion for a nonsuit, and di­
rected the jury.—
1st. That if in the timber the Defendants got, was included 
any the sole property of the Plaintiff, he was entitled to recover 
the value thereof, as goods sold and delivered.
2d. If Taylor got more than Gill’s share, and sold it to Rankin, 
the Plaintiff was entitled to half the value of the excess in money 
had and received.
A verdict was given for the Plaintiff for £43 : 12:6.
In last Trinity Term the Solicitor General moved for and ob­
tained a rule nisi to set aside the verdict: he argued—
1st. If the Plaintiff were entitled to recover, he should have 
brought trover for any quantity that came to his possession. A 
party could only waive a tortp^and bring assumpsit where a con­
tract could be implied. Here that could not be the case, the De­
fendant claimed Gill’s share, and he received the timber as Gill’s 
—if, therefore, he had got more than Gill was entitled to have— 
the Plaintiff, after a demand, might perhaps, be entitled to recover 
in trover, but could maintain assumpsit only against his co-tenant 
Gill; and in order to do so, he must prove an actual sale, and mo­
ney paid, which had not been shewn in this case.
2d. The Plaintiff claimed for his separate property, and a pro­
portion of his joint property; he had received more than the amount 
of his separate property iu Fredericton. It did not appear whether, 
what 
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what he so received was his sole property or not; he had not 
shewn the quantity of timber he claimed, but sought to spell it out 
from the number of joints, and the contents of the whole twenty 
four joints. There was not evidence to go to the jury in the 
way the cause was left—the rights of the parties could only be 
determined in equity. 1 Ch. Pl. 112, et seq.—Lee v. Shore, 1 B 
& C. 91, Cowper 419, 3 Taun. 274; Bull N. P. 131, 1 Bing, 
new cases, 198.
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas Term, by N. Parker and 
Berton;—
The Plaintiff claimed the value of liis separate property as 
goods sold, and the value of his proportion of the joint property 
of Gill and Doyle, of money had and received. Gill & Doyle 
were tenants in common, and when Gill assigned to the Defend­
ants, the Plaintiff and Defendants stood in the same relative situ­
ation. The rights of tenants in common were distinguishable 
from those of joint tenants or partners ; the latter were seized per 
mi et per tout, but tenants in common had each a separate right in 
his own share, over which his co-tenant had no controul. It was 
an established princinle, that if a tenant in common destroyed the 
common property, his cc-tenant might maintain trover. And the 
opinion expressed by Chief Justice Wi’les, (Willes R. 209,) re­
cognized by Lord Kenyon, in Martin v. Knowlis, 8 T. R. 146, es­
tablished the further principle, that if a tenant in common sold the 
common chattel, money had and received would lie by his co- 
tenant. The principle was the same as between strangers, the 
seller disposed of that over which he had no right, his co-tenant’s 
undivided share. The co-tenant therefore was entitled either to 
dispute the sale, and seek his goods, or to affirm the contract, and 
require the money received for them by bis co-tenant. Applying 
these principles to the present case, the Plaintiff had shewn the 
whole quantity of the timber—he had shewn- the proportionate 
amouut of his several claims and rights therein; he had shewn 
further what amount he had received—that the remainder of the 
whole quantity was taken by the Defendant, carried to market and 
disposed of, and he had shewn the value It was not necessary 
for the Plaintiff to shew whether in the timber he received was 
contained his separate property or a portion of his joint property ; 
the value of his separate property was recoverable as goods sold— 
the whole was recoverable as money had and received.
[Parker J.—Can you, by shewing Rankin’s mark, presume a 
sale, and then proving the va’ue, presume a’so the price.]
Tnat point had been submitted to the jury by the learned Judge, 
and was determined—it had not been taken by the Solm to- Ge­
neral. The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. T orf 
E1 
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for money had and received was an equitable action, Wells r. Ross, 
7 Taunt. 403, and the sale having been established by the verdict, 
it was not necessary to prove the actual receipt of the money by 
the Defendant—he must be presumed to have sold for the value of 
the timber in money, and proof of the value was evidence to fix 
the amount. The verdict was according to equity and good con­
science, and therefore a new trial should not be granted.—Graham 
on new trials, 398, Wilkinson w. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.
The Solicitor General replied :—
To support the declaration it was necessary to prove an express 
contract, or circumstances from whence a contract could be im­
plied. The Defendants had nothing to do with the timber until 
it came to Fredericton—what they got they received as Gid’s 
share therein—that was all they claimed or desired to have.
If a tortious holder should sell property it was true the owner 
had a choice of remedies, either by action of trover for the wrong, 
or waiving the tort, by money had and received—but to maintain 
the latter, he must adopt the contract and prove a sale, and the 
price for which the goods were sold.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
I think that in this case there must be a new trial. There is 
not, I think, sufficient evidence to support the verdict, either on 
the count for goods sold and delivered, or on that for money had 
and received; as to the count for goods sold and delivered, there 
does not appear to me, to be any ground to infer a sale from the 
Plaintiff to the Defendants, of any part of the timber in question 
in this case. As to the count for money had and received, al­
though there is no doubt, that if the Defendants, even without 
authority and wrongfully, sold the timber, which was the exclusive 
property of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff may waive the tort, and 
elect to consider the Defendants as his agents in selling the timber, 
and, upon this principle, may maintain an action for the money 
into which his goods have been converted; (IBing. N. C. 215T 
Cowp. 419.) And although it be admitted that as to any timber 
in which the Defendants may have acquired an interest as tenants 
in common with the Plaintiff, if the Defendants sold such timber, 
the Plaintiff may also maintain an action for his share of the price, 
as for money had and received to his use; (Willes, 209, 8 JT. R. 
146.—See also 5 Greenl. (Maine,) R. 356.) Yet I apprehend, 
that in either case, there must be proof of the Defendants having 
made the transfer by sale of the Plaintiff’s property ; and the na­
tural course would also be, to prove the price for which the timber 
was sold, and the actual receipt of that price by the Defendants. 
It was, however, held, in the case cited at the bar, (Weils Ross, 7 
Taunt 
in the Seventh Year of WILLIAM IV. 205
Taunt. 403,) that when a sale has been proved, it will be in­
ferred that the sale was for money, and that the seller received 
the money, but even in this case, it would seem that the price of 
the goods was in evidence as a necessary ingredient of the sale. 
In the present case it was not proved that the Defendants made 
a sale to Rankin & Co. of the timber in question, but the tenor of 
the argument on the part of the Plaintiff was, that such a sale 
might be implied from the facts which were proved, of the timber 
having been delivered to Rankin & Co. and its having been seen 
with their private mark upon it—which latter circumstance, (that 
of the timber having the mark of Messrs. Rankins upon it,) it 
may be observed would not probably have arisen from the act of 
the Defendants, but from that of Rankin & Co., and to give it 
any weight, the light under which this mark was put upon the 
timber, should have been proved under oath. I do not think that 
these facts, standing alone, are sufficient for the Plaintiff’s pur­
pose. I do not perceive that there could have been any difficulty 
in producing direct proof of a sale to Rankin & Co. with the price 
agreed upon, and the other circumstances attending the sale; but 
instead of furnishing direct proof, it is a sequence of inferences, 
that the Plaintiff has chosen to rest his case upon ; first lie infers 
a contract of sale between the Defendants and Rankin & Co. 
from the bare circumstance of the timber being in the hands of the 
latter, and upon the result of this inference he builds the further 
inference of the receipt of money by the Defendants. A very 
material objection is, that no contract of sale being in proof, there 
is no evidence of any stipulated price. Now the principle upon 
which the action in this form is maintainable is, as has been be­
fore stated, that the Plaintiff waives any right to damages for the 
wrongful act of the Defendants, and adopts the sale as if it had 
been authorised by him, and claims on y the amount which the 
Defendants actually have received, or are entitled to receive by 
virtue of the sale, as the proceeds of his property. I bear in 
mind, that the point as to the sale to Rankin & Co. was left by 
the learned Judge to the jury, upon the evidence as it stood ; still 
I cannot think that the evidence is sufficient to warrant the find­
ing of the jury. No case has been cited which goes the length, 
now contended for, in implying the receipt of money by a Defend­
ant to the Plaintiff’s use, and I do not think it would be safe to es­
tablish such a precedent. In the present posture of the evidence 
therefore, I am of opinion that the verdict cannot be sustained on 
the count for money had and received. Where a verdict is set 
aside for being contrary to evidence, it is usual to require the party 
which seeks a new trial to pay the costs of the former trial. In 
the present case, as the jury may have been influenced by what 
fell from the learned Judge, I do not think it would be right to 
impose 
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impose this condition. I think it will meet the justice of the case, 
to let the costs abide the event of the suit.
Parker, J.:
I entirely agree in the opinion pronounced by His Honor the 
Chief Justice, and the reasons on which it is founded. Whatever 
may have been said at the trial, it was hardly contended on the 
argument that the Plaintiff could recover on the count for goods 
sold and delivered. Nothing like a contract of sale was expressly 
proved, and the existence of such a contract cannot be inferred 
from the circumstances of this case ; no transfer of the Plaintiff’s 
property to the Defendants appears to have been contemplated in 
the arrangement made for carrying the timber to St. John.
The question whether a wrongful conversion of a party’s goods 
could be turned into a contract for goods sold and delivered, was 
expressly raised in Bennett v. Francis, 2 B. & P. 550. Though 
it was not necessary to the decision of that case to determine it, the 
opinion of Lord Alvanley, who delivered the judgment of the Court, 
can hardly be mistaken. He sneaks thus:—“ When the case 
“ came before the Court, a wide field of argument was entered 
“ into on the question, namely, whether, in all cases, when a party 
“ has converted goods of another to his own use, it is competent to 
“ the Plaintiff to change the transaction into a contract for goods 
“ sold and delivered ? We thought it right to stop the Counsel for 
“ the Defendant, being of opinion that the case would not turn on 
“ that point; and I do not now intend to give a positive opinion on 
“ it, but thus far I will say, that it does appear to me monstrous to 
“ carry the cases to any such extent as that which has been con- 
“ tended for, and that they do not warrant the conclusion which 
“ has been drawn from them: the cases cited were Hambly v. 
“ Trott, Lindon v. Hooper, and Feltham v. Terry Lord Mans- 
“ field, in the case of Hambly v. Trott, confines the doctrine to 
“ the case of money had and received.”—The reason for this is 
given, which I will refer towhen I come to mention this case again.
This case must then stand or fall by the count for money had 
and received; and on this point there is no question on the fact 
that no authority was given by the Plaintiff to the Defendants to 
dispose of his interest; and the law is clear that without such 
authority the Defendants could not rightfully dispose of the Plain­
tiff’s interest; though after such sale, wrongfully made, the Plain­
tiff, instead of look g for his interest in the timber, may waive the 
tort, affirm the contract entered into by the Defendants, and recover 
in assumpsit. And as he proceeds for money had and received, he 
is to make out by express proof or reasonable inference, that his 
share or interest in the timber has been converted into money.
Now there are three things material to be shewn:—
1st.
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1 st. That a sale was in fact made at all by the Defendants to 
Rankin.
2d. That such sale covered the Plaintiff’s interest in the timber.
3d. The produce of such sale.
If a sale of the timber had been in fact proved, I quite agree 
that such sale would be prima facie taken to cover the Plaintiff’s 
interest, unless it appeared to have been made with a reservation 
of the Plaintiff’s right; but we are wholly in the dark as to the 
bargain between the Defendants and Rankin.
The case of Wells and another v. Ross, 7 Taun. 403, was cited 
to shew that under certain circumstances a sale would be presumed; 
and also that the sale was for money, so as to entitle the Plaintiff 
to recover on the money count. The issue in that case was on a 
plea in abatement for the nonjoinder of a joint contractor, and that 
a sale really took place was not contested ; besides, there was the 
material fact of an express authority to sell, the goods being sent 
to the Defendant for that very purpose, so that in that case a sale 
and disposal of the goods were in performance of the Defendant’s 
duty. In the case before w such sale and disposal would be in 
violation of the duty of the Defendants.
It is not contended that it was out of the Plaintiff’s power to 
give evidence of the real transaction between the Defendants and 
Rankin, but that such proof ought to come from the Defendants, 
and in default thereof we are required to infer a sale, and then, in 
ignorance of the particulars of such sale, that it covered the Plain­
tiff’s interest, and was made for money.
But allowing, if we can, the Plaintiff’s right to recover, how is 
the extent of damages to be ascertained? Not, I conceive, in the 
way the Plaintiff has taken,—but by shewing the price paid by 
Rankin, namely, the produce of the sale. Upon this the argument 
of the Solicitor General is fully borne out by numerous cases, and 
in all which I can find on the subject, an actual sale seems to have 
been clearly established.
In regard to the case cited from Brook’s Abridgment, probably 
the earliest recorded, that of the horse belonging to A. & B. and 
sold by A. without B’s. authority ; Willes, C. J. observes, in his 
Reports, p. 208, “that by a sale and turning the thing into money, 
“ the joint interest was gone, and each had a separate interest for 
“ a sum certain.” There was no dispute there as to the sale or 
the amount.
Lamine v. Dorrell, 2 Ld. R. 1216, is one of the earliest reported 
cases in which the right to waive the tort and recover in assumpsit 
had been established ; Powell, J. there says, “ when the act that is 
“ done is in its nature tortious, it is hard to turn that into a con- 
“ tract, and against the reason of assumpsit, but the Plaintiff may 
“ dispense with the wrong, and suppose the sale made by his 
“ consent 
208 CASES IN HILARY TERM,
“ consent, and bring his action for the money they were sold for, 
“ as money received to his use.”
In Cowp. 419, Lord Mansfield, citing Feltham v. Terry, says, 
“ The Plaintiff by bringing his action for money had and received, 
“ could only recover the money for which the goods were sold.”
Tim next case in order of time is that which I have before cited 
from 2 B. & P.—Lord Alvanley, as a reason for allowing a tortious 
conversion to be turned into an action for money had and received, 
says, “ In the case of money had and received, where nothing 
“ more than the money actually received can be recovered, no 
“ injury can arise to the Defendant.” He adds afterwards, “ All 
“ that is to be collected from the cases is this, that if the goods be 
“ converted into money, the Court will allow the Plaintiff to waive 
“ the tort and bring an action, in which he can recover nothing 
“ more than the sum actually received.”
Liglitley v. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 113.
Notley v. Buck, 8 B. & C. 160.
Oughton v. Seppings, 1 B. & Ad. 241.
Young v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 43.
Marsh v. Keating, 1 Bing. N. C. 198, and
Clark v. Gilbert, 2 Bing. N. C. 343, may be cited to the same 
effect.
The language of Tindal, C. J. in Clark v. Gilbert, in 1835, 
probably the latest case on the subject, is very clear and decisive : 
he says,—“ If then the assignees might have maintained an action 
“ of trover, they may, according to a well known class of cases, 
“ waive the tort and bring an action for money had and received; 
“ such waiver being a benefit to the Defendant, as it limits the 
“ damages to the amount of the proceeds of the tortious sale."
In all these cases, the fact of the sale was clearly proved : no 
where can I find that the Plaintiff has recovered in this form of 
action for a wrongful conversion of his goods, without shewing the 
sale and what the sale produced.
It is for want of such evidence, that I think the Plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover in this action. The evidence has, however, 
satisfied the jury that the Defendants have a further account to 
render of this timber, and it is to be hoped an amicable arrange­
ment may take place.
I was certainly disposed at first to have required the Defendants 
to pay costs on obtaining a new trial, but on the whole, accede to 
the opinion of his Honor, that the costs shall abide the event.
Carter, J. concurred.
Rule absolute.
N. Parker and Berton for Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General for Defendants.
Expartf-
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Exparte. HENN1GAR, a Confined Debtor.
When a confined debtor applies for a discharge on the ground that he has 
been confined a year, such application can only apply to the suit in which he 
has been confined a whole year, and the fact must be explicitly stated.
Berton moved in this Term for the Defendant’s discharge, on an 
affidavit, which stated that he was in custody on four several suits 
-—that he had been arrested in one of them on a particular day, and 
had since been in custody during a period of sixteen months. From 
the statement in the affidavit, it was inferable that he had assigned 
his property for the payment of his debts, and had been in custody 
in all the suits over a year. It was contended that the Defendant 
having been confined for a year in one suit, was entitled to his dis­
charge in all; but if not, yet he should be relieved from the one 
for which he appeared to have been confined a year.
Per Curiam.
The Defendant can only apply to be discharged from custody in 
the cause for which he has been confined a year, and it does not 
sufficiently appear that he has been confined in all a year. He 
might have stated the fact explicitly, but has not done so, and the 
Court will not presume in his favour. His affidavit speaks of a 
deed of assignment, the nature or legal effect of which is not be­
fore us ; and without knowing what the effect of that instrument 
is, the Court will not interfere.
MERRITT v. QUINTON.
A, under a claim of right, enters on land, at the time within the enclo­
sure, and in the actual possession of C, but without C’s privity or assent; 
A surveys and marks off a part of the land within C’s enclosure, and puts 
up fences, but does not remain thereon; the fences are within a night or 
two pulled down. A again enters and puts them ap, and they are again 
immediately pulled down. A enters and puts them up a third time, when B 
declaring that A is trespassing on the land, pulls the fences down and des­
troys them, which is the alleged trespass. At the trial, A failed in proving 
his title,—Held that A, failing to shew any title to the land, or the expul­
sion of C therefrom, had not sufficient possession to maintain trespass, qu. 
cl. fr. against B.
It is a question for the Judge whether the jPLaintiff has made out a suffi­
cient possession to entitle him to go to the jury.
r This was an action of Trespass quare clausum fregit, on land 
situate in the Parish of Lancaster, in the County of St. John, 
tried before Parker J. at the Circuit for that County, in January,
1836.
The Plaintiff opened a case of title derived from one Roden, to 
the Plaintiff’s father, David Merritt, who de used to the Plaintiff; 
he claimed the locus in quo, as comprised within the bounds of 
three 
210 CASES in HILARY TERM,
three contiguous lots, Nos. 100, 101, & 102, in the ten acre 
grant, so called ; one of which Roden held under the grant, and 
the other two by purchase.
The Plaintiff failed in proof of his title, and the learned judge 
being of opinion at the close of the case that, in the absence of title, 
the evidence did not shew a sufficient possession of the locus in 
quo, to entitle him to recover, directed a non-suit; but the Plain­
tiff refusing to acquiesce, the case went to the jury, who, contrary 
to the direction of liis Honor, found a verdict for the Plaintiff with 
six-pence damages.
The facts of the case are so fully detailed in the arguments of 
the Counsel, and in the judgment of the Court, as to render it un­
necessary to state them more fully here.
Parker, for the Defendant, applied for a rule nisi in Trinity 
Term last, to set aside the verdict, as being contrary to evidence 
and the Judge’s charge :—-
The party must recover either by title to a distinct allotment, or 
by a clear and exclusive possession of the locus in quo. 1st. Was 
there a distinct allotment ? 2d. Was the fence on the lines of the
allotment ? 3d. Was Merritt in the actual and exclusive posses­
sion of the lands when the alleged trespass was committed ?
As to the title to a distinct allotment; the Plaintiff opened his 
case on title from the crown—the grant referred to a plan which 
which was not annexed nor in evidence. The grantees were te­
nants in common, a severance was then to be shewn—the deed 
offered was clearly inadmissible, the case *cf title therefore broke 
down, until the lease from Merritt to Craft and others : it was ne­
cessary for the Plaintiff to have shewn an allotment between the 
parties—a survey.'was made by Timothy Wetmore, and there was 
a report the lots were divided,—the plan of the survey by Wetmore 
was absolutely essential. This is the more apparent from the cir­
cumstance that no two lines ran the same courses. A.S to Minette’s 
survey, he ran by a plan stated to have been given him by the late 
Thomas Wetmore, Esq., but that document was not produced, yet it 
was in existence—it was not put in evidence—was not accounted 
for—and without it there was no legal evidence of a severance.
There was not any evidence that the line on which the fence 
stood, was a correct one.
Having shewn no separate allotment, what is the evidence of 
possession ? The only thing spoken of was the fishing by Roden 
in front, from 1790 to 1795, and by his son as late as 1796—but 
it did not appear that any possession had been exercised between 
the river and the road. Craft applied to Jessie Quinton for certain 
lots, he replied, get lots 100, 101, 102, and I will exchange,— 
there was no evidence what part of the large enc’osure of Clark 
and others was designated by Nos. 100,101, 102. The land was 
in 
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in tlie possession of another person—there was, therefore, no evi­
dence of Plaintiff’s possession in this case; it was upon this ground 
that the Judge at nisi prius nonsuited the Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General shewed cause last Term :—
The question here is not whether all tlie facts in evidence were fully 
proved, but was there any evidence to go to the jury of those facts ? 
i there was any evidence, the jury have but exercised their right in 
judging of its sufficiency, and giving their verdict as they did. (See 
Carpenters Company v. Hayward, Douglas, 374.) Few cases 
have come up in questions of real property where so much evi­
dence lias been given, and although loose, yet it contains so many 
circumstances that it was proper to put it to the jury to say if these 
circumstances did not maintain a possession. A grant was put in 
evidence shewing all the grantees to be tenants in common,—evi­
dence was given of a division more than thirty years since. It 
was also proved that there were two marks supposed to be boun­
daries, a rock above, and Lord’s stores below, the place in question. 
The testimony of Minnette also proved that tlie lines were run by 
the late T. Wetmore’s survey. Hence, there was some evidence 
of a division; it was then the province of the jury to determine 
upon the sufficiency of it. Roden, Knapp and Blair owned the 
three lots in question—a purchase was spoken of, and after that 
they were always called the Roden Lots. No adverse possession 
of the lots appeared after Roden went away, but Davi I Merritt 
came in claiming under Roden, and continued in possession up­
wards of sixteen years back. How did Jesse Quinton occupy the 
land or get possession ? By a bargain with Meritt’s tenants. He 
thereby held as an under tenant to the Plaintiff—the fence spoken 
of along the road was not a fence of one in possession, but merely 
to keep cattle from going down to the beach, for there is the ex­
press declaration of Jesse Quinton, that there were no division 
fences. It is clear that David Merritt received the rent until his 
death, and died in the actual possession of tlie locus in quo. After 
liis death the tenants declined taking a new lease ; subsequent to 
this a man named Lord, who owned below had been encroaching 
and got up a fence, but he is not the Defendant. When the 
Plaintiff after his lines were run, entered on the land and caused 
his fence to be put up, Lord made no objection, nor in any wray 
interfered with him. The' presumption therefore is irresistible, 
that the Plaintiff took possession of his land with Lord’s consent, 
and the jury have found accordingly.
In Smith v. Page, (2 Salk. 644) Goslin v. Wilcock, (2 Wil­
son, 306) Wilkinson v. Paine, (4 T. R. 468) and other cases—it 
has been expressly decided that where the jury have found a ver­
dict for the Plaintiff upon a presumption contrary to evidence, the 
Court will not grant a new trial, if the Plaintiff w'ere entitled to 
cl recover
212 CASES IN HILARY TERM, 
recover in conscience and equity. Taking all the facts and circum­
stances of the case together, it appears clear that the Plaintiff has 
at least an equitable right to the land in question—a better one 
than the Defendant; but the objection urged is, the non-production 
of the plan—it appeared that it had been in the possession of the 
Defendant’s attorney—he was regularly called on but could not 
remember having it—these were circumstances for the jury topre­
sume it still in the attorney’s possession, and that the Plaintiff 
having dene all he could to obtain it, was entitled to give the next 
best evidence, viz. the testimony of Minnette, who swore the lines 
were run by the plan in question evidence sufficient to satisfy 
the jury’s mind of the Plaintiff’s right to recover.
So in 2 Salk. 644, though the verdict may be against evidence 
and the strict rules of law, the Court will not give a second chance 
to an unconscionable defence—here the defence is unconscionable. 
The Plaintiff enters upon the land and puts up his fence, the De­
fendant without any claim whatever, either in his own right or un­
der another, does a malicious injury tc the Plaintiff by destroying 
his fences, and when the jury find against him he attempts to avoid 
their verdict by the non-production of the plan.
The present case is even stronger than those above cited. As 
therefore there was some evidence for the jury, and the honesty of 
the case with the plaintiff, and unconscionable defence resorted to 
by the Defendant were apparent, he contended that the verdict 
should be sustained.
Saunders and Parker, contra:—
Plaintiff should have shewn a title or a previous occupation—at 
the trial he not only failed in shewing title in himself, but in fact 
shewed it in another—he now rests his case entirely on his previous 
occupancy—there is no evidence of the land designated as lots 100, 
101, 102. The occupation only extended to the fishing ground. 
Suppose the Plaintiff is owner of the lots in question ; has he a 
right to go upon a large unenclosed space, and mark off what he 
calls 100, 101, 102, and then put up fences and claim exclusive 
possession thereby ? The Plaintiff’s argument shews and admits 
a plan in existence. If Plaintiff came in by Lord he ought to have 
shewn it; in addition to this the Judge at nisi prius, declared h's 
opinion that there was no evidence to go to the jury, therefore the 
Court will not support the verdict. The Defendant rested on his 
Honor’s decision, and went into no evidence.
Curia advisari vult.
And now in this term the Judges delivered their opinions. 
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is a motion for a new trial. The action is trespass, qua. 
cl. fregit, and was tried at the Saint John Circuit in Jan. 1836. 
The Plaintiff opened a case of title to the land on which the alleged 
trespass 
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trespass was committed, which land, as claimed by the Plaintiff, 
compriseslots nos. 100, 101, and 102, ;n the ten acre grant, so 
called, in the Parish of Lancaster, in the County of Saint John. 
This grant was given in evidence it was a grant under the Great 
Seal of Nova Scotia, dated lltli August, 1784, to a number of 
grantees, including one William Roden, of a tract of land divided 
by metes and bounds, containing 1120 acres, habendum to each of 
the grantees in severalty ten acres a-pie'ce. There was evidence 
that at an early period after the grant, a survey of this tract, and 
a division thereof into lots was made by Timothy Wetmore, and 
that a plan and survey of this division were also made. It appeared 
that William Roden held one of the above mentioned lots, in his 
own right, under the grant, and division, and the other two by 
purchase ; and that he had all three in possession more than thirty 
years ago, and that his son William Roden had possession of the 
same lots after his death.—The plan was not produced; it was 
spoken of in some of the testimony, as having been seen of late 
years. The Plaintiff endeavoured to make out a case for admitting 
secondary evidencsTof this plan, but failed in shewing sufficient 
grounds for such admission. The Plaintiff also failed in deriving 
the title to the lots in question from the Rodens to David Merritt, 
his father; the learned Judge having ruled that a deed tendered in 
evidence for this purpose was inadmissible. The Plaintiff proved 
an indenture of lease of a specified part of the three lots in question 
from David Merritt to John Craft and others, dated 16th of April, 
1821, for seven years from the 1st of May, 1821, at the annual 
rent of £3.—The part of these lots which was thus leased, was 
what the Plaintiff claimed as including the locus Kn quo in this ac­
tion ; regular receipt of rent under this lease, by David Merritt, in 
his life time, was proved. It was proved that David Merritt died 
about seven years ago ; his will was given in evidence by which 
he devised the'three lots to his son, the Plaintiff. This is the sub­
stance of the evidence in relation to the Plaintiff’s title. Now, 
even if the lease from David Merritt, and his receipt of rent under 
it, could, under the circumstances, be considered as evidence to go 
to the jury of a seisin in fee in him ; still the defect remains, that 
the Plaintiff did not shew the boundaries of the lots which he 
claimed, under the division which he set up as a part of his case, 
and therefore could not shew that the locus in quo was within 
these boundaries; and this defect it is which in the present 
state of the evidence, must at all events defeat the Plaintiff’s 
title to the particular parcel of land in which the alleged trespass 
was committed, and must cause him to be considered as a mere 
stranger with regard to this parcel of land.—It was further shewn 
in evidence that the Plaintiff in the month of September, 1S35, 
went with a surveyor to the land, and caused what he claimed as 
the
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the lines of the lots 100, 101, and 102, to be run out, and fences to 
be erected on these lines so run by him. These fences were bro­
ken down within a night or two after they were put up; it came 
out from the Plaintiff’s witnesses that they were pulled down and 
burnt by John Quinton, the Defendant; and this was the trespass 
for which the present action was brought. This last destruction 
of the fences took place about a fortnight after they were first put 
up ; it came out from the Plaintiff’s witnesses that at the time the 
Plaintiff thus caused the lines to be run and fences erected, the 
land was in the occupation of one Henry Lord, having been for 
some years within his enclosure, and cultivated and enjoyed by 
him. Whether there was any connexion between the Defen­
dant and Lord in this occupation, did not distinctly appear. 
These being the facts, with regard to the Plaintiff’s possession, 
the learned Judge was of opinion that there was not sufficient evi­
dence of possession to entitle him to recover, and directed a non­
suit, to which the Plaintiff declined submitting, and went to the 
jury. The Defendant called no witnesses, and the Judge charged 
t ie jury, that, in his opinion, they should find for the Defendant. 
The jury nevertheless returned a verdict for the Plaintiff. And 
the question now is, whether this verdict can be sustained ;—that 
question depends upon this, whether a mere stranger, by a bare 
entry into land, in the actual occupation of another, can gain such 
a possession of the land as will enable him to maintain trespass. 
It is true, that he who has the right to land, may, by entering 
thereupon, with an intent to take possession, acquire by such entry 
the lawful possession, although another person may be in actual 
possession of the land at the time ; and the rightful owner, having 
thus entered, may maintain trespass even against the person thus 
in possession at the time of his entry, should such person wrong­
fully continue upon the land.—Butcher v. Butcher, 7 B. & C. 399. 
See also Argent v. Durrant, 8 T. R. 404 ; Taunton n. Caster, 7 
T. R. 431 ; Turner v. Meymott, 1 Bing. 158.—And this may 
well be, for it is also a clear principle of law, that when two per­
sons are in the possession of land, claiming under different titles, 
the law will adjudge him to be in the possession who hath the 
right.—Coke Iatt. 36, 2 Salk. 423.—But I conceive that this 
operation of a bare entry upon land, to work a change of the pos­
session from the person in actual occupation of the land to the 
person so entering, must be confined to cases where the person 
making the entry has the right to the land. In a case like the 
present, where a Plaintiff fails in the proof of title, and must, there­
fore, in order to succeed in the action, depend upon possession 
alone, he must shew a clear and exclusive possession.—Revett v. 
Brown, 5 Bing. 7.—But when a man enters upon land in the ad­
verse occupation of another, it is evident that in point of fact he 
cannot 
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cannot acquire an exclusive possession, unless he effects an expul­
sion of the person'-actually in possession. It is expressly held, 
with regard to disseisin, in 1 Salk. 246, that “ a bare entry on 
another without an expulsion, makes such a seisin only that the 
“ law will adjudge him in possession that hath the right, but it 
“ will not work a disseisin or abatement without actual expulsion.” 
S. P. Co. Litt. 181, a. 1 Burr. 79.—In the present case, I am of 
opinion, that the Plaintiff not having shewn a right to enter upon 
the locus in quo, did not by his entry divest Lord of his possession 
thereof, and did not under such circumstances acquire such a pos­
session as will enable him to maintain th’s action. There is no 
evidence of Lord’s having acquiesced in the acts of the Plaintiff, 
or having in any manner yielded up or abandoned his possession. 
Indeed, it is manifest upon the testimony as it stands, Lord might 
have maintained trespass against the Plaintiff for his acts in enter­
ing upon the land, and erecting fences, and that the latter must, 
in such case, have failed in liis justification, and been dealt with as 
a wrong doer. It would be attended with the most mischievous 
consequences to hold, that a man entering without right into land 
in the occupation of another should, by such entry, oust the occu­
pant of his possession. But it is said that this was a question for 
the jury, and not for the Court; now I apprehend that this ques­
tion falls exactly within the predicament of a question for the 
Court: certain facts are proved? and the question is, whether these 
facts are sufficient in point of law to oust the actual occupant of 
the land of his possession, and to transfer that possession to the 
Plaintiff. Surely this must be a question within the province of 
the Court alone. The case referred to by the learned Judge who 
tried the cause, (Revett w. Brown, 5 Bing. 7), is directly in point. 
—In that case it was left to the jury to say, whether the Plaintiff 
was sufficiently in possession to maintain trespass, and subject to 
this question which was also reserved for the Court, the jury found 
a verdict for the Plaintiff. The Court however held that there 
was not sufficient evidence of possession to go to the jury, and 
ordered the verdict to be set aside, aud a nonsuit to be entered. 
I am of opinion that this rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
Carter, J.:
The first question which it is necessary to determine in this case 
is, whether the possession which is sufficient to enable a person to 
maintain trespass against a wrong doer, is a question of law for the 
decision of the Court, or a question of fact, in all cases to be de­
cided by the jury ? If it be clear that the latter proposition is 
correct, it would seem to me useless to send this case to another 
jury, it having been already decided by one. After a careful pe­
rusal of the cases, I cannot come to such a conclusion. I grant 
that in most cases this question of possession will have to be deter­
mined 
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mined by the jury—because, whether there has been a possession 
or not, will depend on the existence of circumstances, and of facts, 
which the jury can alone determine. This, however, will be only 
in cases where taking certain facts as proved, a possession will be 
established, sufficient in point of law to sustain an action of tres­
pass against a wrong doer. The question, whether, taking all the 
evidence as true, such a possession has been established, seems to 
me to be one for the decision of the Court.
. This view of the question is warranted by the case of Revett v. 
Brown, where Park, J. after stating the facts of the case says,— 
“ This is not sufficient evidence of possession to go to the jury.''— 
To the same effect is the case of Topham v. Dent, 6 Bing. 515, (3.)
Taking it for granted, therefore, that it is the province of the 
Court to determine, whether upon the facts as proved, a possession 
has been made out sufficient to enable the Plaintiff to maintain 
trespass; let us consider whether in this case such a possession 
was established. It is abundantly evident from all the cases on 
this point, that the possession which will entitle a person to main­
tain trespass, must be a clear and exclusive one. What evidence 
have we in this case of the Plaintiff’s possession ? It does not 
appear that he ever was in the locus in quo.-or eVer exercised any 
act of ownership upon it till September, 1835, when he employed 
a surveyor to run a line and put up a fence—the breaking down 
of which fence is the trespass complained of; and it is certainly 
somewhat singular, that the very witness produced by the Plaintiff 
to prove this trespass, states positively, that the land, at the time 
the trespass was committed, so far from being in the dear and ex­
clusive possession of the Plaintiff, was in the possession of another 
person.
It was argued for the Plaintiff, that it might be fairly presumed 
that Lord’s possession was consistent with Plaintiff’s property, and 
that the Plaintiff put up the fence with his consent. If that were 
so, I am far from thinking that sucli a state of facts would enable 
the Plaintiff to maintain trespass ; but the answer to that argu­
ment is clearly this : If it were so, the Plaintiff might and should 
have proved it by evidence ; for I cannot find any case in which 
the Court has presumed a possession, which has not been clearly 
proved, nor do I think It at all desirable tc extend the law in fa­
vour of mere possession beyond its present ascertained limits.
What the effect of the lease made by Plaintiff’s father in 1821, 
and the occupation of Defendant under that lease, by means of the 
exchange with Craft, might have been, had it been proved that 
the locus in quo was part of the land included in that ’ease, I am 
not now prepared to decide. It is sufficient for the decision of this 
case, that no such proof was given. That lease only included lots 
100, 101 and 102 of the ten acre grant. The grant itself made no 
division 
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division into lots. No plan by which any subsequent division had 
been made, was in evidence, and the only evidence we have of any 
division line is in September, 1835, when a surveyor, taken by 
the Plaintiff for the purpose, states he ran a line according to what 
he called the old plan, of which plan we know nothing. From 
these considerations it appears to me there was no evidence what­
ever that the locus in quo was part of lots 100, 101 or 102 of the 
ten acre grant, and therefore any thing which might have availed 
the Plaintiff by means of the lease of 1821, utterly fails.
On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the ruling of the 
learned Judge at the trial was correct—that there was no evidence, 
either of title or possession, wdiich could entitle the Plaintiff to a 
verdict—that the verdict being entirely against the evidence, the 
rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
Parker, J.:
I see no reason for changing the opinion wdiich I formed at the 
trial, that the Plaintiff had not established such a possession as 
would justify the judge in leaving the case to the jury. I am very 
glad to find that opinion so fully supported by the judgments of 
their Honors tlie Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Carter; for the 
more I reflect on the case, the more satisfied I am of maintaining 
the distinction between an unauthorized entry upon laud in the oc­
cupation and within the actual enclosure of another ; and a posses­
sion, the disturbance of which would entitle the party to maintain 
trespass. The Plaintiff in fact, on his own opening, did not intend 
to rest on a mere possession, but set up a right, wdiich, fit may be 
unfortunately, as some of the documents offered in evidence were 
necessarily excluded,) he could not support.
After the judgments already pronounced, it is superfluous to say 
more ; the parties wdll have an opportunity of going to another 
trial, fully aware of the grounds on which they stand; and the 
merits wdll then probably be more fully investigated.
The rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
N. Parker for Defendant.
This cause was again tried at the Saint John Circuit in August, 1837, before 
His Honor the Chief Justice, when the Plaintiff made out a more •complete 
case of title and boundary, and the cause was left to the jury, by the learned 
Chief Justice, upon the evidence:—the jury found for the Plaintiff, and the case 
was not afterwards moved.
LEDDEN v, RUSSELL AND ANOTHER.
This Court .rill not grant a mandamus to the Justices of an Inferior Court 
of Common Pleas, requiring them to enter up judgment for the Plaintiff in 
an action on a recognizance of bail in that Court; when such Justices had, 
in 
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m the exercise of their discretion, set aside the Plaintiff’s judgment, and 
allowed <» render of the principal; although their proceedings might not 
have conformed to the rules or practice of this Court.
Send).—The Inferior Courts of Common Pleas have the same controul 
over recognizances of hail as this Court; and are not bound by the rules of 
this Court.
J. A. Street moved in this Term for a mandamus to compel the 
Justices of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of the County of 
Northumberland to grant judgment in this case against the De­
fendants, who had been sued on a recognizance of bail. It ap­
peared by affidavit, that judgment had been entered in the suit by 
default in vacation ; which judgment, the Court at the ensuing 
Term had set aside, on the ground of a render of the principal; 
which render, however, the Plaintiff contended was not warranted 
by the rules or practice of this Court, which must be binding on 
the Court below. He cited 5 Bac. Abr. 270, and exparte Morgan, 
2 Chitty’s Rep. 250, to shew that the Supreme Court, having su­
perintendence of all Inferior Courts and Magistrates, would oblige 
them to execute that justice which the party is entitled to, and 
could command them to give judgment in a matter fit and proper 
for their cognizance, &c. The Court below have considered the 
bail discharged by render of the principal.
[Parker, J.—Proceedings on a recognizance of bail depend upon 
the practice of the Courts : the Court of Common Pleas in Nor­
thumberland may have rules of their own, and may have acted in 
conformity with those rules ; if not, the question would come up, 
how far this Court can interfere ? Can the Superior Courts in 
England, in points of practice, interfere with an Inferior Court ? 
Could not this Court have done just as the Court below has done ? 
The rules of a Court are in restraint of its discretion—all Courts 
exercise a discretion over recognizances of bail.]
[Chipman, C. J.—If this is not an attempt to interfere with the 
practice of the Inferior Court, I do not know what would be.]
The Court granted judgment below, and it has set that judg­
ment aside ; it is competent for this Court, and is within the gene­
ral rule, to grant a mandamus for general purposes. The practice 
in the Courts below has been to pursue the practice of the Supreme 
Court. This Court has granted a mandamus to compel judgment 
on verdict.
[Chipman, C. J.—There is a wide distinction between cases 
depending on pc'nts of practice and those which are governed by 
the general rules of law.]
\Parker, J.—There is a great distinction between cases of re­
cognizance of bail and other cases. The Common Pleas decidedly 
have the same power in regard to bail as we have. We have limited
our
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our discretion, and it has a right to limit its discretion, but can­
not enlarge its jurisdiction.]
There may be a question as to the right of the Inferior Court to 
set aside a judgment already given ; upon looking into the autho­
rities, it appears that this Court has the power of setting aside a 
judgment of an Inferior Court for irregularity.
Chipman, Chief Justice :
This is an application to compel proceedings in another Court 
in a matter which rests in the d' scretion of thai Court, and in 
which we have no control over the exercise of that discretion.
Mandamus refused.
J. A. Street for Plaintiff.
Berton for Defendant.
SPENCE v. STUART AND THOMPSON.
Debt on recognizance of bail, in a suit brought in the Inferior Court of 
Common Pleas for the County of Charlotte, in which the judgment set out 
against the principal was for : 17 : 0. Plea, no ca. sa. duij sued out 
against the principal. Replication set out a ca. sa. for X'81 : 16 : 10- duly 
issued on the judgment, and retwmei prout patet per recordam. Rejoinder 
nut tiel record, on which issue being joined to the Court, it was found for 
the Plaintiff,—Held that the variance apparent on the record between tbe 
judgment and the ca. sa. in the Inferior Court, was no ground for arresting 
the judgment in the action against the bail.
Semi.—Such variance is an irregularity which may be amended or waived, 
and not a defect to make void the writ.
Chipman, Chief Justice:
THIS is an action of debt against bail upon their recognizance. 
The declaration sets forth a udgment against the principal in the 
Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the County of Charlotte, in 
which Court the original action was brought and bail given. The 
Defendant pleads in his third plea “ that there was no writ of ca. 
sa. duly sued out upon the said judgment. ” The Plaintiff replies 
to this plea “ that Plaintiff sued out a writ of ca. sa. upon the said 
“ judgment, by which said writ,” &c. &c. (setting forth the writ); 
the Defendant rejoins “ that there is not any record of the said 
“ supposed writ of ca. sa. in manner and form, as the said Plain- 
‘‘ tiff hath in his replication alleged.” The Plaintiff in his sur-re- 
joinder alleges, “ That there is such a record of the said writ of 
“ ca. sa.” &c.
Upon a trial by the record, on these pleadings, the Plaintiff 
had judgment that he had perfected his record; and this motion is 
now made in arrest of final judgment, upon the ground that the 
writ of ca. sa. set forth in the pleadings, does not follow the judg­
ment upon which it purports to be founded. The discrepancy 
complained
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complained of is that the judgment set forth is for a debt of <£567 
19s. 2d. and the writ ofc«. sa. recites a judgment for debt of £72 
Os. 9d. The Defendant in his third plea, have rested his defence 
upon the point that no writ of ca. sa. had issued upon the judg­
ment set forth in the declaration—and the Plaintiff in his replica­
tion to this plea, having alleged that such a writ had been sued out 
upon the said judgment, which writ he sets forth, and the Defen­
dant having in his rejoinder further put his defence upon the single 
point of the non existence of the writ set forth by the Plaintiff, by 
pleading nul tiel record of the said supposed writ, which the Plain­
tiff had alleged, had been sued out on the judgment, must be held 
to have admitted on the record that the writ set forth, if such a 
writ in point of fact had existence, was sued out upon the judg­
ment set forth by the Plaintiff in his declaration—and this 
is the pith of the objection, that the execution does not follow the 
judgment. I give no opinion upon what would have been the re­
sult if the question had been brought upon demurrer, but the court 
is extremely cautious how they arrest a judgment after verdict. (1 
Sellon’s Prac. 499, citing Burr. 1725) and a pleading of nul tiel re­
cord where the Plaintiff shews the record, is held to be as strong 
as if the Defendant had traversed the title of the Plaintiff—and 
this had been found against him by verdict. (18 Vin. Abr. 181.) 
It is stated in the books (Tidd. 918, 19 Ed.) that, in former times, 
it was the practice for the party, on his day in Court after verdict, 
to plead any exception he might have in arrest of judgment, which 
differed from moving in arrest of judgment, this being done by one 
as amicus curite when the party was out of Court; and in a case 
in which it was held, that a party could move in arrest of judgment, 
after a judgment upoii demurrer (1 Str. 425) the Court said, 
“ the parties cannot be said to come as amici curite, nor shall any 
“ body tell us that the judgment we gave on mature deliberation is 
“ wrong.” So here I would say that no one shall come in, and 
tell us, that the execution was not founded upon the judgment, 
when the party himself by his own c ourse of pleading, has admitted 
that it is. As to the merits of the objection, the bail having ad­
mitted upon the record in this action, that the execution was sued 
out upon the judgment, have had that notice, which the law re­
quires they should have, that the Plaintiff in the original action 
against the Defendant’s person. And even with regard to the error 
in the execution, in its differing from the judgment in the statement 
of the sum recovered, this defect would have been amendable in the 
writ itself, by the Court from which the writ issued. (1 Chit. Rep 
349, Stevenson v. Castle, and the cases there cited.) But upon 
the ground which I have already stated, I think this rule for ar­
resting the judgment must be discharged.
Carter,
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Carter, J.:
I am also of opinion that the rule for arresting judgment in this 
case should be discharged ; without giving any opinion on the point 
that the Defendant is precluded by his admission on the record. 1 
found my opinion on the general rule laid down on this subject by Mr 
Tidd, p. 919, 949. “ The parties cannot move in arrest of judg- 
“ ment, for any thing that is aided after verdict at common law, 
“ or amendable at common law, or by the statutes of amendments ; 
“ or cured as matter of form by the statutes of jeofails.”
Now a variance between the judgment and execution in the sum 
recovered, is one which is clearly amendable, as is shewn by a late 
case of M‘Cormack. v. Melton, 1 Ad. & El. 331, (note.)
It is true that in this case, this Court has no power to make the 
amendment—but if this rule would hold good in a case where the 
whole proceedings had been in this Court, where this variance 
would have been amendable, and therefore the judgment would not 
have been arrested, I think it will follow that where, from the pro­
ceedings having been in another Court, we have no power to amend 
them—still we should hold that this variance is not a sufficient 
ground for anesting the judgment,
Parker, J.:
In this case the Defendants who were bail in the original action 
of the Inferior Court, after joining issue with the Plaintiff as to the 
existence of a certain ca. sa. specifically set out in the pleadings ; 
now, after it has been proved that such ca. sa. was issued at a pro­
per time, in the proper County, and duly returned, call on the 
Court to arrest the judgment, on the ground of a variance in tli? 
amount between the ca- sa. and the judgment. It is this single ob­
jection to which our attention is nvited, and after a full considera­
tion I agree in thinking it cannot now avail.
Examining this record by the rules of pleading, it appears to me 
established that the ca. sa. (such as it was,) was duly issued on the 
judgment and was duly returned before the proceedings were taken 
against the bail; and that the bail consequently had that notice 
which the law requires to make them liable on their recognizances.
By the course they have adopted they have, in my opinion, 
waived any benefit of the objection, supposing it to be open to them 
at all, which I much doubt, for as was said by Heath, J. in the 
case of Donnelly v. Dunn, 2 B. & P. 45r “ It does not follow that 
“ the bail are to have all the advantages to which the principal is 
“ entitled. Suppose in an action on a judgment there be mani- 
“ fest error in the record, the bail cannot avail themselves of that 
“ error though the principal may.”
The case cited from Keble was that of a ca. sa. appearing by 
the record to have been issued before the judgment, as is fully ex­
plained 
222 CASES jn HILARY TERM,
plained by Lord Holt, in Cholmondeley v. Bealing, 2 Ld. R. 1096, 
6 Mod. 304.
In Dudlow v. Watchom, 16 East. 40, the ca. sa. was issued in­
to a wrong County ; and therefore did net give the notice to the 
bail which the law required. The remarks on this case in Sandon 
v. Proctor, are well worth noting: neither the decision in Keble, 
nor that in 16 East, affect the present case.
In 2 Sell. Pr. 62, a case is cited from Burr. 1187, Campbell v. 
Cumming, that a defect in the return of the ca. sa. (though it 
might render the ca. sa. liable to be set aside on motion,) could 
not be taken advantage of by bail on a general demurrer. It is 
said the Court were clearly and unanimously of that opinion.
In Ball v. Manucaptors of Russell, 2 Ld. R. 1176; fully recog­
nized in Sandon v. Proctor ; to a plea of no ca. sa. the Plaintiff 
replied, setting out a capias which had only five days between 
teste and return, and therefore irregular as against bail. On de­
murrer the Court agreed that it was an irregularity, but said the 
Defendant’s course was to have moved the Court to set it 
aside ; and they gave judgment for the Plaintiff.
The question then appears to me to resolve itself into this: 
viz. whether the mistake in the ca. sa. is such as would make it 
absolutely void, or only an irregularity which might be waived or 
amended ; and I think it abundantly clear, lrom the following cases, 
that a variance between the sum for which the judgment is given, 
and the ca, sa. is only an irregularity
Laroche v. Wasbrougli, 2 T. R. 737.
Stevenson v. Castle, 1 Ch. R. 349, and the cases collected in 
the note there.
Arnell v. Weatherby, 3D. P. R. 464.
M‘Cormack v. Melton, 1 Ad. & Ell. 331.
The reason for the issuing a ca. sa. in order to found proceedings 
against bail, and the law on that subject are well laid down in the 
judgments of Bayley, Abbott, and Holroyd, J. in Payne v. Spen­
cer, 6 M, & S. 231.
The objection after all is a mere formal one, if the sum menti­
oned in the ca. sa. is all the plaintiff seeks to recover ; and would 
at all events, have been endorsed as the direction of the Sheriff. 
Should the Plaintiff on this present judgment against the bail take 
out execution for a greater sum, the Court may perhaps have 
power to relieve on motion ; but that must be a matter of after 
consideration—it is clear that the present rule cannot be sustained.
Rule discharged.
F. A. Kinnear for Plaintiff.
J. W. Chandler and Berton for Defendants.
HILARY TERM, 7th Wm. 4th.
1837.
I. Whereas it is deemed improper that any Clerk in the office 
of the Pleas of this Court should act as an agent of any Attorney, 
with or without remuneration or gratuity : It is ordered, that 
henceforth no Attorney of this Court do employ any such Clerk as 
his agent, in any suit or matter pending in this Court, or in the 
transaction of any business in the office either of Clerk of the 
Crown or Clerk of the Pleas, and that the Clerk of the Pleas do 
not allow or suffer any Clerk or other person employed in his office 
to act as such agent, under any pretence whatsoever.
II. It is further Ordered, That from and after this present Hi­
lary Term, every Attorney of this Court enter the return, and file 
the writ or process in all actions which have not, at or before such 
return, been settled or discontinued ; and make and file with the 
Clerk a docket of all such returns and rules, on or before the last 
return day of the Term at which such writs are returnable, or 
within thirty days thereafter : And that the Clerk do not in future 
receive or file any docket, or enter any such rule after the said 
thirty days, without the special order of the Court, or a Judge, to 
be made on affidavit or affidavits, properly accounting for the delay.
III. It is further Ordered, That the party applying for the 
examination of a witness or witnesses de bene esse, under the Act 
26 Geo. 3, c. 20, or for an order for such examination, or for the 
issuing a commission under the Act 5 W. 4, c. 34, do state in the 
affidavit or affidavits upon which such application is founded, the 
nature of the action, the venue, and the state of the pleadings at 
the time of such application, also the name of the opposite Attorney 
or agent: And do also whenever time will permit, give notice of 
such application, together with a copy of the affidavit or affidavits 
to such Attorney or agent.
IV. It is further Ordered, That no judgment be signed upon 
any warrant authorizing any Attorney to confess judgment, with­
out such warrant being delivered to and filed by the Clerk.
V
224 GENERAL RULES.
V. It is further Ordered, That every Attorney of this Court 
who shall prepare any warrant of Attorney to confess any judg­
ment which is to be subject to any defeazance, do cause such de­
feazance to be written on the same paper or parchment on which 
the warrant of Attorney shall be written, or cause a memorandum 
in writing to be made on such warrant, containing the substance 
and effect of such defeazance.
VI. It is further Ordered, That no Sheriff, Bailiff, or Sheriff’s 
officer, shall presume to exact or take from any person' or persons, 
being in his custody by arrest, any warrant to confess judgment, 
but in the presence of an Attorney of the Defendant, which At­
torney shall then subscribe his name thereto : and that no Attor­
ney do acknowledge or enter any judgment by color of any war­
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LIVINGSTONE v. POWELL, RITCHIE & WHEATON, 
Executors of POWELL, Deceased.
A beqeathed a legacy to B, to be paid to C in trust, to be put at inte­
rest until B should attain the age of 18 years, and then principal and inte­
rest to be paid to B. The legacy was not paid to C, B attained the age of 18 
years, and brought an action of debt against the Executor,—Held main­
tainable.
Debt. The Plaintiffs declared that the Testator on the 23d day 
of December, 1817, by his last will and testament, in writing did, 
amongst other things, give and bequeath unto Isabella Livingstone, 
one of the Plaintiffs by her then name of Isabella Powell Wnea- 
ton, daughter of the Testator’s friend John Wheaton, the sum of 
£40, to be paid to her father in trust for her, as soon as conveni­
ently might be after the testator’s death, by him to be put to in­
terest for her use, until she attained the age of 18 years, and then 
the amount of principal and interest to be paid to her; and in case 
of her decease before attaining that age, then the amount of that 
legacy to be equally divided between her sisters Jane and Ann 
Wheaton : that the testator appointed the Defendants Executors 
of his said will, and died on the 10th day of May, 1819—that the 
Defendants took upon themselves the execution of the will—that 
assets more than sufficient to pay the debts, legacies, &c. of the 
testator came into the hands and power of the Defendants—that 
the Defendants did not as soon as conveniently might be pay the 
said £40 unto the hands of the said John Wheaton, and although 
the said Isabella on the 29th day of September, 1828, attained the 
age of 18 years, yet the Defendants did not pay to her while sole, 
or to the Plaintiffs, since their intermarriage, the said sum of £40, 
and interest amounting in all to a large sum of money, to wit, <S’c. 
whereby and by force of the Act of Assembly in such cast made 
and provided, an action accrued, &c.
To this declaration the Defendant demurred generally,- and sta­
ged the following grounds of demurrer:
El 1.
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1. That the action was brought in the name of the cestui que 
trust, instead of the trustee in whom the legal interest, if any, 
vested.
2. That tlie action involved a question of trust, cognizable only 
in equity.
3. That if an action at law could be maintained, debt was not 
the proper form.
4. That the legal interest in the legacy, vested in John Whea­
ton, one of the Defendants, and the declaration charging assets in 
the hands of the defendants, disclosed a right of action, if any, in 
the Plaintiff, against Wheaton alone, for non-performance of his 
trust.
The cause was entered in the special paper for argument in last 
Hilary Term.
Berton in support of the demurrer:—
Ev the common law a legacy was only recoverable in equity, 
but by the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 11, a remedy at law 
was given for the recovery of legacies ; it could not however be 
intended to give a remedy to two distinct parties at the same time ; 
but to the person in whom by the will the legal interest vested. 
By the will stated in the declaration, the legal interest was vested 
in John Wheaton; the right of the Plaintiff was strictly an equita­
ble one, to which the statute could not be intended to apply. As 
to the general principle of law upon the subject of the right of 
trustee and cestui que trust he cited 2 Saun. Uses and Trusts, 
222; Holts, N. P. Cases, 641; 7 T. R. 666; 1 East. 497; 
5 East. 137.
As to the form of action, if the party had any remedy at law, it 
was created by the statute, and must be pursued according to the 
forms of it; the 9th and 11th sections which gave the remedy spoke 
onlyofthe action of accountwhich the Plaintiff should have pursued, 
and if the party was not confined to the action of account, assump­
sit was the proper remedy. 1 Ch. on Plead. 116.
The fourth point was abandoned, it did not appear by the record 
that John Wheaton the Defendant was John Wheaton the trustee 
named in the will.
E. B. Chandler contra,
Argued that the rights of the trustee existed only while the 
cestui que trust was within the age mentioned m the will, but when 
she attained that age the trust was at an end and the legal right 
vested in himself under the 9th section of the Provincial statute. 
That section prescribed no form, but gave a right of action for any 
certain legacy ; the action of account spoken of in the 11 th section 
applied only to actions by co-executors and others mentioned 
therein, but did not apply to the present case. In Cowper’s Rep. 
289, Lord Mansfield said “ an executor who has received assets 
is 
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is under every kind of obligation to pay a legacy.” It is admitted 
on the record that the executors had assets, and that Wheaton had 
not received the money. Toller on Ex. 219; Riddle v. Sutton, 
5 Bing. 200; 4 M. & S. 119; Salk. 415; Bac. Abr. Tit. Stat.
In this Term the Court gave judgment for the Plaintiffs. 
Chipman, Chief Justice:
This is a case of demurrer to the declaration. The action is 
debt for a legacy, bequeathed to the Plaintilf, Isabella Livingston, 
while unmarried. The declaration contains three counts; the two 
first are very much alike, and each contains an allegation of a 
sufficiency of assets having come to the hands of the Defendants. 
The third count is substantially the same as the two first, excepting 
that there is no such allegation of assets. The demurrer :s general 
to the whole declaration. The clause of the will, wlr ch contains 
the legacy in question, is set forth in the declaration in the follow- 
“ ing terms : “ I give and bequeath to Isabella Powell Wheaton, 
“ daughter of my friend John Wheaton, forty pounds, to be paid 
“ to her father in trust for her, as soon as conveniently may be 
“ after my decease, by him to be put to interest for her use, until 
“ she attains the age of eighteen years, and then the amount of 
“ principal and interest to be paid to her; and in case of her decease 
“ before attaining that age, then the amount of this legacy to be 
“ equally divided between her sisters, Jane and Ann Wheaton.”
The points entered in the margin of the demurrer book, as those 
to be insisted on argument in support of the demurrer, are the 
following :—
1st. That this action is brought in the name of the cestui que 
trust, instead of the trustee, in whom the legal interest, if any, is 
vested.
2d. That this action, being not only for a legacy, but also in­
volving a question of trust, is only cognizable in equity.
3d. That if any action can be maintained at law, debt will not 
lie, the case not being analagous to actions brought against execu­
tors to recover amounts due from their testator in his life time.
4th. That the legal interest in the legacy, for recovery of which 
this action is brought, clear'y vested in John Wheaton, and the de­
claration charges, that he, together with the other Defendants, re­
ceived assets sufficient to pay the just debts, legacies, &c of the 
testator, thus disclosing a right of action, if any, against the said 
John Wheaton alone, for non-performance of his trust, instead of 
any right of action against the present Defendants.
The fourth point was abandoned at the time of the argument, 
as there is no allegation in the declaration that John Wheaton, the 
person named as trustee, is the same person with John Wheaton 
the executor, and one of thf Defendants. The two first points 
may
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may well be considered together. In doing so, I will, in the first 
place, remark, that whatever may have been the juriso)btion which 
the temporal Courts of common law in England exercised in mat­
ters of legacy in ancient times, it is clearly settled by modern de­
cisions, that no action will lie at law for a legacy, [Deeks v. 
Strutt, 5 T. R. 690,]; and the Jurisdiction of the Courts of common 
law in this Province in these matters is derived altogether from the 
act of the Provincial Legislature on the subject. The Provincial 
enactments are as follows:—26 Geo. 3, c. 11, s. 9. “ And be i,
“ enacted, That when any certain legacy is or shall be be- 
“ queathed, and given by any person in his or her last will and tes- 
•' tament, as also when any residuary or uncertain legacy is or 
“ shall, by the account of any executor, be reduced to a certainty, 
“ every such legacy or legacies as aforesaid, may be sued for and 
“ recovered at common law, any law custom or usage to the con- 
“ trary notwithstanding.”
Ibid, s. 10. “ And any executor being a residuary legatee, may 
“ bring his action of account against his co-executor or execu- 
“ tors of the estate of the testator in their hands, and may also sue 
“ and recover his equal and rateable part thereof, and any other 
“ legatee, or residuary legatee, shall have like remedy against the 
“ executors.”
By virtue of the ninth section, every certain legacy may be re­
covered in a Court of common law, and it may be stated as a clear 
posiuon, that the right of suing therefor at common law, can ex­
ist only in the person in whom is vested the present right to hold 
or to possess the legacy. The question to be considered therefore,, 
under the two first points of argument, will be whether, in the 
present instance, there is such a vested right in the Plaintiffs. It 
is alleged in each count of the declaration, and it is therefore ad­
mitted by the demurrer, that the Plaintiff, Isabella Livingston, has 
attained the age of eighteen years ; can there be any doubt then 
as to the person in whom the present right to hold this legacy is 
vested, when we advert to the express terms of the legacy, which, 
after an absolute gift of the sum bequeathed to the legatee, Isabella 
Powell Wheaton, declares, that when she shall have attained the 
age of eighteen years, “ the amount of the principal and interest 
shall be paid to her There is indeed a trust vested in the father 
of the legatee, to be executed in the time intervening between the 
death of the testator and the legatee’s attaining the prescribed age 
of eighteen years, and that trust is to receive the amount of the 
legacy and to put it to interest for her use ; but the time for exe­
cuting this trust having elapsed, the trust itself no longer exists, 
and there becomes an absolute vested right in the legatee to re­
quire payment of the legacy, and to use and enjoy the same as she 
pleases ; and this being a chose in action of the wife, the husband 
and
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and wife properly join in suing for it. If it were possible to hold, 
that under the facts of this case the present right of action for re­
covering this legacy was in John Wheaton the trustee, such right 
of action must be exercised not for the purpose of enabling him to 
execute the trust reposed in him, for doing which the time has 
elapsed, but solely for the purpose of subjecting himself to the 
right of action which the present Plaintiffs now indisputably 
have for reducing the legacy into t.lu-ir final possession in order 
to enjoy it. Although this point seems to be thus clear upon prin­
ciple, it is nevertheless satisfactory to find a case very much in 
point lately decided in the Arches Court of Canterbury, by Sir 
John Nichol. I refer to the case of Grignion v. Grignion, re­
ported in 1 Hag. Ec. Rep. 538, A. D. 1828. In that case the 
legacy was in the following terms, “ And as to the said sum of 
“ £120, and the said last mentioned fourth pa t of the rest resi- 
“ due and remainder of my personal estate and effects, and the 
“ stocks, funds and securities in or upon which the same shall or 
“ may be so placed, laid out and invested, my will and mind is, 
“ and I do hereby declare, that the said Isaac Webb, and my said 
“ son Claudius, their executors and administrators, shall and do, 
“ from and immediately after the decease of my said son Israel, 
“ stand, be and continue possessed thereof, in trust for all and 
“ every the child and children of my said son Israel, equally to be 
“ divided between them, share and share alike, to be paid and trans- 
“ ferred to them when and as they respectively shall attain the age 
“ of twenty one years.” The suit was brought by one of the re­
siduary legatees who had become of age, against the executor, for 
recovery of his part of the legacy, and was sustained in the Eccle­
siastical Court upon the express ground that there remained no 
longer any trust for a Court of equity to act upon ; in giving judg­
ment, Sir John Nichol expresses himself as follows :—“ These 
“ trusts are now all at an end. Israel is dead, leaving three children— 
“ all have attained the age of twenty one—each is entitled to his 
“ third—there is no resulting trust to be executed—each has a 
“ vested absolute interest in his legacy, to receive it and do what 
“ he pleases with it. Nothing remains to be done but to enforce 
“ payment. The executor, though not expressly called a trustee 
“ in the will, (a fact that makes no real distinction,) has had both 
“ characters—his function as trustee has be^n finished—his duty 
“ as executor remains—namely, to pay the legatees. This seems 
“ to be the substantial, good sen$e and plain reason of the matte’-, 
“ stripped of refinement and fiction, and technicality. As execu- 
“ tor he is sworn to pay the legacies. This is a legacy now be- 
“ come absolute and due—simply to be paid—the executor sub- 
“ tracts it—he refuses payment; has this Court then the juris- 
“ diction to enforce the duty which, when the office was commit- i 
“ ted to him, he swore to this Court to discharge ? or is it clear
“that
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“ that a Court of equity would grant an injunction to restrain 
“ the Court from proceeding.
“ The general proposition is, that Courts of Equity have the 
“ exclusive jurisdiction of all trusts ; the answer is, here is no trust 
“ remaining—here only remains the duty of an executor—the pay- 
“ ment of a legacy absolutely vested in the legatee. When there 
“ is a trust, or when the Ecclesiastical Courts cannot do justice, 
“ as happened, while the demand for security to refund was the 
“ practice of the Court of equity; or where a married woman is 
to be protected—or where there are proceedings in account to 
“ ascertain assets—or where there is anything in the nature of a 
“ trust to be executed, an injunction wi'l go ; but not as I under- 
“ stand, when there is the bare duty of an executor to perform— 
*■ to pay legacies ; for that would in all cases give an exclusive 
“ and not a mere concurrent jurisdiction.” It is true that the pre­
sent case in which the husband and wife are suing for a legacy 
due to the wife, is the very case put by Lord Kenyon, (5, T. R. 
692; 7, T. R. 667,) as conclusive against the Courts of com­
mon law in England having jurisdiction over legacies, because these 
Courts cannot compel the husband to make provision for the wife 
before he shall receive the benefit of her property; it is true also 
that this is a case in which it appears from the judgment of Sir 
John Nichol, which I have cited, that the Ecclesiastical Courts in 
England would not be permitted to entertain a suit for a legacy for 
the same reason. The answer to any objection that might be 
raised on this score, is to be found in the positive enactments of the 
Provincial Statute, which give a general jurisdiction to the Courts 
of common law in this Province for the recovery of legacies, with­
out any exception, notwithstanding any law usage or custom to the 
contrary. The Provincial Legislature have thus expressly de­
termined, that the English rule which denies this jurisdiction to 
Courts of common law, shall not prevail in this Province. It has 
also made express provision for the distinct cases of certain, and of 
residuary and uncertain legacies. This leads me to the third ob­
jection, which is, that the action of debt will not lie in the present 
case. Tire ninth section of the A.ct of Assembly which relates to 
legacies, which are, or have been rendered certain, does not pre­
scribe any form of action ; it therefore leaves the form of action to 
be settled upon the general principles which govern this matter. 
Serjeant Stephen, in his book on pleading, page 14, says, that 
“ The action of debt lies where a party claims a debt, i. e. a li- 
“ quidated or certain sum of money alleged to be due to him.” I 
do not deem it necessary to cite the numerous authorities which 
may be found to support this position. Applying this principle to 
the present case, it does appear to me, that, so far from there 
being any objection in point of form to the action of debt, for re­
covering 
in the Seventh Year of WILLIAM IV. 231
co vering a pecuniary legacy of a certain or ascertained amount, it is 
the peculiarly appropriate remedy. The eleventh section, which gives 
the action of account, is intended to provide for cases of residuary 
and uncertain legacies, and decidedly does not in any manner li­
mit or controul the remedy given in the ninth section, io cases of 
legacies, which are certain in themselves, or have been reduced to 
a certainty.
I entertain doubt as to the third count in the declaration, which 
does not contain any allegation either of assets in the hands of tlie 
Defendants, or of their assent to the legacy; but the point was 
not made at the bar, and even if there be a defect in this one 
count, it will not affect the judgment on this demurrer to the 
whole declaration, which I think for the reasons I have stated, 
must be for the Plaintiff.
Botsford, J. concurred:
Carter, J.
This case comes before the Court on a demurrer to a declaration, 
in an action of debt, brought by the Plaintiffs Henry Livingstone 
and Isabella his wife, against the Defendants, as executors of one 
Jacob Powell, deceased, for a legacy bequeathed by the will 
of the said Jacob Powell, in the manner following, as set 
forth in the declaration, “ unto Isabella Powel Wheaton, daughter 
of my friend John Wheaton, the sum of £40, to be paid to her 
father in trust for her, as soon as conveniently may be after testa­
tor’s death, by him to be put to interest for her use, until she at­
tained the age of 18 years, and then the amount of the principal 
and interest to be paid to her ; and in case of her death before at­
taining that age, then the amount of that legacy to be equally 
divided between her sisters Jane and Ann Wheaton.”
From the course of the argument, it appeared that the grounds 
of demurrer were reduced to two material ones:
1. That the form of action was wrong.
2. That the Flaintiffs were the wrong parties to have sued, in 
as much as the legal interest in this legacy was vested in John 
Wheaton, and he was the party who Should have been Plaintiff.
On the first point, viz. that the form of action is wrong, it was 
contended that the action of debt will not lie against an executor. 
This however will apply only to cases of simple contract, where 
the cause of action occurred in the life time of the testator—and the 
reason assigned is, that in such a case the testator might have 
waged his law, a mode of defence from which his executor would 
be precluded. That reason cannot clearly apply to the present 
case, where the cause of action has accrued against the executors 
alone, and where it is clear the defence by wager of law could not 
apply.
The
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The 9th section of 26 G. 3, c. 11, on which this action is founded, 
giving no particular form of action, it appears to me that debt is 
the peculiar and proper form of action to be used on the general 
principle laid down by Mr. Justice Bailey in Tilson v. Warwick 
Gas Light Company, 4 B. & C. 962, “ where an Act of Parlia- 
“ ment, casts upon a party an obligation to pay a specific sum 
“ of money to particular persons, the law then enables those 
“ persons to maintain an action of debt.” In Bac. Abr. (Title 
Debt, A.) it is said that an action of debt lies by the Sheriff on 
28 Eliz. c. 4, for his fees given him by statute for an execution 
served by him, though the statute does not say that he shall have 
his fees in any action for them, but only says that he shall not take 
for any execution served any consideration or recompense, besides 
that thereafter mentioned by the Act.
It was further contended that the 11th section of the Act gave 
the action of account as the form, and only form of action by which 
legacies were to be recovered under the Act. That section ap­
pears to me to go no further than to give to the parties the power 
of suing in that form of action, when circumstances render it an 
appropriate and convenient form. The first part of it which ena­
bles any executor being a residuary legatee to bring his action of 
account against his co-executor, was intended, I imagine, to give 
that convenient form of action in a case where, by the common 
law. it was not allowed—in Selwyn’s N. P. Title Account, it is 
said “This action does notlie by one executor against another.” It 
would indeed seem absurd that the action of account, which from 
its nature cannot apply to a debt finally ascertained, and which is 
said in Bac. Abr. (Account C.)*ZZiBmoZ for a thing certain,” 
should by the 11 th section be prescribed as the only form of action 
for recovering—that which is described in the 9th section to be 
'■'■any certain legacy,” or “any residuary or uncertain legacy 
“ which is or shall be by the account of any executor reduced to 
“ a certainty. For these reasons I am of opinion that the form of 
action adopted by the present Plaintiffs is correct.
On the second point, I am of opinion that the present Plaintiffs 
are the persons in whose names this action should have been 
brought. It is admitted by the demurrer that the legacy has not 
been paid to John Wheaton the father—that the legatee attained 
the age of 18 before action was brought. The marriage of the 
Plaintiffs is also admitted. By these admissions, therefore, the 
legacy being unpaid, and the Plaintiffs having not only a vested 
interest in the legacy, but being entitled to the immediate posses­
sion of it, I cannot entertain any doubt of their being the proper 
parties to sue for it, under the 9th section of the Act. We must of 
course be bound by legal principles in deciding this case, and I 
am glad that in so doing we are enabled to promote that which is 
the
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the obvious object of the Act to such parties—the delay and expence 
of recourse to a Court of Chancery. Had we felt ourselves bound 
to decide that this action should have been brought by John Whea­
ton rj in the event of any difficulty in his paying it over to the 
present Plaintiffs, they would then have had recourse to a Court 
of Equity, so that in such case the operation of this Act of Assem­
bly would have been to them worse than useless. On the whole I 
am of opinion that j udgment should be for the Plaintiffs.
Parker, J.:
I also am of opinion that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment 
in their favor on this demurrer; I cannot see any thing in the 
terms of this bequest which will deprive them of the right of action 
at Law, given by the Act of Assembly to Legatees. The legacy 
is to the daughter Isabella, payable on the contingency of her 
arriving at the age of eighteen years; if she died before that period 
it is to be given to others ; the only trust created by the will is for 
the security and accumulation of the sum bequeathed until the time 
arrived for paying it. The Defendants have not carried into effect 
this direction, but themselves retain the amount until the tune has 
come in which the daughter, and not the father, is entitled to the 
possession of it. This being the case they are, I think, liable to 
her directly. To hold the father entitled to recover it now would 
fulfil no intent of the testator ; to give him a present control over 
it would be setting up a new trust, and not that of the will.
On the other point as to the form of action, I think the Act 
very plain ; and that though the action of account is given by the 
11th section, it cannot be considered ascontrolling the general 
words of the 9th section, which clearly gives an action of debt. 
The action of account would be well suited to certain cases where 
the contest was between the executors, or the bequest concerned 
the residue, or otherwise required a previous account in order to 
ascertain the amount to be recovered ; but would be inapplicable 
to the case of a legacy made certain by the will, or by the admitted 
account of the executors.
The action of account is so limited in its application by the 
Common Law as already to have required several English statutes 
to extend it, and without the express enactment of the 11th section 
it could not, I think, have been resorted to in the cases there con­
templated.
I agree also with His Honor the Chief Justice, to leave un­
touched the question on the third count of the declaration, not 
mooted at the bar, and not necessary to be now decided.
Judgment for the Plaintiffs, on demurrer.
E. B. Chandler, for Plaintiffs.
Berton for Defendants.
Fl DOE
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DOE EX DEM DISBROW v. FEN.
Service of a Declaration in Ejectment on the daughter of the tenant on 
the premises,—Held insufficient.
J. M. Bobinson moved for a rule msi for judgment against 
the casual ejector on an affidavit which stated the service of the 
declaration on the daughter of the tenant on the premises, sought 
to be recovered.
The Court considered the service insufficient and refused the 
rule.
<’A!SE!'i I>r MICHAELMAS rE»M-
IN THE
FIRST YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.
Note.—Botsfobd, J. was absent during the Term.
PARENT AND ANOTHER v. CORNELISON AND 
OTHERS.
Trespass quare clausum fregit by A. against B.
In one count of the declaration the locus in quo was described by abut­
tals as being part of Lot No. 135 ; in another count it was described more 
generally as the close of A. in the Parish of Prince William.
Held that B. the occupant of an adjacent Lot, No. 134, could not justify 
an entry on any part of the 'and in A’s. possession, in order to contest the 
true boundary between the Lots, under a mere verbal agreement with J. K. 
the owner of Lot No. 134, for the purchase thereof, neither B. nor J. K. 
having actual possession, and there being no command nor distinct authority 
from J. K. to B. to make such entry.
Although the weight of evidence may have shewn the locus in quo to be 
within the true bounds of Lot No. 134, and the boundary be the principal 
matter in contest at the trial, yet A. will be entitled to recover on the general 
count for disturbance of his possession against B., having no title nor com­
mand from the owner, unless it clearly appear that A. intended to confine 
himself specifically to the trespass on the Lot No. 135.
A Defendant in trespass may justify his entry by the command, but not 
by the mere permission or license, of the person entitled to the possession. 
Possession is necessary in order to constitute a tenancy at will.
Trespass for breaking and entering Plaintiffs’ close m Prince 
William, in the County of York. Plaintiffs declared in the first 
count setting out abuttals, and in the second count for breaking 
and entering generally.
Plea—general issue.
This action was brought principally to try a question of boun­
dary in dispute between the parties. At the trial, before Chip­
man, Chief Justice, at the York sittings, after last Michaelmas 
Term, it appeared in evidence on the part of the Plaintiffs that in 
1825 they became the owners of Lot No. 135, in the Parish of 
Prince William, by purchase from one Foreman, the original 
grantee, and as such had been in the possession thereof until May
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1836, when the Defendants (one of whom lived on the adjoining 
•Lot No. 134,) came, accompanied by several others, threw down 
the boundary fence and commenced ploughing &c. on the land 
within the Plaintiffs’ enclosure.
For the Defendants it appeared that Lots No. 135 and 134 had 
been laid out at an early period, but no grants had passed; that 
William Cornelison, the father of one of the Defendants, had lived 
on Lot 131 in 1797 and 98; that he left it, but in 1820 or 21 
returned and re-occupied the Lot and continued there up to the 
time of action brought. It was likewise proved that in December 
1830, a grant from the Crown of Lot 134 to the said William Cor­
nelison was made; that William Cornelison, by deed of bargain 
and sale bearing date 10th March, 1832, conveyed the said Lot 
134 to one George E. Ketchum, in fee, and that George E. 
Ketchum, by like deed of bargain and sale bearing date 26th 
February. 1835, conveyed the upper two third parts (I. e. the parts 
adjoining Lot 135,) to one James Ketchum, in fee ; and that 
James Ketchum, by like deed of bargain and sale dated 26th day 
of August, 1836, (after this action was brought, the bill having 
been filed the Term previous,) conveyed the said upper two third 
parts to Charles Cornelison, one of the Defendants in fee, by whom 
and under whose authority the alleged trespass was committed.
A Witness (Isaac Cornelison,) proved that about two years 
previous a verbal bargainor contract had been entered into between 
Ketchum, the then owner, and Charles the Defendant, for the pur­
chase of the said Lot No. 134, and that the latter had occupied by 
virtue of this barga’n or verbal purchase, and had lately got a deed 
of it.
The principal witness called to prove the boundary on the part 
of the Plaintiffs was one George West, who stated that he had run 
the line contended for by the Plaintiffs, at their request, about 
nine or ten years before, and that Charles, the father, and several of 
the sons were along with him, who appeared to make no objection. 
Evidence was also given that until a short time before the De­
fendants had worked up to West’s line, and had not gone beyondit.
Old Cornelison was called to give evidence of the boundary 
sought to be established by the Defendants, who among other 
things stated that he had never agreed to the line of West, and 
that one of the Plaintiffs had come to the Defendant’s house the 
past winter and desired to have the line run ; one George More- 
liouse was likewise called, who proved a line run by himself while 
old Cornelison resided on the land, at a time previous to West’s 
line, which the learned Judge considered the more correctone ; but 
the case turned on a different ground, for it wasobjected on the trial 
that the Defendants at the time of the trespasses had no title to the 
land, nor any authority from the owner to commit the trespasses 
complained
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complained of, (and Bulwer vs. Bulwer, 2 Stark 71, Dodd 
vs. Kyffin 7, T. R. 354, 8 T. Rep. 403 were cited,) and of this 
opinion was the learned Judge who told tlie jury that as the evi­
dence stood the question of boundary could not begone into. But 
he thought the cause must turn upon another point, namely, that 
as the Plaintiffs had shewn a clear possession of the locus in quo 
the Defendants were bound to shew a title to, or proper authority to 
enter upon the land in question. This the Defendants had failed 
in doing, having shewn that when the trespass was committed the 
title was in James Ketchum, and not having, as he thought, shewn 
that by tlie command of James Ketchum, they entered on the 
Plaintiffs’ possession, and accordingly directed the jury to find for 
the Plaintiffs ; the jury however brought in a verdict for the De­
fendants. In Hilary Term last a rule nisi was obtained to set 
aside the verdict, on tlie grounds of its being contrary to evidence 
and the Judge’s charge.
Last Term Parker and Wilmot shewed cause :—
It was essential to ascertain where the line between Lots Nos.
134 and 135 ought to be. If that point could be determined, 
the matter would be set at rest. The question was not merely 
whether the verdict was contrary to the opinion of the Judge, but 
was it contrary to right ? for if opposed to tlie former, yet in 
accordance with the latter it might well stand. Was the main 
object of the trial gained ? Had the Plaintiffs succeeded in estab­
lishing—or had they not entirely failed in establishing the line for 
which they contended ?. It appeared that by the most correct 
method of survey, and one approved by His Honor the Chief Jus­
tice at the trial, that the line proved by the Defendants, and not 
that sought to be maintained by the Plaintiffs, was the more cor­
rect line ; there was evidence that old Cornelison always asserted 
his right up to the old boundary, and that at a time prior to the com­
mitting of the alleged trespasses Parent went to Charles Cornelison 
and expressed a desire to have tlie line run, and dealt with him 
as if the land were liis own ; all these circumstances clearly shewed 
that the Parents had no established line. As to the Defendants’ 
right to enter, a party justifying in trespass must defend, in his own 
right, or justify under that of another; here the Defendants did the lat­
ter, under Ketchum the owner. Charles Cornelison was either tenant 
at will to Ketchum, or the agreement of purchase was tantamount 
to a command to enter. Ketchum the owner might have entered 
on the premises and every part thereof, and the tenant holding 
under him had an equal right. Bulwer vs. Bulwer, 2 Stark 71, 
cited by the other side at the trial, proved nothing more than that 
if the Defendant there had shewn an authority from the owner 
might have justified; in this case the authority was shewn by the 
agreement of purchase. In Dodd us. Kyffin 7, T. R. 354, the
Court
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Court were clearly of opinion that the Defendant ought to have 
been permitted to give evidence of title and right of possession 
under the general issue ; that case was equally like the one before 
the Court, and was confirmed by all the Judges in the subsequent 
case of Argent v. Durant, 8 T. Rep. 403, and was not opposed by 
any other in the books. If Charles Cornelison in this case had 
pleaded the tenancy at will specially, it would have been a good 
defence; so according to the authorities in 7 T. Rep. 354 and8, T. 
Rep. 403, it was a good defence under the general issue. In 1 
Chitty on Pleading 538, it is said “ any title whether freehold or 
possessory in the Defendant, or a person under whom he claims, 
may be given in evidence under ‘ not guilty,’ if such title shew 
that the right of possession is not in the Plaintiff but in the De­
fendant, or the party under whom he justifies.”
It was the opinion of His Honor the Chief Justice at the trial 
that the line contended for by the Defendants was the more correct 
boundary; it was likewise proved that the adjoining land belonged 
to James Ketchum, consequently the land in dispute between the 
lines and the right of possession belonged to James Ketchum. It 
was also proved that the Defendant Charles was claiming the land 
under Ketchurn\>\r virtue of a contract of purchase,—the Defendants 
therefore shewed that the right of possession of the disputed land 
was not in the Plaintiffs but in the Defendant or James Ketchum, 
under whom he justified. In Right on the demise of Lewis v. 
Beard, it was held that one who was put in possession unon an 
agreement for the purchase of land, could not be ousted by ejectment 
before his lawful possession was determined by demand of posses­
sion or otherwise, 13 Eas. 210. The possession of the De­
fendant here being undetermined, he could not be disturbed by the 
owner himself; the Defendant therefore for all purposes of possession 
was in the owner’s stead, as the owner Ketel im might have 
entered, so could the tenant. The same doctrine as in the case 
last cited was held in Doe ex. Dem Newby v. Jackson, 1 B. & 
Cres. 448, in which it was also held that an occupation under an 
agreement of purchase creates a tenancy; here there was an agree­
ment of purchase, of consequence a tenancy; that tenancy must nave 
begun by an entry under the authority of James Ketchum, tanta­
mount to his command,—therefore an entry by the command of 
James Ketchum. Doe ex. Dem Hall v. Miller, 5 Can. & P. 
595, & Bink v. Wright 1 T. Rep. 378 were to the same effect. 
The deduction from all the cases was, that a tenant in lawful pos­
session stood in the place of his landlord.
The Solicitor General, with whom was Berton, in reply con­
tended—
If a party were in the peaceable possession of land and another en­
tered upon that possession it was a trespass, but the latter might 
justify
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justify by shewing thotitle in himself, or an entry under the command 
of another; the proof of either he admitted would be a sufficient 
defence, but in the trial of this cause the Defendants failed in both. 
They failed in proving a documentary title and then attempted to 
set up a possessory one.
[Chipman, Chief J.—They applied it to the question of boun­
dary.]
The end of it was, that instead of making out the defence set up 
they neither proved any title in themselves nor any command from 
the owner to commit the trespass, but on the contrary it appeared 
that as mere wrong doers they entered on the land in the posses­
sion of aud worked by the Plaintiffs for seven or eight yaars.
It has been contended on the other side that although the De­
fendants had no title in themselves, yet under the agreement of 
purchase they might justify. They must shew that they commit­
ted the trespass complained of, by the command of Ketchum the 
owner, and make him a party to the trespass; if not Ketchum 
would say “ I never gave any command to commit the trespasses 
complained of.” Neither the Defendants nor old Cornelison 
opposed the line run by West, but shewed their concurrence by 
working up to an d never going beyond it. Another ground taken 
by the other side was. that although they are wrong in law, yet 
that the object of the trial had been gained, and the verdict should 
stand; but the real question had not yet been settled, and a new 
trial was necessary for the purpose of determining it. It had been 
attempted to be shewn that Clmrles Cornelison was tenant at will, 
but the authorities did not bear out the position contended for ; the 
Defendant C harles could not be treated as tenant at will, for he 
was in the possession of the Lot No. 134 when Ketchum became 
the purchaser; how then could he be considered tenant at will ? 
The authorities on tenancies at will did not come up to the present 
ease, nor did they appear to apply to it at all, for Ketchum was 
never in possession. When a party conveys a piece of land he 
conveys the property as he holds it and no more. When old Cor­
nelison obi inert a grant from the Crown he took so much only as 
he had in possession, and that was up to West’s line; when he 
conveyed away his right no more passed than was possessed by 
him. If the Defendantshad a title let them bring their ejectment. 
It had been contended that there was nothing in the case that 
demanded a second trial :• —was this not a case in which the parties 
had a right to say, let our rights be determined according to law ? 
It was most important that another trial should be had.
In tnis Term the Court made absolute the rule nisi for a new 
trial.
Carter, J.:
This was an action of trespass, quure clausum fregit.
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The declaration contained a count for a. trespass on the Plaintiffs' 
close, described as Lot No. 135 and set out by,,abuttals; and there 
were also general counts for trespass to Plaintiffs’ close, without 
description or abuttals. The Plaintiffs shewed title in themselves 
to Lot 135, as described in the first count of the declaration, by 
proving a conveyance to them of that Lot from James Foreman, 
the original grantee of the Crown.
It was also proved on the part of the Plaintiffs that a line had 
been run between Lots 134 and 135 by West, a surveyor, in the 
year 1825, and there was clear evidence that from the time that 
line had been run to the time when the alleged trespass was com­
mitted, the land as far as that line had been in the actual posses­
sion and occupation of the Plaintiffs.
On the part of the Defendants it was proved that Defendants 
were in the occupation of Lot 134—that in 1820 a line had been 
run by Morehouse, a surveyor, between Lots 134 and 135, 
which would leave the locus in quo in Lot 134—that in 1830 
Lot 134 was granted by the Crown to William Cornelison, who 
in 1832 conveyed to George E. Ketchum—that in 1835 the 
upper two thirds of Lot 134 (which would include the part adjoin­
ing Lot 135,) were conveyed by George E. Ketchum to James 
Ketchum. A verbal agreement for the sale of this upper two 
thirds was proved between James Ketchum and the Defendant, 
Charles Cornelison.
On this evidence His Honor the Chief Justice, who tried the 
cause, told the jury, that the Plaintiffs having proved an actual 
occupation of the jand in question, and the Defendants having 
failed in shewing title, the Plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict. 
The jury however found a verdict for the Defendants, to set aside 
which a rule was obtained last Hilary Term, and the case was last 
Term very fully and elaborately argued.
It was then contended by the Defendants’ Counse1 that this ver­
dict should stand, inasmuch as there was evidencq to shew that 
Morehouse’s line was the true dividing line between the Lots, and 
title to Lot 134 having been shewn in James Ketchum, the verbal 
agreement between him and Charles Cornelison either amounted 
to a permission to the latter to enter on the land, or it made him a 
tenant at will.
On the first point, I am clearly of opinion that this case cannot 
come within the general principle laid down in the books, that a 
Defendant under the general issue in trespass to land, may prove 
that the freehold and right of possession were in a third person, by 
whose command he entered. In such case it is laid down that the 
command must be proved. Now it can hardly be contended that 
the verbal agreement between Charles Cornelison and James 
Ketchum, upon the sale of the upper two thirds of Lot No. 134,
CASES in HILARY iSElW,
IN THE
FIRST YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.
GILCHRIST v. WYER AND OTHERS, TRUSTEES OF 
THE CHARLOTTE COUNTY SAVINGS BANK.
The rules, orders and regulations of a Savings Bank, established under 
the Act of Assembly, 6 G. 4, C. 4, together with the Institution to which 
they relate, must be subject to, and under the superintending control of the 
provisions of the Act.
The persons to whom the management of such Institution is entrusted, 
and who are invested with the property belonging thereto, will be consi­
dered the Trustees under the Act, although the rules and regulations do not 
provide for their appointment under that name, but as President and Di­
rectors.
Such President and Directors duly elected for one year, and filling the 
office of Trustees, remain in office after the year until others are duly 
chosen in their place.
THIS was an action of debt, brought by the Plaintiff against the 
Defendants, as the Trustees of the Charlotte County Savings 
Bank, to recover a sum of £50 deposited by the Plaintiff in the 
said Bank.
At the trial before Mr. Justice Carter, at the last Charlotte As­
sizes, a verdict was found for the Defendants, under the direction 
of the Court. In Trinity Term last a rule nisi was obtained by 
N. Parker, for the Plaintiff, to set aside the verdict, and for a new 
trial on the ground of the misdirection of the learned Judge who 
tried the cause.
It appeared in evidence at the trial that a Savings Lank was 
instituted in August, 1830, in Charlotte County, under the provi­
sions of the Act of the Assembly, 6 George 4, C. 4, passed the 
17th March, 1825,—the following rules, orders and regulations 
for the management of such Institution having been entered, depo­
sited and filed pursuant to the directions of the said Act:— 
Rales for the Management of the Charlotte County Savings 
Bank.
I. The Charlotte County Savings Bank is formed for the pur­
pose of affording a secure investment to Trades-people, Mechanics, 
Servants, Labourers, and other persons of either sex, for such sums 
of money as they may wish to deposit: Provided however that 
no person shall at any one time be entitled to receive interest on 
Hl any
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any sum exceeding fifty pounds ; and provided also and neverthe­
less that any benevolent or friendly society mav through their Trea­
surer, Steward, or other proper officers, duly authorized thereto, 
deposit their fund, not in any case to exceed one hundred pounds, 
at interest in the funds of this Institution, and may leave therein 
any excess above the sum of one hundred pounds for safe custody.
II. The Bank shall be under the management of a President 
and eight Directors, who shall meet on the first Monday in each 
month, at eleven o’clock in the forenoon, with power of adjourn­
ment, or at any other hour and day of the month that they shall 
hereafter find more convenient, and may be summoned at any 
other time by desire of two of said Directors, three to be a quorum.
III. That the President and Directors be annually chosen by 
ballot out of the members, on the first Monday in May in each 
year.
IV. That all persons subscribing and paying ten dollars or 
upwards at any one time, or one dollar annually for the benefit of 
the Institution, shall be considered members thereof, and entitled 
to vote at the annual election.
V. The President and Directors shall not receive any salary or 
remuneration for their services, but they shall be at liberty to 
appoint a Cashier for the conducting of the business of the Insti­
tution, and to pay him such salary as shall be adjudged sufficient.
VI. That the President and Directors shall have power in case 
of vacancies occurring by resignation or otherwise, to elect other 
persons to fill such vacancies until the next annual election.
VII. That in addition to the security of the Provincial Govern­
ment, the President and Directors shall be responsible to Deposi­
tors for any sums invested in the Bank, and such interest as may 
become due thereon.
VIII. Deposits of sums of not less than one shilling shall be 
received, and when the smaller deposits shall amount to twenty 
shillings, interest shall be allowed thereon at the rate of five per 
cent, per annum, that is one penny per calendar month for one 
twenty shillings, and so for every twenty shillings deposited under 
the following regulations. Interest shall be recovered from the 
first day of every month, and from no other period, and no interest 
shall be allowed for any fractional part of twenty shillings, or of 
any fractional part of a month, and the interest shall be added to 
and become principal at the end of each year.
IX. That at the end of each year the surplus of the income of 
the Bank, if any, shall be at the disposal of the President and 
Directors, for the genera, .nterest of the Depositors.
X. Depositors shall be repaid the whole or any part of the sums 
they shall have lodged, together with interest due them, on giving 
one -week's notice.
XI.
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XI. The President and Directors shall regulate that one or more 
of their number with the Cashier, if found necessary, shall attend 
at the office on the appointed days and hours to receive deposits, 
and pay such sums as the depositors may wish to withdraw.
XII. The deposits shall be entered at the time they are made 
in a book or books kept in the office, in presence of the Depositor, 
and also a duplicate entry made in a book or on a slip of paper to 
be kept by the Depositor, and which must be brought to the office 
every time any further sum is deposited or drawn out: The Pre­
sident and Directors to have power to make such regulations to 
protect against error or fraud as from time to time they shall find 
necessary.
XIII. The President and Directors shall have a right to close 
the account of any Depositor, on account of him or her not con­
forming to the Rules ol the Institution, or behaving in an unbe­
coming manner toward it or any other ground, first paying the 
sum that may be due to him or lier on the books of the Bank, and 
no new account shall be opened for such person unless the Presi­
dent and Directors shafi agree thereto on special application.
XIV. The President and Directors shall be empowered to make 
all such further regulations for the carrying out the objects of this 
Institution as they shall find necessary, provided such regulations 
be not at variance with the spirit and intention of the foregoing 
rules.
JOHN DUNN, President.
GEORGE MILLER, Cashier President.
It appeared that there was an election of President and Direc­
tors in the year 1830, when the Defendants were chosen for that 
year; that no other election of President and Directors was ever 
liad ; that although no election took place at the expiration of the 
first term of office, for one year, there was evidence to prove that all 
the Defendants either continued to act as Directors, or acknow­
ledged themselves as such, with the exception of Kerr, with respect 
to whom there was no evidence of his having acted as a Director 
after the expiration of the year, for which he had been at first 
elected,—he having about that time left the Province. There was his 
acknowledgment, that he had then been elected, and his name was on 
the books of the Institution as one of the Directors. It appeared that 
the deposit had been made by the Plaintiff on the 5th of March, 
1832, who then received a deposit note, signed by Peter Stubs, 
the Cashier of the Bank, for £50 ; and upon which there were 
receipts for the interest, indorsed to the year 1835, and that previous 
to bringing the action the Plaintiff had given the notice required 
by one of the rules of the Institution.
On shewing cause in last Michaelmas Term, the Solicitor Gene­
ral and George D. Street, for Defendants, contended, that by the 
rules 
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rules and regulations of the Charlotte County Savings Bank the 
President and Directors were required to be chosen annually; that 
no election having taken place subsequently to the suit in the year 
1830, when the Defendants were elected, their authority ceased at 
the end of the year, beyond which they had no power to act: 
that consequently at the time the deposit was made, there were no 
Directors. Admitting that an action might be maintained against 
those persons who acted as Directors, or acknowledged themselves 
to be such, after the expiration of the year for which they had been 
elected, it would not lie against Kerr, against whom there was no 
such evidence, and who could not be considered as a Director at 
the time the deposit was made. It was also contended that no 
election having been made of a President and Directors at the 
expiration of the first year, pursuant to the rules and regulations of 
the Institution, the same was dissolved. In support of this Rex v. 
the Mayor and Burgesses of Tregony, (8 Mod. 127), the case of 
the Corporation of Banbury (10 Mod. 346,) and Passmore’s case 
(3 T. R. 199,) were relied upon. It was also objected, that 
the Defendants were not liable inasmuch as the deposit was not 
paid by the Plaintiff to the Cashier in the presence of one or more 
of the Directors, as is required by the eleventh rule. Another 
ground of objection was, that the President and Directors were not 
Trustees within the meaning of the Act of Assembly.
In reply, it was urged by N. Parker for the Plaintiff, that the 
President and Directors having been elected in 1830, they would 
continue in office until others were chosen; that the rule requiring 
them to be elected annually was only directory, and he cited the 
case of Foot n. Prowse (1 Stra. 625), as an authority in point; 
that the rule requiring the deposit to be made to the Cashier in 
the presence of one or more of the Directors was merely directory, 
and could make no difference when the money had been actually 
paid to, and received by the Cashier of tire Institution; that it 
was of no consequence by what name the officers of the Institution 
are called : in the 5th section of the Act they are named Mana­
gers ; the moment they received any deposit they were in fact 
Trustees for the management of the same. It was also contended, 
that as the names of the Defendants remained on the Books as the 
only President and Directors that at any time had been elected, 
there was sufficient evidence, had it been left to the jury, for them 
to have presumed them to be such, wnen the right of a third person 
was concerned.
Botsford J.:
In the view that I have taken of this case, I think the question 
must depend upon the construction of the seventh section of the 
Act of Assembly, 6. G. 4, C. 4. Whatever may be the nature of the 
rules, orders and regulations of any Institution or Savings Bank, 
as 
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as to the mode of election and the length of service of the officers 
who are to have the management of the deposits, when such rules, 
orders and regulations have been duly entered, deposited and filed 
in the manner required by the said Act, and for the purpose of 
taking the benefit of the same, such rules, orders and regulations, 
together with the Institution to which they relate, must become 
subject to and be under the superintending control of its provisions.
By the seventh section of the Act it is enacted, “ thatall monies, 
“ goods, chattels and effects whatsoever, and all securities for 
“ money or other obligatory instruments, and evidences or nmni- 
“ ments, and all other effects whatever, and all rights or claims be- 
“ longing to or had by such Institution, shall be vested in the Trustee 
“ or Trustees of such Institution for the time being, for the use 
“ and benefit of such Institution, and of the respective Depositors 
“ therein, their respective executors or administrators, according to 
“ their respective claims and interests; and after the death or 
“ removal of any Trustee or Trustees, shall vest in the surviving 
“ Trustee or Trustees, for the same estate and interest as the former 
“ Trustee or Trustees had therein, and subject to the same trusts 
“ without any assignment or conveyance whatever.”
No reference is made in this Section or regard had to the time for 
which the Trustees are appointed, under the rules, orders and regu­
lations of their respective institutions, but the Act vests the moi.les 
and effects belonging to such Institutions in the Trustee or Trustees 
until death or removal. It is clear that a removal from office by 
the appointment of another or others in his or their stead was 
intended, otherwise the word succeeding would not apply. I am 
therefore of the opinion, under this construction of the Act, that 
the Defendants having been appointed, and having acted as the 
President and Directors of the Charlotte County Savings Bank, 
continue in office until death, or until others are appointed in their 
stead.
By the rules, orders and regulations of the Charlotte County 
Savings Bank, the President and Directors are to have the manage­
ment of the Institution, and are made responsible for the deposit 
money and interest, and are clearly Trustees within the meaning 
of the 7th section of the Act..
I think the rule in this case should be made absolute for setting 
aside the verdict, and for granting a new trial.
Parker, J.:
Three questions arise in this cause.
1st. Do the persons chosen to be President and Directors under 
the rules of the Savings Bank, fill the office of Trustees under the 
Act of Assembly, by virtue of which this and other similar Insti­
tutions have been established ?
2d. Did the persons elected in May, 1830, under the third rule, 
remain
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remain in office for one year only, or were they to be considered as 
continuing in office until others were duly chosen to succeed 
them ?
3d. Supposing the Defendants to have become Trustees on their 
election in May, 1830, and to continue in office after the year, are 
they jointly liable to this action at law of debt for the money depo­
sited by the Plaintiff in the Savings Bank ?
As to the first question—It is, I think, impossible for any one to 
read attentively the Act of Assembly, 6 G. 4, c. 4, passed to 
encourage the establishment of Banks for savings in the Province, 
without feeling satisfied that the office of Trustee is essential to the 
existence of any Institution established in conformity thereto, and 
entitled to the privileges thereby conferred ; neither in my opinion 
can any one compaie the 3d, 5th, 7th and subsequent sections of 
the Act with the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7tli, 9th, 11th, 12th and 13th 
rules made and filed under the express direction of the Act, and 
entertain any doubt that the President and eight Directors, under 
whom the management of the Bank was to be, answer fully to the 
description of the Trustees contemplated by the Act.
The Act does not specify any particular number of Trustees 
nor the mode of their appointment,—this therefore requires to be 
provided for by rule; but it does distinctly vest in them all the 
monies, goods, chattels and effects whatever; and all securities for 
money, and all rights or claims of the Institution, for the use and 
benefit of the Institution and the Depositors : it gives them to a 
certain extent a corporate power as to carrying on and defending 
suits; it declares that they shall derive no benefit from the deposits; 
it enables them to pay money into the Treasury upon debentures, 
under certain regulations and restrictions which Trustees alone 
could comply with ; it enables them to demand payment or renewal 
of such debentures; it also authorizes them to loan the money 
deposited in the Institution or other securities, and gives direction 
as to the repayment of monies to the Depositors, and the distribu­
tion of sums belonging to the deceased Depositors.
The 3d and 17th sections of the Act speak of Trustees or Mana­
gers, where it is evident the terms are identical.
By looking at the rules we find that it is the President and Di­
rectors who are to have the-management of the Institution ; they 
are to be at liberty to appoint a Cashier,—they are to have the 
disposal of the surplus income for the general interest of the Depo­
sitors,—they are to attend with the Cashier (who is the only other 
officer named, and who could not answer to the description of 
Trustee because he was allowed to receive emolument from his 
office,) to receive and pay deposits.
It is not pretended that any other officers were ever appointed 
or thought of in the character of Trustees, and if any doubt could 
« remain
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remain it would be removed by finding that the duty required of 
the Trustees under the Act had been constantly performed by the 
President and Directors, or the Cashier, who was the officer of 
their appointment. The Pre-sident and Directors were uniformly 
considered by the Deputy Treasurer at Saint Andrews as the 
Trustees with whom he was to deal, under the provisions of the 
Act, and they or such of them as attended to that part of the busi­
ness in their transactions with the Deputy Treasurer used the very 
name of Trustees.
In fact it is impossible that the persons elected as President and 
Directors, could perform the duties required of them by the rules 
and regulations, unless they were clothed with the power and 
authority vested in the Trustees by the Act.
Under all these circumstances I must confess I see no weight in 
this objection, which was urged in shewing cause to the rule, and 
which appears also to have been made at the trial, but overruled 
by the learned Judge who tried the cause.
The principal objection to the action, and that on which the 
verdict has proceeded, undoubtedly arises on the second question, 
and I have considered with much attention the argument of the 
Counsel and the authorities which have been cited.
It would probably strike any one on first reading the 3d rule, as 
it did the learned Judge at Nisi Prius, that the Defendants were 
Trustees for the year only; but I think on full consideration, and 
having regard to the nature of a Trustee’s office, both reason and 
authority will bear out the argument of the Plaintiff’s Counsel,-— 
that having been duly elected they remained in office until others 
were chosen in their place, on whom the rights, authority and 
responsibility would devolve.
The 7th section of the Act, already cited by Mr. Justice Bots- 
ford, clearly contemplates that the office of Trustees should be 
always full, and that the property and funds of the Institution 
should not pass out of the Trustees in whom they are once vested, 
until there are others to take their place.
The rule relative to the election of the officers is as follows:— 
Rule 3. That the President and Directors be annually chosen by 
ballot out of the members, on the first Monday in May in each 
year.”
There are no negative words restricting them to the year only, 
or directing that they shall not continue after the year. In the 
absence of these or of any positive words stating that they are to 
continue until others are appointed, we must look to analogous 
cases to see what construction has heretofore been given to similar 
provisions, or under like circumstances.
The case of a Mayor of a Corporation whose office is held to 
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words of continuance in the Charter, has been a good deal pressed 
on us, but I think the determinations have proceeded on the nature 
of the Mayor’s office, which in England is almost invariably an 
annual one; and is to be taken rather as an exception to the gene­
ral rule than the rule itself.
Mr. Kyd, in his work on Corporations, 2d vol. 6th page, says: “It 
“ has been seen that when there is no clause enabling the Mayor ex- 
“ pressly to hold over, that power is not incident to his office : in 
“ this respect he differs from those officers who are usually chosen 
“ for life, but may be directed to be chosen annually ; for in this 
“ case if there be no election at the end of the year, the former are 
“ to continue till others are chosen.”
He refers to the case of Foote v. Prowse, 1 Str. 625, and 2 Br. 
P. C. 289, cited in the argument, which is a case of the highest 
authority ; the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, 
deciding that in the case of Aidermen “ the words annuatim ele- 
“ yen di were only directory, and that an annual election of them 
“ was not necessary to make an election in their presence good,” 
(reversing that of the King’s Bench,) was affirmed in Parlia­
ment, so that the case must have undergone the fullest consideration.
In an American work of much repute, Angelland Ames on Cor­
porations, 75, a case more nearly analagous to the present is cited as 
having occurred in the Supreme Court of New York, viz: the 
People v. Runkin, in which it was held fl that the Trustees of a 
“ Religious Society who go out of office at the end of the year, 
“ hold over until others are appointed.” This is supported by the 
high authority of Chancellor Kent, who carries the doctrine even 
beyond the English cases.
The cases also of the Constable and the Town Clerk, cited from 
,10 and 12 Mod. Rep. confirm the view of the rule. If the reason 
given in the Constable’s case, who has nothing to do with the ap­
pointing, be good, that he is not discharged till the new one is 
sworn because the Parish cannot be without an officer, with how 
much greater force may such a reason be urged in the present 
case, when we consider the consequences which would ensue from 
holding that the office of the Defendants ended with the year, and 
when we bear it in mind that it was their duty, a3 the managers of 
the Institution, to take care that the annual election was held ?
There is a well recognized distinction in construing Statutes be­
tween what is imperative and what is only directory. See Dwarris 
on Statutes, 613, and the cases there referred to.
By Statute 43, Eliz. c. 2, the Overseers of the Poor are to be 
nominated yearly in Easter week, or within one week after Easter, 
yet the Court held an appointment after the month good, and 
observed particularly on the want of any negative words—Rex v. 
Sparrow, 2 Str. 1123.
It
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can be construed into a coi imand given by Janies Ketchum to the 
Defendants to enter on the locus in quo, and do the acts complained 
of as a trespass in this action.
On the other point, that a tenancy at will was created by this 
agreement, I had very great doubts whether such a tenancy 
could, under the circumstances of this case, have been created as 
to any part of the land, but it certainly could not have been created 
as to the land in question, which not only had never been in the 
possession of the lessor or lessee but in the actual adverse possession 
of the Plaintiffs. For these reasons I think the Defendants had 
failed in their grounds of opposition to the rule for granting a new 
trial. It was also urged that the Court would not be inclined to 
grant a new trial in this case, even though there might be legal 
grounds for it, because it appeared that the verdict was agreeable 
to the justice of the case ; I cannot come to such a conclusion. The 
view of the case taken at the trial when the points afterwards 
raised by the Defendants in support of the verdict were not 
mooted, was one which rendered the decision by the jury as to the 
dividing line between the Lots unnecessary, and if that be the 
question on which this case should mainly rest, it would be highly 
necessary that that question should be decided by a jury when it 
was properly put to them, accompanied by the observations of the 
Judge as to the manner in which the evidence and facts of the case 
would bear on it.
I think the justice of this case requires that it should again be 
submitted to a jury.
Parker, J.:
The objections which have been urged by the Defendant’s Coun­
sel against making the rule for a new trial absolute, may be re­
solved into the three following:
1st. That the Plaintiffs failed in making out any case against the 
Defendant.
2d. That the Plaintiffs have not made out that particular case 
with which they set out.
3d. That if they have made out a case, it is under such circum­
stances as will induce the Court not to interfere with the verdict
As to the first, it is not contended that the Defendant did not 
enter and commit acts on land in the Plaintiffs’ possession, which 
would be trespasses if not justified; neither is it denied that these 
acts were not in point of law justified, unless the Defendant was 
owner or acting under the authority of the owner of the soil. Thau 
neither of the Cornelisons was owner at the time is clear by their ■ 
own shewing ; the documentary evidence offered by them exhi­
biting a title to the part of the Lot No. 134 in which the locus in 
quo would fall (if within the line of that lot at all,) in one James 
Ketchum; and there is a total absence of proof of any command,
G1 authority 
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authority or assent by Ketchum to the acts of the Defendant. 
But it is said that a verbal agreement was proved for the sale by 
Ketchum to Defendant, of Lot No. 134, under which the Defendant 
was in possession ; that this agreement made him tenant at will to 
Ketchum, and that this tenancy at will authorised the acts. If 
the Defendant were not tenant at will the ground must fail, and I 
have no hesitation in saying that as to the locus in quo, which at 
the time of the grant from the Crown to William Cornelison, and 
of the suosequent assignments to Ketchum, and at the time of the 
parol agreement between Ketchum and Defendant, was not in 
possession of either, but in the actual possession of the Plaintiffs, 
claiming it as theirs, Defendant could not be considered as tenant 
at will; neither can I well conceive how a man can be tenant at 
will without being tenant in possession.
The evidence was full and clear, not merely of the running of a 
line by West, but of the actual erection of a fence on that line, and 
the occupation and cultivation by the Plaintiffs of the locus in quo 
up to the time of the acts complained of.
But when Cornelison’s right to enter is so broadly asserted, it 
becomes proper to examine the foundation of it a little more closely; 
and in this view let us see what a Defendant may plead in justifi­
cation of an action of trespass q. c.f. He may plead soil and free­
hold in himself, or soil and freehold in A, and that he entered by 
command of A ; he may plead lease or license from the Plaintiff, 
but I do not find it any where stated that he may plead soil and 
freehold in A, and lease or license from A;— a command from 
the owner is necessary, and the allegation of such command 
is traversable, and the party who sets up title in a third person 
must shew that he had the command, not merely the permission of 
such third person. If therefore the Defendant in this case would 
justify under Ketchum, he must shew such authority as will make 
Ketchum responsible for his acts.
We come then t the second and perhaps the main ground on 
which the Defendant relied, which is this :—That the Plaintiffs 
are confined to shewing that the entry was made on the Lot No. 
135 ; that there was conflicting evidence as to the true boundary 
between that Lot and Lot No. 134, upon which the jury have 
decided in favor of the Defendant, thereby establishing that the 
entry was made on Lot No. 134, and not on Lot 135.
If the effect of our decision this day in favor of the Plaintiffs 
could be considered as conveying an opinion that the true division 
line between the Lots was that which was fixed by West’s and 
not Morehouse’s survey, I should hesitate much to interfere 
with the verdict; but as the Plaintiffs have proved a tresspass 
commi tted by Defendant on land in their possession, to which Defend­
ant had neither the right of property nor possession, we should be 
fully 
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fully satis: ii(l that they have confined themselves in the manner 
which the Defendant asserts, and that the case in that view of it 
was Droperly left to the jury.
When we look to the record we find that the Plaintiffs have, in 
addition to the specific counts, inserted a count for trespass gene­
rally on their close in the Parish of Queensbury. The Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel have on the argument denied expressly that they intended 
to confine themselves as the Defendant alleges, although much was 
no doubt said about the boundary. We are left then to determine 
from the course of proceedings at the trial.
There does not, I would first observe, appear to have been any 
surprise on the Defendant; both parties came to trial fully aware 
of the acts complained of and the place which was entered upon. It 
is evident that the Plaintiffs did call and claim their place as part of 
Lot No. 135, and that the Plaintiff’s opening did not mislead the 
Defendant as to the real place on which the trespass was alleged 
to be ; neither does the mode of defence adopted by the Defendant 
support what he now contends for; for if the true and single point 
at issue was whether the locus in quo was or was not included in 
Let No. 135, without reference to the title of No. 134, would the 
Defendant’s Counsel have opened a defence resting mainly on the 
ownership of Lot No. 134 ? Whereas if the present objection be good 
it is wholly immaterial whether that Lot were owned by the De­
fendant or not.
Neither did the learned Judge who tried the cause take that view 
of it, for the two points on which the case would then rest would be 
those which His Honor stated to the Jury for the very purpose of 
withdrawing them from their consideration, telling them that the 
case would not turn on those because the Defendant had failed in 
making out any title to Lot No. 134. Under these circumstances, 
to which I have given a very careful consideration, I think the 
second objection cannot be maintained.
The third and last question is whether, supposing the Plaintiffs 
to have made out a case yet taking all the circumstances together, 
justice requires that there should be a new trial. Cases have been 
cited to support this ground, but none I think which come quite 
up to the present.
It is said that the jury have by their verdict decided the two 
points stated at the trial, though not expressly left to them ;—they 
must certainly be considered so .to have done, and I will not say 
the conclusion they came to was a wrong one, but it is evident 
both in regard to the surveys and the acquiescence, there was a 
good deal of evidence and matters which would call for much obser­
vation from the Judge to direct tlie minds of the jury in making up 
their verdict. The jury, as I have already said, had not the benefit 
of the Judge’s remarks on these points for the reason stated, neither 
does 
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does it appear that the Judge was requested by the Defendant’s 
Counsel to review his charge, which perhaps might have been 
done in reference to the first count of the declaration. Had the 
distinction been then taken as to the counts, it might have led to 
an abandonment of the first count, or to the difference between 
them being pointed out.
Under all the circumstances I concur in thinking that the case 
should go to another trial.
Chipman, Chief J ustice:
Said that he had heard nothing which induced him to alter the 
view he had taken of this cause at the trial, and that as the subject 
had been so fully gone into by the other Judges he would only add 
that he concurred with them in opinion that there must be a new 
trial.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
Solicitor General and Berton for Plaintiffs.
Parker and Wilmot for Defendants.
QUEEN v. WETMORE.
An attachment will not be granted for not obeying a subpoena where the 
pai'ty is in custody at the time of service.
Botsford shewed cause against a rule obtained by G. D. Street 
in last Trinity Term, calling on the Defendant Wetmore to shew 
cause why an attachment should not issue against him for not 
obeying a subpoena served upon him, requiring his attendance at 
the last April Assizes in Charlotte; and it appearing from the affi­
davits produced that Wetmore was in custody of the Sheriff at the 
time of the service of the subpoena, and had stated this fact to the 
person who served him,—
The Court discharged the rule with costs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.
Michaelmas Term, 1st Victoria, Anno Domini, 1837.
ffcMJEKAA MUMS.
I. Whereas it is expedient, That every person desirous of being 
admitted as an Attorney of this Court, should, before such admis­
sion, be examined as to his fitness and capacity to act as such At­
torney : It is Ordered, That the Judges of this Court, together with 
four Barristers of not less than five years standing, to be for that 
purpose appointed by rule of Court in Hilary Term in every year, 
or any two of them, whereof a Judge to be one, shall be competent 
to conduct the examination of any person who may have made 
application for admission as an Attorney of this Court in the form 
hereafter mentioned; and that from and after the last day of next 
Hilary Term, subject to such appeal as hereafter mentioned, no 
person shall be admitted to be sworn as an Attorney of this Court 
without the production of a Certificate signed by such examiners, 
testifying his fitness and capacity to act as an Attorney.
II. It is further Ordered, That the said examination shall be 
held at such times and places respectively, and under such regu­
lations as the Judges, or any three of them, may from time to time 
appoint.
III. It is further Ordered, That in case any person shall be 
dissatisfied with the refusal of the examiners to grant such Certi­
ficate, he shall be at liberty to apply for admission, by petition in 
writing to the Judges ; which application shall be heard by not less 
than three of the Judges, at such time and place as they may 
appoint.
IV. It is further Ordered, That every person who may desire 
to be admitted an Attorney shall, on or before the Thursday in the 
first week of the Term immediately preceding that at which he 
shall propose to be admitted, make application by Petition to the 
Court, in the form hereunto annexed, or to the like effect, which 
Petition shall be accompanied by the requisite certificates of the 
age, moral character, and service of the applicant; and the certi­
ficate of moral character shall be full, positive and explicit, 
and shall contain particular testimonials to the sober and temperate 
habits of the applicant, and the Court, if satisfied with the certifi­




V. It is further Ordered, That the foregoing rules touching 
examination, shall extend to persons who may apply for admission 
upon certificates from any other part of Her Majesty’s dominions, 
as well as to persons who may have pursued their studies in this 
Province; and any person coming from any other part of Her 
Majesty’s dominions shall produce a certificate from the Court 
in which he may have become a practitioner, or one of the Judges 
thereof, that he has conducted himself with credit and reputation 
since his admission there.
VI. It is further Ordered, That no Attorney of this Court who 
shall have been absent from the Prov ince, or have discontinued the 
practice of the Law for the space of five years together, shall here­
after be permitted to commence or resume practice as an Attorney 
until he be re-admitted and re-sworn.
VII. It is further Ordered, That every Attorney who may de­
sire to be re-admitted shall apply by Petition to the Court, stating 
therein the place or places in which he may have resided, and the 
business, profession or employment in which he may have been 
engaged or concerned since his first admission, which Petition shall 
be verified by the affidavit of the Petitioner, and shall be presented 
to the Court on or before the Thursday in the first week of the 
Term, immediately preceding that at which he may desire to be 
re-admitted.
VIII. It is further Ordered, That every apnlicant for re-admis­
sion shall be examined as to his fitness and capacity to act as an 
Attorney, in the same manner as if applying for a first admission, 
unless the Court shall see fit in any case to dispense with such 
examination, and shall make order accordingly.
IX. It is further Ordered, That from and after the present Mi­
chaelmas Term, no Attorney of any other part of Her Majesty’s 
Dominions shall be admitted as an Attorney of this Court unless he 
shall have entered as a Student with one of the Attornies of this 
Court, having the rank of Barrister and resident and practising in 
the Province, and shall have continued as such Student for one 
year; the entry of every such Student to be registered with the 
Clerk as in the case of other Students ; and a certificate of such 
year’s study from the Barrister with whom the same may have 
been performed shall be one of the testimonials necessary for the 
admission of such applicant.
X. Whereas it is desirable that arguments on rules for ‘new 
trials or the like, made in causes tried at the Sittings for the 
County of York, should be heard and disposed of more speedily 
than can be done under the present practice of the Court: It is 
Ordered, That in future any party intending, after the trial had 
at the said Sittings, to move the Court for a rule to shew cause 
why a new trial should not be wanted, or for any rule of a like
description
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description, do give notice to the opposite party of such his inten­
tion, together with a note in writing, specifying the general grounds 
of the intended motion thirty days before the ensuing Term; and 
that Rules Nisi granted on such motions be made returnable in the 
same Term, unless the Court should see fit, with the consent of 
parties, or for other good reason, to extend the time for shewing 




Form of Petition for admission as an Attorney.
To the Honorable the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme 
Court.
The Petition of A. B. Humbly Sheweth,
That your petitioner was born in on
[state the place and day of birth\, as by the accompanying certifi­
cate or affidavit will appear. That on he entered as a
Student in the office of C. D. Esquire, a Barrister of this Court, at 
in this Province, and has continued as such from that 
time hitherto; during which time he has not absented himself 
without the permission of the said C. D. nor been engaged in any 
other profession, business or employment.
[If the applicant have studied part of the time with any other 
Barrister, or been absent without permission, or engaged in any 
other profession, business or employment, since commencing his 
studies, he must state fully the reasons therefor, the particular 
time and length of such other study, or absence, or engagement in 
other pursuits, together with such other particulars as he may 
think advisable, explanatory of his conduct. If the applicant have 
not studied in this Province he must state the particular grounds 
on which he applies for admission, the place or places in which he 
may have resided and ^practised since his admission by any other 
Court; and if he have been engaged bn-a ny other profession, 
business or employment, he must state the particulars of the 
same with any other matters explanatory of his conduct and 
pursuits as he may deem necessary or advisable*}.
That your Petitioner is at present resident at and is
desirous of being admitted an Attorney of this Honorable Court at 
the ensuing Term, and prays that your Honors will
make such order touching his examination or admission as by the 
rules of the Court are required, or as to your Honors may seem 
meet. Dated the 18 .
• Noth.—If the Petitioner’s full time of study has not expired at the time or 
application, he must further state his intention to continue a Student in the Bar­
rister’s office until such time expires, and will he required to produce an addi­
tional certificate to that effect at the ensuing Term.
Parker, J. was prevented by indisposition from attending the Court during 
the latter part of this Term.
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words of continuance in tlie Charter, has been a good deal pressed 
on us, but I think the determinations have proceeded on the nature 
of the Mayor’s office, which in England is almost invariably an 
annual one; and is to be taken rather as an exception to the gene­
ral rule than the rule itself.
Mr. Kyd, in his work on Corporations, 2d vol. 6th page, says: “It 
“has been seen that when there is no clause enabling the Mayor ex- 
“ pressly to hold over, that power is not incident to his office : in 
“ this respect he differs from those officers who are usually chosen 
“ for life, but may be directed to be chosen annually ; for in this 
“ case if there be no election at the end of the year, the former are 
“ io continue till others are chosen.”
He refers to the case of Foote v. Prowse, 1 Str. 625, and 2 Br. 
P. C. 289, cited in the argument, which is a case of the highest 
authority ; the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, ( 
deciding that in the case of Aidermen “ the words annuatim ele- 
“ gendi were only directory, and that an annual election of them 
“ was not necessary to make an election in'their presence good,” 
' (reversing that of the King’s Bench,) was affirmed in Parlia­
ment, so that the case must have undergone the fullest consideration.
In an American work of much repute, Angell and Ames on Cor­
porations, 75, a case more nearly analagous to the present is cited as 
having occurred in the Supreme Court of New York, viz: the 
People v. Runkin, in which it was held “ that the Trustees of a 
“ Religious Society who go out of office at the end of the year, 
“ hold over until others are appointed.” This is supported by the 
high authority of Chancellor Kent, who carries the doctrine even 
beyond the English cases.
The cases also of the Constable and the Town Clerk, cited from 
10 and 12 Mod. Rep. confirm the view of the rule. If the"reason 
given in the Constable’s case, who has nothing to do with the ap­
pointing, be good, that he is not discharged till the new one is 
sworn because the Parish cannot be without an officer, with how 
much greater force may such a reason be urged in the present 
case, when we consider the consequences which would ensue from 
holding that the office of the Defendants ended with the year, and 
when we bear it in mind that it was their duty, as the managers of 
the Ins1 tution, to take care that the annual election was held ?
There is a well recognized distinction in construing Statutes be­
tween what is imperative and what is only directory. See Dwarris 
on Statutes, 613, and the cases there referred to.
By Statute 43, Eliz. c. 2, the Overseers of the Poor are to be 
nominated yearly in Easter week, or within one week after Easter, 
yet the Court held an appointment after the month good, and 
observed particularly on the want of any negative words—Rex v. 
Sparrow, 2 Str. 1123. -
It
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It is satisfactory to know that in arriving at the conclusion that 
the Defendants continued in the office to which they were elected 
after the year, we are only giving effect to the view which they, or 
at least all those who contest the suit, took of the office them­
selves.
It is not disputed that all the eight Defendants, together with 
Elisha Andrews, since deceased, were duly elected in May, 1830; 
and that all of them with the exception of William Kerr, who was out 
of the Province, and therefore could not act, have been proved to 
have acted subsequent to the year, and the three Defendants who 
join issue in the suit up to the latest period.
3d. The third and last question is, whether the Defendants as 
Trustees are liable to this action.
It was clearly proved that the Plaintiff duly deposited the sum 
of £50 at the Bank with the Trustees, or the Cashier, their agent 
and officer for this purpose. The deposit was made on the 5th 
March, 1832, and interest was paid thereon for the three following 
years. We are not called upon now to decide on the respective 
liabilities of different sets of Trustees, should there be any doubt on 
that point, as the Defendants were Trustees at the time of the 
Deposit, and have so continued ever since; neither are we bound 
to decide whether, under the Act of Assembly alone, the Trustees 
would be liable to actions at law at the suit of Depositors, for in 
the published code of rules and regulations, (the authority of which 
is not questioned,) it is expressly provided, that in addition to the 
security of the Provincial Government the President and Directors 
should be responsible to Depositors for any sums invested in the 
Bank, and such interest as may become due thereon.
The Defendants have there received the Plaintiff’s money under 
an agreement to be responsible for the repayment thereof, when 
duly demanded, and this in truth is the only effectual security 
which the Depositors had. There is no Provincial security to 
which they could resort; it was optional with the Trustees whether 
they would invest the monies in Province Debentures; they do 
not shew that there are any such available for the Plaintiff’s 
claim, and if there are the Defendants and not the Plaintiff are 
entitled to receive and appropriate the amount. It was no doubt 
with the view of satisfying the Depositors that their monies would 
be safely kept, or that there would be responsible persons to whom 
they could, if necessary, resort, that the rules are required to be so 
public that Depositors could always have access to them.
Sec. 6 of the Act provides that “ if the officer entrusted with 
“ the receipt or custody of the money subscribed or deposited for 
“ purposes of the Institution, shall be required by the rules and 
“ regulations of such Institution to become bound with sureties for 
■“ the just and faithful execution of such office, such security shall 
11 and 
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“ and may be given by bond or bonds to the Clerk of the Peace 
“ for the time being, for the County where such Institution shall be 
“ established ; and in case of forfeiture it should be lawful for the 
“ persons authorized for that purpose by the rules, regulations and 
“ orders of such Institution, to sue upon such bond or bonds in the 
“ name of the Clerk of the Peace.”
It would doubtless have been a proper precaution to have re­
quired security from the Cashier, whose default it is said has occa­
sioned the present difficulties, but it was left optional by the Act 
to require security or not, and we find that although it is provided 
for by the rules that the President and Directors shall be at liberty 
to appoint a Cashier for the conducting of the Institution, and to 
pay him such salary as shall be judged sufficient, it was not 
deemed fit to require him to give any security-
The President and Directors hold themselves responsible for 
him, for the 7th rule must be considered as applying to a case like 
the present, or their responsibility would be of little avail to the 
Depositors.
On this pledge the Plaintiff has relied in making his deposit, and 
to this he now resorts, as it appears to me he was clearly entitled to 
do; and the President and Directors being, as I conceive they were, 
the Trustees of the Bank under the Act, and sued in that capacity 
for money deposited in the Bank ; this action is I think maintain­
able, and the Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict.
In regard to the English Savings Bank case cited from 2 Bing. 
394, the express ground of that decision was, that the only Statute 
in force at the time, 9 G. 4, c. 92, made arbitration the only 
remedy and ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law. That 
Act repealed the former Statutes from which our Act of Assembly 
was copied, and introduced several new provisions, one making it 
imperative on the Cashier or Treasurer to give security, and 
another (S. 9,) expressly enacting “ that no Trustee or Manager 
“ shall be personally liable except for his own acts and deeds, nor 
“ for any thing done by him in virtue of his office in the execution 
“ of this Act, except in cases where he shall be guilty of wilful 
“ neglect or default.”
The observations of Lord Ch. J. Tindal are certainly strong 
as to the inconvenience of subjecting Trustees of Savings Banks to 
actions at law, but could not be intended to apply to cases where 
their responsibility was voluntarily pledged ; they were probably 
made with a view of shewing the reasonableness and propriety of 
the new enactments, and may be worthy the attention of the 
Legislature should the subject be again brought under their notice.
I concur with Mr. Justice Botsford,in thinking that the rule for 
a new trial must be made absolute.
Carter,
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Carter J.:
I assent to tlie opinions given by my brethren. The only doubt 
1 had was under the seventh section of the Act, whether the rule 
could make Trustees personally liable, but my doubts are not suf­
ficiently strong to induce me to dissent from the judgment given 
by the rest of the Court.
Chipman, Ch. J. gave no opinion, being himself President of 
the Saint John Savings Bank.
Rule absolute.
N. Parker for the Plaintiff.
The Solicitor General and A. L. and G. D. Street for the De­
fendants.
GRANT v. AIKEN AND SHAW.
When A. delivers goods to B. upon an understanding that other goods 
were to be given by B. in exchange, but subsequently A. renders an account 
to B. of the same, which B. acknowledges to be correct and promises to 
pay, A. may recover therefor under an account stated, notwithstanding in 
his bill of particulars he has given the items of the account as the ground of 
his demand.
A bill of particulars which gives substantial information of the Plaintiff’s 
demand and does not confine the claim to any particular count, or mislead 
the Defendant, is sufficient to let in evidence under any count to which the 
same may be applicable.
Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, tried before CARTER J. 
at the Charlotte Circuit in April last.
On the part of the Plaintiff it was proved that an account of the 
goods was rendered in 1834 to Shaw, who admitted it to be cor­
rect and promised to pay the amount. On the part of the Defend­
ant it was contended that the goods were a consignment to be sold 
on commission, and evidence was also given of an agreement to 
deliver otter goods in exchange. The learned Judge directed the 
jury that if the goods were a consignment to the Defendant to be 
sold on commission the Plaintiff must fail, but if the bargain was 
that the Defendant should deliver other goods in exchange, the 
Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. The jury found for the Plain­
tiff, damages £47.
Kinnear for the Defendant in Trinity Term obtained a rule 
nisi to set aside the verdict, on the ground that the learned Judge 
had mis-directed the jury to find for the Plaintiff, if the goods were 
delivered in exchange for other goods.
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas Term by N. Parker.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court discharged the rule.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
It was contended on the part of the Plaintiff on shewing cause 
against 
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against the rule nisi for a new trial which had been obtained in this 
case, that the Plaintiff was at all events entitled to retain his ver­
dict, as the evidence given at the trial supports the count in the 
declaration for money due on an account stated. I am of that 
opinion and therefore I do not think it necessary to discuss the 
ground upon which the rule was originally granted. It was 
proved that the Defendant Shaw had admitted the correctness of 
the account given in evidence, and said that he would pay it, 
which is sufficient evidence to support the count on an account 
stated. But it w’as contended on the part of the Defendant that 
the Plaintiff had estopped himself by the particulars which he had 
given of his demand from recovering on this count. The bill of 
particulars is in the following form:—-
“ Messrs. Aiken & Shaw,
To Alexander Grant, Dr.
1 piece Oxford Cloth, 19 yards @ 20s. £19 0 0
1 do. Olive Do. 15 15 0
1 do. White Flannel, 2 9 6
1 do. Brown Holland, 2 13 5
1 do. Bombazette, 7 13 0
£47 10 11”
Subjoined to this bill is the following statement:—
“ The above are the particulars of the Plaintiff’s demand in this 
“ action, and the Plaintiff intends insisting upon each and every of 
“ the counts in the declaration in this cause for the recovery of the 
“ same.”
It is to be observed that the bill of parcels, furnished as the bill 
of particulars, as above set forth, does not limit the demand to any 
count in the declaration. There is a very late case, Fisher v. 
Wainwright, (1 Tyr. & Gr. 606, 1 Mees. & Weis. 480.) which 
shows that a bill of particulars, which gives substantial information 
of the Plaintiff’s claim, and does not confine the claim to any par­
ticular count, or otherwise mislead the Defendant, will be sufficient 
to let in evidence under any count to which the evidence may be 
applicable, even without any express notice that the Plaintiff 
means to avail himself of every count in his declaration; but when 
such an express notice is given, as in the present case, it excludes 
all doubt. The case of Sideways v. Todd, 2 Starkie, N. P. C. 
402, is a case where a siiHilar notice was given. If it were neces­
sary to cite an authority for supporting a verdict on a count which 
had not been adverted to at the trial, the case of Brown v. Hodgson, 
4 Taunton 189, furnishes such an authority. This case also sup­
ports the general doctrine, in regard to bills of particulars, which I 
have before stated. In every point of view therefore, there is ex­
press authority for retaining this verdict upon the count for an 
account 
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account stated, and I am of opinion that tlife rule for a new trial 
must be discharged.
BOTSFORD, J.:
I am of the same opinion. There is no question that the verdict 
can be supported upon the evidence on the account stated, and 
therefore there is no occasion to consider the charge of the Judge.
Parker J. not having been present at the argument in this 
cause, gave no opinion.
Rule discharged.
N. Parker, Berton and Whitlock for Plaintiff.
Kinnecir, Wilmot and J. Chandler for Defendants.
MERRITT v. WOODS.
In an action by the payee against the maker, a promissory note is admis­
sible in evidence on the common money counts, although it is in the body of 
it made payable at a particular place; the right of recovery, however, is 
suspended until presentment be made at the place, on or after the time of 
payment.
This was an action of Assumpsit.
The Plaintiff’s declaration contained one count on a promissory 
note made by the Defendant, payable to the Plaintiff at his, the 
Plaintiff’s store, in Saint John, but without any averment of a 
presentment for payment at the place specified, after the note be­
came due. There were the common money counts also, and the 
account stated. The Plaintiff’s bill of particulars stated three notes 
payable at certain times therein mentioned, at the Plaintiff's store. 
At the trial before Parker J. at the sittings after last Hilary Term, 
on the note set out in the first count of the Plaintiff’s declaration 
being given in evidence, Berton for the Defendant objected, that 
this being a note payable at a particular place, it was material for 
the Plaintiff to shew that the note when due had been presented 
at that place for payment; that in order to admit such proof, the 
Plaintiff should specially have averred a presentment in his decla­
ration. In the absence of such averment the proof was inadmissi­
ble, and the Plaintiff therefore was not entitled to recover the 
amount of the said note. Two other notes stated in the bill of 
particulars were also offered in evidence, to which it was objected 
that be’ng payable at a particular time and place, a presentment 
for payment was a condition precedent to the Plaintiff’s right to 
recover, and that the Plaintiff should have declared specially on the 
notes and have averred the presentment.
Saunders and Wright, for the Plaintiff, admitted generally the 
necessity of presentment of a note payable at a particular place, 
but contended that the notes offered in evidence being payable at 
the Plaintiff’s store, a presentment was not necessary,—it would be 
but 
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out a presentment to the Plaintiff himself. They contended, 
moreover, that although the Plaintiff might fail on the special 
count for want of the averment of presentment, he was entitled 
to give all the three notes in evidence under the money counts, and 
to shew a presentment thereof at the time and place appointed.
The learned Judge rejected the notes offered under the common 
counts, as he could see no distinction between a note payable at 
the Plaintiff’s store, and a note payable at any other place. He 
was of opinion that a presentment at the place was necessary to 
entitle the Plaintiff to recover, and that this ought to have been 
specially averred. Whereupon the Plaintiff was non-suited.
A rule nisi was obtained in Trinity Term by Solicitor General 
and Wright, for Plaintiff, to set aside the non-suit and grant a new 
trial.
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas Term, by Wilmot, for De­
fendant, and in this Term the Court made absolute the rule. 
Chipman, Chief Justice:
The original character of promissory notes was that of evidence 
of money lent. It was an additional privilege conferred on them 
by the Statute 3 & 4 of Anne, c. 9, that they might be declared 
upon as special instruments. [Clerke v. Martin; 2 Lord Raym. 
758; Carter v. Palmer; 12 Mod. 380; Grant v. Vaughan; 3 Burr 
1525; Story 0. Atkins, 2 Lord Raym. 1430; Harris v. Hub­
bard, 1 Burr 373 ; Morgan v. Jones, I Tyrr. 28; 1 C. & J. 162.]
And it is said by Bolland B. in Morgan v. Jones, that the form 
of promissory notes was the same before the Statute, that it is 
since.
Why is a promissory note evidence of money lent? Because it 
binds the maker to pay money at all events, and therefore the pre­
sumption fairly arises, that the reason for the maker so binding 
himself is, that he had received upon loan money which he had 
thus undertaken to repay. Bayley B. in Morgan v. Jones, ex­
presses himself to this effect: “ If this had been” says the learned 
“ Baron, “ an ordinary promissory note to pay money at all events, 
“ I should have agreed with the opinion of Lord Holt, (in Clerke 
“ v. Martin,) and with the dictum of Lord Mansfield, (in Grant v. 
“ Vaughan,) that a note is prima facie evidence of money lent by 
“ payee to maker ; but as this sum is only payable at the end of 
“ nine years, in the event of the return of David Morgan not 
“ taking place, or the certificate of his death in the interim, the 
“ presumption that the security was given for money lent does not 
“ arise, for the borrower of money is bound to repay at all events."
There is nothing in the circumstance of the undertaking being 
to pay, at a particular time and place, which rebuts the presump­
tion of money lent, as the undertaking to pay upon a contingency 
does. The undertaking is absolute when the time elapsed, and a 
demand has been made at the appointed place. In
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In the present case the presentment was sufficiently proved, or 
the Plaintiff was ready to prove it, by shewing that the notes were 
exhibited to the Defendant at the appointed place after they be­
come due, and I am quite of opinion that the promissory notes in 
question should have been received as evidence of money lent by 
the Plaintiff to the Defendant. I therefore think that there must 
be a new trial upon this ground, without adverting to the other 
grounds upon which the application was made.
Botsford, J.:
The authorities are clear, that when the place of payment is 
mentioned in the body of the note, it is part of the condition on 
which it is made payable, and presentment for payment must be 
made at that particular place.
The question whether, as between the payee and the maker, a 
promissory note, payable at a particular time and place specified 
in the body of the note, and not set out in the declaration, can be 
given in evidence on the money counts, is one in which I have met 
with much difficulty in coming to a decision, as no authority is to 
be found precisely in point. In Carter v. Palmer, 12 Mod. 380, 
which was an action on a note made by the Defendant and paya­
ble to the bearer, and in which the Plaintiff grounded his action 
upon the custom of Merchants, as if it were a Bill of Exchange, 
it was said by Ilolt, Ch. J. “we will take such a note prima 
•"■facie for evidence of money lent, and though they have declared 
“ on the custom, yet we must take care that by such a drift the 
“ Law of England be not changed, by making all notes Bills of 
“ Exchange.’1’
In Clerke v. Martin, 2 Lord Ray, 757, one count w’as upon a 
general indebitatus assumpsit for money lent; another count was 
upon the custom of merchants as upon a Bill of Exchange, and 
shewed that the Defendant gave a note for a sum of money paya­
ble to the Plaintiff or order. Holt, C. J. said, “ that the con- 
“ tinuing to declare upon these notes, upon the custom of mer- 
“ chants, proceeded from obstinacy and opinionativeness, since he 
“ had always expressed liis opinion against them, and since there 
“ was so easy a method as to declare upon a general indebitatus 
“ assumpsit for money lent.” The doctrine as laid down by Lord 
C. J. Holt, in the above cited cases, is recognized by Mr. Justice 
Wilmot in Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1526, where he says: 
“ even before the Statute 3 & 4 Anne, Lord C. J. Holt himself 
“ thought that an indebitatus assumpsit for money lent, or for 
“ money had and received, might be maintained upon such a note.” 
In Story v. Atkinson, Strange 725, it was held by Raymond, C. 
J. that the Statute 3 & 4 Anne “ only gives an additional remedy 
“ upon promissory notes, but does not take away the old one.” 
In Morgan v. Jones, 1 Cromp. & Jer. 169, ft was said by Bolland
B.
264 CASES IN HILARY TERM,
B. “ long before the Statute the practice had prevailed amongst 
“ traders of sending these instruments into the world, and Courts of 
“ Justice entertained and acted upon them. They stood before 
“ the Statute on exactly the same footing as at present, as to being 
“ evidence on the money counts.”
From an examination of the above cited authorities, I am led to 
the conclusion, that before the Statute of 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, notes 
payable to bearer, or order, were admitted in evidence on the 
money counts, as between the payee and the maker,—Lord C. J. 
Holt having, in the most complete manner, expressed himself 
against the method of declaring upon them, upon the custom of 
merchants, as being an innovation upon tlie rules of the Common 
Law; and that the Statute of 3 & 4 Anne, did not take away the 
old remedy upon promissory notes, but that they now stand on the 
same footing with respect to being evidence on the money counts, 
as they did before the passing of tlie Statute.
I am therefore, upon the whole, of opinion that the notes offered 
in evidence by the Plaintiff at the trial of this cause were ad­
missible, and ought to have been received as evidence on the 
money counts.
Carter, J.:
I am entirely of the same opinion, and founded upon the same 
authorities. These notes should have been- received in evidence 
under the common counts.
Parker, J.:
No case being discoverable in which a promissory note made, 
payable in the body of it at a particular place, had been received in 
evidence under the common counts, and it being so clearly laid 
down that in declaring on such a note it was necessary even in an 
action against the maker, to aver as well as prove presentment at 
the place; a marked distinction also being made between notes in 
which the place of payment is stated in the body and at the foot of 
the instrument; I was certainly induced to think at the trial that 
the notes ought to have been specially declared on, and a present­
ment at the place averred.
But on full consideration I am not able to discover any good 
reason for saying that while a promissory note, though payable at 
some time after the date, shall be evidence prima facie under the 
money counts for the sum by such note payable, yet that the addi­
tion of a place of payment shall render the note less evidence of 
the consideration. In the first case though the note imports so 
much money lent or received, and the promise is to be implied at 
the time the note was given, [3 B. & Ad. 513,] yet the right of action 
is suspended until the time of payment specified in the note is past; 
in the latter there is a further suspension of the action until payment
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is demanded at the place, on or subsequent to the day of pay­
ment. In a case like the present no formal demand is necessary ; 
it would be sufficient to shew that the note was at the place of 
payment, where the promissor could receive it on paying the 
amount. I would observe that the case of Sanderson v. Bowes, on 
which much reliance was placed at the trial, was that of a note 
payable to R. N., oi bearer, and the action brought by the bearer, 
consequently not between the original parties ; it differs therefore 
irom this case in that very material particular. Roche & Camp­
bell, 3. Camp. 247, was between indorsee and indorsor, and there­
fore the common counts could not then be resorted to.
As it was proved in the case before the Court that the two notes 
were lying at the store of the Plaintiff, where they were made 
payable, at a day subsequent to their becoming due, when the De­
fendant was present, and that they remained unpaid, I think I 
ought to have received them in evidence under the common 
counts.
On the other points, namely, the reception of oral testimony to 
prove the contents of an account or memorandum in existence, 
and in the Plaintiff’s possession, on which it was attempted to 
found an admission for the Defendant, I should like to have heard 
the Counsel again, though I do not conceive it was very material 
in this case as the witness did state that the Defendant in fact 
made no admission. The authorities for admitting such testimony 
certainly go further than I thought; I have not however examined 
them with much attention, agreeing with the rest of the Court on 
the first point, that the rule for setting aside the non-suit must be 
be made absolute.
Rule absolute 
Saunders and Wright, for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendant.
CAMPBELL WILSON.
In an action brought in this Province for the value of goods sold and deli­
vered in England, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover such a sum currency 
as would be equivalent to the demand in sterling, according to the actual 
rate of exchange between this Province and England at the time of the trial.
The jury having allowed in the estimate of damages, a sum sufficient to 
cover the difference of exchange, to which it appeared that the Plaintiff was 
clearly entitled, the Court refused to reduce the amount of verdict by striking 
off this allowance, on the mere ground that the bill of particulars did not 
contain such a specific charge ; the account set out in the particulars being 
dated at Liverpool, and made up in sterling money.
Such an allowance may be recovered under the common count, for goods 
sold and delivered without any specific averment that the debt was contracted 
in sterling money, or any allegation of the relative value of sterling and cur­
rency, this is matter of evidence.
Kl The
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The place where the debt is payable, when not necessary to support the 
right to recover but only to regulate the amount, need not be alleged in the 
declaration.
This was an action of Assumpsit, tried before Chipman Chief 
Justice, at the last Circuit Court in Saint John.
The Plaintiff resided in England, the Defendant in New Bruns­
wick. The Plaintiff’s claim was for goods sold and shipped to 
Defendant, to be paid for by him in England. A verdict was 
entered for the Plaintiff for £818 19s. 8<Z., which amount included 
an allowance for premium of bills on England at 121 per cent., to 
be deducted from the amount of the verdict, if the Court should be 
of opinion that the Plaintiff was not entitled to such an allowance. 
A rule nisi was obtained in last Michaelmas Term by A. Parker, 
for Defendant to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, or 
reduce the damages by the amount of the premium allowed by the 
jury. The learned Counsel urged that in no case between a cre­
ditor in England and a debtor in this Province had the Court 
entertained a claim for premium, and there was no alteration in the 
circumstances which would justify the introduction of a new prac­
tice in the Province. Secondly, the Plaintiff had not declared on 
any special contract, nor had he alleged in his declaration that the 
debt was payable in any particular place. His bill of particulars 
charged a specific amount, without stating whether in sterling or 
currency, and contained no claim for premium on bills.
Cause was shewn at this Terra by the Solicitor General and 
''William, B. Kinnear.
The Court confined the attention of the learned Counsel to the 
objection to the premium on bills. They considered the bill of 
particulars to be in sterling money, because from the various mat­
ters appearing on the face of it and in evidence, the Defendant 
could not have been misled as to Plaintiff’s claim ; and as to the 
want of a special count to authorize the recovery of the premium, 
that the true question was, whether the amount claimed in cur­
rency, including the premium, was not the value of the sterling 
money claimed by the Plaintiff. The learned Counsel argued that 
every contract must be construed and have its full effect according 
to the law of the country where it is made ; but the manner of re­
covering according to the law of the country where the action is 
brought. The full effect of the contract in the present case enti­
tled the Plaintiff to recover as much here as would give him the 
full amount of the debt due him, in the country where the debt was 
contracted. The place of contracting the debt was the place of 
payment, unless there was some special agreement to the contrary. 
This principle was fully recognized in Scott v. Beaven, 2 Barn & 
Ad. 78. The learned Counsel also cited Story on Conflict of 
Laws, 254.
A. Parker, was heard in support of the rule.
Chipman,
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Chipman, Ch. J.:
I consider the case of Scott v. Bevan, 2 B. & Ad. 78, as quite 
decisive of the main question in this case, that is, the right of the 
Plaintiff to retain his verdict for the allowance made by the jury 
for the premium of Bills on England. Lord Tenterden in deliver­
ing the judgment of the Court in that case expresses himself as 
follows: “ The practice has probably been in favor of the Plaintiff, 
but there is no case that decides the question. Upon the whole 
“ we think the Defendant’s mode of computation approximates most 
“ nearly to a payment in Jamaica, in the currency of that Island, 
“ though speaking for myself personally, I must say that I still 
“ hesitate as to the propriety of the conclusion. ## It is true, 
“ undoubtedly, that if the Plaintiff should wish to send the money 
“ which he may receive under the judgment of this Court, to Ja- 
“ maica, where the money was originally due, the mode to be 
“ adopted according to the most general and practicable, if not the 
“ only usage, would be to get some person resident in that Island 
“ to draw upon him for the amount of the sterling money recovered 
“ here, and this might be done by bills drawn at the Exchange, on 
“ which the Defendant relies, and which is at the rate of more than 
“ £140, namely, about £160 currency to £100 sterling, so that a 
“ less number of hundreds of pounds sterling, than in the propor- 
“ tion of £140 to £100, would placehim in the situation of receiving 
“ his principal and interest, to wit, £1,836 10s., currency in the 
“ Island of Jamaica. The rule therefore must be made absolute 
“ for a new trial.”
This judgment establishes the principle, that when a debt origi­
nally due and payable in one country is recovered in another 
country, the amount to be paid to the creditor in the country 
where the debt is recovered should be such a sum as will enable 
him to realise the amount of the debt, without either increase or 
diminution in the country where the debt was originally payable; 
and it further determines that a computation, founded on the rate 
of exchange between the two countries, will most nearly approxi­
mate to the true measure of justice between the parties founded 
upon this principle. The verdict in the present case has been 
made up on this principle, and by this mode of computation, and 
although it will introduce a new practice in this Province, as it 
seems the case of Scott v. Bevan did in England, it is a practice 
so obviously just that I have no hesitation in adopting it.
Then it is objected that the Bill of particulars in this case does 
not contain a claim for a premium on bills. But I conceive that 
the bill of particulars does virtually include this claiim inasmuch 
as the whole tenor of it shews that the debt which the Plain tiff was 
seeking to recover was due and payable in England. Neverthe­
less, as this is a case in which the rule heretofore acted upon by 
the 
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the Courts in this Province was sought to he changed, if the De 
fendant had shewn by affidavit that he was actually misled, and 
was not prepared to meet such a demand at the trial, I should have 
been inclined to yield to the objection. There being no such affi­
davit the bill of particulars must have its unrestrained operation.
It was further objected, that in order to let in such a demand it 
is necessary that the place where the debt is payable should be 
alleged in the declaration. This might be necessary if the place 
were material to support the right to recover at all, but where it 
is only material for regulating the amount which is to be paid, it 
must be matter of evidence only, and it cannot be necessary to 
allege it in the declaration.
For these reasons I am of opinion that this rule for reducing the 
verdict cannot be supported on any of the grounds which have 
been urged in favor of it, and must be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
I am of the same opinion. The debt for which this action was 
orougnt was contracted by the Defendant at Liverpool, in England, 
where the Plaintiff resides, and by the terms of the contract, no 
doubt, was to have been paid there. Had the Defendant per­
formed his part of the agreement, by remitting the amount in 
specie, or bills of exchange, the remittance must have been made 
by him according to the current rate of exchange between sterling 
money and the currency of this Province, and would not only have 
included the usual exchange, but the premium upon bills. Now 
would it not be unjust that the Plaintiff, who has been obliged to 
pursue his remedy in this country against the Defendant for the 
recovery of his debt, should be compelled to take a less sum than 
would be sufficient to procure a remittance, equal in amount and 
value to the debt at Liverpool, where the same was payable ?—it 
certainly would, and I think the jury have done right in making 
the premium a part of their verdict.
Had the Defendant been misled by the Plaintiff’s bill of parti­
culars, I think that there would be something in the objection. 
Carter J.:
I had doubts if the omission of the charge of premium in the 
Plaintiff’s particulars were not fatal, and on a slight affidavit I 
would so have considered it; but in the absence of any statement 
that he was misled, I must consider the particulars as sufficient. 
It is a new rule which is now introduced ; the allowance of pre­
mium is not justified by the former practice of the Court, but is 
founded in equity and justice, and is fully supported by the case of 
Scott v. Bevan.
Parker J.:
There can be no question as to the justice of the claim of the 
English 
in the First Year of VICTORIA. 269
English creditor, who is compelled to seek for payment of Lis debt 
in this country, to recover as much of the current money of the 
country as is really equivalent to sterling money in England ; and 
I should regret much if we were precluded by any technical rule of 
changing sterling into currency from allowing it.
I am aware that the Court here has made objection to the allow­
ance of more than the 9tli, which was at the earliest settlement of 
the Province considered the fair difference, making the rate of the 
dollar at 4s. 6ff. sterling; but the point has never I believe been 
solemnly argued, and the application was made prior to the case of 
Scott v. Bevan, 2 B. & Ad. 78, in which the subject is fully dis­
cussed.
I never could reconcile myself to the decision of the Court here, 
which certainly had the effect of giving a direct premium to those 
who withheld payment of their debts until legal proceedings were 
taken in the Province, and must have had, to some extent, an in­
jurious effect on the commercial relation between the two countries.
Supposing the goods to have been shipped either at an agreed 
price, or the quantum valebant, and the invoices to be made out 
with the charges in sterling money, the intention and meaning of 
the parties is fully understood. The English merchant does not 
mean that an item charged in his invoice at £9 sterling, is to be 
taken as £10 currency of New Brunswick, neither does the mer­
chant here so understand it. The pound currency is (as was said 
in Scott v. Eevan,) an imaginary coin. If that case is to be neld 
good law, and as laying down the rule to govern the Courts in Eng­
land, let us see what the effect here would be, of our deciding in 
favor of the Defendant.
The judgment of the Plaintiff would be for £727 19s. 9<Z, only, 
as equal to £654 3s. 1 Id. sterling, yet if the Plaintiff were obliged 
to have recourse on this judgment in England, he would not re­
cover the £654 3s. 11 d. sterling, but only so much sterling as 
£727 19s. 9d. currency would be equal to at the current rate of 
exchange.
There is another circumstance worthy of remark in the present 
case, that in the items in the bill of particulars are sums paid other 
persons for the articles sent, is the Plaintiff to recover 12 per cent, 
less on the goods sent to the Defendant than he has actually him­
self paid for them ? yet this must be the consequence of adopting 
the Defendant’s rule of computation.
I have not felt much difficulty on the record; on the bill of par­
ticulars I have entertained some doubts, and were there reason to 
suppose that the Defendant was misled, or suffered the least injus­
tice by the rate of premium allowed, I should have been disposed 
to accede to the present application, but nothing of the kind ap­
pears. The heading of the account states the residence of the 
Plaintiff 
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Plaintiff as Liverpool, which, wnen coupled with the circumstance 
of the interest being all calculated at the English rate of five per 
cent., and the whole complexion of the account, could not well lead 
to any misconception as to the nature of the demand.
Besides as the rate of exchange was constantly fluctuating, and 
was to be taken as it was, not at the time of bringing the 
action or delivery of the bill of particulars, but at the trial, the par­
ticulars could not well contain the exact amount of this charge, 
though it might have been as well had they noticed it.
As however nothing would have been easier than for the De­
fendant to have produced an affidavit to that effect if he was 
unprepared for such a charge, and as we are called on not to grant 
a new trial where the matter ought again to be investigated, but 
to disallow the charge altogether, I concur in thinking that suffi­
cient ground has not been shewn for so far interfering with the 
verdict.
Rule discharged.
Solicitor General and Kinnear for Plaintiff.
Parker for Defendant.
CHANDLER u. BECKWITH.
A accepted a Bill in favor of B, payable at a particular time and place, 
and delivered it to C to be delivered to the payee on the execution of cre- 
taiu bonds, which were duly executed and delivered. The bill became due- 
on the 3d November.
Held 1. That the bill was in the hands of C. as an escrmiL. it had ex­
istence as a paper-writing, but not as a binding contract until the execution 
of such bonds ; when that condition was performed it became a binding con­
tract, according to its full tenor and effect.
2. The decision in the case of Rowe i>. Young, 2 B. & B. 165, is binding 
in this Province, the law not having been altered here by Legislative enact- 
rni nt, therefore an acceptance payable at a particular place, is a qualified 
acceptance.
3. Plaintiff averred a presentment for payment on 2d November. Held 
he was not bound to prove the precise day, the objection could only avail on 
special demurrer; the material fact to be proved was a presentment when 
the bill Lad become due.
4. The bill was presented on 2d November to the Defendant, at the place 
of payment, and the bonds before spoken of left with him; on the 3d, at the 
same place, he returned the bonds, and said the bill would not be paid. 
Held that although the bill was not there exhibited, yet the express refused to 
pay was a waiver of any objection on that ground.
THIS was an action on a bill of exchange, drawn by W. J. 
Layton on the Defendant, in favor of the Plaintiff, for the sum of 
£251 5s. which was accepted by the Defendant in the following 
words: “ accepted, payable at my office.” The bill became due 
on the 31st October, and the 3d November, 1836, was the last 
day of grace.
At
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At the 1 -ial before Parker J. at the Kent Circuit, in August, 
1837, it appeared that the acceptance was given by the Defendant 
to Joseph Cunard, to be delivered to the Plaintiff as the conside­
ration for the purchase of certain lands, on the execution by the 
Plaintiff of certain bonds for the conveyance of such lands to the 
Plaintiff. The acceptance remained for some time in the hands of 
Cunard. The Plaintiff and the drawer of the note met at Cunard’s 
office, and there Layton the drawer, who had, as the agent of the 
Defendant, agreed for the purchase of the land, protested against 
the Bill being delivered to the Plaintiff, and insisted that the con­
tract was at an end. Cunard, in pursuance of his instructions said 
that if the bonds were given he must deliver the acceptance, and 
on a tender of the bonds by the Plaintiff he delivered the bill to 
him. Some evidence was given on behalf of the Defendant of a 
mutual agreement to rescind the whole contract, but not very satis­
factory.
On the 2d day of November Starritt, an agent for the Plaintiff, 
called upon the Defendant and presented the bill for payment, 
which Defendant refused; he left with Defendant at the same time 
the bonds which had previously remained in the Plaintiff’s posses­
ion. On the following day he again called and got the bonds, he 
did not on that day present the bill, but Defendant when he re­
turned the bonds said the bill would not be paid. Payment was 
not required on the third day. The learned Judge reserved the 
point as to the allegation of presentment, and directed the jury that 
the acceptance was not conditional; but merely qualified, and that 
the Plaintiff was entitled to recover on proof of presentment at the 
place unless the jury should think that both parties had agreed to 
rescind the contract, which would be a matter for their considera­
tion on the evidence ; he considered the evidence of presentment 
was sufficient to enable the Plaintiff to recover. The jury found 
for the Plaintiff. On the second count of his declaration, in which 
count he averred a presentment to the Defendant, for payment at 
the office of the Defendant in Fredericton on the 2d day of 
November. In Michaelmas Term J. A. Street, for Defendant, 
obtained a rule nisi to set aside the verdict on the following 
grounds:
1st. That the Plaintiff, in opening his case, stated that the ac­
ceptance was a conditional one, as set out in' the first count of the 
declaration, and having failed in proving the performance of the 
condition, could not set it up as merely a qualified acceptance.
2d. That there was no consideration for the acceptance.
3d. That no presentment for payment after the bill became due 
was averred or proved.
The learned Counsel contended that the acceptance being condi­
tional, it was necessary to aver the condition and performance. It 
appeared 
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appeared that when certain bonds were executed, Cunard was autho­
rized to give up the bill. This rendered it a conditional accept­
ance—Chitty on Bills, 331 ; 4 Camp. 176 ; 1 Marsh 176.
At the time of making the acceptance no consideration had 
passed, and before the delivery of the bill by Cunard the agree­
ment was repudiated by the Defendant.
The Plaintiff was not entitled to recover upon the second count, 
inasmuch as the presentment was alleged and proved to have been 
made before, and not after or when the bill became due. The 
party was not liable to pay at the time of the presentment.
Cause was shewn by Chandler, for the Plaintiff, in this present 
Term.
Layton was employed to purchase property for the Defendant. 
He purchased from Plaintiff and drew on the Defendant for the 
amount of the consideration. Defendant accepted the bill abso­
lutely, but gave Cunard, by whom the bill was presented for 
acceptance, verbal instructions not to deliver the bill to payee 
until certain bonds were placed in his hands. The instructions to 
Cunard formed no part of the acceptance, but merely restrained 
the delivery of the bill until the performance of the act required, 
and then became, an absolute acceptance. This was the grand 
distinction between the present and the cases cited on the other 
side. In those cases the acceptances were delivered, and a condi­
tion formed part of the contract of acceptance. If the Defendant 
intended a qualified acceptance, he should so have expressed it on 
the Bill. •
[Chipman, Ch. J.—The Court are of opinion that it is not 
necessary to trouble you further on the first and second points.]
As to the third point the acceptor of a bill of exchange is ordi­
narily as the maker of a promissory note, ar.d if a bill be accepted 
or a note made payable generally, no presentment need be averred, 
or if averred unnecessarily may be treated as surplusage. This is 
a general acceptance ; to make it a special acceptance it should 
have been payable at a particular place, and “ not elsewhere.” 
But even if this should be treated as a special acceptance, the 
averment was good, and the evi lence under it sufficient. The 
general principle is, that in alleging time the precise day is not 
material, except in stating the day of the demise in ejectment, in 
prosecutions under the usury laws, or in the description of a written 
instrument when the exact day is professedly set out, as in describ­
ing a bill or note bearing date on a particular day. Stevens on 
Pleading, 292. Chitty on Pending, 287, 8, 2 Campbell, 307, 8.
In an action against an acceptor of a bill payable after sight, an 
allegation that it was accepted on the day of the date will be sus­
tained by proof of an acceptance on a subsequent day, 1 Star. N. 
P. C. 46. So in an action on a bill or note it is not necessary to 
describe
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describe the instrument as bearing date on the exact day, 6 M. 
&. S. 75.
Even in cases of usury, where time is the very gist of the ac­
tion, it has recently been doubted whether the precise day need be 
proved as laid, Fox v. Keeling, 2 Adol- & El. 676. Matter 
of description must be literally proved ; matter of substance sub­
stantially—Purcelle v. M‘Namara, 9 East. 60; 2 B. & C. 4. 
3 B. & C. 4. An allegation of acceptance is not a matter of 
description, 4 B. & C. 313; Rose. Ev. 50. A mistake in the 
allegation of the day of presentment is of no consequence 
even on special demurrer—1 Bing, 23.
In Fenton v. Goundry 13 E. 460, a bill was drawn payable four 
months after date, and a presentment was alleged on the day it 
was dated, being four months before it was due. On demurrer it 
was held that the exact day was not material. The words “ duly 
presented” and the averment that payment was duly required, 
were the substance of the allegation—6 M. & S. 210; 3 Bing. 
475. Then as to the proof, under this averment the Defendant, 
on the third day of grace, declared that the bill would not be paid. 
Therefore, even considering the acceptance to be special, the refu­
sal of the Defendant relieved the Plaintiff from the necessity of any 
further presentment.
J. A. Street, in reply:—
The Plaintiff ii. his second count averred the performance of 
certain acts—he recovered entirely on that count—he averred a 
presentment on the 2d November, and the breach complained of 
was the non-payment on that day, when in fact the bill was not 
due.
[Parker J.—How do you get over the case Bynner v 
Russell, 1 Bing. 23 ?]
There the averment was of a presentment after the bill became 
due and payable.
[Parker J.—The Court held the day immaterial, being stated 
under a videlicet^
The precise day is not material, but it must be a day subsequent 
to that on which the bill became due.
[Chipman J.—In Fenton v. Goundry it was held immaterial on 
general demurrer. I have not any doubt on the subject.]
As to the acceptance being conditional, it is true the acceptance 
is not on the face of it conditional, but the Plaintiff has treated it 
as such. He so opened his case and so put it to the jury, and 
gave evidence to shew the condition performed.
[Parker J.—It might have been a defence to have shewn the 
acceptance improperly delivered.]
[Chipman C. J.—The declaration has several counts—the evi­
dence spoken of applied to other counts—the second count does 
Ll not 
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not treat it as a conditional acceptance, and the question is, can 
the Plaintiff support his verdict under that count ?]
As to the consideration, a failure of consideration will avoid a 
hill. When this acceptance was made there was no bond in exist­
ence.
[Chipman C. J.—The bond was made before the bill was deli­
vered ; the condition being performed has relation to the date of 
the instrument.]
Before the delivery of the bond the Defendant had a right to 
repudiate the contract—Chitty on Con. 11 & 12. This»agent did 
repudiate the contract before the bonds were given or tendered, 
and Cunard’s authority to deliver the acceptance was thereby at 
an end.
As to the presentment, if the averment be sufficient, there was 
no proof of a presentment on or after the last day of grace, and the 
Defendant’s declaration was not sufficient to do away with thu 
necessity of such presentment. He did not see the bill after it 
became due. Had it been presented he might have repented of 
his determination and paid the bill.
On a subsequent day the Court delivered their opinions. 
Chipman, Ch.idi ■ i
This was an action on a bill of exchange drawn by W. J. Lay 
ton on the Defendant, in favor of the Plaintiff, for £251 5s. at 
thirty days sight, and accepted by the Defendant in the following 
terms: P Accepted, payable at my office, F. E. Beckwith, 1st 
October, 1835.” The bill thus accepted was lodged in the hands 
of Joseph Cunard, and the following memorandum in the hand 
writing of Mr. Cunard, and signed by him, were given in evidence: 
“ The enclosed acceptances for £251 5s. (the bill in question in 
“ this cause,) and £50 5s., are to remain in my hands until Mr. 
“ Chandler shall have duly executed a bond for the property on 
“ which they are a payment, J. Cunard, 1st October, 1835)11 
Mr. Cunard proved that a bond was tendered to Layton, as the 
Defendant’s agent, about three weeks after the acceptance was 
given, and that he thereupon delivered the bill in question to the 
Plaintiff. ‘
Under these circumstances the bill was clearly put in the hands 
of Cunard as an escrow. It had existence as a paper writing, but 
it did not exist as a binding contract until the condition was per­
formed by the execution of their bond, but when that condition 
was performed it became a binding contract according to its full 
tenor and effect. It was also upon a sufficient consideration, that 
consideration being the very performance of the condition upon 
which the instrument was to be clothed with its legal force, namely, 
the execution of the bond. It was open to the Defendant to inva­
lidate lhe consideration, or to shew that the condition upon which 
the
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the bill was to be delivered to the Plaintiff had not been performed, 
by shewing that the bond was not what it ought to have been 
according to the agreement of the parties; but this was not at­
tempted.
It was then contended that as in the second count in the decla­
ration, upon which count the verdict was taken, the Plaintiff had 
alleged the presentment for payment to have been on the 2d No­
vember, which was the day before the bill became due, he could 
not be permitted to prove a presentment on the day on which the 
bill became due.
Without doubt the final decision of the House of Lords in the 
case of Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B. 165, is binding here, the law 
not having been altered in this Province by Legislative enactment. 
The acceptance in the present case, therefore, must be deemed a 
qualified acceptance as to place, and to render the acceptor liable, 
there must have been a presentment at the place specified in the 
acceptance. I cannot yield to the distinction which was made by 
the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, that in order to bring the case 
within the decision of Rowe v. Young, the acceptance must import 
that the bill should be paid by a third person at a different place 
from the acceptor’s residence or place of business. The essence 
of the qualification is, that the acceptor charges himself to pay the 
bill at a particular place which he specifies, whether that place be 
connected with his own establishment or that of another person. 
If there be any doubt as to the particular place intended, that must 
be a matter to be settled by the jury on the evidence ^ibut I do 
not think that under the allegation in the declaration, the Plaintiff 
was bound to prove the precise day. If a wrong day were alleged 
the objection might have been available on special demurrer, but 
no further. The material thing at the trial was to prove a pre­
sentment at a place specified at a time when the bill had become 
due, and this, it seems, might have been done without any allega­
tion of presentment in the declaration; for in the case of Dickenson 
v. Bowes, 16 E. 110, where the action was brought against the 
maker of a promissory note payable at a particular place, in which 
there was no averment of presentment ,in the declaration, the 
Plaintiff was allowed to give evidence of the presentment, and 
thereupon to recover.
This brings the present case to the point whether a sufficient 
presentment was proved. The bill became due on the 3d November, 
—on the 2d November it was presented at the place namedin the 
acceptance, and the bond was left with the Defendant by the 
Plaintiff’s agent. The next day the Plaintiff’s agent called 
again, and the Defendant at that time expressly refused to pay the 
bill. It did not appear that the bill was on this day exhibited to 
the Defendant, but the Defendant’s refusal to pay the bill clearly 
rendered 
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rendered it unnecessary to present it again, and must, I think, be 
deemed a waiver of any objection on this ground. For these rea­
sons I am of opinion that the rule for a new trial must be dis­
charged.
Carter, J.:
I entirely agree in the opinion expressed by His Honor the 
Chief Justice. I only doubted as to the fact of the presentment 
being sufficiently established, but on reflection I consider that the 
conversation which took place between the Plaintiff’s agent and 
the Defendant was a waiver by the latter of the necessity of any 
further presentment.
Parker J.:
The only point on which I have entertained much doubt is that 
which related to the averment of presentment, which at the trial 
appeared to me a very strong one against the Plaintiff, though it 
might have been a proper case for amendment of the record, had 
an application been made under the late Statute. No such 
amendment, however, having been made, we are called on 
to determine whether or not the averment is defective in not 
alleging a presentment of the bill for payment at or after the day 
on which it became due. As the action is against the acceptor, it 
would not have been necessary to allege or prove a presentment at 
all, unless the acceptance had made the bill payable at a particular 
place.
Now it will be remarked that in declaring on the bill the place 
is, but time is not, of the essence of the contract; it was necessary 
to aver and prove a presentment at the place, but the time was 
wholly immaterial, provided the bill had then come to maturity; 
and this makes the difference between this and the cases cited 
again st indorsers, where an averment and proof of presentment on 
the precise day is essential, because the liability of the indorser is 
conditional onlv.
The acceptance here is not a conditional but a qualified one, and 
the right of action is merely suspended until payment is demanded 
at the place.
Had the declaration in this case contained the usual words, viz.: 
“ afterwards to wit &c. when the said bill became due and payable, 
&c.,” it is clear by recent authorities that the mistake would not 
be material, and Mr. Ch'tty seems to think the omission of these 
words unimportant. The point, however, has not, so far as I am 
aware, come up for express adjudication, unless indeed in Fenton 
v. Goundry, 13 East 459, which would seem to decide that it is 
an objection only available on special demurrer. On the whole I 
can see no good reason to dissent from the opinion expressed by 
Mr. Chitty.
As to the objections on which the Defendant’s Counsel mainly 
relied. 
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relied, I considered at the trial, and still think, that the acceptance 
was given in the nature of an escrow, and that the Defendant 
would have been at liberty to shew, if he could, that the Plaintiff 
had not given the consideration agreed on, as specified in Mr. 
Cunard’s memorandum—Jefferies v. Austin, 1 Str. 674.
As to the want of consideration, a bond or agreement for a 
conveyance, on which the party in default would be liable 
to an action, is certainly a sufficient consideration for a bill of 
exchange. The law is thus clearly laid down by Mr. .Sugden: 
—“ The -vendor cannot bring an action for purchase money 
“ without having executed the conveyance or offered to do so, 
“ unless the purchaser has discharged him from so doing: but 
“ if the purchaser give a bill of exchange or other security for 
“ the purchase money, payable at a certain day, he must pay it 
“ when due, and cannot resist the payment even in the case of a bill 
“ of exchange, on the ground that there was no consideration for the 
“ drawing of the bill because the seller has refused to convey the 
“ estate according to the agreement: but he will have his remedy 
“ on the agreement for the non-execution of the conveyance.”
Here a bond to convey the land was duly executed according to 
the agreement, and tendered to the Defendant’s agent, whose own 
fault it is if he is not in possession of it.
BOTSFORD, J. gave no opinion in this cause.
Rule discharged.
E. B. Chandler, for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street and Berton, for Defendant.
MITCHELL v. CUPPAGE & WHITE.
An affidavit by the Attorney, of the absence of a material witness, and of 
the Attorney's belief that the testimony would be procured at the next Cir­
cuit, not sufficient to oppose a rule for judgment, as in case of a non-suit, 
for not proceeding to trial pursuant to notice, without stating the grounds 
of his^belief, or that any thing had been done to procure the attendance at 
the first Circuit; but the Court allowed time for further affidavits.
J. A. Street movtd for judgment, as in case of a non-suit, for 
not having proceeded to trial pursuant to notice.
Kerr, contra, produced an affidavit of the Plaintiff’s Attorney, 
which stated the absence of a material witness, without whose tes­
timony the Plaintiff could not safely proceed to trial, and the belief 
of the Attorney that the testimony of the witness would be pro­
cured at the next Assizes.
Per Curiam.
The affidavit is not sufficiently specific ; it does not shew that 
any effort was made to procure the attendance of the witness at 
the Circuit, or what prospect there is of getting him at the 
next Circuit; the Attorney appears to have sworn merely to bring 
himself
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himself within the words of the Statute. The matter may stand 
open to enable the Plaintiff to shew further cause during^the Term.
On the last day of the Term, no further cause having been 
shewn, the Court granted a
Rule absolute for judgment.
SAMUEL v. SAUNDERS.
By the practice of this Court a Plaintiff is bound to try at the first Cir­
cuit after issue joined, unless issue is joined at the Term immediately pro­
ceeding.
An affidavit stating the temporary mental derangement of a witness, and his 
subsequent recovery, is sufficient to discharge a rule for judgment, as in 
case of a non-suit, upon a peremptory undertaking and payment of costs.
J. A. Street moved for judgment, as in case of a non-suit, for 
not proceeding to trial according to the practice of the Court.
Issue was joined in Trinity Term, 1836. The venue wras laid 
in Northumberland ; no Circuit was held in that County in that 
yearpEa Circuit took place in September, 1837.
James H. Peters, for Plaintiff, contended that the Court should not 
entertain the application until after two Circuit Courts had been 
held, at which the Plaintiff might have tried his cause. He cited 
Prentice v. Block, 2 Bing, 360 ; Hall v. Buchanan, 2T. R. 734; 
Simonds v. Folkenham, 1 Cr. & Jer. 573 ; 3 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 184; 
2 Tidd’s Prac. 825.
It was mentioned at the bar by the Solicitor General and IV. 
B. Kinnear, that the practice had been not to move until after the 
second Circuit, unless notice of trial had been given. It was also 
said that the practice of entering the issue had not been acted upon 
in this country.
J. A Street, in reply, urged that the Plaintiff was bound to give 
notice of trial at the first sittings after the second Term after issue 
joined, and failing to do so, the Defendant was entitled to move 
without waiting for a second Circuit.
Per Curiam^
The rule appears to be that the party is bound to try at the first 
Circuit after issue joined, unless the issue is joined of the Term 
immediately preceding. It was no reason for not giving notice of 
trial in 1837, that there was no Circuit held in 1836.
J. H. Peters put in an affidavit, which stated that a witness had 
been deranged in mind, which prevented the Plaintiff from proceeding 
to trial in 1837 ; that the witness had subsequently recovered and 
become capable of giving testimony, and contended, on the authority 
of Hall v. Buchanan, in 2 T. R. 734, that this was sufficient 
to discharge the application without a peremptory undertaking, 
and that the Plaintiff, not having been in fault, ought not 
to pay costs.
Per
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Per Curiam.
In the case you cite, it was shewn, that the witness could not 
give evidence at the coining Circuit, and therefore a peremptory 
undertaking was notrequired; but your affidavit shews that the disa­
bility which prevented you from procuring the testimony of the 
witness at the last Circuit is removed, and that his testimony may 
be procured at the next Circuit; the Defendant is not in fault 
either—he was entitled to make his application and the Plaintiff 
must pay the costs.
Motion discharged on peremptory undertaking and payment of 
costs of the application.
James H. Peters, for Plaintiff.
J. A. Street, for Defendant.
POLLOCK AND OTHERS v. SHORT.
Where the bail had been prevented from surrendering the Defendant by 
the Plaintiff’s procuring his absence from the Province, the Court allowed 
an emoneretur to be entered on the bail piece ; although it appeared that 
the bail had received an indemnity.
J. A. Street moved to discharge the special bail and enter an 
exoneretur on the bail-piece, on the ground that the Plaintiffs had 
given Defendant notice to go away ; that he had subsequently 
gone out of the Province, and thus by the Plaintiffs’ own procure­
ment the bail had been prevented from discharging themselves by 
surrendering the Defendant. He cited West v. Ashdown and 
another, 1 Bing, 164.
Barberie, contra.
The only grounds of collusion on which Courts had dis­
charged bail were where the Plaintiff and Defendant had 
colluded to enable the Plaintiff to recover judgment for more 
than was due; but here the whole case was a mere motion to the 
Defendant to go away, without which he could as well have gone 
as after receiving it. He produced affidavits to shew that the bail 
were indemnified by a security on the property of the Defendant, 
and that the Plaintiffs were prevented by such security from levying 
on the property, but did not deny that the Plaintiffs had been 
instrumental in procuring the Defendant’s absence in order to pre­
vent a surrender.
Per Curiam.
There is no doubt in this case; it is clearly shewn that the 
Plaintiffs’ Clerk, by direction of the Plaintiffs, gave notice to the 
Defendant to go away, and that he went away to Canada, and 
thus prevented the nail from surrendering him.
It is a present right of bail to discharge themselves by the ren­
der of the principal, and if a Plaintiff by his act prevents the bail 
from
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from rendering, the bail are entitled to be discharged. The Plain­
tiff has not denied but has confessed and avoided the fact, and 
endeavored to justify by reason that the bail are indemnified. 
This is a case which will not admit of justification ; if the Plain­
tiffs have caused Defendant to go away, there is no state of ante­
cedent or concomitant circumstances which can amount to a justi­
fication. *
J. A. Street asked to have the costs of the application, but the 
Court were clearly of opinion that he was not entitled to costs.
Rule for entering an exoneretur on the bail piece.
WILSON v. KERR AND CAMPBELL.
Submission at Nisi Prius to the pwanl of A B and C, or any two of 
them. They agreed on an award which was drawn up and signed by A and 
B, who handed it to C for his signature and delivery to the parties : C dis­
covered a mistake which he pointed out to A and B, to which they assented. 
The award was corrected and signed by all three, but not within the time 
limited. The Court refused to give effect to the erroneous award, although 
the amended one could not be sustained.
J. A. Chandler moved for leave to enter the award of arbitra­
tors on the postea. The cause was referred at the Charlotte Cir­
cuit to three arbitrators ; two of them executed the award within 
the tnne limited by the rule, and handed it to the third to be deli­
vered to the parties; he discovered a material mistake, and after 
the expiration of the time limited the award was altered and the 
mistake rectified.
Chandler contended that the award was completed, and the duty 
of the arbitrators ended when they executed the award, and that 
any alteration afterwards made would not affect it.
G. D. Street, contra, was stopped by the Court.
Per Curiam.
The Court will not give effect to that as an award which appears 
to have been manifestly erroneous, by reason of a mistake which 
all the arbitrators agreed to correct before the award left their 
hands. As however the corrected award has not been made within 
the time limited by the submission, it may of course be set aside.
The present motion must be dismissed with costs.
M'DONALD v. MTNTYRE.
Where Plaintiff, after giving notice of trial, was induced by the Defendant 
to submit the cause to reference, the Court dismissed a motion for judgment, 
as in case of a non-suit, with costs.
Kerr, for Defendant, moved for judgment, as in case of a non­
suit for not having proceeded to trial pursuant to notice.
The Solicitor General, contra, shewed for cause, that the 
Defendant 
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Defendant applied and requested that the cause might not come on, 
and proposed a reference which was acceded to, and the parties 
entered into arbitration bonds, whereupon the Plaintiff did not 
proceed to trial. He cited Jenkins v. Charity, 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 
197 ; Doe v. Lord, 2 Dowl. Pr. Ca. 419.
Per Curiam.
There is no ground for this application. The Defendant re­
quested that the cause might not be tried, and now asks for judg­
ment because the Plaintiff compli id with his request
Let the motion be dismissed with costs.
HILL v. RIND,
Where Defendant has obtained an order to stay proceedings until secu­
rity for costs be given, after sufficient time has elapsed and no further pro­
ceedings taken by the Plaintiff in the cause, the Court will order an exone­
retur to be entered on the bail piece.
The Solicitor General moved to discharge special bail and enter 
an exoneretur on filing common bail for the Defendant.
The process was returnable in Hilary, 1837 ; special bail was 
entered in March, 1837, and declaration delivered. In May, 
1837, the Defendant obtained an order to stay proceedings until 
security given for costs. Security had not been given and no pro­
ceedings had been taken.
The Solicitor General cited Boulcot v. Hughes, 1 Ch. R. 279, 
and contended that if the Plaintiff did not proceed he was not en­
titled to hold the bail.
Wilmot, for Plaintiff, did not oppose the motion.
Per Curiam.
The application is reasonable ; the Plaintiff has had ample time 
to go on with his cause ; two sittings have passed. at either of 
which the cause might have been tried and disposed of, and the 
bail charged or discharged.
Rule accordingly.
STEVENSON v. DOUGLAS.
Where a surplus remains in the hands of the Sheriff from the sale of 
goods taken under an execution against A, at the suit of B, the Court will 
not order the Sheriff to pay the same over to the Coroner upon an execu­
tion in his hands against A at the suit of C, notwithstanding the Sheriff had 
received notice not to pay the same to the Defendant A, and notwithstand­
ing the Coroner had levied upon the same goods (though withou the 
Sheriff’s knowledge,) between the times of levying and sale by the Sheriff.
A rule was obtained in this cause, calling on the Shei ff of the 
County of Charlotte to shew cause why he should not pay over to 
the Coroner of that County a sum of money in his hands, being 
Ml the 
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the surplus of the proceeds of certain timber sold by the Sheriff 
under executions in bis hands against the Defendant. This rule 
was granted on an affidavit of the Plaintiff, stating that after the 
timber had been levied on by the Sheriff, and before the sale, it was 
again levied on by the Coroner under the execution in this suit, 
and was afterwards sold by the Sheriff under the executions in his 
hands, and that the sale had been made not in parcels but in one large 
lot; but it did not appear by the affidavit that the Sheriff had any 
notice of the levy by the Coroner prior to the sale. Notice had 
been given to the Sheriff after the sale not to pay over the surplus 
in his hands to the Defendant.
G. D. Street now shewed cause, and urged that in no case will 
the Court interfere to order money in the Sheriff’s hands to be 
applied to a subsequent execution ; but in this case, at all events, 
he contended it could not be done, and produced an affidavit from 
the Sheriff explaining the reason why he had sold all the timber 
in one lot, and stating that he had not received notice of the 
present application until after he had paid over the money to the 
assignees of the Defendant.
Parlier, contra, contended that this was a case of extreme 
hardship; the Plaintiff would get no benefit from his execution 
unless he received this money, as it appeared the Defendant had 
no property. The Sheriff no doubt has been indemnified before he 
paid over the money.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
I do not think the Court can interfere. If a second execution 
conies into the Sheriff’s hands after he has sold under a former 
one, he has no right to apply any money remaining in his hands 
towaids the second execution. Here it does not appear that the 
Sheriff had notice of the levy by the Coroner until after he had 
sold and received the money.
Botsford, J.:
Here the Plaintiff first gave notice to the Sheriff that he would 
apply to the Court of Common Pleas; he does not do this and 
afterwards, before receiving any notice of this application, the 
Sheriff pays over the money to the Defendant’s trustees for the 
benefit of the creditors generally. It would be hard to make the 
Sheriff now personally responsible for the money.
Parker J.:
I think in this case the Court cannot interfere, and T regret it; 
the Plaintiff appears to have suffered from the manner in which 
the goods were sold by the She; :ff under the execution in his hands. 
A difficulty has arisen from one Plaintiff directing his execution to 
the Sheriff and another to the Coroner against the same Defendant. 
Does the practice require that any other than the jury process 
should be directed to the Coroner where the only objection to the 
Sheriff 
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Sheriff is, that he is a relation of the Defendant, or has the Plaintiff 
an option in such a case ? There should be a uniformity in the 
practice, or collisions between the officers may frequently occur.
The costs of the motion were applied for but refused under the 
circumstances.
Rule discharged.
LAWRENCE AND HILL v. M‘DOWALL.
Where the respective owners of adjoining lands agree by parol to a 
survey and marking of their division line, the Court in an action of 
trespass quare clausum fregit, by one against the other, held that 
such agreement was not within the Statute of Frauds, not being for the 
transfer of any interest or title to lands, and that the Plaintiff i night recover 
notwithstanding the trespass was committed on a part of the premises which 
the Defendant had, previous tu said survey, actually occupied according to 
a boundary which had existed for a number of years between the Plaintiff 
and Defendant.
This was an action of trespass, quare clausum fregit, tried 
before Carter, J. at the April Circuit for the County of Charlotte, 
in the year 1837. The facts of the ease and the points reserved 
for the opinion of the Court are fully stated in the judgment of Ilis 
Honor the Chief Justice.
In Trinity Term last a rule Nisi for a new trial was obtained by 
N. Parker, for the Defendant, upon the points reserved at the trial. 
Cause was shewn in Michaelmas last by G. 1). Street, Counsel 
for the Plaintiff, and at this Term the Court delivered their 
opinions as follow:— 
Chipman, Ch. J.:
After a careful consideration of this case, I am of opinion that 
the application for a new trial cannot be sustained upon either of 
the points which have been so ingeniously raised and urged by the 
learned Counsel for the Defendant.
It appears in evidence that the Plaintiffs and the Defendant were 
respectively in possession of two contiguous lots; that there was 
an actual boundary of their respective possessions which had 
existed for a number of years, part of which boundary consisted of 
a stone wall erected by the Defendant; that in the autumn of 
1834 Hathew'ay, a Surveyor, at the instance of the Plaintiffs, came 
to the land to run the dividing line between these lots; that after 
a good deal of discussion the Defendant stated that he was willing to 
have this line run parallel to the other side line of his own lot, which 
latter line had been run by Mahood, a Surveyor, some years before; 
that Hatlieway ran the line according to this proposition and 
agreement of the Defendant, and set marks upon it, and was 
assisted in so running this line by the Defendant; that this 
line so run cut off from the Defendant’s lot a considerable piece of 
land
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land which had been included within the former actual boundaries 
of his possession, and had been cleared and cultivated by him. 
The trespass for which this action was brought was for the act of 
the Defendant in cutting the grass in the year 1835 between the 
line so run by Hatheway, and the stone wall which formed part of 
the former boundary. There was no question as to the title of the 
parties to theii respective lots. The points made on the part of 
the Defendant which I shall presently advert to, were reserved by 
the learned Judge for the opinion of the Court. He stated to the 
jury that if they were fully satisfied of the Defendants having con­
sented to the line run and marked by Hatheway, this consent would 
be sufficientto givethe Plaintiffs possession of the land up to that line, 
and such possession would ena i e them to sustain this action. It 
was acknowledged by the Defendant’s Counsel that the necessity 
of the jury being entirely satisfied of the full and free consent of 
the Defendant to this line run by Hatheway, before they could find 
for the Plaintiffs, was put by the Judge to the jury in the strongest 
possible manner. The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiffs.
The present argument turns upon the points reserved at the 
trial.
It was in the first place urged on the part of the Defendant that 
this transaction was in substance and effect a conveyance from the 
Defendant to the Plaintiffs of the land which lay between the for­
mer actual line of boundary and Hatheway’s line, which land the 
Defendant had previously in his possession, and that to permit 
land to be conveyed by parol in this manner, would do away with 
the salutary rules which the Law has prescribed in regard to the 
conveyance of land, and particularly with the provisions of the 
Statute of Frauds. But such, it seems to me, was not the cha­
racter and import of this transaction. There was no question of 
title between the parties, but merely a question of boundary. 
Each party acknowledged the title of the other to the lot of which 
he was in possession, and the intent of running the new line and of 
setting the marks upon it, was to designate by mutual agreement 
the limit to which the title of each party extended. There was no 
intention in either party to pass or transfer any estate or interest 
in the land, and the Defendant by consenting to Hatheway’s 
line did no more than acknowledge that his right and title did 
not extend beyond that line, and the conclusion to which the 
jury came, that this consent of the Defendant to this line was 
in point of fact a relinquishment and transfer of his pre-existing 
possession in the locus in quo to the Plaintiffs, does not convey 
with it an implication that any estate, even a tenancy at will, 
thereby passed from the Defendant to the Plaintiffs. It was a 
delivery to the Plaintiffs of the possession of what was acknow­
ledged to be their own, simultaneous with the acknowledgment of 
their right to it. I
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I have not found any English authority directly bearing upon 
this point; but I have met with a case in the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in which it was expressly held that an agree­
ment with regard to a boundary did not import a conveyance of 
title. I extract this case from 3d Davie’s, Abr. of Am. Law, 
402. It is there cited from 5 Wheaton’s Rep. 513, Boyd’s 
Lessee v. Graves, and is abridged as follows : “ A boundary may 
“ be fixed by parol agreement, survey and 21 years possession. 
“ As when in Kentucky in 1793, two adjacent owners of land dis- 
“ puting the boundary line between them, agreed by parol to run 
“ the line, and had it run by a surveyor and marked and possessed 
“ and sold by it for more than 20 years before the suit. Held 
“ this line, as marked on the plat, was legally established and con- 
“ clusivelv; that it is not affected by the Statute of Frauds ; ‘ it is 
“ ‘ not a contract for the sale or conveyance of lands,’ it has no 
“ ingredients of such a contract; there is no quid pro quo, and the 
“ Court do not consider it as a conveyance of title from one person 
“ to another.”
I quote this case, not as an authority which governs my judg­
ment, but as shewing the opinion of a learned Court in a foreign 
country, on the point in hand.
The second point made by the Counsel for the Defendant was 
that the transaction in regard to Hatheway’s line, if binding on the 
Defendant, was so binding on no other principle than that of 
estoppel,—that the Plaintiffs were tenants in common with other 
persons of the lot of which they were in possession that estoppels 
must be mutual and reciprocal; that the estoppel in the present 
instance would not be binding on the co-tenants of the Plaintiffs 
and therefore it ought not to be binding upon the Defendant. 
“ An estoppel is when a man is concluded by his own act or 
“ acceptance to say the truth.”—Coke Lit. 352. The parties to 
an estoppel and their privies are bound by it, and although the co- 
tenants of the Plaintiffs should not be deemed either parties or 
privies to an estoppel created by an act of the Plaintiffs, a point 
which I do not think it necessary to stop to consider, it would not 
absolve the Plaintiffs, who were parties to it, from their obligation, 
and the mutuality of the estoppel as between the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendant would still exist. The point whether the Defendant 
was conclusively estopped by his consent to Hatheway’s line so 
that it would not have been open to him, if he could have done so, 
to shew that there was mistake or deception in this line and that 
it was not the true boundary, does not appear to have arisen; as 
it has not arisen it is not necessary to discuss it. The conduct of 
the Defendant was at all events most cogent evidence against him, 
and if he has lost his vantage ground by agreeing to quit the walls 
and fences which formed the limits of his former occupation, and to 
hold by a new line, it is his own fault. The
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The third objection made on the part of the Defendant wap on 
a matter of fact and not of law, and was predicated on the assump­
tion that the possession had been changed; but it was contended 
that the possession had been transferred to one M‘ Gowan and not 
to the Plaintiffs. M‘Gowan held under a lease which had been 
ratified by the Plaintiffs, by their accepting rent under it. The 
description of the premises in this lease was very loose and indefi­
nite, being “all that part and portion of his lands lying to the 
“ eastward of bis the said James M‘Culloch’s House, comprising 
“ and commonly called the Ridge.”
Evidence of the actual possession taken under this lease would 
under any circumstances, probably be deemed to be the best evi­
dence of its specific limits. Now it was distinctly proved by 
M‘Gowan himself that he never was in possession of any land 
beyond the stone fence ; he was therefore never in possession of 
the locus in quo, and this is conclusive where the matter of actual 
possession alone is concerned.
The points made on the part of the Defendant being thus dis­
posed of in a manner satisfactory to my mind, the case reverts to 
the point which was left by the learned Judge to the jury, whether 
the acts of the Defendant had changed the possession which he 
had formerly held, and had vested it in the Plaintiffs. The jury 
with a full view of all the circumstances of the case have decided 
they did so ; and there I think this cause must rest, and the rule 
for a new trial be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
In the absence of evidence to prove the existence of the line said 
to have been run twenty five years ago by M‘Donald, between old 
Lawrence, the father, and the Defendant, or a twenty years pos­
session under that or any other dividing line between their respec­
tive lots—on the contrary it appearing that the possession of the 
Defendant up to the stone wall did not go farther back than eight 
or nine years,—I am of opinion thatthe possession of the Defendant 
was not such as to have required a deed to transfer his right to the 
Plaintiffs. It does not appear by the evidence that M‘Gowan 
was at any time in possession of the stone wall, or of the ground 
to the south of it; his lease only extending to so much of the ridge 
as he could improve. This case will therefore depend upon the 
question whether the line run by Hatheway between the lots, and 
agreed to by both parties shall be binding and conclusive. It is a 
question of some importance, and, from the recent settlement of the 
country, one that is likely to be of frequent recurrence.
There are many instances where the dividing lines between 
lots have never been ascerta: ned by the respective owners, owing 
to the land being in a state of wilderness, and of low value ; in 
some cases, even where the side lines have been traced by the 
surveyors 
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surveyors on the original surveys, no farther than was sufficient 
to mark their respective courses. Public policy, as well as private 
convenience, require that every facility should be given to the 
settlement and adjustment of such boundaries. It appears to me 
therefore, that when a dividing line which was before uncertain 
and undetermined has been established and mutually agreed upon 
by the owners as the boundary between the respective lots, without 
fraud or circumvention by either of the parties, that such line 
should be conclusive and binding.
In the present case both the parties were present, and assenting 
to the line run by Hatheway,—expressed themselves as satisfied 
with the line established by him, and set up stakes along the same 
as the boundary of their respective lots. The transaction appears 
to have been a very fair one, and I think the parties are bound 
by it.
Carter, J. concurs.
Parker, J. gave no opinion, being interested in a mortgage of the 
Defendant’s lot.
Rule discharged.
G. D. Street, for Plaintiffs.
N. Parker, for Defendant.
STRANG v. BELL.
Riem en arrear is not a good plea in an action for double value.
After demurrer is argued the Court will allow the plea to be withdrawn 
upon payment of the costs of demurrer.
The declaration contained three Counts; the two first were for 
the double value of the premises, the last was for use and occu­
pation.
The Defendant pleaded rien en arrear, to which plea there was 
a demurrer and a joinder in demurrer.
At this Term W. B. Kinnear was heard in support of the 
demurrer :—
The plea rien en arrear is no answer to the first and 
second counts, 2 Ros. on Real Property, 478 480. The 
action is brought for the double value, the tenancy having been 
terminated by notice to quit given by the landlord. After such 
termination the Defendant is in fact treated as a trespasser. Rien 
en arrear is a good plea only when the action is brought for the 
rent reserved—Stev. on Pl. 188 ; 1 Chit, on Pl. 552.
Wilmot, contra.
The plea is good as it answers the whole action. A set off' 
could have been pleaded, and for the same reason rien en arrear. 
Warner v. Theobald, Cowp. 588; Cobb. v. Stokes, 8 Eas 358.
Kinnear, in reply, was stopped by the Court. Per
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Per Curiam.
The plea is clearly bad, being no answer to the action for the 
double value.
Wilmot then applied for leave to withdraw the plea of rien en 
arrear, which the Court allowed on the payment of the costs of 
the demurrer.
W. B. Kinnear, for Plaintiff.
L. A. Wilmot, for Defendant.
K 'MIOTY TEltM,
IN THE
FIRST YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.
DOE EX DEM COLE AND OTHERS, v. HARPER AND 
WIFE.
Where A, a feme sole, was, previous to her coverture, in the actual occu­
pation, conjointly with her brother, of lands which descended to them from 
their father, and upon her marriage left the possession in her brother, who 
occupied it for more than forty years, paying, during that period, all taxes 
and charges thereon, and receiving all the rents and profits; in an action of 
ejectment brought by her heirs on the death of A and her husband, the 
Court held, that under the 14th Section of the Act of Assembly 6, Wm. 4, 
c. 43, which provides that if, at the time of the Act coming into operation, 
the possession were not adverse the right should not be barred for five years, 
the question of adverse possession should be left to the jury to determine, 
and that it should be decided according to the law as it stood when the said 
Act came into operation.
This was an action tried before Parker J. at the last West­
morland Circuit, in September 1837. The facts of the case are 
fully stated in the following report of the learned Judge before 
whom the cause was tried:—
This was ejectment to recover certain undivided parts of the 
real estate of John Grace, deceased, in the Parish of Sackville, 
being two marsh lots, Nos. 25 and 18, each containing 10| acres, 
now in the possession of the Defendant. John Grace died seised 
on the 7th March, 1788, intestate, leaving a widow and three 
children, Michael, Martha and John.
John Grace, the son, died 26th September, 1792, intestate, and 
without issue.
At the death of John Grace, the elder, his widow and children 
were in possession of the land, and continued to occupy it together 
until the marriage of Martha and death of John ; after which time 
it was in the sole occupation of Michael Grace.
Martha Grace married Ebenezer Cole about 1789, and died in 
1809, leaving seven children, the six younger of whom are the 
lessors of the Plaintiff, or standing in their rights, who claim their 
several shares of their mother’s portion, viz. one fourth, of John 
Grace, Senior’s estate, as one of his immediate heirs, and one third 
of one fourth as one of the heirs to her brother, John Grace. Junior.
N1 Ebenezer
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Ebenezer Cole died in 1826, more than ten years before br:ngmg 
this action.
AH the lessors of the Plaintiff, except one, were of age when 
their father, Ebenezer Cole, died.
Michael Grace died on 5th January, 1836. He was three times 
married, leaving issue by the first marriage, who still survive, and 
leaving a widow in possession of the land in question, who has 
since married Christopher Harper, and who are the Defendants in 
this suit, he coming into possession on his marriage.
The widow of old John Grace lived with her son Michael until 
her death in 1813.
It was proved by the cross-examination of Plaintiff’s witness, that 
from the time of Michael Grace being left in the sole occupation 
until his death, he claimed it as his own, and was never disturbed; 
that he paid the dyke bills to the Commissioners of Sewers, and 
was annually assessed as owner, and no other person paid any part 
of the charges ; he took all the produce.
The Defendants called no witnesses, but contended that although 
the possession of Michael Grace was not at first adverse, his sister 
being a tenant in common or coparcener; yet that
1 st. There was sufficient evidence to presume an ouster, she 
having had no possession from 1789, nearly fifty years.
2d. That a conveyance from Ebenezer Cole, and Martha his 
wife, might be presumed.
3d. That supposing Martha Cole’s coverture to enure as a dis­
ability, an entry ought to have been made within ten years of her 
death.
4. That although the children could not enter in consequence of 
Ebenezer Cole’s intervening estate as tenant by the courtesy, they 
should have entered within ten years of his death, at least all who 
were then of full age.
That consequently this action was barred by the Statute of Li­
mitations on all the demises, or on all except that of Martin Cole, 
who was not of full age within ten years.
Ad. on Ej. 52, 53, 72, 54, 56. Fairclaim v. Shackleton, 5 
Burr, 2607; 2 Bl, 1692 ; Doe d. Fisher v. Prosser, 1 Cowp. 217.
To this it was answered by the Counsel for the Plaintiff; that 
Michael Grace’s possession was not adverse ; he came into posses­
sion with Martha, who had a joint possession until she married.
That she being under the disability of coverture, no actual ous­
ter or disseisin could be presumed against her.
That although the Lessors of Plaintiff inherited her estate in 
1809, their right of entry did not accrue until their father’s death 
in 1826, he being tenant by the courtesy.
That sufficient time had not elapsed since his death to warrant 
the presumption of actual ouster as against them,—nothing short 
of
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of twenty years would be sufficient; that, at all events, Martin 
Cole was not barred.
That Martha Cole could only convey with her husband by deed 
duly acknowledged and registered under the Act of Assembly, 
and that such a deed would not be presumed,—no ground for such 
presumption in this case; Ebenezer Cole could not convey his 
children’s right.
It was stated in the Plaintiff’s opening that Michael Grace had 
held by purchase from Ebenezer Cole, but this fact was not proved.
In charging the jury I stated that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
recover, unless the lessors were barred by the Statute of Limita­
tions. That whether they were so barred depended altogether 
upon the presumption of an actual ouster by Michael Grace, of 
Martha Cole or her children; as I did not think a conveyance 
could be presumed in this case. That whether such presumption 
could be made was a fact for them to determine, Or rather an in­
ference which it was their province to draw from the circumstances, 
but I thought it the duty of tlie Judge to state his opinion to them.
That in myopinion, although a great length of time had elapsed,— 
still considering Martha Cole’s coverture, her joint possession until 
her marriage, and Ebenezer Cole’s life estate, wrho had died only 
in 1826,—the circumstances w’ere not sufficient to induce the 
inference of an actual ouster. I recommended them, therefore, to 
find for the Plaintiff, saying to them, that if I was wrong in stating 
my opinion to them, or in the opinion I had formed, it would be a 
ground for setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
The jury found for the Plaintiff.
Chandler, in Michaelmas Term, 1837, after full discussion of the 
points mooted at the trial, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial.
In Hilary Term last, cause was shewn by G. Botsford, for 
the lessors of the Plaintiff.
When ouster can be presumed the parties must have been in 
such a situation as to have availed themselves of their right, or to 
have acquiesced in the adverse claim. As at the time of Martha 
Grace’s marriage she and her brother, Michael Grace, (through 
whom the Defendant’s claim,) were co-heirs and tenants in com­
mon, both by right and by actual possession, Ebenezer Colp,1' her 
husband, became invested eo instanti by the marriage with the im­
mediate right of possession, and had a life estate in the same, and 
Martha lost all present control over the property, and an ouster could 
not be presumed against her; she having no power to take advantage 
of her right, or to acquiesce in the adverse claim, consequently her 
children could not be affected by the possession sought to be set up. 
No length of possession of a third person could give an estate as 
against Martha and her heirs, as the law would presume such pos­
session to be consistent with her husband’s life estate, or at most 
but
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but adverse to it and ilis rights. In the case cited from Cowp. 217, 
there was no disability to help the lessors of the Plaintiff. Pos­
session for any length of time is not evidence of ouster—Doe d. 
Fairclain, v. Shackleton, 5 Burr, 2607.; Doe u. Pike and another; 
r> B. & Ad. 738. In the latter case the Court held that 35 years 
possession in the parties should be referable to a presumed agree­
ment, and would not presume an ouster. So far as regarded Mar­
tha’s estate her brother’s possession would not be considered ad­
verse, but in fact, under the authority of the last case cited, would 
be properly referable to a presumed transfer from Martha’s husband 
of his right. By the learned Counsel for the Defendants it had 
been urged, that the length of possession and receipt of profits 
would prove an actual ouster, but the cases did not bear out this 
doctrine. “ If two tenants in common enter and afterwards one of 
“ them take all the profits, this does not divest the other without 
actual ouster or disseisin”—Cq. Lit. 200 & 373; Hob. 120 ; Com. 
Dig. Tit. Parcener A3. In Fairclaim v. Shackleton, the Court 
says when there is no adverse possession, no actual keeping out of 
possession, but one tenant receives all the rent without accounting 
there is no ouster.
In Reading v. Rawsterne, L. Raymond, 830, it was decided that 
the taking of profits by one heir for a number of years did not bar 
the right,—it was necessary that there should be an actual disseisin.
The Act of Assembly 6 Win. 4, c. 43, §. 3, which fixes the 
time when a right shal 1 be deemed to have accrued, uses these 
words: “ when a party shall have been dispossessed or have discon- 
“ tinued such possession &c.” Now as the possession of Michael 
Grace was the possession of Martha, the mother of the lessors of 
the Plaintiff, there was no dispossessing of or discontinuing of pos­
session by Martha in the contemplation of the Act. The case of 
Doe d. Corbyn, v. Bramston, 3 Adol. & Ell. 63, which was cited 
and much relied on by the Counsel for Defendant, differed from 
the present in this material point,—in that the possession was left 
vacant, but in this in a co-heir and tenant in common and thus 
accorded with Lord Denman’s declaration, “that if there were any- 
“ thing to shew a unity of possession it could not be held adverse.” 
An Act of Assembly which affected the right of property like the 
Statute of Limitations, should be construed strictly. The 12th 
section of the Act of Assembly was not intended to operate except 
as between co-heirs or co-tenants, and not to deprive a party 
Plaintiff of the right to resort to the entry of his co-tenant to shew 
a possession in both as against a stranger. The entry of one co­
parcener operates in favor of both; also the entry of the mother as 
guardian to one co-parcener, operates for both—7 T. R. 396. 
Under the 14tli section of the Act the lessors of the Plaintiff at all 
events were entitled to recover. It rested with the Defendant in 
this case to prove an actual ouster, and as by the laws of this
Province 
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Province a method of conveying a feme covert’s property was pro­
vided, that method must be proved to have been strictly followed. 
No presumption can arise in this case, aspindependent of such 
proceedings, the wife has no power to make a deed, and all pre 
sumption, if any, must attach to a transfer by Martha’s husband 
of his life estate, as it legally might.
Parker, contra:—
This case presents a party who was in quiet possession nearly 
fifty years, and was regularly assessed for dyke ratbs and poor 
taxes, which were paid by him individually, and no demand was 
ever made upon him for rent &c. It was not a case of wilderndSs 
land, but of productive and valuable property, and the parties under 
whom the lessors of Plaintiff claim, resided in the neighbourhood 
and never demanded their right or contributed to the expense. It 
is a naked claim of'possession, and the policy of the Act as regards 
Michael Grace and those who claim under him, goes as far to pro­
tect liis possession as it does the right of the lessors of the Plaintiff. 
The Stat, of J he. I. has been extended to guard against every pos­
sible case under which a very long possession might, by any possi­
bility, be disturbed. This is a new country and the policy of the 
Statute applies with double force. It has been contended that the 
combined effect of a tenancy in common and a disability, is greater 
than either would individually be entitled to. Now as a simple 
case, and disembarassed, suppose Michael Grade’a perfect stranger 
to Martha, and she a feme sole, Michael’s pefesession would have 
given him a perfect title febut it is contended that here the cir­
cumstances of the tenancy in common and Martha’s coverture 
make a difference, but they cannot be blended. Taking then the 
question of tenancy in common, wholly divested of the question of 
disability, I dissent from the position that the Act of Assembly was 
intended to operate only between tenants in common, parceners, 
&c. No longer ago than in the case of Merritt and Quinton, the 
distinct and decifled possession of one tenant in common was con­
sidered such a possession as ousted a co-tenant.
[Parker J.—There was no proof of any actual possession in 
Quinton.]
The grant was to all, and by act of law the possession of oue 
is as much the possession of all as in the case of livery of seisin.
[Parker J.—The grant was to each of so many acres.]
So here the land depended in equal proportions to the children 
of old John Grace. As to the case of a former Rector, to which 
this case has been compared, no claim of any right of way &c. 
could be set up against a subsequent Rector, because as no grant 
could be made nene could be presumed, nullum tempos occurrit 
ecclesioe. This case has been argued on the point of disability, and 
if the Plaintiff cannot bring himself within the provisions thereof 
the 
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the tenancy in common will not help him. The character of pos­
session is not affected by the consideration that the claimant is a 
minor orfeme-covert, or undgrany other disability. The question of 
the possession being adverse and its commencement as adverse 
was for the jury, and they might fairly presume that some informal 
conveyance had been made by Martha Cole, and that from thence 
the possession of Michael was adverse. In a late case Doe v. 
Nepean, ,5 13 & Ad. 86, of presumption of the death of a party not 
having been heard of for seven years, the Court said it was .not a 
presumption that he died at the end of the seven years j so in the 
case in Cowper 217, the presumption of adverse possession was 
not held as commencing at the end of the 36 years. If the jury 
had a right to carry back the possession, then in 1809 Defendant 
had 20 years possession ; and allowing for the estate of courtesy 
which then accrued, in 1819 the ten yearg, expired which the Act 
of Assembly might have given; but in 1826 all disability ceased, 
and ten years elapsed to 1836, during which the lessors of Plaintiff 
made no claim whatever.
[Carter J.—This argument resets on the presumption that the 
jury had a right to find the possession adverse from the time of 
Martha leaving.]
Chipman, Ch. J.—The point to determine is when the ouster 
was, and that must be when Martha discontinued possession ; if 
that took place on her marriage 40 years have elapsed.]
The 16th section over-rides the provisions of the 14th, but 
if protected by disability the Act gives ten years after it 
ceases; and whether the disability ceased in 1809, as there 
can be no succession of disabilities, or expired with theestate of 
courtesy in 1326, ten years only remained, either from 1809, or 
at all events from 1826.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—It would seem the 12th section of the Act 
intended to get rid of the presumption of ouster, by excluding the 
presumption of possession.]
To support themselves by the 12th section it must be argued 
that there was no ground of presumption for a jury during the 
whole course of Michael (trace’s sole occupancy up to the time of 
this action brought. In the previous sections there are provisions 
restricting the operations of the 12th section ; these commence 
with the words “provided always,’’ ; the 16thsection commences 
with the words “ provided nevertheless,” and controling the pre­
vious restrictions, fixes 40 years as the ultimate period at which 
any claim can be set up, and this from public policy and to quiet 
possessions. The 3d and 12th sections of the Act afford a crite­
rion to judge of the commencement of a right. By the former of 
these sections, when the party has been once in possession, the 
period at which his right shall be deemed to have accrued is to be 
taken to be the time of the discontinuance of such possession; and 
by 
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by the latter section the possession of one tenant in common is not 
to be deemed the possession of his co-tenant. To get the benefit 
of the 14tli section it must be contended that there never was 
adverse possession. Now if it could be shewn that there would be 
no adverse possession gained, as against a party while under dis­
ability, then there might be some wight in the argument; but the 
case of Doe d. CoMyn,H. Bramston, clearly shews that the disabi­
lity of the wife’s coverture will not prevent her discontinuance* of 
possession as operating"under the statute. If a f-’me covert could 
not con vey, then this and the case! of a Rector would be analagous, 
but there was nothing to prevent a conveyance by Martha and her 
husband. In Doe v. Pike, the ftreesliTr eiitered and so did the 
lessor of the Plaintiff within 20 years, and that was the express 
ground of the judgment of the Court. In Doe d. Corbyn v. 
Bramston, the Court fully supported the doctrine 'df 40 years pos­
session, and refused to enter into the circumstances.
E. B. Chandler follows:—
Tlje case of Fisher v. Proper shewed that it did not require an 
express denial to raise a presumption of ouster, nor is there any 
case to support such doctrine ; but it is sufficient to entitle the jury 
to presume an ouster that the party has been in undisturbed pos­
session for a number of years. In Fairclain v., Shackleton it was 
not made a point. In the argument the lessors in this case were 
considered as reversioners, but the case of Corbyn v, Bramston 
sets at rest this idea; and again, the wife’^ estate exists in such a 
way as might be enforced by herself and husband, but a rever­
sioner can bring no action. The Statute of Limitations is gene­
rally applicable to all who are not particularly excepted.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Ch. J., after reading the report of the learned Judge 
who tried the cause, proceeded as follows j—
Such was the case at the trial.—In arguing this motion for a 
new trial the learned Counsel for the Defendants have placed their 
principal reliance on the 16th section of the new Provincial Statute 
of Limitations, 6 Wm. 4, c. 43, and have called our attention to 
the case of Doe d. Corbyn v. Bramston, 3 Ad. & Ellis. 63, which 
was decided upon the corresponding section of the Imperial Statute 
3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27. The 16tli Section of the Provincial Act is 
as follows:—“ Provided nevertheless and be it further enacted, 
“ That no entry or action shall be made or brought by any person, 
“ who, at the time at which his right to make an entry or to bring 
“ an action to recover any land shall have first accrued, shall be 
“ under any of the disabilities hereinbefore mentioned, or by any 
“ person claiming through him, but within forty years next after 
“ the time at which such right shall have first accrued, although 
the 
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“ the person under disability at such time may have remained un- 
“ der one or more of such disabilities during the whole of such 
“ forty years, or although the term of ten years from the date at 
“ which he shall have ceased to be under any such disability, or 
“ have died, shall not have expired.” It is contended on the other 
side that the beneficial operations of the 14th section of this Act 
will extend to the lessors of the Plaintiff; that section provides 
“ That when no such acknowledgement as aforesaid shall have 
been given before the time appointed for this Act to take effect, 
“ and the possesion or receipt of the profits of "the land shall not, 
“ at the time of this Act taking effect, have been adverse to the 
“ right or title of the person claiming to be entitled thereto, then 
“ such person or the person claiming through him may, notwith- 
“ standing the period of twenty years hereinbefore limited shall 
“ have expired, make an entry or bring an action to recover such 
“ land at any time within five years next after the time appointed 
“ for this Act to take effect.” If this were a simple case of disa- 
ability, I should have great difficulty in applying to it the protec­
tion of the 14th Section in opposition to the positive enactment of 
the 16th section, and should consider the case of Doe d. Corbynv. 
Bramston, as conclusive on the point. But the distinguishing fea­
ture of the present case is the circumstance which exists in it, of 
a co-tenancy ; it is a compound case of disability and of tenancy in 
in common ; and if the lessors of the Plaintiff have a Zocms Wawrfz un­
der the Statute independent of the circumstance of disability, the 
disability of Martha Cole, unde /whom they claim, ought not to pre­
judice them. What then is tlfe case apart from the.circumstance 
of disability ?' that when','’’according to the provisions of the 
3rd section of the Act, the title of Martha Cole first accrued in 
regard to the respective interests claimecf in this suit, that is to 
say, at the respective times of her quitting possession on her mar­
riage, and of the death of her brother John Grace, her brother and 
co-tenant in common, Michael Grace,, was in possession, and he 
afterwards continued to hold possession. Now there is no one 
principle of law more clear than that, previously to the late Statute 
of limitations, the possession of one tenant in common was to be 
deemed the possession of his companion. This constructive pos­
session in avoidance of the Statute of Limitations, is now indeed 
done away with by the I2th section of the Act. The case of Doe 
d. Fisher v. Proper, Cowp. 217, was relied upon on the part of the 
Defendants, to shew that an undisturbed possession and receipt of 
profits for a great length of time in one tenant in common is a suf­
ficient ground for presuming an ouster of his companion ; but this 
is a presumption for a jury and not for the Court to make, and 
without this presumption it is clear, that according to the law as it 
stood at the time of the passing of the Act, the possession of 
Michael Grace and those claiming under him was not adverse to 
the 
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the title of Martha Cole and those claiming under her. In a very 
late case Doe d. Jones r. Williams, 5 Ad. and Ellis. 291, it was 
decided, that in determining what was adverse possession under 
the section of the Imperial Statute which corresponds to the 14th 
section of the Provincial Act, the law must be taken as it stood at 
the time of the passing of the Act. Can then this Court, without 
the finding of a jury, say, that at the ti ne when the Provincial 
Act took effect the possession of those who held under Michael 
Grace was adverse to the title of Martha Cole? Under the facts 
of the case the Court, I think, cannot say this. If indeed, under 
the authority of the case of Doe d. Fisher v. Prosser, the circum­
stances of long possession would alone have been conclusive topre­
sume an ouster of Martha Cole, had it not been for her coverture 
I should have had more difficulty. But the opinion of Lord Ten- 
terdenwith regard to the case of Doe d. Fisher v. Prosser, as given 
in the case of Doe v. Phillips, 3 Bar. & Ad. 761, is that the deed 
of partition between Mary Taylor, one of the tenants in common, 
and the husband of the other for his life, and not merely the fact of 
undisturbed possession was much depended upon as indicating that 
the possession of the tenant in common was adverse to that of her 
companion. As the husband in his own right is entitled to the 
profits of his wife’s estate, and in this right may claim them, it 
does not strike me that the mere circumstance of the coverture is 
of so great potency to avoid the presumption of an ouster if that 
presumption would have arisen from long possession and receipt of 
profits alone, if there had been no coverture. Upon the whc e, I 
am of opinion, that as this action was commenced after the Pro 
vincial Act 6 Wm. 4, c. 43, came into operation, it must be 
governed by the provisions of it; and that this Act will be a bar to 
the act’on unless the lessors pf the Plaintiff are protected by the 
14th section, for it has been decided in a very late case under the 
Imperial Act, Nepean d. Doe;w. Knight, 2 M. & W. 911, that the 
second and third sections of this Act, 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 2i, have 
done away with the doctrine of non-adverse possession, and ex ­
cept in cases falling within the 15tli section of the Act, (which cor 
responds with the 14tli section of the Provincial Act,) the question 
is whether twenty years have elapsed since the right accrued, 
whatever be the nature of the possession. In order to ascertain 
whether this case will fall under the protection of tlie 14 th section 
of the Provincial Act, it must, I think, be sent to another jury for 
the express purpose of determining whether the possession of the 
land by the Defendants, or those under whom thejr claim, on fhe 
first of January, 1837, the day on which the Act took effect, was 
adverse to the title of the lessors of the Plaintiff; and I think the 
costs of the former trial should abide the event of the suit.
Botsford
01
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Botsford, J.:
It is a general rule of law, that the possession of any one copar­
cener, joint tenant, or tenant in common, is the possession of the 
others of them, so as to prevent them being barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. The examination of some of the principal cases 
will shew the application and effect of this rule of law, and under 
what circumstances its operation may be prevented and controlled. 
In Fairclaim v. Shackelton, 5 Burr, 2604, the lands were in the 
possession of a tenant who had paid the rent for the whole premi­
ses for about twenty six years, to a tenant in common of one undi­
vided moiety. It was contended on the part of the Defendant, 
that the taking of the profits for so long a time was an ousting of 
the other tenant in common, and that the Plaintiff was bound by 
the Statute of Limitations. It was laid down by Lord Mansfield, 
“ that there must be an adverse possession in order to enable the 
Statute to run ; there must be disseisin, and a disseisin strictly 
proved.” In Dee v. Bird, 11 East. 49, it was objected that as the 
Plaintiff and Defendant were tenants in common, the ejectment 
could not be maintained, without proof of actual ouster. At the 
trial the Plaintiff proved a demand of possession of the premises 
by letter, under a power of Attorney, to which demand a refusal 
was returned by the Defendant, who stated that he claimed the 
whole ; and this was thought by the learned Judge sufficient evi­
dence of an. actual ouster. On a motion for a new trial it was said, 
per curiam, “ one tenant in common in possession, claiming the 
whole and denying possession to the other, is beyond the mere act 
of receiving the whole rent, which is equivocal; this was certainly 
evidence of an ouster of his companion.”. In the case of Doe v. 
Taylor 5 Ba. & Ad. 575, where there were several coparceners, 
and one only in actual possession, a feoffment executed by her, and 
livery of seisin to a stranger, under a’fine levied by her with pro­
clamations of the whole premises to him, was held to operate asan 
ouster and disseisin of the other coparceners, as to the whole pre­
mises. This case is contrary to that of Ford v. Grey, 1 Sal. 285, 
where it was ruled by the Court: “ If one joint tenant levies a 
fine it severs the jointure, but does not amount to an ouster of his 
companion;” and also to Peaceable v. Reed, 1 Ea. 568. I come 
now to the case of Doe v. Prosser, Cowper 217, which has been 
much relied upon by the Counsel for the Defendant, and which 
appears to establish the doctrine, that a sole and uninterrupted 
possession of forty years by one tenant in common, without any 
demand or claim by the other, and without any payment to him 
during that time, was sufficient to prove an adverse possession and 
ouster. There was a circumstance, however, in that case, which 
in Doe v. Phillips, 3 Ba. & Ad. 761, was adverted to in the fol­
lowing manner by Lord Tenterden: “ Doe v. Prosser,” says his 
Lordship, 
in the 1 irst Year of VICTORIA. 299
Lordship, “ is a very different case ; there there had been a deed 
of partition between Mary Taylor, one of the tenants in common, 
and the husband of the other for his life, and the.husband enjoyed 
under that for twenty nine years ; liis widow, the other cotenant, 
after his death, enjoyed for nearly forty years; that was considered 
an adverse holding, equivalent to an actual ouster.” It is clear 
that in the opinion of his Lordship the deed of partition connected 
with the long possession of the widow under it, distinguished the 
case of Doe v. Prosser. In this case of Doe v. Prosser, it is natu­
ral to suppose that the partition made between the sisters was an 
equal and just division of the property, and though it was in the 
first place limited by the life of Stevens, the husband of one of 
them, yet from the continuance of his widow in the possession for 
so long a time after his death, that it had been intended by them 
to remain a permanent one. Lord Mansfield, in giving his opinion 
upon the motion for a new trial, appears to have assimilated the 
case to one where there had been a holding over after the expira­
tion of a particular estate ; and it is to be inferred from the way in 
which he put the question, viz. “ whether the possession in this 
case after the death of Stevens, in the year 1734, that is after the 
particular estate ended, was a possession as tenant in common, eo 
nomine or adverse, that he must have considered the w’ low of 
Stevens not in the light of a tenant in common, but as holding over 
after the expiration of the particular estate created by the deed of 
partition ?”
From an attentive consideration of. the above authorities, and 
there being no case to be found in which a quiet and uninterrupted 
possession by one tenant in common, alone and unaccompanied 
with any controlling circumstances, has been adjudged an ouster 
of the other cotenant, I have come to the conclusion, that in the 
present case the possession of Michael Grace of the premises in 
question, was the possession of Martha Cole, the other cotenant, 
and since her death the possession of the lessors of the Plaintiff as 
the heirs of the said Martha.
That subsequently to the death of Michael Grace, in 1836, the 
possession of his widow was the possession of his infant son, as 
his guardian in soccage, pursuant to the doctrine as laid down by 
Lord Ch. J. De Grey in Goodtitle v. Newman, 3 Wils 527; that 
with respect to the objection that the lessors of the Plaintiff are 
barred by the 16th section of the Act of Assembly 6 Wm. 4, c. 43, 
I am of the opinion that the possession of the son of Michael 
Grace at the time of passing the Act, was the possession of the 
lessors of the Plaintiff as tenants in common, and was not adverse 
to their claim, consequently they are within the exception con­
tained in the 14th section of the Act.
This, in my opinion, being the law, the question of ouster under 
the 
300 CASES in TRINITY TERM,
the peculiar circumstances of the case, is one for a jury to deter­
mine, and should, I think, he submitted to the consideration of 
another jury.
Parker J.:
. I quite agree with the rest of the Court, that the rule for a new 
trial must be made absolute, as the only inquiry at the former 
trial was, whether or no an ouster should be presumed twenty 
years before the action, so as to make an adverse possession of that 
extent, I also agree in thinking that on the state of facts exis­
ted at the trial, this action is barred by the late Act of Assembly, 
6 Wm. 4, c. 43, unless the lessors of the Plaintiff can bring them­
selves within the benefit of the five years given by the 14th section 
of that Act.
I do not, however, accede to the position taken by the learned 
Counsel for the Defendants at the argument, that because Martha 
Cole discontinued possession more than forty years before action 
brought, and was then under the disability of coverture, the lesssors 
of the Plaintiff claiming through her are necessarily barred by the 
16th section, and therefore cannot avail themselv.es of the 14th.
If they are unable to make out their right without the aid 
which the 15th section gives to the disability arising out of their 
mother’s coverture, then indeed it would seem difficult to evade 
the positive enactment of the 16th( for this latter section certainly 
controls and limits the operation of the 15th, but I do not think it 
can have any such general effect as has been contended for.
To render the 15th and 16th sections applicable, there must 
have been a long adverse possession, whereas the 14 th section is 
intended only for cases where no adverse possession had commen­
ced when the Act took effect. I shall endeavor to explain this by 
a few remarks.
Section 13 has no bearing on the case, and the words of refe­
rence thereto, used in the 14th, may be omitted without altering 
its sense in its present application. The 14tli section will then 
read thus: “ Provided always and be it further enacted, That 
when the possession or receipt of the profits of the land shall not, 
at the time of the Act taking effect, have been adverse to the 
right or title of the person claiming to be entitled thereto, then 
such person, or the person claiming through h'm may, notwith­
standing the period of twenty years hereinbefore limited shall have 
expired, make an entry or bring an action to recover such land 
at any time within five years next after the time appointed for 
this Act to take effect.”
The question here arises, whether the possession of the Defend­
ants was or was not adverse at the time of the Act taking effect, 
namely, on the 1st January, 1837. If it be said that this question 
does not arise because there was a forty years possession in the 
Defendants 
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Defendants and Michael Grace, under whom they claim, I reply 
that by such a construction of the Act the les^irs of the Plaintiff 
are placed in a worse situation, because th'-ir mother, through whom 
they claim, was under disability, than if she had been under no 
disability, for the 16th section applies only to persons under disa­
bility, and those claiming through them.
The fallacy of the argument of the Defendant’s Counsel on this 
point, consists either in the taking it for granted that there was a 
twenty years adverse possession proved against Martha Cole and 
her heirs under the old law, and that the1 right of those claiming 
through her to make an entry depended on thl additional ten years 
given by the 15th section; or in considering that the time at which 
the right of entry first accrued is at all events to be ascertained by 
the standard of the new Act. But what are the facts ?
Martha Cole entered before her coverture, and was at the time 
thereof seised jointly with Michael Grace, they being tenants in 
common. After her marriage she ceased to occupy, but prima 
facie Michael Grace’s possession was her possession, it would not 
become adverse until there was an ouster. Proof of actual ouster 
there was none, but the circumstances, it is said, are such as would 
warrant the presumption of an ouster; this however is but a pre­
sumption to be made by a jury, not the Court, though the jury on 
this, as well as on other matters, may be guided by the opinion of 
the Court. The fact of adverse possession cannot therefore here 
be assumed, it must be found, and we cannot now say that the 
possession was adverse when the act took effect.
It may be argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs, that true it is forty 
years have passed since Martha Cole, through whom we claim, left 
Michael Grace in possession, but we deny that his possession, or 
that of the Defendants, was adverse; neither does our right to 
maintain our action necessarily depend on our shewing that Mar­
tha Cole was under disability, for supposing she had been under no 
disability, and we were enabled to prove verbal admissions or 
other matters sufficient before the late Act to negative any pre­
sumption of ouster arisjjjg out of the length of possession, our 
right of entry would have existed when that Act took effect, and 
we should be entitled to the five years in which to bring our action, 
although the possession would be esteemed adverse, and although 
the admissions would not have saved the right of entry according 
to the provisions of the 3d, 12th & 13th sections of the new Act.
The question as to the fact of an adverse possession such as 
would briiig a party within the 14th section, must be determined 
as it would have been if the Act had never passed. The Act can 
admit of no other meaning, and the English decisions under the 
late statute, from which our Act is copied, are clear on this point- — 
Doe d. Jones v. Williams ; 5 Ad. & E. ^91 ; Doe d. Burgess v. 
Thompson, lb. 533. In
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In the case from 3 Ad. & E. Doe v. Bramston, so much relied 
on at the argument, Lord Denman qualifies his general expressions 
in this way : “ If the persons actually in possession could be shewn 
to have held under him through whom the Plaintiff claims, the 
possession of the former might be regarded as the possession of the 
latter.” In that case there was no doubt of the adverse possession 
when the Statute took effect, in fact there was no privity whatever 
between the Plaintiff and Defendant.
Should the jury on a new trial find that the possession of Har­
per and his wife on the 1st January, 1837, was adverse to the les­
sors of the Plaintiff, their right would, under the existing state of 
facts, be barred, but I conceive they are entitled to have that 
point distinctly put to the jury, accompanied by such observations 
from the Judge as the case may require, and ought to recover if 
that be established in their favor.
As to the question which arose at the trial, I quite concur with 
Mr. Justice Botsford, in thinking that the circumstances of this 
case upon the evidence there given would not warrant the jury in 
presuming an actual ouster of Martha Cole.
The judgment of Lord Kenyon in Peaceable v. Read, 1 East 
568, states very clearly the ground on which such presumptions 
are made pritna facie^’ says his Lordship, “ the possession of 
one tenant in common is that of another ; every case and dictum 
in the books is to that effect. But you may shew that one of them 
has been in possession and received the rents and profits to his own 
sole use, without account to the other, and that the other has ac­
quiesced in this for such a length of time as may induce a juryun- 
der all the circumstances, to presume an actual ouster of his com­
panion, and there the line of presumption ends. *** All the cases 
mentioned go upon the ground of acquiescence in an adverse hold­
ing, in order- to presume an ouster*^*without an ouster be found 
by the jury, the possession of one tenant in common must be taken 
to be the possession of all.”
If the presumption rests on tlie acquiescence of the party entitled, 
how could there be an acquiescence to bind Martha Cole wdiile she 
was sub protestate viri, or to bind her children until they had a 
right to enter ?
It was opened at the trial that Michael Grace held under a con­
veyance of Ebenezer Cole, and notice had been given to produce 
the conveyance, though not, it appeared to me sufficiently soon 
for the admission of secondary evidence; as this may be supplied 
at a new trial, it may be well to consider what effect such a state 
of facts would have on the question of ouster. A conveyance by 
Cole seized in sight of his wife would put an end to the tenancy in 
common, but not by ouster or disseisin which is a wrongful act, 
but by a rightful vesting of Cole’s life estate in Michael Grace.
By
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By the Common Law Cole’s conveyance of the fee would have 
operated as a discontinuance, but by the Statute 32 Hen. 8, C. 
28, a feoffment, or other act of the husband alone, of the inheri­
tance or freehold of his wife, shall be no discontinuance, nor preju­
dice the entry of the wife, her heirs, or any claiming after her 
death. Fines levied by the husband and wife (whereunto the said 
wife is party or privy,) are only excepted.
By our Act of Assembly 32 Geo. 3, c. 2, the husband and wife 
are enabled to convey the wife’s estate of freehold and inheritance 
by Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, the conveyance to 
have the same operation in that respect as a fine.
If Michael Grace then was holding not adversely to, but under 
a conveyance of Ebenezer Cole, the right of entry as against him 
would not have accrued until Cole’s death, when the estate which 
he could lawfully convey to Grace would cease, and here the 5th 
section of the Act may be applicable.
See 3. Com. Dig. 430; Discontinuance A. 3.
Litt. 8, 594, 605, Co. Litt 326.
2 Com. Dig. 385.
1 Bac. Abr. 727.
Runnington on Ej.
I make these suggestions, though now somewhat extrajudicial, 
for the purpose of calling the attention of the parties to them before 
a new trial, as the mention of them now may perhaps save expence 
and delay hereafte-.
For the reasons before assigned, I agree that the rule for a new 
trial must be made absolute.
As the point on which the new trial is granted was not taken at 
the last trial, the Plaintiff is at least entitled to have the costs 
abide the event. Rule absolute.
RANKIN v. CLARKE.
Action on the case. The declaration contained counts for libel, malicious 
prosecution and oral slander. Some of the evidence given by the Plaintiff 
would not have been admissible on the slander counts. The Plaintiff aban­
doned the counts for malicious prosecution, and went to the jury on the 
libel and slander counts. The Judge in his summing up left the case open 
to the jury on the slander counts, to which a justification had been pleaded, 
but directed them to find for the Defendant on the others. The jury however 
found for the Plaintiff on the whole declaration, with general damages.
The Plaintiff not having requested the verdict to be corrected before the 
jury were discharged, the Court refused now to allow the verdict to be en­
tered on the slander counts only, not being satisfied that the jury had limited 
their damages to those counts.
In an action for oral slander, an affidavit of the Defendant made before 
a Magistrate as the foundation of a criminal proceeding against the Plaintiff, 
which is still pending, is not admissible in evidence to shew malice in the 
Defendant.
In granting a new trial the Court directed the costs to abide the event.
This
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This was all action on the case. The declaration contained 
seven counts.
The first count was for a libel • the second and third for libel­
lous matter contained in an affidavit of the Defendant made Jjefore 
two Justices of the Peace; the fourth and fifth bounts were for a 
malicious prosecution; the sixth and seventh for oral slander. 
The defendant pleaded, first the general issue, and secondly as to 
the sixth and seventh counts, a justification of the words spoken.
Replication de iitptria, tyc.
At the trial before Botsford J. at the last Northumber­
land | Circuit it appeared in evidence that Defendant said 
to a witness, that the Plaintiff had taken a boy whom he found 
stealing nuts at his store, and thrown him off his wharf into the 
river, where the water was two or three fathoms .deep, and that 
the boy would have been drowned if he had not been taken out of 
the water by two men in a canoe, who caught him just as he was 
in the act of sinking a second time. That at the request of the 
Defendant, Ilea, a witness, drew up a statement in pencil which 
he gave to Defendant. An affidavit, sworn before two Justices 
procured from the files of the Court, was put in evidence. This 
affidavit was brought to the Justiqes by the Defendant, and was 
sworn before them, Defendant was recognized to appear as a wit­
ness, and the affidavit'and recognizance were filed with the Clerk 
of the Circuits. Hea, the witness, stated that the affidavit was 
materially the same as the memorandum he had drawn up in pen­
cil from the Defendant’s statement.
Wilmot, for Defendant, moved for a non-suit, on the grounds—
1 st. That the affidavit stated in the three first counts, being 
made in course of justice, was no libel.
2nd. That no prosecution was shewn, or proved to be ended.
3rd That the words charged in the two last counts were quali­
fied by other words proved, and that the evidence disproved 
malice.
The fourth and fifth counts were abandoned; as to the other 
counts the learned Judge ruled, that the Defendant had proceeded 
in an extraordinary manner, professing duty, a desire to discharge 
liis conscience, a record for the authorities to proceed on, and 
having applied to a third person, instead of a Justice of the Peace, 
the ground of objection failed. As to the sixth and seventh counts, 
the question of malice was for the consideration of the jury.
The Defendant went into evidence to support his plea of justi­
fication.
The Plaintiff had a verdict for £100 damages.
In Michaelmas Term Wilmot, for Defendant, obtained a rule 
nisi to set aside the verdict on the following grounds :—
1st. That words qualifying those charged were omitted to be 
stated in the declaration.
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2nd. That the words were spoken in a course of justice.
3rd. That the verdict was against evidence, the plea of justi­
fication having been proved.
Cause was shewn in Hilary Term, by J. A. Street, and N. Par­
ker for Plaintiff; and
Wilmot, for Defendant, was heard in support of the rule.
At the close of the argument the Court permitted the Plaintiff’s 
Counsel to take out a rule nisi to enter the verdict on the sixth 
and seventh counts of the declaration, and that if that rule should 
be made absolute the argument should be considered as closed.
In Trinity Term, J. A. Street and Berton argued in support of 
the rule, that where a verdict at Nisi Prius in libel contained 
seventeen counts and seventeen special pleas of justification, the 
Court permitted an amendment, saying it was impossible in such 
a case to hold Counsel bound in the confusion of Nisi Prius—13 
Price^499. Almost anything would be presumed to support a 
verdict. In Richardson v. Mellish, 3 Bing. 334, the Court in­
quired, first, w’as there evidence to support the count on which the 
Plaintiff sought to rest ? and secondly, was all the evidence given 
applicable to that count? In the case before the Court all the 
evidence was admissible under the two last counts. Those counts 
were for words spoken, but it was competent for the Plaintiff to 
give in evidence any words spoken or written, as well as any act 
of the Defendant, to shew quo animo he spoke the words—Russel 
v. M'Quister, 1 Camp. 49, [Note.] In Mead v. Daubigny, 1 
Camp. 49, Lord Kenyon, in an action for a libel, allowed other 
papers in evidence which were themselves libels. In Tote v. 
Humphrey, 2 Campbell, 73 in an action for words of perjury to 
shew the quo animo, the Plaintiff offered a bill of indictment pre­
ferred by the Defendant against him and returned ignoramus ; on 
motion to set aside the verdict, it was held that the evidence was 
properly admitted.
\Botsford J.—I was surprised you did not ask to enter the ver­
dict upon the two last counts, if you had asked I certainly should 
have permitted it.]
Counsel are not bound to elect at the time, but could' elect after­
wards. Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taun. 40. The post6a was 
amendable at any time, even after final judgment—3 T. R. 749.
Wilmot contra.
The grand objection was, that the evidence on the three first 
counts was inapplicable to the two last, and those three counts 
were pressed to the jury as containing a substantive charge of libel. 
In 13 Price all the counts Were for the same libel, all the evidence 
was applicable to any one count; here the Plaintiff’s Counsel put 
the libel strongly to the jury, urging the cool deliberate malice of 
the Defendant. The distinction was if a good count, to which all 
Pl the
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the evidence was applicable, were joined with a bad count, in 
the following Term Plaintiff might amend ; but there was no case 
where the Court had permitted an amendment, unless the evidence 
were so applicable.
Chipman, Ch. J. :
In this case the verdict is for general damages. Before permit­
ting an amendment we must be satisfied from all the proceedings 
that we are carrying into effect the intention of the jury. At the 
trial the Pla itifi proceeded for damages for a malicious prosecu­
tion for a libel, and for oral slander. As to the first, the counts 
relating thereto were abandoned at the trial. and there can be no 
question that they were not considered. As to the second, the 
Plaintiff went to the jury for damages for the libel as a substantive 
cause of action. The learned Judge directed the jmy not to find 
for the libel; they found a verdict for general damages. Then 
unless the Plaintiff felt that he could support the verdict, be should 
have ascertained the intention of the jury ; and I think under the 
circumstances of this case, it is not competent for the Plaintiff to 
ask for a liin'ted verdict. It is contended that the evidence was 
applicable to the two last counts to shew quo aninuo tlffi words 
were spoken. But is there any case to shew that for such a pur­
pose a party may give in evidence a judicial proteediitg that ex­
pressly excludes malice, and therefore cannot be evidence of it? 
Again, if intended for that purpose it should have been so offered, 
and the Judge would then have excluded it as a ground of dama­
ges, and have di'-ected the jury only to find on the substantive 
charge. If this be so, can. we say that the jury with this evidence 
pressed on them by the talent and eloquence of Counsel, were not 
affected by it? and unless it appeared clear that the jtuy intended 
their verdict only on the two last counts, I cannot accede to the 
application.
Botsfoud, J.:
The libel is here stated in the record; the jury had that before 
them, and considered it not as evidence quo auMUM of the speaking 
of the words. I flunk this application is too late, it should have 
been made at the time of the trial.
The Cotlrt then called upon the Counsel for the Plaintiff to 
shew cause against the rule nisi for a new trial.
The learned Counsel argued that the first count was supported 
by the evidence of the contents of the pencil memorandum made 
by Hea, and that the affidavit in the second and third counts was 
not made for the purpose of a judicial proceeding. The Defendant 
prepared a statement in writing and went and swore to it, saying 
he should like to leave a record of the facts. The affidavit was 
not sworn with an intent to prosecute, and if not, no subsequent 
act would throw round it the protection Mtended to judicial pro­
ceedings. Chipman,
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Chipman, Ch. J.:
The Jibel stated was an affidavit made in the usual course of 
justice, and the deponent was bound over to prosecute, and there­
fore the parly was not amenable to justice for the publication of a 
libel. The Plaintiff took the verdict on these counts at his peril; 
Botsford, J.:
I am of the same opinion. The party might have taken bis 
verdict on the two last counts, and even then the damages were 
more than perhaps the occasion called for.
Parker, J.
It is impossible for us to say that ihe juiy in their award of 
damages did not take into consideration the libel as well as the 
slanderous words. The libel in tmtli was the main ground of the 
action, and dwelt upon very much by the Counsel in the summing 
up to the jury, and although Ibejuy were directed by the learned 
Judge to find for the Plaintiff on the slander counis only, still their 
verdict was general, qnd tae Plaintiff would not avail himself of 
an opportunity afforded him by the Judge to ascertain distinctly 
upon what they found, and to have the mistake, if such it was, 
corrected in the verdict before the same was recorded and the jury 
discharged.
Had the action been confined as it should have been to the slan­
derous words, the affidavit before the magistrate would not have 
been let in ; but as the Plaintiff has inserted counts for a malicious 
prosecution as well as libel, it rendered the defence very embar­
rassing and evidence was admitted which we are all quite satisfied 
ought not to have been received when the real state of the case 
was apparent. The prosecution was still pending when the ac­
tion was brought it was perfectly clear then that the count for 
malicious prosecution could not be sustained; and without the pro­
duction of the pencil memorandum written by Mr. Hea, or account­
ing for its non-p’oduclton, in order to let in secondary evidence, 
the count charging that as a libel could not be supported.
We are bound, I think, to send this case down lo a second trial, 
and the Plaintiff ought, it appear^ to me, to be prepared to state 
what is the particular offence which be complains the Defendant 
lias charged him with, in order that the jury may distinctly under­
stand the nature of the complaint, and the facts which lead to it, 
in determini jig how far the evidence substantially supports the 
special plea of justification. I have read the two slander counts 
with much attention, and have called on the Counsel to explain 
them, but have not, to the present moment, received any satisfac­
tory answer to my question whether they pre intended to allege a 
charge of felony or misdemeanour. I hope the record wifi be taken 
down to a new trial, dismembered of the counts which are net sus­
tainable, and that the case may undergo a full, fair and final con­
sideration on its real merits. The
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The Court took time to consider as to the question of costs, and 
on a subsequent day determined that, although the verdict was 
against the direction of the Court, and in such cases the rule was 
usually silent, yet the whole question of costs being in the discre­
tion of the Court, under all the circumstances of this case, it would 
best meet the ends of justice to order that the costs of the last trial 
should abide the event of the suit.
Rule absolute accordingly.
J. A. Street, A. Stewart, N. Parker, G. Kerr, and Berton for 
Plaintiff.
Wilmot and W. Carman for Defendant.
JOPLIN v. DAVIDSON.
Where the Sessions, under an authority to appoint for an unlimited time, 
displaced an officer without a reasonable cause, and appointed another in 
his stead, the Court held that the former was entitled to his action for 
money had and received against the latter, for the profits received subse­
quent to his removal.
An appointment without limitation is an appointment for life.
This was an action of Assumpsit, for money had and received, 
tried before BOTSFORD J. at the Northumberland Circuit, held in 
September last.
If appeared in evidence that W. Abrams held the situation of 
Harbour Master for the Port of Miramichi until August, 1835, 
when he resigned the same. Upon his resignation Plaintiff was 
appointed by the Court of General Sessions for Northumberland, 
under the Act of Assembly 3 G. 4, c. 28, and continued to receive 
the fees of office from that time until March, 1836, when Plaintiff 
was displaced by the Sessions, and Defendant appointed in his stead. 
It also appeared from a resolution, moved at the General Sessions 
by the Defendant himself, (who was one of the Magistrates,) and 
passed, that the ground upon which the Plaintiff was displaced 
was, that at the time of his appointment no notice had been given to 
the public. The Plaintiff sought to recover the amount of fees 
received by Defendant since the time, as he contended, he was ille­
gally removed. A verdict was found for Defendant.
N. Parker, in moving for a new trial in last Michaelmas Term, 
took three grounds :
1st. That an appointment without limitation was an appoint­
ment for life.
2nd. That the Sessions had grounded their appointment on a 
want of notice, and that no notice was required by the law.
3rd. That no power was given to the Sessions to displace, ex­
cept in cases of neglect or misconduct.
The learned Counsel contended that the Plaintiff was an officer 
fairly appointed under the law of the land, and as such had been 
displaced 
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displaced without any sufficient cause, and illegally deprived of 
the profits and emoluments of his office ; that there was no limita­
tion in the Act as to the time that Harbour Masters should act, 
and no power was given to, or arbitrary right conferred upon, the 
Sessions, either by the Act or at the Common Law, to remove 
Harbour Masters at their mere whim or caprice, without any rea­
sonable grounds of charge for neglect, incapacity or mal-conduct. 
The Sessions had declared the situation vacant, because no notice 
hal been given to the public previous to the Plaintiff’s appoint­
ment. By the Act of Assembly no notice was required, and 
Plaintiff was appointed when a competent number of Magistrates 
were present. It was for Defendant to have shewn that notice 
was requisite, especially as he was the mover of the resolution 
which declared the situation of Harbour Master to be vacant, and 
which was so declared vacant in order that the Defendant himself 
might succeed to the appointment. If the appointment had been 
made for one year, the Plaintiff could not have been displaced 
within the year ; he was therefore entitled to bring his action for 
money had and received—1 Sei. N. P. Asst. p. 79 ; Tomlin’s 
Law Diet. Tit. Office.
Ch. J.—No1 objection is raised to the form of action; 
an appointment without 1’nitation must be considered as an ap­
pointment for life.]
The learned Counsel cited Rex v. Guardians of Poor, St. 
Nichols, 4 Maule & Sei. 324 ; Queen v. Corporation, Durham 10, 
Mod. 146; 16 Vin. Abt. 110, 130; Co. Lit. 233, a. b. Croke 
Car. 59.
In Hilary Term J. A. Street, for Defendant, shewed cause.
The learned Counsel contended that the number of Harbour 
Masters for each Harbour were not limited by the Act of Assem­
bly, but that the Court of General Sessions might, in their discre­
tion, appoint as many as they thought proper. The terms of the 
Act were as follows :—“ That it shall and may be lawful for the 
Justices of the Peace in the several and respective Counties, in 
General Sessions, to appoint Harbour Masters for such Harbours 
as may be found to require the same.” Plaintiff was appointed 
without any notice, and in March the Sessions, considering the 
appointment to be incorrect, declared it vacant, and Defendant 
was duly installed therein. The question isj- whether the De­
fendant is Harbour Master or not ? if so, be is clearly entitled to 
the fees and emoluments appertaining to the office. Again, if not 
being such, having performed the duties, has he not in equity and 
good conscience, aright to retain the fees ? Davidson was legally 
appointed ; the Sessions have a right to displace, but even if they 
have not, the correctness of Defendant’s appointment does not 
depend upon the correctness of Plaintiff’s removal.
‘ Chipman,
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[Chipman, Ch. J.—I very much doubt if the Court of Sessions 
can appoint more than one; the Act declares it to be the duty 
of the Harbour Master to enforce the directions and regulations 
of the Sessions, and it appears from the whole tenor of the Act, 
that one Harbour Master was intended for each port.]
[Botsford, J.—I left it the jury, under the impression that the 
Court might have appointed more than one under the Act.]
This action was for money had and received ; Davidson was not 
a usurper in the office; he was regularly appointed and acted and 
performed the duties in pursuance of that appointment, and the 
profits roust clearly enure to his benefit.—bmith v. Latham, 9 
Bing, 692.
There is no case where it has been determined that a party ap­
pointed to a new office under and by virtue of an Act of Parlia­
ment, shall be considered to hold during good behaviour.
N. Parker, contra:—
As to the first point,that the Sessions may appoint more than one 
Harbour Master, no serious question cau be raised. The true 
construction of the Act is, that one Harbour Master shall be ap­
pointed to each Harbour ; the fees are payable to, and certain regu­
lations are to be enforced by the Harbour Master, and if more 
than one were appointed both could not recover. The two ap­
pointments were not intended to be concurrent; that of David­
son’s was evidently intended to supersede Joplin’s, and makes the 
three exceptions in Smith 3 Latham completely analagous. The 
appointment of a person to an office held during pleasure is an 
effectual revocation of a former appointment; and although this 
may be considered a new office, yet the objection of the learned 
Counsel would apply to almost every situation in a new colony. 
The office under different names is well known.
[Chipman, Ch. J.— The nature of the office must depend 
entirely on the Statute ; it is not an ancient or common law 
office.]
Curia advisari wilt.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This case depends entirely on the question, whether the Plain­
tiff still continues to be the legal Harbour Master for the River 
and Harbour of Miramichi, under his appointment to that office by 
the Justices of the Peace for the County of Northumberland, in 
General Sessions, in the month of September, 1835, or whether 
the subsequent proceedings had for the purpose of displacing him, 
and of appointing the Defendant to the said office, are valid and 
effectual for that purpose. The proceedings of the Justices in re­
lation to this matter were given in evidence in the following ex­
tracts from the minutes of the Court of General Sessions of the 
Peace for that County. “ At
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“At a General Sessions of the Peace of our Lord the King, held at 
the Court House at Newcastle, in and for the County of Nor­
thumberland, on Friday the 4th day of September, in the year 
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty five
PRESENT.
Alexander Davidson,N /-".Joseph Cunard,
John Nesmith, < K George Henderson,
John 'I'. Williston, T Esquires, 1 William Joplin. 
Dudley Perley. £ Justices. A John J. Doualds, 
'Phom as C. Allan, \ / Henry B. Allison,
Robert Leslie, J braiiam Mooers.
William Abrams, Esquire, appears by George Kerr, his Attor­
ney, and tenders the tollowing resignation of the office of Harbour 
Master
To the Justices of the Peace for the County of Northumberland.
I hereby resign and give up the office of Harbour Master for 
the River and Port of Miramichi, at present held by me by virtue 
of your appointment.
(Signed) WILLAM ABRAMS, 
By George Kerr, his Atty.
On motion of John T. Williston, Esquire, that William Joplin, 
Esquire, be appointed Harbour Master for the River and Harbour 
of Miramichi, the Court divided as follows, viz. :—
Against the motion. 










Therefore Ordered, That William Joplin, Esquire, be appointed 
Harbour Master for the River and Harboitt of Miramichi, and 
that the Clerk notify him of such appointment.”
“ At a General Session of the Peace of our Lord the King, held at 
the Court House at Newcastle, in and for the County of Nor­
thumberland, on Saturday the nineteenth day of March, in the 
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty six.
PRESENT.
Alexander Davidson,/-John Fraser, 
John Nesmith, J V George Henderson,
Dudley Perley, f Esquires, 7 Donald M;I<ay,
Robert Leslie, £ Justices. £ Alexander Goodfellow,
James Gilmour, * > Robert Doak,
John T. Williston, / VWilliam Joplin.
Moved by Alexander Davidson, Esquire—Whereas on the last 
day of the sitting of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace, 
held 
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held in and for this County in August and September last, Wil­
liam Abrams, the then Harbour Master of the Port and River of 
Miramichi, then and now absent in Great Britain, did by his At- 
tofnef, George Kerr, give in his resignation and relinquishment of 
the office of Harbour Master of said Port and River of Miramichi, 
which wa^ accepted by the said Court; And whereas the said 
office of Harbour Master of the said Port and River of Miramichi, 
there, was immediately thereafter filled up by the appointment of 
William Joplin thereto, and without any notice being given to the 
public that such office had been vacated,—Resolved, That it is 
now expedient that the said office be declared vacant by this 
Court, and it is accordingly hereby declared vacant, and that this 
Court willf elect, on Tuesday tliq 22d March ne.\t, a fit and proper 
person to fulfil the duties of the office.
For the motion—Mr. Justice Nesmith, Fraser, M‘Kay, Leslie, 
Henderson, Doak, Gilmour, Goodfellow, Davidson.
Against th^lnotion—Mr. Justice Williston and Perley.”
‘•'TUESDAY MORNING, March 22, 1836. 
PRESENT.
Alexander Davidson, John Fraser, Joseph Cunard, John T. 
Williston, Donald M‘Kay, Alexander Goodfellow, James Gilmour, 
John Nesmith, Robert Doak, Dudley Perley, Abraham Moores, 
William Joplin, John J. Donalds, Robert Leslie, George Hender­
son, Esquires. Justices.
On motion of Mr. Justice Leslie, that the Resolution passed on 
Saturday last, relative to the appointment of a Harbour Master, be 
read.
Mr. Justice Cunard tenders a protest against the proceedings 
and requests that it may be entered on the minutes, which motion 
is seconded by Justice Williston ; on which the question of the 
Court being taken it is_docided in the negative.
Mr. Justice Cunard, Perley, Moores, Donalds and Williston ten­
der a second protest, which is also moved to be entered on the 
minutes, and the question being taken it is decided in the negative.
Moved by Mr. Justice Leslie, that Alexander Davidson, Esq. 
be appointed Harbour Master for the River and Harbour of Mira­
michi, which is Seconded by Mr. Justice Goodfellow.
Before the question taken on the motion, Mr. Justice Cunard 
tenders a third protest, and moves that it be entered on the 
minutes, which is seconded by Mr. Justice Williston, and on the 
question being taken it was decided in the negative.
Mr. Justice Fraser in the.Qhair.
On motion, that Alexander Davidson, Esquire, be appointed 
Harbour Master for the River and Harbour of Miramichi, the 
Court divided as follows:—
For
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For the motion.
Mr. Justice Nesmith,













Justice Davidson retires from the Chair before the question, and 
Justice Fraser, as Chairman declines voting.
Therefore Ordered, That Alexander Davidson, Esquire, be ap­
pointed Harbour Master for the Paver and Harbour of Mira- 
michi.”
The authority of the Justices in this matter is found in the Act 
of Assembly, 3 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 4, which is as follows:—“ And 
be it further enacted, That it shall and may be lawful for the Jus­
tices of the Peace in the several and respective Counties, in Gene­
ral Session, to appoint Harbour Masters for such Harbours as 
may be found to require the same, and shall also have power and 
authority to regulate tne ballast births, and also the manner in 
which vessels coming into such Ports or Harbours shall anchor 
and moor, which directions and regulations it shall be the duty of 
the Harbour Master to enforce ; and the master or commander of 
any ship or vessel who shall refuse or neglect to obey or conform 
to the directions of such Harbour Master, shall forfeit and pay the 
sum of five pounds for such refusal or neglect; and it shall and 
may be lawful for such Harbour Master to ask, demand and re­
ceive from the master, commander or consignee of every ship or 
vessel (coasters excepted,) the sum of five shillings for all vessels 
above fifty tons and net exceeding one hundred tons, and ten shil­
lings for all vessels above one hundred tons, a3 Harbour Master's 
fees, which Harbour Masters shall furnish copies of all regulations 
made for the respective Harbours to tlie pilots appointed for such 
Harbour, one copy of which regulations such pilots are hereby 
required to give to the master or commander of every vessel they 
may take in charge, for his information; and it shall be the duty 
of the Harbour Masters to prosecute all breaches of this Act.”
The question then will turn upon what is the true legal 
construction of this Act of Assembly, with regard to the duration and 
tenure of the office of Harbour Master. It is much to be regretted 
that the intention of the Legislature, with respect to appointments 
which are to be made by the various Benches of Magistrates in 
the several Counties of the Province, should not have been ex­
pressed at large in such explicit terms as not to require a reference 
to judicial interpretation for the purpose of determining the true 
meaning of the Act. The Justices by whom the Plair.tiff was 
displaced,Ql
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displaced, have evidently assumed that it was in the power of the 
Justices in General Sessions to declare the officp of Harbour Mas­
ter to be vacant whenever they might deem it expedient so to do, 
and to reappoint to it, thus making the tenure of the office to be 
absolutely at the will of the Justices; for it was not, and could not 
for a moment have been contended, that the reason assigned by 
the Justices for vacating the original appointment of the Plaintiff 
was a sufficient reason for that measure. How precarious such a 
tenure of office would be, is shewn by the present case, in which 
it is seen to depend on the shifting majority in a numerous body of 
Magistrates, actuated, it is to be feared, from what appears on the 
face of these proceedings, very much by party motives. If the 
principle be admitted there is nothing to prevent a change in the 
office at every succeeding General Session, without limitation or 
restraint, according as management or accident might produce a 
majority on one side or the other. The evil of such a state of 
things would be grievous and palpable, and would require the im­
mediate interposition of the Legislature to give some certainty to 
the tenure of an office, of which the functions are so important in 
the maritime districts of the Province. Whilst the inconveniences 
which would arise from this office being held at the will of the 
Magistrates, afford so cogent an argument to negative such a con­
struction, there is, on the other hand, a positive rule of law for in­
terpreting the Act, as conferr'ng a power of appointment for life ; 
that rule is, that grants which convey an estate without any limi­
tation as to time, are held to convey an estate for life. Applying 
this rule to the present case, I am of opinion that the words of the 
Act by which the Justices are authorized to appoint “ Harbour 
Masters for such Harbours as may be found to require the same,” 
confer upon the Justice’s a power to make such appointment for 
life, and not revocable at their pleasure, there being nothing in 
any other part of the Act which requires a different construction of 
these general and indefinite expressions, and the appointment is 
actually made by the Justices in the general terms of the Act. 
The office will indeed be held upon the condition which the law im­
plies with regard to all offices, viz. that the duties of it shall be dili­
gently and faithfully discharged, and 1 conceive that the same body 
which has power to appoint, must necessarily have power to remove 
for inefficiency, unfaithfulness or negligence; in other words that the 
tenure of the office is during good behaviour, which is but another 
expression for an office for life. The application of the rule I have 
mentioned to appointments to office*is expressly recognized in 
Dighton’s case, Vent. 84, where the Court say, if the Letters Pa­
tent in question in that case “ hail been to choose a Town Clerk 
generally” it had been for his life.” The same principle is ad­
verted to by Lord Holt in the case of Harcourt v. Fox, reported
very 
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very much at large in 1 Shower, 506, and the application of it to 
offices is, I apprehend, constant and clear. In the case of Smith 
v. Lathan 9, Bing. 692, cited by the learned Counsel for the De­
fendant, the Court held that the object of the Act of Parliament in 
question there, could not be carried into effect unless the power to 
appoint, vested in the Lords of the Treasury, should be held to be 
during their pleasure. But the inference from that case undoubt­
edly is, that if it had not appeared on the face of the Statute, 
which the Court take great pains to shew, that this was the neces­
sary construction the general expressions of the Act giving power 
to appoint, without limit, as to the duration of the office, would in 
their ordinary import be construed to confer a power of appointing 
for life, and not at will. In the case now before the Court, the 
opinion that the tenure of the office is during good behaviour, is 
strongly corroborated by the provision in the Act which establishes 
certain permanent fees as the emoluments of the office. It would 
tend to constant abtisjes if an office of profit of this description were 
held at the fluctuating pleasure of a numerous body of mdn.*
In ,answer to the objection made at the Bar that it would be in­
congruous that Justices, who hold their own offices only during 
pleasure, should have power to make a permanent appointment, it 
is to be rema ked, that when the Justices have fulfilled their func­
tions under flip ‘Act by making the appointment, the appointee is 
1 under the Act^ and will hold the office by virtue of the Act, and 
not by virtue of any estate or interest that lias passed from them 
to him. It was also argued that, as the Justices had the power of 
appointing Harbour Masters only for “ such Harbours as may be 
found to require the samq/’ they had power to put an end to the 
office altogether, which would involve the power of dismissing the 
officer at their pleasure.
But the one power is by no means a necessary consequence of 
the other. In determining in what Harbours it may be expedient 
to have the services of a Harbour Master, it is the intendment of 
the law that they would be guided only by considerations of the 
public good, and if circumstances should arise which would render 
it unnecessary to keep up the office in any place where a Harbour 
Master may have been appointed, it may very properly be implied 
that they have power, upon grounds of public expediency, to put 
an end to the,office, but this is very different from an arbitrary 
power to dismiss the officer while the office is continued. It was 
further argued, that if the Justices were to be the judges of the 
insufficiency or misbehaviour of the Harbour Master, the tenure of 
the office would still be at their discretion ; but here agSin the law 
presumes, that they would be faithful and impartial in the discharge 
of this duty, and they would in this, as in other cases, be amenable 
to the superintending authority and jurisdiction of this Court.
A
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A distinct ground of argument was taken up by the learned 
Counsel for tlie Defendant, and it was contended that there was no 
limit in the Act to the number of Harbour Masters, and that the 
Justices might appoint as many as they saw fit. It might be 
answered to this argument, that this is not the principle upon 
which the parties have proceeded in the present case,—they de­
clared the appointment of the Plaintiff to be vacated, before they 
proceeded to make the appointment of the Defendant, and their 
act and intention clearly were, to make the latter appointment, 
not concurrent with, but exclusive of, the former. But the Act of 
Assembly cannot possibly, as it seems to me, bear the construction 
which is thus attempted to be' given to it.
It is, I think, clear, both from the reason of the thing and the 
enactments of the Statute, that there ban be but one Harbour Mas­
ter for any one Port or place. Tlie general duty of the officer is 
to regulate the movements and anchorage of the shipping resorting 
to the Port, and it would tend to endless conflict and confusion if 
the shipping were made subject to the different orders of different 
Flarbour Masters. The positive provisions of the Act also forbid 
such a construction. The Harbour Master is to enforce the regu­
lations of the Sessions, and a penalty is imposed upon the master 
or commander of any vessel who shall not conform to the directions 
of ‘e such Harbour Master.” If there were two Harbour Masters 
and they were1 to give different directions, which of them would 
the ship master be bound to obey ? 1 “ Such Harbour Master” is 
also authorized to demand and receive the Harbour Master’s fees. 
If there were two, which of them would be entitled to the fees ? 
which fees, be it remembered, are evidently intended to serve as 
the compensation for the performance of the general duties of the 
office, and not for any specific service in regard to each vessel. 
Again, if there were two Harbour Masters to one Port, of which 
of them would it be the duty to furnish copies of regulations to 
pilots, and to prosecute for offences against the Act ?
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that tlie Plaintiff, having been 
rightfully appointed to the office of Harbour Master for the River 
and Harbour of Miramichi, and this appointment not having been, 
in point of law, vacated by the subsequent proceedings of the Jus­
tices, remahis still possessor of the office, and that the fees in question 
in this case, having been wrongfully received by the Defendant, 
the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the same in this action, and that 
therefore the rule for a new trial must be made absolute.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.
Parker J.:
Allowing that a power to remove the Harbour Master is neces­
sarily incident to the power to appoint to a certain extent, it can 
never be contended that a power to remove at the will and pleasure 
of 
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of tlie Sessions without any just caAse, must bo so incidental. 
I should incline to think that for insufficiency or misbehaviour, a 
power of amotion would be vested in the Sessions1,: but it is unne­
cessary to decide that point at present, it being quite sufficient for 
this case to determine that they icannot exercise that power at 
their mere will and pleasure, for no sufficient cause has been as­
signed or suggested in tire present case. I would rerhark also, that 
the appointment has,,been made generally without specifying any 
limitation; therefore it might be said, that supposing they had the 
power to make it an office at pleasure^ they have not so done. 
Instances sre given in the Books where, by a Charter, a Corpora­
tion might appoint either for life or during pleasure.
In considering the Act of Assembly and the nature of the office, 
I cannot think it was the intention of t ie Legislature to give any 
such arbitrary authority to the Sessions", particularly when I see 
in what distinct language they have spoken when it was thought 
proper to give that power, namely, in the case of the County Trea­
surer.
The several Acts relating to the appointment of Firemen also give 
a power to remove at pleasure in express terms.
In making the Act now in question the Legislature had before 
them the other Acts in which an appointing power is given to Jus­
tices in Session; most of the officers by them appointed are ex­
pressly ffwrawafglthat of the County Treasurer is expressly during 
pleasure. Having made this office of Harbour Master neither one 
nor the other, I think they must have intended it to be during 
good behaviouh!1 *
I do not think anything could be made of the point that the 
Sessions had a right to appoint more than one 'Harbour Master ; 
the act appears to me clearly to mean one Flarbour Master for each 
Harbour. But the question does not arise in this'1 case, for the 
Defendant has been clearly appointed the Harbour Master for the 
Port of Miramichi in the place of the Plaintiff, who is first dis­
placed from the office before the Sessions proceed to appoint the 
Defendant. If they had the powrer of appointing more than one it 
must be in separate districts, as two Harbour Masters could not 
each have concurrent jurisdiction over the whole Harbour; and al­
though there may bd different towns on its banks, yet the Harbour 
does not derive its name from any of them, but retains the appel­
lation which it had distinct, from indeed prior to the existence of 
any town there, namely, the Port or Harbour of Miramichi.
On the other point in this case it is abundantly clear from a 
whole series of cases, that if the Sessions had not the power to re­
move in the present instance, the Plaintiff remained the legal offi­
cer, and as such was entitled to the legal fees, and that the Defen­
dant can claim no right to retain them although he did discharge 
the 
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the duties of the office, he not being legally invested there­
with. Cases of seemingly much greater hardship than the present 
have been decided in England on this point, by the authority and 
reason of which this Court must be governed.
I am authorised by Mr. Justice Carter to state that he fully 
concurs in this judgment of the Court.
Rule absolute for a new trial. 
N. Parker. for Plaintiff.
Street Jr Kerr, for Defendant.
ROGERS « PECK AND OTHERS.
In an action on the case for special damage, the Court will not disturb a 
verdict for the Defendant where no permanent rights are bound by it, unless 
the evidence is all on one side, or very greatly preponderates.
The words privileges and appurtenances in a deed do not create a right of 
way.
Where A, the owner of a milland of the stream from the mill to navigable 
waters, sells the mill and some land, including a part of the stream, to B, the 
right to use the stream through A’s land for the purpose of taking logs to 
and from the mill, will not pass to B by the words privileges and appm/rle- 
nances, nor as incident to the mill, although A, previous to the sale, had 
used it for that purpose.
The Court will not entertain a motion for a new trial, on the ground that 
nominal damages should have been given when the point was not raised at 
the trial.
This was an action on the case by the Plaintiff, as owner of a 
saw mill situate on a creek flowing into ths Shepody River, for 
consequential damages occasioned by the erection by the Defend­
ant of a gallows dam further down the stream, whereby the pas­
sage of lumber to and from the Plaintiff’s mill was obstructed, and 
for specific damages occasioned to the Plaintiff by forcing back the 
water above the gallows dam.
The declaration contained six counts; the 1st stated the 
stream to be a public navigable river ; the 2d and 3d to be a pub­
lic highway ; the 4th and Sth to be a private way ; the 6th alleged 
special damage to Plaintiff’s mill from the back water occasioned 
by Defendant’s dam.
The cause was tried before PARKER J. and a special jury at 
the last Westmorland Assizes. Part of the jury had before been 
on a jury of view of the premises. It appeared in evidence at the 
trial that the tide flowed at high tides above the gallows dam, but 
at ordinary tides did not reach it. Plaintiff’s mill was built-in 1817, 
by Peck, one of the Defendants, and conveyed by him to the 
Plaintiff, by deed, under which deed the Plaintiff claimed a right 
of way over the stream passing through Defendant’s land, and 
upon which land the gallows dam was erected; the Shepody River 
is a navigable river ; the logs to supply the Plaintiff’s mdl were 
brought 
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brought down the Shepody River, and thence carried up the creek 
The gallows dam is a sill of timber sunk in the river, filled in with 
stones, and above it is a ditch which leads the water to Defendant’s 
mill. The creek is used by all persons with boats and scows in 
times of freshet. There is a bridge across the Shepody River. 
A wharf of the Plaintiff’s was floated away the spring after the 
gallows dam was erected, by a rise of water occasioned by the dam. 
PARKER J. left it to the jury to say whether the Plaintiff had 
proved damage, and directed them that if so, the question as to 
whether the stream were a public or private way, was not material. 
A verdict was found for the Defendants.
E. B. Chandler, in moving for a new trial, admitted thatthe stream 
was not a navigable river, or even a public highway, but contended 
that the verdict was against evidence, and that the jury should 
have been directed to find for the Plaintiff for some amount of 
damage. The Plaintiff’s right to use the stream was necessarily 
appurtenant to the ownership of his land and the prior occupancy 
of the stream. It was conveyed to him by the same title under 
which he held his lands, and was necessarily included in the term 
appurtenances-—Hill v. Mason, 5 Barn & Ad. p. 16 26.
Cf. Botsford, for the Defendant, shewed cause.
The Plaintiff having abandoned his first three counts, it became 
necessary to separate the evidence applicable to those counts, and 
those on which the Plaintiff rested. To recover under the latter 
counts be must shew specific damage. If the stream were a pub­
lic river then the dam, if an obstruction, would be a public nui­
sance, and the remedy would be by indictment unless for specific 
damage. The stream is not a public highway—Angel on Tide 
Waters, p. 60. Bower v. Hill, 2 Bing. N. C. 339. The passage 
of boats did not necessarily import the stream to be a public high­
way. The occasional use of the stream rendered navigable by 
sudden freshets or thawing of the snow, would not make it a pub­
lic highway, otherwise dyking marshes, occasionally overflowed by 
the tide, would be a common nuisance. The stream was not a 
private way ; the words privileges and appurtenances in a deed 
will not create a right of way—Whalley v. Tompson ; 1 Bos. & 
Pul. 375 ; Barlow v. Rhodes, 1 Cr. & Mee. 439. A private way 
being an easement must be claimed by prescription or grant— 
Plant v. James, et. al. 5 B & Ad. 791; 3 Salk. 40; 1 Yel. 
159; 1 Com. Dig. 175; Tit. D. case for nuisance and cases 
there cited. If the stream were a private way it was necessary 
that the Plaintiff should prove special damage—Angel on Water 
Courses, 51, 29 ; 3 Black. Com. 317 ; 16 Vin. Ab. 26 22 ; Ma­
son v. Kill, 5 Barn. & Ad. 1; Bealy v. Shaw, 6 East. 215. It 
was entirely a question for the jury, whether or not the Defendant’s 
dam w'ere an obstruction—1 Bur. 337. Being so, and the jury 
having 
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having determined by their verdict that the dam was not an ob­
struction, the Court would not grant a new trial—Harris v. Jones, 
1 Mood. & Rob. 173; Anon. 1 Wil. 22.
E. B. Chandler, in reply, urged that ifthe tide periodically flowed to 
the tail of Plaintiff's mill, then, although the river were not a 
public highway, no party had a right to obstruct it.
Curia advisari vult.
In this Term the Court delivered their opinions.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
The principal ground upon which the application for a new trial 
in this case rested, was, that the verdict was against evidence. 
Before granting a new trial on this ground, at least in cases where 
rights are not permanently bound, we should be satisfied that the 
evidence is all on one side, or very greatly preponderates. When 
evidence has been given on both sides and is conflicting, as in the 
present case, although we may be of opinion that the weight of 
evidence is against the verdict, yet “ the jury are the proper judges 
which scale preponderates,”—2 Stra. 1142. In the present case 
also the jury was a special jury, and part of them had a view of 
the premises, and they were therefore peculiarly well qualified to 
judge of the bearing of the evidence.—The right is not bound, for 
the Plaintiff may, if so advised, bring a subsequent action for a 
continuance of the obstruction. I am therefore of opinion that we 
should be invading the propej. province cf the jury, if we were in 
this case to grant a new trial upon this ground.
It was also contended, that the Plaintiff was, in all events, en­
titled to a verdict for nominal damage? upon the counts in the 
declaration which describee! his right as that of a private way 
through the Defendant’s stream. This point opens the question, 
whether the expressions in the deed, upon which the Defendant 
grounds this right, are sufficient to convey the way which he thus 
claims, and was argued at large on this motion. The way 
claimed is oyer and upon that part of the stre.am which remained 
in the Defendant's ownership and possession after the conveyance 
to the Plaintiff, a right which is perfectly distinct from the water 
course, or the flowing of the water in the stream up to the Defen­
dant’s mill, and which vyould subject the Defendant’s part of the 
stream to a servitude or burthen to be exercised within his own 
limits. The words of the deed are as follows : “ a certain piece 
or tract of land, being part of that farm or tract purchased by me 
from James Peck, (described by metes and bounds,) together with 
the said mill thereon, with ah and singular the privileges and 
appurtenances belonging thereto, together with mill pond, mill 
dam and any other privilege connected with, or belonging to, the 
above described premises,” Tha" principle of law applicable to 
the subject, is stated by Lord Denman, in the case of Plant v.
J ames,
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James, 5 B. & Ad. 794. “ Nothing isk, more clear,” says his
Lordship, “ than that under the word ‘ appurtenances,’ according 
to its legal force, an easement which has become extinct or which 
does not exist in point of law by reason of unity cf ownership does 
not pass—1 Bui. 17; Moore, 467 ; 1 B. & P. 371 ; 1 Taunt. 
205 ; 3 Taunt. 24; 3 Tyr. 230 ; 1 Cromp. & Mee. 439. If the 
grantor wishes to revive or create such a right he must do it by 
express words, or introduce the terms ‘ therewith used and enjoyed,’ 
in which case easements existing in point of fact, though not ex­
isting in point of law would be transferred to the grantee.”
As the Plaintiff claims the right of way in question as having 
been created by the deed, the words of the deed are upon the prin­
ciple stated by Lord Denman as derived from the cases which he 
cites, evidently not sufficient for the purpose. With regard to 
the point of nominal damages, there is also another ground upon 
which I think the application for a new trial must be refused. It 
is is reported to us by the learned Judge who tried the cause, that 
the Counsel on both sides went to the jury on the point of actual 
damages, the Plaintiff having therefore taken his chance upon this 
broad and substantial ground, and the jury not having supported 
him therein, is not, I think, in a condition to ask us to grant a new 
tri J upon the new ground which he now assumes with regard to 
damages, even if such an application could be successful if the 
ground had been taken at the trial, when rights are not bound by 
the verdict. In a very late case, Kenyon v. Western, 6 Dow. 
Pr. C. 108, in which an application for a new trial was made on 
the ground that the Plaintiff was entitled, at all events, to nominal 
damages, the Court refused to disturb the verdict for the Defendant 
on the express ground that the point was not raised at the trial. 
For these reasons I am of opinion that the rule for a new trial must 
be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
It was contended on the part of the Plaintiff, that by the words 
in the conveyance, viz : “ all and singular the privileges and ap­
purtenances, and every other privilege connected with and belong­
ing to the above described granted and bargained premises, &c.” 
a right of way was conveyed, in and by the stream, to the mill 
and premises; and the case of Whalley v. Thompson, 1 Bos. & 
Pul. 871, was much relied on. It is true that in that case it was 
said by Eyre, Ch. J. “that the word appurtenances may convey an 
existing right of way. The learned Lord C. J. qualifies this ex­
pression by adding : “ but from the moment that the possession of 
two closes is united in one person, all subordinate rights and ease­
ments are extinguished.” And he further adds, “ that its opera­
tion must be confined to an old existing light, and that if the right 
of way had passed in this instance it must have passed as a mere 
r 1 easement
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easement. Had the devise been with the way now used, it would 
certainly have been a devise of the close A with an easement new­
ly created. The word appurtenances in the will had nothing to 
operate upon.” The same doctrine is laid down in Clement v. 
Lambert, 1 Taunt. 206, where an easement of common had been 
extinguished by unity of possession, and where there had been an 
user for 60 or 70 years. At the trial it was thought by Heath J. 
that the words “ together with all common, common of pasture, 
advai tages, hereditaments and appurtenances whatever thereto 
belonging, or in any wise appertaining,” did not amount to evidence 
of a new grant of common, and this opinion was concurred in by 
Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, who, in delivering the opinion of 
the Court afterwards upon a motion made to set aside the verdict, 
said, “we cannot say upon looking at this deed, that a right of 
common passed by it
The case of Archer and Bennett, 1 Lev. 132, is a case in point. 
A man who owned a close upon which there was a kiln for drying 
oats, and who also owned mills adjoining to the close, and occu­
pied them all together; afterwards sold the mills cum pertinentiis 
and the question was whether the kiln, and the parts of the close 
on which they stood should pass to the Plaintiff, and it was held 
clearly by the Court that they did not pass: “ for by the grant of 
a messuage, or lands cum pertinentiis, any other land or thing 
cannot pass, though by the words cum terris pertinentibusii would. 
But by Windham J., if all the matters had been found, and that 
the kiln was necessary for the use of the mills, the kiln had passed 
as a part of the mills, though not as appurtenances.”
In the case now before the Court, it is not contended that 
the saw mill was not useful without the right of way in the 
stream.
In Beaudly v. Brook, which was an action upon the case, the 
Defendant was seised in fee of the land over which the way is, and 
of other land, and by indenture enrolled, bargained and sold to J. 
S. land in fee, with a way over his land. J. S. let to the Plantiff 
the land for years, and the Defendant disturbed him—Yelverton 
J. took exception, “ that there is not any grant of the way in the 
indenture, but only a bargain and sale of land, and of a way out 
of his other land, which cannot be good, for nothing but the use 
passed by the deed, and there cannot be a use of a thing which is 
not in esse as a way, common &c., which are newly created, and 
until they be created no use can be raised by bargain and sale.” 
All the Court were of opinion that for this cause the Plaintiff had 
not shewn sufficient title.
Tn Barlow v. Rhodes, 1 Crom. & Me. 448, Bayley B. said, “ it 
has been decided over and over again, that when an easement has 
been extinct by unity of ownership, and the owner wishes to grant 
the
in the First year of VICTORIA. 323
the easement with the premises to which it was formerly appur­
tenant, he must use language to shew that he intended to create 
the easement de nov<P— “ If in the case of an
easement extinguished by unity of ownership, a man grants the 
land to which, before extinguishment, the right of common was 
attached, and uses only the words appertaining and belonging, the 
right will not pass, those words not being sufficient to revive the 
right.” The learned Baron also held that there was no distinction 
between the words belonging and appertaining, that the Courts 
had uniformly considered them as having the same meaning.
It is clear from the above authorities, that when a right of way 
has been extinguished by unity of ownership, or does not exist by 
reason of that unity, that it will not be revived or pass under the 
word appurtenance,and that the words appertaining and belonging 
alone, are not sufficient to pass such right.
In the present case, a right of way in and by the brook did not 
exist as appurtenant to the mills, by reason of the unity of owner­
ship in Elisha Peck, one of the Defendants, and consequently did 
not pass under the words of the deed of conveyance as has been 
contended for by the Plaintiff; they were not in law sufficient to 
create a right of way over the soil of Elisha Peck.
The Plaintiff must therefore fail under the 4th and 5th counts 
of his declaration.
With respect to the sixth and last count, there is no doubt but 
that the Plaintiff could recover damages under it, for any obstruc­
tion placed by the Defendants in the stream, which, by penning 
up or throwing back the water impeded or interrupted the working 
of the mill. The evidence applicable to this count was contradic­
tory and conflicting. It was left to the Jury by the learned Judge, 
and they found in favor of the Defendants.
I am not therefore for disturbing the verdict
Parker J.:
Although I should probably have come to a different con­
clusion from that which the jury have formed had I been in their 
place, yet considering that they were special jurors, part uf whom 
had had a view of the premises, I think we ought to be well satis­
fied of the existence of the Plaintiff’s right, and that it will be 
permanently affected by the judgment in this case, before we dis­
turb the verdict.
As to the charge of the CouTt; if under the circumstances ofthis 
case, it was my duty to have told the jury that the erection of the 
gallows dam in the stream by the Defendants, was necessarily an 
abridgment of the Plaintiff’s right, or interference w'ith his privi­
lege, the verdict might be objected to on the ground of misdirec­
tion, and although this was not made a distinct point in moving 
for the rule nisi, I should feel loath to deprive the Plaintiff of all 
the 
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the benefit of it if, on consideration, I could be satisfied he was en­
titled to a verdict. All, however, must depend on the Plaintiff’s 
right to use the stream, the existence of which I assumed at the trial, 
reserving the point, but have not been able since to find sufficient 
ground for supporting.
The Defendants are certainly not entitled to place any erection 
in the creek which may impede the working of the Plaintiff’s 
mill or flood his land; but if it was intended the Plaintiff should en­
joy together with the mill, the free and uninterrupted navigation 
of the stream between the mill and the Shepody -iver, I do not 
think the words in the deed are sufficient to convey such a right, 
or that such will pass as incident to the possession of the milt
As to the manner in which I left this case to the jury, I have 
already stated that finding the Plaffitilf could net decide on select­
ing upon which counts he would proceed,—those charging it as a 
public, or those stating it as a private stream, and that the case 
was summed up to the jury by the Counsel on both sides (and it 
appeared with great fairness and propriety,) as a question of 
damage or no damage, I thought it right to direct the attention of 
the jury first to the point of damage, telling them to find for the 
Plaintiff if they were of opinion he had sustained particular damage 
by reason of the erection, and then to decide on the nature of the 
stream, giving them my reasons for thinking it a private one.
As there was some discrepancy in the evidence, and some doubts 
as to heights and distances, and most of the witnesses were related 
to the parties and seemed to side with one or the other, I was glad 
to appeal to the personal knowledge which some of the jury had 
derived from an inspection of the premises, and was in hopes their 
verdict would have been decisive.
As the verdict returned for the Defendant is now sought to be 
sat aside, we are driven to consider the question of right, supposing 
the stream to be private ; for if it be public it is essential for the 
Plaintiff to make out a particular injury in order to sustain his 
private action. This the jury have negatived ; and as they have 
also decided in favor of the Defendant on the conflicting evidence 
relative to the turning back the water, there is no count on which 
we can say he would be entitled to a verdict, and the rule must 
therefore be discharged.
Rule discharged.
E. B. Chandler, for Plaintiff.
G. Botsford, for Defendant.
WILSON v. EILLS.
Under a general allegation ofloss of time and expence in regaining pro­
perty taken under execution against a third person, evidence of expeiicts in 
proving the Plaintiff’s right before a Sheriff’s jury is not admissible.
Que,
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Que. If under any circumstances or allegations in pleading, such expences 
are recoverable where no right is barred.
A new trial will not be granted for imaginary damages.
This was an action of trespass, tried before Carter J. at tlie 
Charlotte Circuit in November last. The facts appeared as 
follow :—
The Plaintiff was possessed of a quantity of timber which the 
Sheriff of Charlotte, by direction cf the Defendant, seized under 
execution as the property of a third person. The Plaintiff claimed 
the timber, whereupon the Sheriff called a jury of inquiry, who 
found for the Plaintiff, and thereupon the Sheriff gave up the pro­
perty. This action was brought to recover damages occasioned by 
the taking and detention. The first count of Plaintiff’s declara­
tion stated special damage by reason of the loss of time and the 
expenditure of money in regaining the timber. The Plaintiff 
tendered evidence of the expences attending the trial of the right 
of property before the Sheriff’s jury, which the learned Judge re­
jected.
A verdict was found for the Defendant which G'eorge D. Street, 
for Plaintiff, fnoved in Hilary Term to set aside;
1st. On the ground of the improper refection of testimony—2 
Bing. N. C. 210.
2d. Because a taking having been proved the Plaintiff was en­
titled to a verdict if it were only for nominal damages.
per Curiam.
The only point must be the rejection of evidence,—on that the 
Court have some doubt; as to the other, the Court exclude it. 
No right was barred, and the Court will not grant a new trial for 
imaginary damages.
R. M. Andrews, in this Term shewed cause.
After the re-delivery of the timber to the Sheriff, the Plaintiff 
brought this action for the taking and failed to establish his right 
of property, and therefore if the evidence of the expences of the 
inquiry were improperly rejected, the Court would not consider 
that point. Secondly, the attendance of the Plaintiff was volun­
tary ; he was not bound to pursue his claim before the Sheriff, 
and if he chose to do so he was not entitled to his expences —Ros. 
Ev. 37, 594; 1 Chit. 440 ; 1 Camp. 60; 2 Chit. R. 198; 8 T. 
R. 130; 3 Sta. Ev. 1454. Thirdly, under a general allegation of 
damage, evidence was only admissible of damage actually resulting 
from the act complained of. The inquest and the Plaintiff’s ex­
pences were not a natural result of the taking of the timber. 
Chipman, Ch. J.:
Without considering whether under any circumstances the evi­
dence rejected would be admissible, I am clearly of opinion that 
the damages spoken of are not such as the law would imply, and 
as 
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as could be givfui in evidence by the Plaintiff under the general 
allegation in his declaration. The proceeding by inquiry was a 
voluntary one for the safety of the Sheriff, and not binding on any 
party ; the Plaintiff took that easy and expeditious way to get his 
property back ; the expences attending it cannot be considered 
a natural or legal consequence of the act of taking.
Botsford, J.:
The Sheriff’s inquisition was for his own information, and in an 
action against him would be only evidence in mitigation of dama­
ges. Under the general allegation in the Plaintiff’s declaration, 
that he was put to damage in regaining his timber, the Defendant 
could not have been prepared to meet a claim for the Plaintiff’s 
expences in attending the jury of the inquiry.
Parker, J.:
I am also of opinion that if the Plaintiff was entitled to recover 
the expences of tliR proceeding before the Sheriff’s jury, which is, 
to say the least, exceedingly doubtful, he ought to have made a 
particular allegation of the payment; not having done so the Judge 
was quite right in rejecting the evidence.
Rule discharged.
G. D.'Street, for Plaintiff.
R. M. Andrews, for Defendant;
REGINA v. CUNARD AND OTHERS.
The Court will quash an indictment for forcible entry and detainer, 
brought up from the Sessions by certiorari after plea pleaded, upon its ap­
pearing that the prosecutor was one of the Grand Jury who found the bill; 
nor will the Court receive affidavit of the absence of the prosecutor from 
the jury room when the bill was found, his name being mentioned in the 
caption of the indictment.
At the Northumberland General Sessions in March, 1837, an 
indictment was found against the Defendants for a forcible entry 
upon and detainer of the lands of Joseph Russell. The Defend­
ants pleaded not guilty, and traversed the indictment to the next 
Sessions ; previous to which a certiorari was obtained, returnable 
in Michaelmas Term, and the proceedings were removed into this 
Court. The certiorari was returned and filed in the Crown office 
on the 9th September.
By the caption of the ndictment it appeared that Joseph Rus­
sell was one of the Grand Jury by which the indictment was found, 
and the identity of the Grand Juror and the prosecutor was proved 
by affidavits.
In last Hilary Term J. H. Peters moved for a rule nisi to quash 
the indictment, on the ground that the prosecutor was one of the 
Grand Jury, and contended that the indictment was void at com­
mon law, and also by the Stat, of 11 H. 4, c. 9, and the Stat, 
against 
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against forcible entry and detainer. The trial by jury was the 
great protection of the subject, and it was even more important 
that inquiries before Grand Juries should be properly conducted, 
their proceedings being secret, than before Petit Juries, who sat 
openly and heard evidence in the presence of the Court and coun­
try. Grand Jurors were as umpires between the accuser and 
the accused—Phil, on Juries, 71. In Rex v. Dickenson, Russ. 
& Ry. 401, a prisoner was pardoned because a witness w-as ex­
amined before the Grand Jury without having been sworn.
A prosecutor for forcible entry and detainer was incompetent as 
a witness—Anon. 6 Car. & Payne 90; and therefore as a juror, if 
one interested person should be allowed to’ sit, then there might be 
twelve tenants in common of the locus in quo, who might find 
their own bill.
The Stats, of forcible entry and detainer direct “ that Justices 
shall call an inquest of indifferent persons.”
As to quashing indictments, he cited 1 Leach, Cr. Ca. 11; 4 
Com. Dig. Indict. D. 3; 3 Burr, 1731.
A rule nisi having been granted, Berton, for the prosecution, at 
this Term shewed cause.
1st. The common law and Stat. 11 II. 4, c. 9, required that 
jurors should be probi et legates homines, being such, they were 
qualified to serve, and any objection to them on account of interest 
in a particular matter should be taken by way of challenge—Rex 
v. Sheppard, 1 Leach, c. c. 111,4 Bac. Abr. Juries ; A. 2 Hawk 
Pl. Cor. 307.
2nd. That if the indictment was found contrary to the purview of 
the Stat, the person arraigned might plead such matter in avoid­
ance—2 Hawk. 312; 4. Bac. Abr. 525. Judges were in no 
case bound ex debito justitioe to quash an indictment, but might 
oblige the Defendant to plead or demur—2 Hawk. 367. Of late 
years exceptions of this kind had not been favored, 4 Bac. 331, 
and appeared confined almost to cases of manifest want of juris­
diction—Rex v. Williams, 1 Burr, 389; Rex v. Haniton, 2 Str. 
1018; 4. Bac. 332; Rex v. Brotherton, 1 Str. 702, 2 Hawk 
307 ; Rex v. Inliab. of Relton, 1 Salk. 372.
3rd. After plea pleaded it was not competent for the Defendant 
to move to quash an indictment—1 Leach, Cr. Ca. 10.
4. In forcible entry and detainer, even a defective indictment 
would not be quashed—4 Com. Dig. 565, indictment H.
The Defendants had, in the present case, waived their challenge 
of the Grand Juror, had appeared and pleaded to the indictment, 
had removed it into this Court, had suffered the Michaelmas Term 
to pass ; after so great delay this application should not be enter­
tained, more especially as it was merely technical. The learned 
Counsel offered affidavits of the prosecutor and foreman, and others 
of
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of the Grand Jury, to shew that the prosecutor was not present at 
the investigations and did not vote upon the bill.
Per. Curiam.
We cannot receive affidavits to contradict the record ; the pro­
secutor’s name appears in the caption as returned, and the affida­
vits are offered in contradiction thereto.
J. A. Street, in reply.
The indictment having been found the Defendants were obliged 
to plead to prevent judgment of restitution passing against them. 
In misdemeanor they could only plead one plea ; the indictment 
could be quashed only in this Court. If it were a question of 
irregularity the delay might help the prosecutor, but the objection 
here rendered the indictment void.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This is a motion to quash an indictment for forcible entry and 
detainer, brought up by certiorari from the General Sessions of the 
Peace for the County of Northumberland, on the ground tba| the 
prosecutor of the indictment was one of the Grand Jury by whom 
the bill was found —It is a principle which lies at tlie foundation 
of the administration of justice, that a party shall not be a Judge 
or Juror in his own cause. The expressions of Lord Mansfield 
in 3 Bur. 1856, are very strong on this subject: “ There is no 
principle in law,” says his Lordship, more settled than this, that 
any degree, even the smallest degree of interest in the question 
depending, ’s a decisive objection to a witness, and much more to 
a Juror or to the officer by whom the jury is to be returned. The 
law has so watchful an eye to the pure and unbiassed administra­
tion of justice, that it will never trust the passions of mankind in 
the decision of any matter of right. If therefore the Sheriff or Ju­
ror, or a witness, be in any sort interested in the matter to be 
te ’ id, the law considers him ns under an influence which may warp 
his integrity or pervert his judgment, and (therefore itv/Z not trust 
him.'” In the present case the objection has double force, from 
the circumstance of the prosecutor being the tenant who would be 
entitled to restitution if the proceedings should be successful, and 
who on this ground is excluded even from being a witness—9 B. & 
Cr. 549, Rex v. Williams. It is, I conceive, a fatal objection to 
the indictment, and it is not helped by there having been a suffi­
cient number on the jury to find the bill, without the prosecutor. 
It is impossible to measure the influence which he may have had 
upon his fellow jurors. In cases under the Statute 11 II. c. 9, 
it is expressly held that if owe juror be returned at the nomination 
of the party, the whole indictment shall be avoided, although 
twenty others were on the same inquest—Com. Dig. Indict. A ; 
and although this may be a case which does not fall directly within 
the provision of the Statute, yet the principles on which the 
Statute 
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Statute is founded most forcibly apply to it. It is argued that this 
objection comes too late after plea. Now, although the Court will 
not encourage applications to quash indictments after plea, yet it 
is in the discretion of the Court to quash an indictment at any 
time before trial—1 Leach, c. c. 11; 2 Hawk. 299. And in a 
case like the present I should feel myself bound, for the sake of 
public example, and from the paramount necessity of preserving 
the purity of the streams of justice, to exercise this discretion at 
any time when I am not absolutely prohibited by the rules of prac­
tice from so doing. There is also, I think, weight in the reason 
assigned on the part of the Defendant for traversing the force in- 
stanter at the Sessions, in order to prevent an award of restitution. 
As to the objection that the Court will in no case quash an indict­
ment fox forcible entry, I have looked into the authorities, and am 
satisfied that there is no such rule, but on the contrary there are 
many cases in which it is held that such indictments may be 
quashed.
Botsford, J.:
To allo w one of the Grand Jury, as in the present case, to act in 
the capacity of a juror when he is also the prosecutor, and so im­
mediately interested as he must have been on this indictment for a 
forcible entry and detainer, would be a violation of the principle of 
law, which will not allow a man to be a judge in his own cause.
As to the objection that this Court will not quash an indictment 
for forcible entry and detainer, it cannot be sustained. In Frith's 
case, 1 Leach 11, it is said the Court may in its discretion quash 
an indictment at any time before the jury are charged with the 
trial of the prisoner. And in Rex “6. Blake, 3 Bur. 1731, an in­
dictment for forcible entry, not shev ng any actual force, was 
quashed upon motion.
Parker, J.:
The only difficulty I have felt in acceding to the present appli­
cation has arisen from the delay which has taken place in coming 
before the Court; but the objection is of too serious a nature to be 
got over on that ground; indeed the Defendant’s Counsel have 
satisfied me that it was necessary to plead to the indictment at the 
Sessions, in order to prevent a restitution, so that the motion could 
not be made before plea pleaded, as in ordinary cases it ought to 
be done.
The proceedings before the Grand Jury being secret, we cannot 
tell whether the bill in this case was found by the whole, or by 
twelve only; for aught we can know there may have been only 
twelve, and Russell, the party interested as the tenant in possession, 
may have been one of those twelve.
The prosecution is of a private nature, conducted by the Pro­
secutor’s own Counsel, who ought to have taken care that he was 
Si not 
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not present when the matter was under discussion before the Grand 
Jury, and that his withdrawal was duly noted on the minutes of 
the Court. As his name appears on the caption there would be 
the same reason for quashing the indictment, as there existed 
for quashing the order of Session in the case of Foxham Tithing in 
2 Salk. 607.
It has been argued that the Defendants should have challenged 
the Grand Jury, but I do not see how they could well have done 
this, and it has not been made out affirmatively that they were 
aware of the intention of the prosecutor to prefer the bill at the 
Sessions.
I do not find any case in the books exactly in point, but there 
are two cases, viz. Rex v. Holiday, 3 Salk. 186, and Rex v. 
Brown, Ld. R. 592, where indictments were quashed for errors in 
the caption, and the Court has exercised a like discretion in nu­
merous other cases.
We should not, I think, be justified in suffering the trial to 
proceed on this indictment, and I am fully of opinion that the rule 
for granting it must be made absolute.
Rule absolute.
J. A. Street, for the Prosecution.
J. H. Peters, for Defendant.
RANKIN AND OTHERS v. EMERY.
Where A sold and delivered to B a lot of Timber, subject to re-survey by 
Mr. Scott, and it appeared that there were two Mr. Scotts, one a sworn 
Surveyor under the Act of Assembly 1 Wm. 4, c. 45, and the other not, and 
the latter made the survey but not according to the provisions in such Act, 
in an action for the deduction and expences allowed upon such re-survey and 
upon a verdict for the Plaintiff:
Held that the learned Judge put it rightly to the j ury to find which of the 
two* Scotts the parties intended by their agreement; but that prima facie 
the re- survey must be presumed to be according to the provisions oi the Act 
1 Wm. 4, c. 45, and it should have been left to the jury to say whether 
the parties intended such survey, or a re-survey according to the discretion 
of the Surveyor; the onus probandi of which intention lies upon the party 
seeking the benefit of it.
Assumpsit. The declaration contained a count for goods sold 
and delivered, and other common counts.
The Plaintiffs put in evidence an account in writing signed by 
the Defendant, in which he was charged with sundry items, and 
credited with a lot of timber at a certain price per ton “ subject to 
such deductions as might be made on a re-survey by Mr. Scott, th 
their (the Plaintiffs) pond.” A balance was struck, and such 
balance carried to a new account.
At and before the time of delivering the timber, the Plaintiffs 
were in the habit of employing one John Scott to survey timber 
for 
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for them, who was not, however, a sworn Surveyor under the Act 
of Assembly 1 W. 4, c. 45. A re-survey of the timber delivered 
by the Defendant was made by John Scott, and his bill of deduc­
tions and expences amounted to <£‘80 11s. For this sum, as well 
as subsequent items of account, the Plaintiffs sought to recover in 
this action. It came out in the course of the evidence that Scott’s 
survey was not made according to the regulations of the Act of 
Assembly, although it was the opinion of the Plaintiffs witnesses 
that a survey under the Act would have been less favorable to the 
Defendant, though in what particulars was not distinctly shewn, 
neither did it appear by what rule the survey was made.
It did not appear that the timber was intended for exportation. 
Evidence was given on the part of the Defendant that there was in 
the Parish where the timber pond was situate, one James Scott, a 
sworn surveyor of lumber under the Act of Assembly, ar.d it was 
contended that the agreement should be construed to have intended 
a sworn surveyor, and a survey according to the Act. The learned 
Judge directed the jury to find for the Plaintiffs, if they were satis­
fied that John Scott, by whom the timber was surveyed, was the 
person intended by the agreement. The Plaintiffs obtained a 
verdict
A t this Term the Solicitor General, for the Defendant, in moving 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, took several grounds.
1st. That the Plaintiffs should have declared specially on the 
agreement to re-survey.
2nd. That the requirements of the Act of Assembly as to the 
survey of lumber by qualified persons, were imperative, and could 
not be controverted even by the terms of the agreement, and that 
therefore the Mr. Scott mentioned in the agreement must be con­
sidered to intend Scott, a surveyor of lumber.
3d. That the survey intended by the agreement was a survey 
under tlie Act of Assembly; and it having been proved that the 
survey was not made according to law, the Plaintiffs were not en­
titled to recover the amount of deductions claimed.
As to the first point the Solicitor General contended that the 
whole value of the timber was passed to account between the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant. That account had been settled, and 
Plaintiffs claiming a trifling balance due on that settlement sought 
to recover the amount of the deductions on tlie survey of the tim­
ber subsequently made. They could not go back and say that 
before the settlement they paid Defendant certain sums which, by 
reason of circumstances arising after that settlement, the Defen­
dant was not entitled to retain.
\Chipman, Ch. J.—The original demand remains for all that was 
not paid, and if an action had been brought to recover for the 
timber, then the deductions would‘have been a proper subject of 
allowance.] j [Parker
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[Parker J.-—I have no doubt if the deductions were properly 
made that they would, to that extent, reduce the credit originally 
given. The evidence at the trial was not merely as to the balance 
on the settlement, but shewed the whole of the original transaction 
between the parties.]
As to the second point, the Court considered that there was 
nothing in this case to prevent the parties naming a person to sur­
vey who was not a sworn Surveyor ; and in the present case the 
jury had determined that the survey was made by the person 
intended by the agreement.
A rule nisi was granted on the third point.
Berton, for the Plaintiffs, shewed cause.
The Act of Assembly 1 W. 4, c. 45, was, as appeared by its 
title and provisions, an Act regulating the exportation of lumber, 
and could not affect any agreement between individuals respecting 
the sale of lumber. In the present case it had not been shewn 
that the contract related to timber for exportation ; there was 
nothing prohibitory in the Act, it merely directed under certain 
penalties that all lumber exported should be of the descriptions and 
quantities therein mentioned, to be ascertained by the examination 
of surveyors appointed and qualified pursuant to the provisions of 
the said Act. It was perfectly competent therefore for parties 
buying and selling lumber, to agree as to the quality and descrip­
tion of the lumber, as to the manner of ascertaining such quality 
and description, and as to the person by whom the same should be 
ascertained. In this case the parties agreed upon a person not a 
sworn surveyor; that fact alone proved that they did not contem­
plate a survey according to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, 
but rather that the person named was selected as an arbiter to 
select the good from the bad timber, and to ascertain the deduc­
tions according to his skill and judgment. Again, the Defendant 
was benefitted by the manner of survey, inasmuch as a survey 
under the Act would have condemned more timber, and increased 
the amount of deductions.
The survey by Scott was made in May, 1836; the Act of 1 W. 
4, c. 45, expired on the 1st of April in that year, and therefore its 
provisions could not control a survey made after such expiration. 
The Act, as to all matters not concluded at the time of its expira­
tion, was as if it had never existed—3 W. 420 ; 1 Wils. B. 451.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—If the agreement between the parties were 
an agreement for a survey under that Act, then its provisions 
must be considered as embodied in and forming a part of the 
agreement,
Solicitor General, in reply:—
There was nothing in the finding of the fact that John Scott 
was the person intended to support the position, that Defendant 
knew 
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knew lie was not a sworn surveyor ; the presumption was rather 
that he believed him to be a sworn surveyor. The Act of Assem­
bly applied to every description of lumber, and in the trade there 
was no distinction between timber for exportation and for home 
consumption. If a party purchased lumber as merchantable., 
clear or refuse, the surveyor ascertained the description according 
to the provisions of the Act.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This motion for a new trial rests on the ruling of the learned 
Judge at the trial that the parties were bound by Scott’s survey, 
if the jury were satisfied that the survey was made by the Mr. 
Scott intended by the agreement, without having put it to the jury 
to consider whether such survey were intended to be a survey ac­
cording to the lumber law or the discretion of the surveyor. I am 
not disposed to shake the position that the Act of Assembly 
regulating the exportation of lumber is a general regulation for the 
lumber trade, although prohibitory only as to lumber for exporta­
tion ; and that all surveys of lumber should be deemed to be surveys 
under that Act, unless otherwise agreed upon. But here the 
question arises, was a different rule agreed upon ? There is 
nothing prohibitory in the Act, and if the question had been pro­
perly decided by the jury, that the parties intended to be bound by 
a different standard from that contained in the law, I should not 
have been for disturbing the verdict. The agreement is quite open 
to such a construction, but the iury were precluded from consider­
ing that question by the broad ground taken by the Judge at the 
trial. I think justice would not be answered unless the cause 
went down again, in order that a jury may determine specifically 
upon that fact.
Botsford, J. :
Under the peculiar circumstances I was doubtful if the Defendant 
had not precluded himself from making any objection to the sur­
vey. It appeared that Scott had surveyed timber for the Plaintiffs 
for five years, during which time Defendant had been in the habit 
of selling timber to the Plaintiffs, and that the surveys by Scott had 
been made continually in the same manner. Now had it appeared 
that Defendant knew all these facts, I think he would be bound 
by the survey. Parties may agree as to a survey to be made by 
any person they may select, and in such manner as they may ap­
point ; but I think this case should be sent for the consideration of 
a new jury, in order to obtain their opinion as to the manner of 
survey intended.
Parker J.:
I should have been glad to support this verdict it possible, for it 
is by no means clear that injustice has been done to the Defendant 
by Scott’s survey, and independently of that there is a considerable
sum 
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ble sum due to the Plaintiffs ; but I cannot find anything in the 
evidence which will enable us to lay down a different rule for con­
struing the agreement, as between these parties, from that which 
would govern in ordinary cases.
The survey of timber is regulated by law, and persons who ex­
ercise the calling of surveyors have their duty prescribed to them 
by law ; and although it may not be required by the Act that tim­
ber intended for home consumption should be surveyed, yet this is 
constantly done, and when parties in a written contract use the 
terms survey and re-survey 1 think, prima facie, they must be 
considered as used in relation to the existing law, and it rests on 
the party who seeks to give them a different interpretation, to 
shew distinctly that such was the intention.
Here a quantity of timber is purchased by the Plaintiffs from 
the Defendant (whether for exportation or home consumption does 
not appear,) at an agreed quantity and price, subject however to 
deductions to be ascertained afterwards. Suppose the memoran­
dum had merely been “ subject to such deduBions as may be 
made on a re-survey in your pond,” could it be said that prima 
facie any other rule for the survey was meant than that specified 
in that Act? but it is contended that the addition of the words “ by 
Mr. Scott” shew that the parties intended that the deductions 
were to be made according to Mr. Scott’s discretion, and not ac­
cording to law. I quite agree that the partilfe having named Mr. 
Scott, no objection shall be taken on the ground of his not being 
a sworn surveyor ; he was no doubt acquainted with the business, 
and the jury have rightly decided as to the identity of the person ; 
but I cannot agree with the learned Judge who tried the cause, 
that the Defendant is to be bound by Scott’s survey under this 
agreement, when it comes out that he did not survey according to 
the regulations of the Act.
The amount of the deductions is considerable, and I think the 
Defendant has a right to know by what rule they were made, and 
that the law should not be departed from without his assent.
If the Plaintiffs really intend to purchase, subject to their own 
rules of survey or the discretion of their surveyor, it will be easy 
for them to specify this so distinctly in their agreements that the 
sellers may understand on what terms they are dealing. If they 
use the terms of the law without any explanatory words, they must 
be considered as referring to the law.
As the case is to go to a new trial I suggest to the Plaintiff’s 
Counsel the expediency of amending the Bill of particulars, for it 
is certain the particulars do not contain the items for which the 
Plaintiffs seek to recover satisfaction under the common couuts; 
and if the objection had been taken at the trial to the evidence, as 
not corresponding with the particulars, it might have been 
materia) 
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material. The deductions I presume are not merly for work and 
labour on the timber, but for rejections of parts thereof. As 
the casp stands, the amount of the deductions is not to be 
considered as a charge against the Defendant, but as a reduc­
tion of the credit allowed him on a settlement made, which when 
thus rectified would shew a different balance from that with which 
the Plaintiff begins his particulars. The.,, deductions might per­
haps be recovered for co tiofiine, on a special count, but here the 
Plaintiffs proceed on the common counts only._
Rule absolute for a new trial, costs to abide the event.
Berton <§• Dibblee, for Plaintiffs.
Solicitor General for Defendant.
DOE EX DEM GILMOUR v. WHITNEY.
Secondary evidence of a will devising real property in this Province not 
admissible, where it appeared that the original will was in the possession of 
the Surrogate General of Nova Scotia, and no proof was given of any law of 
Nova Scotia prohibiting its removal from such possession.
This was an action of ejectment tried before Botsford J. at 
the Northumberland Circuit in September last.
On the part of the lessor of the Plaintiff secondary gvidencewas 
offered of the will of James Fraser, deceased.
The original was filed in the Surrogate GeneraLs office in Hali­
fax, Nova Scotia.
A commission to take the examinations of witness was issued, 
and the original will was exhibited and proved before the commissi­
oners. It appeared by the deposition of John Spry Morris, Esquire, 
that he was the Surrogate General of Nova Scotia ; that the ori­
ginal wills of persons dying in Halifax, Nova Scotia, were by law 
filed in the Surrogate General’s office, that they had been some­
times permitted to be taken out of his office into New Brunswick, 
but it was a matter in his discretion, and as the will in question 
affected large and valuable estates in Nova Scotia he thought it im­
proper that he should suffer it to be taken out of the Province. 
An examined copy of the will returned with the commission was 
received in evidence, subject to a motion for a non-suit in banc. 
The Defendant obtained a verdict.
J. iAkStreet, for the Plaintiff, in last Michaelmas Term ob­
tained a rille to set aside the jverilict and grant a new trial on 
several grounds.
At this Term the* Court considered that it would be more con­
venient to discuss in the first place the point reserved as to the 
proof of the will, because if the Defendants should succeed upon 
that point it would be unnecessary to argue the points raised on 
obtaining the rule nisi, and called upon the Counsel for the 
Plaintiff. J. A. Street
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J. A. Street argued that the will was properly deposited in the 
office of the Surogate GeneraL and he was not justified in letting 
such an instrument be taken out of his office—2 Camp. 3S9, 3 
Bac. Abr. Evid. F. 1 Star. Ev. 103, 389.
The will in question was beyond the control of the Court; the 
Plaintiff had made a sufficient attempt to procure it; to refuse 
secondary evidence would amount to a denial of justice.
The will had been proved in the proceeding before the commis­
sioners as it would have been proved in open Court.
[Parker J. mentioned the cases of Morse v. Roach, 2 Str. 961, 
and Frederick v. Aguscomb, 1 Atk. 627, as to the mode of pro 
curing wills from the place of custody in England.]
Wilmot, for the Defendant, argued contra, that secondary evi­
dence was admissible only when the primary testimony was not 
attainable. The law applied with peculiar force to wills where 
the manner of the execution and the situation of the testator 
were so material to be enquired into.
The evidence states that Mr. Morris will not permit the will to 
be removed, but no application has been made to the Surrogate 
General in his Court.
It was not properly shewn that there was any law in Nova 
Scotia regulating the deposit of wills in that Province; if there 
were such a law it should be properly proved—Way v. Yally, 6 
Mod. 194; Roscoe 77; 3 Camp. 166; 2 Swin. 814 (Note); 
11 Vin. Abr. 59 ; 2 Rob. on Wills, 179, 183.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This is a motion for a non-suit, on a point reserved at the trial. 
In proving a devise of lands it is the constant course to produce the 
original, and it is peculiarly necessary that, if practicable, this 
should be done, because by positive Statute particular regulations 
are prescribed for the execution of wills relating to lands in this 
Province, and in questions of real property the lex loci rei sites 
always prevails. Nevertheless, it seems to me, that in cases 
where it is out of the power of the party to produce the original, 
secondary evidence of a will would be admissible, as of any other 
written instrument; but in the case of a will, the Court would be 
peculiarly cautious in requiring a clear case to be made out, for 
the reception of the secondary evidence. In the case of Alivon v. 
Turnival, 1 C. M. & K. 277; 4 Tyrr. 751, where it appeared, 
that by the usage of France, a document deposited with a Notary 
could not be removed; a copy of the document so deposited was 
admitted. To make that case applicable to the present, it should 
be proved that by the law or usage of Nova Scotia, an original 
will cannot be removed from its place of deposit in that Province. 
If usage, distinct from law, is relied on, such usage should be very 
clearly made out. If a rule of the law of Nova Scotia prevents 
the 
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the removal of such a document, such rule of law should also be 
proved ; for although the Province of Nova Scotia is a part of thS 
same empire, it id a, distinct community from this Province,1 and 
this Court cannot take judicial notice of its laws, but they must be 
proved in the same manner as the laws of any foreign country ; if 
the law be written, by a copy of the Statute; if it be unwritten 
law, by the testimony of persons who have a knowledge of it. 
What is the testimony in the present case ? Mr. Morris states 
that he is not aware of any law of Nova Scotia that prevents him 
from allowing tliQ- will to be taken to New Brunswick, but that he 
considers it a matter in his discretion. Whether he means that it 
is a matter in his discretion, as a ministerial officer with whom 
wills are deposited, or as a Judge of the Surrogate Court, does not 
appear and it is not at all shewn that there is any such diserq- 
tion recognized by the law or practice of NovarlScotia, nor even 
that, in the presept instance, any specific application was made to 
the discretion of Mr. Morris to permit this will to be brought to 
this Province. It appears that there have bdhn instances of 
original wills being brought from tha files of the Surrogate Court 
in Nova Scotia for the purpose of being given in evidence of 
trials in the Courts of this Province, and the reason assigned by 
Mr. Morris for thinking it improper in the present case is, to say 
the least of it, vague and unsatisfactory. Under this testimony, 
although I should be disposed to go as far as the rules of evidence 
will allow me in favor of the Plaintiff, I am of opinion that a case 
has not been madejOut for the reception of the secondary evidence. 
Botsford J.r
I thought at the trial that sufficient grounds had not been shewn 
for the admission of the secondary evidence. The general principle 
must only be avoided when the original is not attainable. It is 
necessary to bring this within the reason of Doe v. Calvert 2 
Campbell, 389, and for that purpose itmustbe shewn that theoriginal 
was either lost or beyond control. The will was in custody of the 
Surrogate General of Bova Scotia and no autheifticated copy of 
any law was produced requiring that it should be’there kept. Mr. 
Morris says there was no law to prevent him from sending it out of 
the Province, and further, that in some instances he had suffered 
wills to be taken out. As to his discretion, it would have been 
perhaps an improper exercise of it to have allowed the will to have 
been taken out of it, when unacquainted with the parties and the 
objects for which it was desired ; but suppose an heir undbr the 
will had applied and offefed security, would that not have been a 
case for the exercise of his discretion?
Parker J.:
I am quite of the same opinion. According to the lex loci which 
must govern this case, the original wiil, which is in existence, must
T1 be
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be produced in order to shew the devise, if it be in the Plaintiff’s 
power to procure it yand it has not been sufficiently shewn that he 
had not the means of obtaining it.
Perhaps, on the authority of Alivon v. Furnival, we might have 
been justified in allowing the secondary evidence, if the law of 
Nova Scotia did not permit the original will to be taken out of the 
Province for a temporary purpose; but this is not the case, indeed 
we are not very distinctly informed what the law is, or from what 
source it is derived.
So far as we can understand it, the law appears to be, not that the 
■will shall in no case be taken out cf the Province, but that it shall 
not be taken without the consent of the Surrogate General, in 
whose custody it is. Mr. Morris, in his evidence, states that he 
considers it a matter for his discretion, and gives a reason for 
thinking why he should not have allowed it to have been done in 
the present case ; but no distinct application appears to have been 
made to him, neither is the nature of the discretion he is called on 
to exercise Stated whether judicial or official. From the questions 
under the commission the necessity of producing the original will 
at the trial is not very obvious. The objection he has made could 
no doubt be got over if the interest of the estate required it.
In truth it may be observed that the difficulty has been one of 
the testator’s own creating, and they who claim under his will must 
be subject to it. The documents necessary to shew title to real 
estates ought to bfe where the estate^ are ; and if a person, possessed 
of large property in two separate Provinces, devises or conveys the 
whole by one instrument, unless the law allows secondary evidence 
the expence and risk of moving the instrument, when required for 
the purposes of the estate, must be incurred, and purchasers from 
the devisees may guard themselves by special covenants.
If the will should be lost or destroyed, secondary evidence would 
be admissible ; whether it is expedient as a general rule to allow 
such evidence in other cases, is a question for the Legislature, and 
one which may demand some consideration.
Verdict for Defendant set aside, and non-suit entered.
J. A. Street, for the Plaintiff.
Wilmot, for the Defendant.
CALIFF v. ROBERTSON:
Affidavit of service of a notice of motion “on a Student in the office of 
Plaintiff’s Attorney” not sufficient, it not stating that the service was at 
the office.
Wilmot produced an affidavit of service of notice of motion “ on 
a Student in the office of the Plaintiff’s Attorney.”
Per
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Per Curiam.
Was the notice served at the office of the Attorney. The terms 
used in the affidavit would seem merely a description of the per­
son. Gentlemen should learn to be more accnrate in the phrase­
ology of their affidavits.
The motion was withdrawn in order, to amend the affidavit.
BROWN v. TAYLOR.
In tendering evidence which the Court rejects, Counsel should take care 
that the question is stated explicitly, and that it be correctly entered on the 
Judge’s notes.
This was an action of debt on a sealed note, tried before 
Carter J. at the York Sittings. After last Hilary Term, plea 
non est faction, the Plaintiff obtained a verdict.
Berton, for Defendant moved to set aside the verdict and grant 
anew trial, for the improper rejection of testimony.
The Judges notes stated that the Plaintiff had told a witness 
that the note was given for a particular consideration ; that De­
fendant’s Counsel tendered evidence to shew that no such consi­
deration existed as an item of fraud to invalidate the note.
Berton contended that the Defendant by his plea, and by the 
course of his defence, denied the making, of the note, and asserted 
that it was a forgery; that the making and execution of the instru­
ment was proved only by evidence of the belief of the handwriting, 
and the absence of a particular consideration stated by the Plaintiff 
was a strong circumstance to affect the validity of the instrument, 
and shew it a forgery.
Per Curiam.
The evidence tendered was to shew fraud; that does not neces­
sarily imply forgery ; in tendering* evidence questions should be 
stated explicitly, and Counsel should ascertain if they are taken 
down correctly; in the absence of the learned J udge we can only 
look to his notes.
ESTEY v. NEWCOMB AND ANOTHER.
Where a demand of plea was sent by Plaintiff’s Attorney in a letter to 
his agent, a Student in the office of the Defendant’s Attorney, and was ad­
mitted to have Ween in the office of the latter before sqpiing interlocutory 
judgment, the Court set aside the interlocutory judgment upon an affidavit 
of merits and payment of costs of the judgment.
Till Court condemns the practice of Students acting as agents for Coun­
try practitioners without their master’s express sanction.
A'N application was made in Hilary Term by Berton, for De­
fendants, to set aside an interlocutory judgment for irregularity, 
and on an affidavit of merits.
The
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The irregularity complained of w^3b that the demand of plea 
was sent in a letter to a Student in the office of the Defendants 
Attorney, and was, after the signing of interlocutory judgment,, 
found among the papers in the cause ; it was not disputed that 
the demand had been~E®eived in the office before the signing of 
interlocutory judgment.
Cause was shewn by TYs/ierY
The Court, under the circumstances, granted the application on 
payment of costs, but strongly reprobated the practice of Students 
acting as agents for country practitioners, except under the express 
and immediate sanction and direction of their masters. In the first 
place a Barrister having Students was entitled to their services, 
which he could not have if the Student were otherwise employed. 
Again, a Student, as agent, might be acting on onfcide of a cause, 
while his principal was engaged on the other. On the whole, the 
Court considered the practice inconvenient and improper, and ex­
pressed a hope that gentlemen of the Bar would not hesitate to put 
an end to its continuance in their offices.
HOLLAND v. CLOSE.
Where, ie an action brought to recover upon a note or memorandum for 
the sum of .£22 payable in timber, the amount was reduced by the price of 
an Ox, which had been delivered by Dq£ndant to the Plaintiff, to the sum 
of .£14, the Court allowed full costs to 15e taxed upon a motion for an order 
to review, the Clerk having taxed only summary costs, under 4 W. 4, a. 41.
At this Term Kerr, for the Plaintiff, moved to obtain an order 
for the master to review the taxation of costs] and to tax full costs.
The case was special Assumpsit on the following note in 
writing:—“ For value received I promise to pay to the said Plain- 
“ tiff or order £22 13-6,’payable as follow's:—10 tons of pii'ie tim- 
“ her to be- delivered the first of May, 1834, and one half of the 
“ remaining sum to be paid on the11 aforesaid daj^, 1835, and the 
“ third and last remaining payment payable on the said day, 1836.”
The Plaintiff’s Counsel opened the case upon the note, and 
stated that the Defendant had sold to the Plaintiff an O.\"7 which 
would come in as offset.
The Defendant went into evidence to prove that there wps an 
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant, to the effect that 
the Plaintiff would give up the said note to the Defendant upon 
the Defendant’s giving him an Ox, the Plaintiff having previously 
received 41 tons of timber, and that the Ox was delivered, being 
one of a pair valued at 27 or £28. The learned Judge who tried 
the case left it to the jury, stating that it would seem probable ^hat 
the Ox was intended as the first phyment upon the urate.
The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff for the sum of £14 8 K 
The
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The Clerk refused to tax full costs, but proceeded under the Act of 
Assembly 4 W. 4, c. 41, to ta.t'summary costs only.
It was argued by Kerr, lor Plaintiff, and D. L. Robinson, for 
Defendant.
Botsford, J.:
It does not appear that tlie Ox was received in full discharge of 
the note, as the Plaintiff agreed to give ten pounds for it; neither 
does it appear that the Ox,was adcepjed as part payment of the 
debt. It could not be a set off. The Plaintiff was obliged to de­
clare specially, and for the full amount,dan d had he acknowledged 
the sum of £10 he must have done it by suggestions, and would 
have been put to the expence of declaring specially. It is a mat­
ter of discretion with the Court, and I think that full costs should 
be taxed.
Parker, J.:
The right of the Plaintiff to full costs is sought t<y be sustained 
on two grounds. First, that this not being , a common action of 
debt, but brought on a contract for the delivery of timber, does 
not come within the meaning of the SummaryrAct. Second, that 
if it might have been proceeded with in a sjunmary way, the circum­
stances are such as will induce the Court to allow the larger costs.
Without giving any opinion on the first ground, I think the 
second is sufficient to sustain the application. The amount for 
which the agreement or memorandum isigiven was £22, upwards,, 
payable in timber ; the payment by which it is alleged the sum 
was reduced below £20, was not the article contracted for, but an 
Ox. The case set up by the Defendant was, not that the original 
debt had been reduced by a liquidated payment, but rather in the 
nature of accord and satisfaction, that the Ox was given in full 
discharge of the whole contract.
There was no indorsement on the contract, as is usual in such 
cases, nor any application to the Plaintiff to make- such indorse­
ment, neither was it very clearly shewn that the Oxiwas intended 
as a payment in lieu of the timber, though the jury have drawn 
such an inference from the circumstances.
As the! case stood I think the Plaintiff was fully justified in 
bringing his action for the full amount of the contract, and that he 
is entitled to the cpsts of his proceeding!; i this being in my opinion 
clearly one of those cases to which tlie discretionary power vested 
in the Judge or the Court was intended to apply, though I think 
it much better that applications of this sort should be made to the 
Judge who tries tlie cause, immediately after the trial.
Chipman, Cli. J.:
I did not hear the argument but fully concur.
Rule granted.
Kerr, for Plaintiff.
D. L. Robinson, for Defendant.
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DALEY v. MARKS.
A mere delivery of goods by the vendor, without an actual acceptance 
by the vendee of some part thereof, is not sufficient within the Statute of 
Frauds.—See Provincial Act, 26 Geo. 3. c. 14, s. 14.
The receipt of the goods by a common carrier from the vendor, without 
any specific direction or authority from the vendee, will not amount to an ac­
ceptance by the vendee within the Statute.
This was an action of Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, 
tried before Carter J. at the Charlotte Circuit in November,
1837.
The evidence on the part of the Plaintiff shewed a verbal agree­
ment made between the parties in the autumn of 1836, for the sale 
by the Plaintiff to the Defendant of a quantity of timber at Saint 
Stephens, at a certain price, if delivered in time to be floated down 
the river before the close of the season. It appeared to be the cus­
tom at Saint Stephens to carry the lumber down a sluice-way into 
the tide, and a witness for the Plaintiff sword’that the lumber was 
sluiced and rafted at the foot of the sluice in time for the Defendant 
to have taken it down the river, if he had been there ready to have 
received it.
A non-suit was moved for on the ground that the agreement, not 
being in writing, was void by the Statute of Frauds, and that there 
had been no sufficient acceptance of the goods to take the case out 
of the Statute, and the learned Judge being of this opinion, directed 
a non-suit, which, however, the Plaintiff’s Counsel refused to ac­
cede to, end the case having gone-to the jury, they, contrary to 
the Judge’s direction, found a verdict for the Plaintiff.
In Hilary Term last, G. D. StMt moved for a rule nisi to set 
aside the verdit on the grounds taken at the trial, and cited Ma- 
berley v. Sheppard, 10 Bing. 99 ; Hanson pl .Armitage, 5 B. & A. 
567; 1 D. & R. 128.
Rule Nisi.
Berton now shewed cause, and contended that the sluice men 
were in the nature of common carriers, that there was a sufficient 
delivery of the lumber when placed in their hands, and it was 
proved that the lumber was delivered in due time ; he <,6 ted El­
more v. Stone, 1 Taun. 458 ; Ros. on Vend. 65 ; Dutton v. So- 
lomonson, 3 B. & P. 582.
Per Curiam.
There must be an actual acceptance of the goods by the vendee, 
with the intention of taking possession as owner, to satisfy the 
Statute ; a mere delivery with the intention of vesting possession 
is not sufficient without such acceptance. The language of the 
Court in Maberly v. Sheppard, is -exceedingly strong. There is 
nothing to shew that the parties contemplated a delivery to the 
sluicemen as a delivery to the vendee. They were not the De­
fendant’s agents for that purpose, and a delivery to and receipt by 
them, 
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them, as common carriers, would not make an acceptance by the 
Defendant under the Statute.—See Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & 
W. 656, and Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Aid. 321.
But suppose even there were a doubt on this point, Lord C. J., 
Tindal says : “ it is the duty of the Plaintiff to free the case from 
all doubt, and where any remains it is safer to adhere to the plain 
intelligible words of the Statute, which point, as clearly as words 
can do, to an actual delivery and an actual receiving of part or 
the whole of the goods sold.”
There are two cases in 2 B. & C, pages 44 & 5, to the same 
effect.
The verdict must be set aside.
Rule absolute.
DOE D. M'BRIDE v. ROE.
li 'right moved for rule of judgment nisi against casual ejector 
on affidavit of service of declaration on the daughter of the tenant 
in possession.
Rule refused.
' DOE D. PEABODY v. ROE.
Berton moved for rule for judgment nisi, against casual ejector 




It is not sufficient to set aside proceedings! for irregularity, that the De­
fendant was not personally served with process where it appeared that ser­
vice of the writ was accepted by one who, whilst in the Defendant’s em­
ployment, had a general authority to accept service of process for Defendant, 
although such acceptance was made after having left Defendant’s employ­
ment, the Defendant not having expressly denied any authority so to act, 
or taken any steps to set aside the proceedings.
The rule was discharged without costs, the Plaintiff having proceeded to 
judgment upon an affidavit of belief as to the hand writing of Defendant 
which was in fact incorrect.
Berton, in Hilary Term last, obtained a rule nisi, returnable the 
same term, to shew cause why the judgment and execution in 
this case should not be set aside for irregularity. The application 
was founded upon an affidavit of the Defendant’s which stated that 
the Defendant had never been served with process in the cause, 
nor with notice of proceedings being instituted against him.
On reference to the writ on the files of the Court, there appeared 
an
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an indorsement thereon with the name of the Defendant attached, 
acknowledging service of the process" and there was an affidavit 
annexed to the writ of one John Robert, stating that he was ac­
quainted with the Defendant’s hand writing, and believed the 
signature to the acknowledgment of service to be that of the De­
fendant.
D. L. Piobinson shewed cause the same Term.
An affidavit of one Purdy was produced, which stated that he 
(Purdy) was the agent of the Defendant, and that as such agent, 
and at the request of the Defendant, lie had acknowledged service 
of the process upon which the proceedings in this cause were 
founded, for and on the behalf of the Defendant.
An affidavit also of John F. Winslow, Sheriff of Carleton, was 
produced, which stated that subsequently to the acceptance of the 
service by Purdy, the Defendant had acknowledged to him 
(Winslow,) that he had authorized Purdy to accept service of the 
same writ; and that afterwards, when an execution in the suit was 
placed in deponent’s hands, the Defendant offered to give security for 
the amount, provided deponent would levy a subsequent execution 
against Defendant at the suit of one Ratchford—1 Man. & Ry. 
320 ; Phillips v. Ensell, 2 Dow. P. Ca. 684 ; Rhodes v. Innes, 7 
Bing. 329.
The rule nisi was enlarged to the next Term, for the Defendant 
to answer the affidavits produced by the Plaintiff, with leave for 
Plaintiff to file additional affidavits within thirty days.
And now at this Term an additional affidavit was produced, 
made by the Defendant, which, admitting that Purdy had been ' 
authorized to accept service'' df writs in his absence whilst he re­
mained a clerk of the Defendant’s, stated that Purdy had, previous 
to such acceptance of service of process, left the Defendant’s em­
ployment. The affidavit further stated that Defendant did not 
recollect any directions given by him to Purdy to accept service 
of the process in question, but on the other hand a belief that no 
such directions had been given. That the acknowledgment men­
tioned in Winslow’s affidavit had reference solely to the power 
which Purdy had whilst he remained in Defendant’s employment. 
That at the time Winslow told the Defendant of what Purdy had 
done, Defendant said to Winslow that Purdy had acted improperly. 
The affidavit further expressly denied any acknowledgment by 
Defendant of Purdy’s power after leaving his service.
On the part of the Plaintiff an additional affidavit was produced 
of one M‘Kenzie, a clerk in the employ of the Plaintiff, stating that 
in January last the Defendant had twice come to the Plaintiff’s 
store at Saint John, in company with Mr. Ratchford, and had 
held conversations with the Plaintiff on the subject of this suit, 
and proposed terms of settlement, from which it was inferred that 
both 
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"both the Defendant and Ratchford were aware of the progress of 
the suit.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
The Court must look at the whole case, and is pot confined to the 
affidavit of service of process on file. I entertain no doubt but that 
the Defendant must fail in this application. It clearly appears 
that Purdy had a general authority to accept service of process 
for the Defendant. The Defendant does not deny the authority 
of Purdy in this particular suit, but only says that the authority 
given by him to Purdy was to continue during his clerkship. 
Upoi notice of the proceedings in November or December last, the 
Defendant should have applied to a Judge at Chamber’s, and not 
have laid by until the entry of judgment. This furnishes a strong 
reason on the ground of waiver, also to maintain the judgment, but as 
I think the Plaintiff ought not to have proceeded upon the affidavit 
of belief as to the Defendant’s signature to the acknowledgment of 
service, which now, from his own shewing, turns out to be incor­
rect ; apd as I am not dispcsed to encourage a departure from tlie 
usual and correct course of proceeding, I think the rule should be 
discharged, but without costs.
BOTSFORD, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
It is certainly true as stated by Mr. Berton, that the Plaintiff 
seeks to support the service of process on a ground somewhat dif­
fering from that on which the suit has proceeded; the acknow­
ledgment of service having been subscribed, not by the Defendant 
himself, but by his agent, Purdy. From several cases however 
which have been cited, particularly Phillips v. Ensel, 2 Dow. P. R. 
684, and Herbert «. Dailey, 4 D. P. R. 726, it appears to be the 
practice of the Court to support the service, if the facts, when all 
examined into, will authorize it, although they may not be such 
as would have sanctioned the original affidavits.
That Purdy acknowledged the service on behalf of the Defendant 
is clear; it is not denied that he had at one time express authority 
to do this, and no express revocation of this authority is shewn ; 
but it is said that there was an implied revocation when Purdy 
left the Defendant’s employment. It is probable the Defendant 
intended this, but as it would have been easy for him to have given 
notice to the Sheriff, we ought to be satisfied that the Sheriff was 
aware of the circumstance of Purdy’s dismissal, and that the De­
fendant took the earliest opportunity of repudiating Purdy’s act, 
neither of which are made out.
There can, I think, be no doubt that the Defendant gras fully 
cognizant of the suits’proceeding when he came to Saint John 
and held a conversation with the Plaintiff; Mr. Ratchford, wh< 
was present at the conversation, and is largely interested in th
V1 result
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result of this application, would have corrected the statement in 
the Clerk’s affidavit if he had been mistaken in his belief that the 
negotiation related to the suit, and not merely the subject matter 
of it.
Under all the circumstances, I agree in thinking that the rule 
must be discharged; I think also, for the reasons stated by His 
Honor the Chief Justice, it should be without costs ; the Plaintiff 
ought to have obtained the affidavit of an eye witness to the sig­
nature, and not trusted to the mere belief as to hand-writing.
Rule discharged.
D. L. Robinson, for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendant.
DOE D. PURDY AND OTHERS v. PETERS.
Where B, being put into possession of premises by A under an agree­
ment for purchase, continued to hold such possession for upwards of 21 
years, and receive the rents, profits, &c., the Court considering B strictly a 
tenant at will, held in an action of ejectinent brought by the heirs of A 
against B's grantee, that the Plaintiff’s right of action was barred by the 
7th Section of the Act of Assembly of 6 Wm. 4, c. 43.
This was an action of ejectment tried before PARKER J. at the 
Saint John Circuit in August, 1837. The declaration contained 
counts upon the several demises of the widow and children of one 
Obediah Purdy; deceased.
It appeared in evidence that the locus in quo was granted by the 
Crown in 1784, to one Gilbert Purdy, the father of Obediah Pur­
dy, who by deed poll, dated 24th September, 1818, transferred it 
to the said Obediah. This deed was not registered until 1828. 
Obediah Purdy died on the 22d November, 1836, intestate, leav­
ing a widow and eight children, the lessors of the Plaintiffs. It also 
appeared from the Plaintiffs evidence that one Burr, through whom 
the Defendant claimed title, had been in possession of the premises 
since the year 1800, and that sometime in the year 1820 or 1821, 
having been called upon by Obediah Purdy to give up the posses- 
sesion thereof, he claimed to hold it as having purchased it from 
the said Gabriel Purdy, but at the same time acknowledged that 
he had never received a deed of it. The property had always been 
known as Burr’s.
The Plaintiff having closed his case, Wilmot, for Defendant, 
moved for a non-suit upon the following grounds:—
1st. No proof of possession in Gilbert Purdy, Obediah Purdy, 
or the lessors of the Plaintiff.
2nd. Burr was in the adverse possession when Gilbert Purdy’s 
deed was executed, so nothing passed thereby.
3rd. Obedian Purdy was barred by the Statute of Limitations, 
and neither he nor his children came within any of the exceptions 
of 
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of the Statute—Roscoe Ev. 348, 431 ; Ch. Gen. Pr. 275 ; Mat. 
on Pres. 4; Tolson v. Kaye, 3 B. & B. 217.
The Solicitor General objected that Burr having come into pos­
session under Gilbert Purdy on an agreement of purchase, his pos­
session was not adverse. He was'a tenant at will, which tenancy 
was not put an end to until 1820 or 1821, when he refused to give 
it up to Obediah—Ad. Ejt. 52 ; 1 Esp. 461. The learned Judge 
overruled the motion, reserving the ’mints with leave for the De­
fendant to move the Court to enter a non-suit if the objections 
should be deemed valid.
The Defendant then went into some further evidence of Burr’s 
long possession, and produced a deed from Burr to one C. J. Peters, 
dated 11 th February, 1821; also a deed from the said C. J. Peters 
to the Defendant, dated 12tli August, 1835. Livery of seisin had 
been given by Burr to C. J. Peters, by the delivery of a twig. 
The jury, under the direction of the Court, found a verdict for the 
Plaintiff.
In Hilary Term last, Wilmot obtained a rule nisi upon the 
points reserved at the trial, and also upon the further ground that, 
supposing Burr’s to have been a tenancy at will, the Statute of 
Limitations beginning to run at the expiration of one year from its 
commencement, would consequently bar the title of the lessors 
of the Plaintiff.
At the close of the learned Counsel’s argument, the following 
points for consideration were suggested by the Court.
1st. Is Burr’s possession, after the facts proved in regard to the 
disclaimer of Purdy’s title and the conveyance and delivery of 
possession to Peters in 1820 or 1821, to be deemed absolutely ad­
verse to Purdy, or can it be in the election of Purdy to consider it 
adverse or not ?
2nd. It having been decided by this Court in the case of Doe d. 
Hannington v. M‘Fadden, in Trinity, 1836, that no estate of free­
hold or inheritance passes by a deed of bargain and sale not en­
rolled under the Statute of Enrollments, until it is registered under 
the Provincial Registry Act, is such registry to be viewed in the 
light and be governed by the analogy of L’very of Seisin at Com­
mon Law ?
3rd. The deed from Gilbert Purdy to Obediah being dated in 
1818, but not having been registered until 1828, if Burr’s posses­
sion is to be deemed adverse in 1828, when the registry was made, 
did any estate pass on registry of the deed ?
4. At the time of the conveyance from Gilbert Purdy tc Obe­
diah, was Gilbert’s estate possessory or reversionary, and if the 
latter, would registry be necessary to give effect to the convey­
ance ?
5. Supposing Burr’s possession not to have been adverse, but in
the 
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i he nature of a tenant at will, would the deed of Gilbert to Obe- 
diah pass the estate in the premises without the assent and privity 
of Burr ?
Now at this Term Kerr, for Defendant, had commenced his 
argument upon the points suggested by the Court last Term, but 
the Court desiring first to hear Counsel upon the Statute of Limi­
tations.—
Wilmot was heard at length upon that point.
The Solicitor General and Wright contended that the time 
when the Act commenced running vcould not, under the circum­
stances of this case, be deemed to have arrived before the refusal 
of Burr, in 1820 or 1821, to give up the possession to Purdy. 
Chipman, Ch. J.: ,
This is a motion for a new trial, and in the progress of it various 
important questions have been mooted. Among them was a ques­
tion on the recent Provincial Statute of Limitations, 6 Wm. 4, 
c. 43, and the Court directed this question to be argued first, as it 
might be decisive of the case, the Act having come into operation 
before the present action was commenced.
The principles upon which the Statutes of Limitations are 
founded, seem to be, that it is essential to the peace of society to 
affix a period to the right of disturbing possession; that long pos4 
session affords one of the best proofs of right, and that, even apart 
from the question of right, it would be very mischievous to take 
away property from the possessor of it after long enjoyment. 
They are considered as not affording any reasonable ground of 
complaint, because it is only from the negligence of the party him­
self that they can take effect. In accordance with these princi­
ples, it is the habit of Judges at the present day to treat laws 
limiting actions as laws of peace and justice, and to give them free 
scope according to the intent of their provisions.
The Act of Assembly now brought into question, is evidently 
founded upon the same principles, and framed in the same spirit, 
and will undoubtedly have a very extensive and important opera­
tion upon the lauded property of the country. It adheres to the 
period of twenty years as the general limit for enforcing‘claims, 
and prescribes positive rules for ascertaining the time when that 
period shall be deemed to have commenced. The^general princi­
ple upon which these rules are founded is, that the party’s right 
shall be deemed to have first accrued, in other words, rhe period of 
twenty years shall begin to be numbered against him at the time 
when he shall have been first dispossessed of the land. There is 
& particular rule prescribed for the case of tenants atwffl, as con­
tra distinguished from other tenancies, in the 7th section of the 
Act, which is in the following words : “.-And be it further enacted, 
That when any person shall be in possession or in receipt of the 
profits 
in the First year of VICTORIA. 353
profits of any land as tenants at will, the right of the person enti­
tled subject thereto, or of the person through whom he claims, 'io 
make an entry or bring an action to recover such land, shall be 
deemed te have first accrued either at the determination of such 
tenancy, or at the expiration of one year next after the commence­
ment of such tenancy, at which time such tenancy shall be deemed 
to have determined: Provided always, that no mortgagor or cesi- 
ui quS trust shall be deemed to bd a tenant at will, within the 
meaning of this clause, to his mortgagee or trustee.” I can inter­
pret this clause of the Act in no other way than its express terms 
seem to me to require. It is a positive enactment that a tenancy 
at will shall at ail events for the purposes of the Statute “ be 
deemed to have determined at the expiration of one year next after 
the commenqement of such tenancy.” The other alternative of 
the actual determination of the tenancy being necessarily confined 
to cases where, in point of fact, the tenancy has expired before the 
completion of the first year after its commencement. To admit 
the construction contended for by the Solicitor General, that this 
limit of a year shall be done away with by proof of an actual deter­
mination of the tenancy at any time, even after the lapse of 
twenty or twice twenty years from the time of its commencement, 
would not only be contrary to the express terms of this clause, but 
against the whole policy of the Statute. There is no such great 
hardship in the case, because the party claiming the land, ’ subject 
to the-tenancy at will, Hay always enforce his right within the 
period of twenty years fixed by the Statute, by dispossessing the 
tenant at will, or he may protect it for a new period of twenty 
years by requiring an acknowledgment in writing according to the 
provision in the 13th Section of the Act. Taking this to be the 
true construction of the 7th Section, it is next to be considered 
whether the present is a case which falls within its provisions.
The cases of Ball v. Cullimore, 2 C. M. & R. 120, 5 Tyrr. 
753; and Doe d. Gray v. Stanion,,l M. & W. 695; 1 Tyrr. & 
Gr. 1071, shew, beyond cHtroversjfi that a purchaser put into 
possession of land under a contract of sale, is to be viewed in no 
other light in a Court of law' than that of a strict tenant at will; 
and the exception in the seventh section of the Act of mortgagors 
and cestui que trusts, shews it to be the intention of the law to in­
clude within its provisions persons of every description who may 
fall within the class of tenants at will, other than those who are 
thus expressly excepted.
The person through whom the lessors of the Plaintiff in this 
case claim, is Gilbert Purdy, bis right was subject to the tenancy 
at will in Edward Burr.1 created by Burr’s being let into possession 
of the land under a contract of sale from the said Gilbert Purdy 
in the year 1799, or thereabouts. By the positive enactment of 
the
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the Statute, the right of those claiming under Gilbert Purdy was 
barred at the termination of twenty years from the expiration of 
one year after Burr was so let into possession, and this puts an 
end to tlie“case of the lessors of the Plaintiff, and the rule for a 
new trial must be made absolute.
Botsf6rd, J.:
I fully concur with the Chief Justice in thinking that the present 
case falls witl in the meaning and construction of the 7th section 
of the Act 6 Wm. 4, c. 43, and that by its provisions the lessors 
of the Plaintiff are barred from recovering in this action. But as 
this point was not made at the trial, the rule should be made abso­
lute for a new trial.
Parker J.:
It is in vain to attempt upon any general reasoning, to give a 
construction to the new Act of Limitations favorable to the lessors 
of the Plaintiff in the present suit. It appears to be the manifest 
intention of the Act, at the moment of its going into operation , to 
take away the light of entry in many cases where it had previously 
existed. To a certain class of cases namely, those where the pos­
session would not be dee,med adverse at the time of the Act’s 
taking effect, the Legislature have, for a further period of five 
years, left the rights of the parties to be governed by the old law ; 
but the only time allowed for bringing actions in cases like the 
present, was that which occurred between the IGth March, 1836, 
when the Act was passed, and the 1st of January, 1837, when it 
took effect.
Burr came into possession in 1797, according to the Plaintiff’s 
own shewing, as tenant at will to Gilbert Purdy, for unless that 
be made out the right of action is gone, even under the Statute of 
James. The lessors of the Plaintiff claim through the person who 
was entitled, subject to that tenancy ; the possession of the De­
fendant had clearly become-iidverse before the new Act went into 
operation. To the provisions then of this Act we must look in or­
der to ascertain when the right of entry accrued, in order to find out 
when it would have expired.
The 7th section professes to determine the time at which the 
right of entry, when a tenant at will is in possession, shall be 
deemed first to have accrued to the person entitled, subject to such 
tenancy, and says this shall be “ either at the determination of 
such tenancy, or at the expiration of one year next after the com­
mencement of such tenancy;” “at which time” it proceeds to 
add “ such tenancy shall be deemed to have determined.”
I cannot give any other signification to this section than that 
which His Honor the Chief Justice has already stated, namely, 
that for the purposes of the Act the tenancy at will shall be con­
sidered as having ended at the expiration of the year, if it had not 
actually terminated at some period within the year. If,
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If, as the Plaintiff’s Counsel contends, it is only ■where the ac­
tual time of the termination of the tenancy does not appear that 
it is to be considered limited to a year, see what such a construc­
tion would lead to,—a Plaintiff might shew the commencement 
of a tenancy at will forty or fifty years back, and then prove a de­
mand of possession, or some other act to determine the tenancy, 
than which nothing would be easier, a few days before the action 
brought, which would exclude the operation of the latter part of 
the clause, and throw on the Defendant the onus of shewing that 
the tenancy was actually put an end to at an earlier period. This 
would be at variance with the whole scope and spirit of the Act, 
and would very often put it in the power of a Plaintiff to upset a 
long possession by oral testimony, which it seems one of the great 
objects of the Legislature to exo ide.
There is an apparent harshness in the application of the law to 
the present case, arising from tlie circumstance of Obediah Pur­
dy’s death but a short time before the Act took effect, and after 
an action brought by him which consequently abated • but apart 
from this there is nothing in the case which would make one desi­
rous of withdrawing it from the operation of the new Act.
A mere tenancy at will is certainly the last sort of tenancy 
which ought to be of long duration ; where it is suffered to con­
tinue there are generally strong equitable circumstances (as in the 
present case) in favor of the Defendant; audit is often unattended 
by the ordinary relations of landlord and tenant, such as payment 
of rent and the like.
If however there be such existing which the parties do not wish 
to alter or terminateyJthe 13tli section provides a safe method, 
namely, a written acknowledgment by the person in possession of 
the other’s title.
This particular point on which we now decide this case, was not 
raised at the trial, as the Defendant contended that Burr’s posses­
sion was not that of a tenant at w„l, but altogether adverse ; but 
if the case is governed by it, it is certainly unnecessary to go into 
consideration of the other very important points which were sug­
gested on obtaining the rule. The great changes introduced by 
the new Act had not then been sufficiently noticed.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
Solicitor General and Wright, for Plaintiff.
J. Peters, Wilmot fy Kerr, for Defendant.
JOHNSTON v. TIBBITS AND MARSH.
Every Writ of Scire Facias should state th.- particular circumstances 
which entitle the party to the remedy sought to be obtained.
Any matter which might have been pleaded in the original action cannot 
be pleaded to an ordinary scire facias under the statute of Westminster.
A
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A party can only have judgment of the execuion prayed for in his scire 
facias, and such judgment in the course ofan ordinary scire facias will not be 
available to give him an execution against a joint debtor not brought into 
Court in the original action or under the Act of Assembly, 23 G. 3, S. 24.
Seattle. That the pleading to a sci. fa. under any Act of the Assembly 
would be governed by the same rules as under the Statute of Westminster.
This was a Scire Facias brought upon a judgment obtained 
against the Defendants, on a recognizance of bail entered into by- 
tliem for cne James M'Cann. The scire facias was in the usual 
form of such writs, under the statute of Westminster, and it was 
sought under it by virtueof the Act of Assembly of 26 G. 3, c. 24, 
to obtain an execution against the person and sole property of 
James Tibbits, one of the Defendants, but who at the i time of 
judgment obtained on the said recognizance, was out of the 
jurisdiction of the Court, had never been served with process or 
notice of the action, and had not appeared thereto. To this scire 
facias the Defendant, Tibbits, pleaded several matters in bar, to 
all of which pleas the Plaintiff demurred specially, and there was 
a joinder in demurrer.
In Hilary Term last the demurrer was powerfully supported 
by Kerr for the Plaintiff, he contending that the pleas were bad 
both in substahce and form.
It was urged in support of the pleas by Berton, that as the 
scire fqcias was under tile Act of Assembly, and brought upon a 
judgment to which the Defendant Tibbits had never been a party, 
either by service of process or notice, it was competent for him to 
plead any matter in bar to the scire facias which could have been 
pleaded in bar to the original action.
These several points received a very full and elaborate discussion, 
but as the judgment of the Court was founded upon the insufficiency 
of the scire facias itself, and as the learned Judges have in their 
opinions adverted to the principal arguments of the counsel, we do 
not give them at large here. At this term the Court gave their 
opinions as follow : —
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This case stands under very peculiar circumstances. When I 
came to consider it, I found it necessary in the first place to look 
to the scire facias set out on the record. This writ recites that 
the Plaintiff had recovered against the Defendants a judgment in 
debt, and that execution remained to be made thereupon, and calls 
upon the Defendants jointly “to shew if they Jia ve or know of any- 
“ thing to say for themselves, why the Plaintiff ought not to have 
“ execution against themf according to the judgment. It is, 
therefore, manifestly an ordinary scire facias under the statute of 
Westminster to authorize an execution after the expiration of a 
year from the time of the judgment. It is, nevertheless, dealt with 
by the Defendant Tibbitts in his pleas, and has been treated on 
both 
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both sides throughout the argument as if it were a scire facias 
against a joint debtor who had not been brought into Court under 
the Act of Assembly, 26 G. 3, c. 24, for enabling creditors more 
easily to recover their debts against joint debtors ; and there is no 
doubt, that, in point of fact, it was intended for this purpose. The 
impression at the bar seems to have been, that this was a general 
form of the writofsc/re facias which was applicable to any special 
case like that provided for in the Provincial Statute to which I 
have referred. But this is not so. The scire facias is indeed a 
judicial writ, founded on matter of record, but it lies in a great 
number of cases, and as it may be pleaded to, it is considered in 
the nature of an action. Hence, like the declaration in other actions, 
it ought to state the particular facts upon which the Plaintiff calls 
upon a Defendant to shew why the particular proceeding prayed 
for, in most cases an execution, should not be so ha d against him. 
In the books of practice we find a variety of forms of this writ 
adapted to many of the cases in which it lies, several of them un­
der particular statutes. And in cases under statutes there is 
always an allegation that the proceeding is “ according to the form 
of the statute in such case made and provided.” {vide Appendix to 
Tidd’s and Chitty’s Practice, title Scire Facias.) Direct autho­
rities on this point are not wanting. Thus in Gill v. Scrivens, 7 
T. R. 27, which was a scire facias under 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, s. 9, 
against a person who had been twice a bankrupt and bad not paid 
fifteen shillings in the pound, the writ was quashed on account 
of a defect appearing in the writ itself, which expressly purported 
on the face of it to be under the statute, and Lord Kenyon says, 
“ The writ ought to state all the circumstances that entitle the
Plaintiff to the execution prayed for by him.” So in the case of 
Parker v. Hall, [Garth. 105, S. C. 2, Sal. 598,] Lord Holt said, 
“ this was a judicial writ and might be framed upon the subject 
“ matter,” and he proceeded to prescribe a form of a writ adapted 
to the particular case. In Goldsworthy v. Southwark, 1 Wils: 
243, where the Defendant died after interlocutory judgment, and 
after a writ of inquiry executed and damages assessed, but before 
final judgment was entered, the Plaintiff sued out a scire facias 
to shew cause why a new writ of inquiry should not be awarded, 
and the scire facias was quashed because it did not shew the state of 
the cause at the instant of the Defendant’s death, and because it 
ought to have been to shew cause why the damages assessed 
should not be recovered. See Buchanan v. Hoskins, (2 Lord Ray, 
1057, 6 Mod. 263.) A writ of scire facias was held to be good 
on the face of it, and all that was amiss in it was that it did not 
fit the case, and the court refused to amend it, and the Plaintiff 
was driven to take out a new writ. I dare say that other autho­
rities may be found to the same effect, but those I have c’ted 
wl sufficiently 
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sufficiently establish that every writ of scire facias should state the 
particular circumstances which entitle the Plaintiff to the remedy 
which he is seeking to obtain. With respect to the Act of As­
sembly, 26 G. 3, c. 24, for facilitating proceedings against joint 
debtors, there is at least one precedent on the files of this Court 
which shews that this principle has in former times been fully 
acted upon, in framing writs of scire facias under this Statute. To 
this precedent I shall presently advert more particularly. I am 
clearly of opinion, that the scire facias which appears on the record 
must be viewed as the ordinary scire facias under the Statute of 
Westminster, and cannot be considered as a scire facias under the 
Act of Assembly above mentioned, and that the Court cannot deal 
wtih it as having any other operation or effect than what its ap­
propriate legal import will give to it. The consequence with re­
gard to all the pleas will be that they cannot for a moment be sus­
tained. One objection alone is fatal—for this being an ordinary 
scire facias to revive the judgment, there is no rule in the law 
more clear than that any matter which might have been pleaded 
in the original action cannot be pleaded to the scire facias. In 
applying t is rule to the case before the Court on this record, I 
must not be understood as intending to intimate the slightest doubt 
that the same rule would apply to a scire facias under the Act of 
Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c 24. But the case of a scire facias under 
this Act not being before the Court, it would be extrajudicial to 
give a direct opinion upon it. Nevertheless as this has been the- 
main point in debate, I think it right to go thus far in making 
known my sentiments upon this matter; I ought to add that I do 
not feel that the application of the rule to cases under the Act of 
Assembly could, as contended at the bar, render nugatory the scire 
facias under the Act. The scire facias would give notice to the 
joint debtor not brought into Court, of the judgment obtained 
against him, who would thereupon have an opportunity to come 
in and plead every matter pleadable to the scire facias; or if there 
were any grounds for relief which would not be available in plead­
ing to the scire facias, he might apply to the Court by motion, 
and it would seem from the case of Cook v. Jones, Cowper. 
727, that upon such a motion the Court would, if the case required 
it, direct an issue for the trial of facts. In modern times the pro­
ceeding by motion has superseded the writ of audita querela, which 
seems to be the remedy provided by the common law for such a 
case. On the grounds which I have stated, I am therefore of opi­
nion, that all the pleas in this oase are bad, and that there must be 
judgment for the Plaintiff on these demurrers. But this judgment 
can be only, that he have the execution prayed for in his scire 
facias, and will not, I conceive, be available to give him an execu­
tion to be executed upon the person and sole property of the
Defendant
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Defendant James Tibbetts, as a joint debtor not brought into Court 
under the Act of Assembly 26 Geo. 3, c. 24.
Here His Honor the Chief J ustice read the writto which he had allu­
ded, as taken from the files ofthe Court but w'hich we do not insert, as 
the Court have since by a rule prescribed a scire facias in such cases. 
Botsford, J.:
I am of the same opinion upon all the points. These pleas can­
not be sustained, and the proc eedings on the scire facias have been 
irregular.
By the construction that the law has put on the terms of the 
recognizance of bail, the Plaintiff is bound to issue a ca. sa. 
against the principal, w'lio is not called upon to render himself in 
discharge of his bail, at all events, but only when the Plaintiff by 
issuing a ca. sa, has intimated his intention of taking the body. 
The bail, therefore, are not bound to render their principal until 
the Plaintiff sues out the ca. sa., the not suing out of whicn would 
be a good defence.
I am not prepared to say that this Court would not grant sum­
mary relief upon motion, in a case where no ca. sa. had been issued 
against the principal, and the proceedings were by scire facias, pur­
suant to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 24. 
Parker .J.:
I am of opinion that the pleas in this case are bad both in sub­
stance and form.
I also quite concur with His Honor the Chief Justice, in think­
ing that the scire facias to which the pleas have been pleaded, is 
not such as the Act of Assembly contemplated; it is nothing more 
than the ordinary writ framed under the Statute of Westminster.
The Plaintiff has placed nothing on the record to shew that this 
was a case under the Act of Assembly, or that the scire facias 
under the Statute of Westminster might not have been necessary 
in order to enable Mm to issue any execution, for the time of the 
original judgment does not appear.
On this point the case might be determined, but as the sub­
stantial ground of objection has been most folly and most ably ar­
gued by the learned Counsel on both sides, and it is of much im­
portance that it should be settled, I have felt it right to give it a 
careful consideration, and have no hesitation in stating the con­
clusion 1 have come to.
Let us first see what the state of the law was at the time of 
passing our Act. The only mode of proceeding against joint 
debtors in England, where all could not be served with process, 
was, first to outlaw such as were not served and did not appear to 
the suit and then to carry on the suit against the others, suggesting 
the outlawry of the co-debtor on the record; and as by judgment of 
outlawry the outlaw’s property was taken into the King’s hands, 
the
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the mode of getting satisfaction out of his estate was by applica­
tion to the officers of the Crown. If any Defendant was served 
with process and did not appear the course was to enter an ap­
pearance for and interlocutory judgment against him, and on the 
trial or inquiry to assess the damages against all.
As proceeding to outlawry was not very feasible in this Pro­
vince, the Legislature have adopted a mode of proceeding more in 
analogy to the case of a co-Defendant neglecting to appear after 
having been served with process ; or perhaps to that of a Defen­
dant against whom a scire facias has issued to which two nihils 
have been returned, but as by this mode judgment would be entered 
up against a party without notice to him of the suit, we must in­
quire further what remedy the law has provided for such an emer­
gency.
The audita querela is undoubtedly the ancient common law 
remedy ; “ it lies,” said the learned editor of Saunders Rep. in his 
note, 2d vol. page 148, “for a person who either is in execution, 
or in danger of being so, upon a judgment, statute merchant, sta­
tute staple or recognizance, when he has matter to shew that such 
execution ought not to have issued, or should not issue against 
him ; and is of a most remedial nature, and seems to have been 
invented lest in any case there would be an oppressive defect of 
justice where the party has a good defence, but had not nor has 
any other means of taking advantage of it.”—Com. Dig. audita 
querela (A.) 3 Bl. Com. 405. As if B be taken in execution 
upon a statute acknowledged by A in his name; F. N. B. 233, 
&c. &c. So if a man be, as is already noticed, only in* danger of 
being taken in execution an audita querela lies quiq. timet Co. 
Litt. 100 a.
This mode of redress remained legally in force, although a resort 
to it was seldom had in consequence of the relief, equally effectual, 
given hy the Court in a summary way on motion ; though occa­
sionally where the matter of fact was doubtful and could not be 
clearly ascertained by affidavit, and therefore proper to be tried, 
the Court has driven the Defendant to his audita querela—4 Burr. 
2287, 1 Salk. 264. And an instance is given in the note to 
Saunders, of an audita querela proceeding, only three years before 
the passing of our Act; though the course adopted in the case 
cited by the Chief Justice from 2 Cowp. 727, of ordering an issue, 
would supersede the necessity of the writ even in the case of a dis­
puted fact. A party however is still entitled to his audita querela 
even where the Court refuses to interfere on motion—Armitage v. 
Rigby, 5 Ad. & E. 82.
Such being the law on this head, providing a remedy which 
would he applicable to the case of a Defendant against whom a 
judgment was entered without notice, and who might therefore 
have
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have a good defence without having had an opportunity to avail 
himself of it before judgment, letihs sde further whethef he could 
avail himself of the defence by way of plea to a scire facias alter 
judgment.
As has already been observed by the Court, it seems to be a 
clearly established and long settled principle of law, that matter 
pleadable in the original action shall not be pleaded ho a scire fa­
cias on the judgment in that action—Baylis v. Hayward, 4 Ad. & 
E. 256. In the case of Bush v. Gower, Rep. T. II. 233, Lord 
Ilardwicke says, “ the general rule is that judgments are not to 
be avoided by surmise of a matter of fact, especially a fact that 
existed before the pronouncing the judgment, and it can never be 
done at all but where such surmise is particularly given by Act of 
Parliament, and then it maythe question there was, whether 
under thte~Statute 12 Ann, c. 16, declaring void all bonds, con­
tracts and assurances made upon a usurious consideration, usury in 
the original contract could be pleaded to a scire facias on the 
judgment upon shell contract; which the Court held could not be 
done, although the judgment was entered up by virtue of a warrant 
of Attorney, made*at the same time with the contract and tainted 
with the same corruption.
The facts were much the same in the case in Cowper, where the 
Court on motion directed an issue to try the usury.
The case before Lord Ilardwicke was in 1736, that before Lord 
Mansfield in 1778; had our Act of Assembly (which was in 
1786,) contemplated relief by pleading to the scire faciqs, I think 
this surmise would have been particularly allowed; and I am 
strengthened in this opinion by finding from a Nova Scotia Act, 
with a memorandum of which I have been favored by Mr. Stewart, 
that the Legislature there have expressly allowed a joint debtor 
not served with process to plead either in bar to the original suit, 
or in answer to the so«e facias- issued on the judgment in such 
suit.
The«c«7'e facias directed by our Act is in itself no remedy, but 
it appears to me was provided for the purpose of giving notice to 
the Defendant, in order that he might plead such matters as were 
properly pleadable thereto, and avail himself of the audita querela, 
or other appropriate remedy where his ground of defence could not 
be set up by way of plea to the scife facias.
The mode of proceeding on a sole facias by no means secured 
in all cases notice to the Defendant; indeed until our late’jVct on 
this subject, 2 Wm. 4, c. 20, was liable to much abuse, but here 
the old law stepped in and gave the relief by audita, querela, 
where two nihils were returned instead of a scire feci'.'
So early as in the case before Lord Hardwicke, allusion is made 
to the relief on motion ; he says in speaking of the cases cited, of 
setting 
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etting aside fines for fraud: “ to be sure the Court can do it, but 
then that is not done by pleading and avoiding them upon record 
but by the discretion of the Courts upon an interlocutory motion. 
But however, it furnishes another consideration, viz. : whether 
judgments of this sort might not be set aside in such an interlocu­
tory way, as whether the party might not come to the Court and 
by motion pray to set aside the judgment for ill practice. 
So where an infant lets judgment go by default, if he appeared by 
Attorney to whom he had made a sealed deed, though he could not 
set it aside by writ of error or by audita querela, or upon pleading to 
a scire facias, yet he might come to the Court and move to set it 
aside, as was the case of Jackson and Mosey, Trin. 3 Geo. 1, in 
C. B.”
In a late case Howell v. Scott 4 D. P. R. 386, where there was 
a scire facias in the Exchequer on a Welch judgment, plea there­
to and demurrer to the plea, Parke J. says: K the Defendant 
should have made an application to the equitable jurisdiction of the 
Court. It cannot be said as a general rule that all matters, as 
well legal as equitable, which shew that execution ought not to 
issue, can be pleaded to a scire facias.'1'
I am by no means satisfied that any change in the law is neces­
sary for the purposes of justice, or that it would be any improve­
ment to introduce the provision of the Nova Scotia Act. There 
may be a very great difference in the relative situation of absent 
parties in regard to their resident joint debtors, and what would be 
a proper ground for the interference of the Court in one case might 
be none in another; however, this is a matter for the consideration 
of the Legislature, we must take the law as it is, which I clearly 
think will not allow the want of a ca. sa. in the original action 
against the principal, to be pleaded to a scire facias, or a judg­
ment already recovered against the bail on their recognizance.
It would be superfluous to go into a critical examination of the 
formal objections taken on special demurrer to these several pleas, 
as the objection, in point of substance, applies to them all. The 
Defendant has been sorely perplexed in trying to get his matter of 
inducement on the record in order to let in his pleas of no ca. sa., 
which matter ought in fact to have come from the other side ; or if 
the Defendant was desirous of waiving all objection to the form of 
the scire facias, it would have taxed his ingenuity to get the mat­
ter into his plea, except by oyer of the original record which would 
have shewn how the Defendant has been proceeded against.
In the case of Simmons v. Parmenter, 1 Wils. 97, against two 
joint debtors, one of whom was outlawed, oyer of the writ and 
record of outlawry was granted ; and other cases I think may be 
found to the same effect; but it is needless to say more on this 
head; 
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head i for the reasons already stated there must be judgment for 
the Plaintiff on the demurrer to all the pleas.




* This ease was omitted to be inserted among the Reports of last Term.
Where goods are delivered under an agreement to be paid lor by endorsed 
notes, payable — days after delivery, the vendor may, before the expira­
tion of the term of credit, sustain an action against the vendee for a partial 
breach of his contract, the vendee having in part paid for the goods according 
to the agreement.
Averments in the declaration of past payment bv Defendant, and re­
quest to deliver the notes, are surplusage, and need not be proved.
This was an action of special Assumpsit, tried before Parker 
J. at the Saint John Circuit in January last.
The Plaintiff declared that in consideration that the Plaintiff 
would sell and deliver three cargoes of Boards at an agreed price, 
Defendant promised to pay by approved indorsed notes, at ninety 
days from delivery ; that he did sell and deliver, and that al­
though Defendant paid a part, to wit, £100, by an approved in­
dorsed note, yet lie refused to pay for the remainder in like 
manner.
The action was brought before the expiration of the term of 
credit.
At the trial N. Parker, for the Defendant, moved for a non-suit 
on the grounds,
1st. That the Plaintiff had not proved his averment of the pay­
ment of a part.
2nd. That there was no evidence of the demand of a note for the 
balance.
The learned .Judge reserved the points, and gave the Defendant 
leave to move for a non-suit in banc, and the Plaintiff had a ver­
dict.
At this Term N. Parker moved to set aside the verdict, and 
enter a non-suit on the points reserved:—
The action, having been brought before the expiration of the ver­
dict, could only be supported on the breach for not delivering the 
promissory note.
The Plaintiff gave no evidence to support the averments of pay­
ment of part or request of a note for the remainder, and therefore 
had not proved the gravamen'of his charge. He did not seek to 
recover on any legal or implied liability, but on the special agree­
ment to do certain acts. He must recover secundum allegata et 
probata.
[Chipman,
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\Chipman, Ch. J.]—This action is by the vendor against the 
vendee, for goods sold and delivered. Without the special agree­
ment the Defendant would have been bound to pay. The special 
contract is for his ease, and he is equally bound to pay for them 
according to that special agreement; the question therefore is if 
the averments are not surplusage.]
The rule as to surplusage is that all which may be struck out 
and leave the declaration good may be rejected as surplusage ; 
here to strike out the averment would leave the count without a 
breach, and if the averment be surplusage, then, although he has 
stated a payment of part, he may recover the whole amount of the 
goods sold.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
It is contended that an allegation in the Plaintiff’s declaration of 
a payment of part of his claim, and a demand of the residuec, 
should be proved as laid. I cannot yield to either objection. A 
precedent debt existed, and therefore no request was necessary. 
This was a contract of sale payable by indorsed notes; the lum­
ber was delivered and thereby the debt accrued, and it became the 
Defendant’s duty to pay by indorsed notes, as in a common case 
it would have been in cash. It cannot be contended that he must 
prove payment of part to recover the balance ; it was an allegation 
in diminution of his demand, and may be regarded as surplusage. 
Botsford, J. concurred.
Carter J.:
I consider the allegation of the payment of a part as an admis­
sion on the record in favor of the Defendant, which it was not 
necessary for the Plaintiff to prove.
As to the second point, I think it was not necessary for the 
Plaintiff to request. This is not different in its effect from a com­
mon contract to pay, except that the Defendant was to pay in a 
particular way ; the contract does not state on request.
In 1st Chitty, 290, it is said from Plowden, if a special request 
be unnecessarily stated it need not be proved.
Parker, J.:
This notion was brought by the vendor against the vendee on a 
contract of sale.
It was necessary for the Plaintiff to aver and prove the contract 
and the performance of his part of it, namely, the delivery of the 
goods to the Defendant, which was done, and upon this the duty 
arises for the Defendant to perform his part, viz. paying for the 
same by good indorsed notes.
It is true the Plaintiff has in addition to the averment of per­
formance on his part, alleged a part performance by the Defen­
dant of his part; but this I agree in thinking amounts only to an 
admission
in the First Year of VICTORIA. 365 
admission for the Defendant’s benefit, saving him the trouble of 
proving the fact, but not making it necessary for the Plaintiff to 
prove it.
As to the request, the contract was not to give the notes on re­
quest after the delivery of the goods, but on such delivery ; it was 
not, therefore, a material averment, and may, I think, be rejected 
as surplusage.
There is no ground for disturbing the verdict.
Rule refused. 
Berton for Plaintiff.
N. Parker for Defendant.
TRINITY TERM, 1st Victoria.
1838.
GEUBEAL EWEE.
It is Ordered, That the entry of the Judgment on the Record, 
in action of debt, when the amount to be recovered is ascertained 
and assessed by the Court under the Act of Assembly, 7, W. 4, 
c. 14, s. 6, shall be in the following form or of the like tenor and 
effect, viz:
“ And the said A. B. [the Plaintiff'] prays that the amount to 
be recovered in this action may be ascertained and assessed by the 
Court here, according to the form of the Act of Assembly in such 
case made and provided ; and thereupon it is suggested and proved 
and manifestly appears to the Court here, that the said A. B. 
ought to recover for his debt in this action, the sum of------, there­
fore it is considered that the said A. B. do recover against the said 
C. D. [the Defendant] the said sum of------for his debt so ascer­
tained and assessed by the Court here, and also &c. [proceed with 





Note.—Carter Justice was absent during the whole of this Term.
CASSES M MICHAEIMAS TEW,
IN THE
SECOND YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.
THE QUEEN v. JOHN KERR.
Courts of Judicature iu this Province have no authority to pronounce an 
Act of the Legislature to he invalid, or to declare it null and void aiter’it 
!! has been passed by the Legislative Council and Assembly and received, the 
13 Governor’s assent, either on the ground tliat such Act interferes with the 
exercise of private rights and is therefore unconstitutional, or that under the 
Royal Instructions to the Governor the Act ought not to have been passed 
without a suspending clause.
This was one of several indictments found by the Grand Jury 
of the City and County of Saint John, at the Court of Oyer and 
Terminer in January, 1838, for offences against the Act of Assem­
bly 7 Wm. 4, cl 11, intituled ‘-An Act for the more effectual 
prevention of fires within the City of Saint John.” The Defen­
dant having pleaded not guilty, the issue came to be tried before 
Parker J. at the Court in August last.
The first count in the indictment is as follows :—
The jurors of our Lady the Queen, upon their oath present, that 
JohiT Kerr, late of the City of Saint John, in the City and County 
of Saint John, Merchant, on the first day of May in the year of 
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty seven, with force 
and arms &c. at the City of Saint John aforesaid, in the City and 
County aforesaid, unlawfully and injuriously did erect and build, 
and cause and procure to be erected and built in the City of Saint 
John, to wit, at the City aforesaid in the City and County afore­
said, a certain building of wood of greater height than twenty six 
feet from the level of the street whereon the said building did front, 
to the top of the corner posts of the said building, to wit, of the 
height of twenty nine feet from the level of Prince William street, 
in the said City, being the street whereon the said building did 
front, to the top of the corner posts of the said building, to the 
great damage and common nuisance of all Her Majesty’s liege 
subjects, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, 
contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and 
provided, and against the peace of our Lord the late King and our 
Lady the present Queen, their Crown and dignity.
xl The
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The second count was for maintaining and continuing the same 
building.
The following are the Sections of this Act on which the prosecu­
tion was founded:—
I. Be it enacted by the Lieutenant Governor, Legislative Coun­
cil and Assembly, That from and after the passing of this Act, no 
dwelling house, store house, or other building whatsoever, shall be 
erected of wood or other combustible materials, in the City of Saint 
John, of greater height than twenty six feet from the level or 
line of the street or wharf whereon the same may front, or of the 
ground whereon the same is erected, to the top of the corner posts 
of such building, and the ridge of the roof of which shall exceed fif­
teen feet perpendicular from the wall plate. * # #
“V. And be it further enacted, That every such dwelling house, 
store house, or other building which, after the passing of this Act, 
shall be erected, built, raised up, built upon, roofed, or repaired, 
contrary to the provisions of this Act, and if constructed of stone 
or brick, shall not have iron, copper or other fire proof window 
shutters, and outer doors, as is herein before provided for, shall be 
deemed a common nuisance.”
The charge being clearly made out by the evidence for the 
Crown, Kerr, for the Defendant, took several exceptions to the 
prosecution:—
1st. The indictment was not sufficient, as it did not set out the 
height of the building above the ground on which it was placed— 
non constat but the ground might have been much higher than 
the street, and the building not higher than the law allowed. The 
street might have been cut down so as to bring it much below the 
level of the building1,’ as had been done in many instances.
2d. The Act itself is void, as being against common right and 
against Magna Charta, and no indictment will lie for a breach of 
its provisions.
3d. The Royal Instructions are part of the Constitution of this 
Province ; they expressly require that no Act affecting private 
property shall be passed by the Assembly without a suspending 
clause. This Act affects private property, has no suspending 
clause, and is therefore void.
4th. Being void at the time of its being passed, no subsequent 
recognition by the Crown could give it validity.
5th. It is the province and duty of the Court to declare Acts 
like this, which are unconstitutional, or not duly passed in confor­
mity to the Royal Instructions, to be void.
The learned Judge was of opinion that the indictment suffici­
ently charged the offence under the Act, and it lay upon the De­
fendant to shew that there were any particular circumstances in 
regard 
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regard to the locality of the building, or peculiarity in the site, 
which would withdraw the case from the operation of the Act.
The words of the Act are:—From the level of the street or 
wharf, or of the ground,” the latter words were probably inserted 
because buildings might not front on any street or wharf.
Prima/acf'e^when the house fronted on any street the level of 
that street was the place from which the height was to be mea­
sured.
As to the several objections to the Act itself, the learned Judge 
suggested, and it was agreed to by the Counsel on both sides, that 
they should be reserved for the consideration of this Court, and in 
case of a verdict for the Crown the judgment should be respited 
until an opportunity was afforded of taking the opinion of the 
Court. The question raised on the construction of the Act was 
also to be brought under consideration if the Counsel thought 
proper.
The Defendant then proceeded to call witnesses, and the case 
went to the jury on the facts, who found the Defendant guilty.
The learned Judge having stated these matters to the Court, 
Kerr, was heard in support of his objections.
He cited and relied on the following clause in the Royal In­
structions :—
“ And whereas great mischief may arise from passing bills of an 
unusual and extraordinary nature and importance in our Planta­
tions, which bills remain in force there from the time of enacting 
until our pleasure be signified to the contrary. We do hereby 
will and require you not to pass or give your assent to any bill or 
bills of an unusual and extraordinary nature and importance 
wherein our prerogative and the property of our subjects may be 
prejudiced, or the trade and shipping of the Kingdom any way af­
fected until you shall have first transmitted unto us through one of 
our principal Secretaries of State, and to the Committee of our 
Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, for their information, 
the drafts of such bill or bills, and shall have received our Royal 
pleasure thereupon, unless you take care that there be a clause 
inserted therein suspending and deferring the execution thereof un­
til our pleasure shall be known concerning the same.”
He quoted also the maxim “ cujus est solum ejus est usque (id 
ccehimr and contended that Colonial Legislatures had no power 
to detract from the full exercise of the right of property by setting 
limits to the height of buildings, at all events not without compen­
sation.
If the public good demanded this injury to the individual, the 
public should make compensation.
The difference was great between Acts of the Imperial Parlia­
ment, and those of subordinate Colonial Legislatures; but even 
with 
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with regard to Acts of Parliament the Judges of the land were to 
construe them and say what were laws and what were not.
The Acts of the Colonial (Legislature had not the force of laws, 
unless they were passed in due conformity to the delegated autho­
rity vested in them by the Royal Instructions.
The 14th Article of those Instructions evidently applied to Acts 
like the present, which were in diminution of private rights; and 
the Act not containing a suspending clause was wholly inoperati've, 
and should be treated by Courts of Justice as no law.
The following authorities were cited and commented upon:— 
1 Black. Com. 138; 2 Kents. Com.12 ; Co. Lit. 98 b.; 5 Com. 
Dig.'313; Hob. 247 ; 7 Bac. Abr. 387, and several of the pases 
and opinions in Chalmers’ Collection, as to the power of Colonial 
Legislatures.
Chipman, C. J.:
I am of oj aion that the objections made to the Validity of tins 
Act of Assembly cannot be sustained. The Lieutenant Gover­
nor, Legislative Council and Assembly form the Legislative Body 
in this Province, subordinate indeed to the Parliament of the Mo­
ther Country, and subject to its control, but with this restriction, 
they have the same power to make laws binding" within the Pro­
vince that the Imperial Parliament has in the United Kingdom ; 
and it is every days practice both in the Mother Country and 
the Colonies, to make laws abridging the exercise of private rights’, 
where the public good requires it. The propriety and necessity 
of such enactments are within the competency of the Legislature 
alone to determine. It is a thing unheard of, under British insti­
tutions, for a radicial tribunal to question the validity and binding 
force of any such law, when duly enacted. While the law re­
mains on the Statute Book, the* Courts are absolutely bound to 
give effect to it. There is this peculiarity in Colonial Legislation, 
that the Crown reserves to itself a right to disallow any law to 
which even its own representative in the Colonial Legislature may 
have given his assent; thus keeping in its own hands a Legislative 
power distinct and separate from that of the Colonial Legislative 
body, and one which affords a remedy for any improper Colonial 
legislation. But a law, passed in proper form by the Provincial 
Legislature, (at least a law not objectionable on account of its re­
pugnancy to an Act of Parliament relating to the Colonies,) goes 
into force and must be executed, subject to being disallowed by the 
Sovereign, unless it contain a clause suspending the execution of 
it until the royal pleasure shall be known. The clause in the 
royal instructions, referred to by Mr. Kerr, is founded on the very 
assumption that every Act of the Colonial Legislature, of which 
the execution is not thus expressly suspended, takes effect on 
receiving the Governor’s assent, and the Governor is therefore 
instructed 
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instructed, in certain cases, to withhold his assent; but this instruc­
tion is merely directory to the Governor, and does not in my opi­
nion, in any manner affect the validity Ind binding force of any 
enactment,” to which the Governor’s assent may be actually given, 
after having been concurred in by the other two branclies’of the 
Legislature. For these reasons, J cannot for a moment yield to 




I will merely add a few words to what has fallen from Ilis 
Honor the Chief Justice.
I did not reserve these questions at the trial in consequence of 
any doubts on my own mind, but because I thought it much bet­
ter the learned Counsel should be heard in support of them at the 
bar of this Court, than that a long argument and consideration of 
several authorities should be gone into at the Circuit; and there 
were a number of other cases in which the slime objections would 
be raised.
Supposing him even to have'been right in his view of the power 
and duty of the Court, I can by no means agree with him in opinion 
that the clause in the Royal Instructions was intended to apply to 
an Act like this, containing general regulations which might affect 
all real property within certain limits.
I agree with him so far as to think that cases may occur in which 
the Court would be bound to pronounce its opinion upon the vali­
dity of an Act of Assembly, for instance  ̂when it conflicts with an 
Act of the Imperial Parliament: whether in any other case, it 
is unnecessary now to say; certainly not in the present, for any of 
the reasons which have been urged or any others that I am aware of.
THE COMMISSIONERS OF HIGHWAYS FOR THE 
PARISH* OF FREDERICTON v. WM. B. PHAIR, 
POSTMASTER.
Postmasters are not exempted by the Statutes 1 Viet. c. 33, s. 1G & c. 
36, from Highway labour imposed by any Act of Assembly of this Province.
This was a conviction had before a Magistrate in September 
last, under the provisions of the Act of Assembly,"!) Wm. IV. c. 
2, for a penalty for the non-performance of Statute labor. By the 
17th section of the said Act, it is provided, “that all male inha­
bitants of the age of sixteen years and upwards (with the excep­
tions therein named) shall work either in person, or by able and 
sufficient men in their stead, in each and every year” the number 
of days prescribed by a scale therein contained, and graduated 
according to the income or property of the several inhabitants.
Another
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Another clause provided that in the Parish of Fredericton, no per­
son liable to perform statute labor should be suffered or permitted 
to work by substitute, but should work in person or pay in lieu 
thereof the sum of two shillings and sixpence, per diem. It was 
also inter alia provided, that within six days after default in the 
payment of the said sum, or refusal to work, report of such delin­
quency was to be made by the Surveyor to one of the Commissi­
oners, which Commissioner was required without delay to make 
complaint before a Justice of the Peace, and the said Justice on 
conviction was to adjudge every delinquent to pay the penalty of 
four shillings per diem for each day’s work that he was liable to 
perform. The defence set up was that the Defendant was an offi­
cer of the Post Office, and exempted by the Acts of Parliament, 
1 Victoria, c. 33, and 36.
In this Term Berton, for Defendant moved to quash the con­
viction on the ground that Defendant was the Post Master in the 
Town of Fredericton, and an officer in the,employment of the 
Post Office within the meaning of the Acts, and as such officer 
was exempt from the performance of labor on the Highways, which 
otherwise by Act of Assembly he was liable to perform.
The 12th Section of the 1st Viet. cap. 33, enacted, “ That no 
“ Postmaster General nor any officer of the Post Office shall be 
“ compelled to serve as a Mayor or Sheriff, or in any Ecclessiasti- 
“ cal or Corporate or Parochial, or other public office or employ- 
“ ment, or to serve on any jury or inquest, or in the militia, any 
“ law or custom to the contrary thereof notwithstandingand cap. 
36 expressly declared the above section, together with the Act 
from which it is extracted, to be in force in all her Majesty’s Co­
lonies and Dominions.
The learned Counsel contended that it was the evident intention 
of the Acts of Pa: ’'ament to exempt all officers of the Post Office 
from any employment or occupation which might in the slightest 
degree interfere with the discharge of their important official duties, 
the steady, regular, and uninterrupted performance of which were 
of paramount importance to the government and the community 
at large; the framers of the A ct had particularly enumerated 
every description of service known in England, and then had ad­
ded general words to include any business or employment unknown 
to them- it could not be contended that the performance of Sta- 
tutute labour was not in the nature of an employment, because the 
Act permitted the commutation of it by money. The penalty of 
4s. per diem was expressly imposed for the non-performance of the 
labor, not for the non-payment of the permitted commutation. If 
i j should be decided that under the terms of the Act of Parliament 
the Defendant, as Postmaster, was not exempted from the per­
formance of Statute Labour, then under the same provision he 
might 
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might be compelled to shut up his office and work in person on the 
roads, and the Provincial Act must be his excuse for the neglect 
of his official duties.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
The performance of Statute Labour does not come within the 
meaning of the term employment. Parochial employment neces­
sarily imports something in the nature of an office, as for instance 
a Commissioner of Highways or Surveyor of Roads.
Parker, J.:
1 I remember a case formerly where the officers of the Customs 
claimed to be exempted from the performance of Militia duty, 
under the term employment; my opinion was taken at the time ; 
I decidedly thought that they were not exempted. Afterwards 
the case was represented home and a special exemption from Mili 
tia duty was inserted in the Act. This Act of Parliament seems 
to contain the same exceptions.
Per Curiam.
We see no reason why officers of the Post Office who have in­
comes and property, should not pay tax on the roads. If exemp­
tion from Statute Labour were intended by the Acts of Parliament, 
it would have been expressly named therein. We find the ex­
emption from serving on juries or inquests, or in the militia, parti­
cularly mentioned in the Act under which this exemption is 
claimed, and these are much more within the meaning of the term 
employment than the performance of Statute Labour. 1 f the Pro­
vincial Legislature think that the public service is likely to suffer 
by compelling officers of the Post Office Department to perform 
Statute Labour, they can provide accordingly by an Act of As­
sembly. We have not the slightest doubts as to the construction 
which we have put upon the Imperial Acts.
The Court overruled the motion and confirmed the conviction. 
Solicitor General for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendant.
LEONARD v. HANSON.
After a case lias gone to the jury on the whole evidence, who have found 
a general verdict for the Plaintiff, the Court will not alter the verdict and 
allow it to be entered on one count only, on the ground that the damages 
were not more than an adequate compensation for the injury complained of 
in the count, uuless all the evidence be admissible under that count, and 
the Court are satisfied the damages were assessed wholly on the cause of 
action contained in that connt.
THIS was an action of trespass tried before CARTER J. at the 
Charlotte Circuit in April 1839.
The declaration contained a count for trespass, quare clausum 
fregit; 
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fregit; and also tlie common asportavit. count. The Defendant 
pleaded the general issue, and also liberum tenementum to the first 
count. The Plaintiff new assigned, setting out the abuttals of his 
close ; and the Defendant pleaded the general issue to the new as­
signment.
The Plaintiff, at the trial, went into evidence of entry on the 
close, and injury to the fences, &c., and also proved the scutting 
down and carrying away of part of the growing crop ; but having 
failed in making out the abuttals of the close, the learned Judge 
directed a nonsuit. The Plaintiff’s Counsel, however, refusing to 
acquiesce, the case then went to the Jury, who, contrary to the di­
rections of the Judge, found a verdict for the Plaintiff with 45s. 
damages. His Honor’s attention was not distinctly drawn to the 
aspoatavit count, and the verdict was entered generally on the 
whole declaration.
In Trinity Term last Wilmot obtained a rule nisi for setting 
aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
In Michaelmas Term, G. D. Street applied for a rule nisi to 
amend the postea by entering the verdict on the asportavit count 
only j which the Court granted and enlarged the previous rule into 
the present term.
Kerr now shewed cause and contended that the verdict could 
not be altered, aS it had been given by the Jury generally upon 
the whole evidence. That the Court could not say that the Jury 
had assessed damages on the asportavit count only; but the contrary 
was evident, as the, Counsel had gone to the Jury on the whole 
evidence, a great part of which was not applicable to the asportavit 
count ,and that in fact no proof had been given of the value of the 
articles taken away.
He cited Eddowes v. Hopkins, Doug. 376; and Williams v. 
Breedon, 1 B. & P. 329.
G. D. Street contra, contended that although the value of the ' 
articles was not proved, yet there was sufficient evidence of the 
quantity to satisfy the Court that the damages given by the Jury 
were not more than adequate.
That this being the case, the Court would presume that the da­
rn agefe were assessed on that count, upon which the Plaintiff was 
clearly entitled to recover, and that the rule as to the reception of 
evidence on the other counts only applied where the count was bad 
in law.
Per Curiam.
It is clear that evidence was received and went to the jury in 
this case, which would not have been properly admissible under 
the asportavit count, and it is impossible for us to say that the jury 
confined their damages to that count. It is true there was suffi­
cient evidence to support that count, and the Plaintiff’s Counsel 
should 
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should, after failing in proof of the abuttals, have abandoned the 
first count, and requested the learned Judge to submit the case to 
the jury on the second count only, with the evidence applicable 
thereto.
We cannot allow this amendment, and as the general verdict 
cannot be supported there must be a new trial.
Rule to amend Posted discharged, and rule for new trial made 
absolute.
MONTGOMERY v. M‘LEOD.
In an action for crim. con. the fact of the Plaintiff’s marriage may he 
proved hy any person present at the ceremony, and if performed hy a Com ■ 
missioner under the Act of Assembly 8 G. 4, c. 9, it will he presumed (at 
least in the absence of evidence to the contrary,) that he was acting within 
the scope of his authority, and followed the requisition of the Acts as to 
notification and form of solemnization.
The certificate made under the Act 52 G. 3, c. 21, and registered with 
the Clerk of the Peace, is admissible in evidence without proof by the at­
testing witness.
This was an action for criminal conversation with the Plain­
tiff’s wife, tried before Parker J. at the last Gloucester Circuit.
The evidence of the Plaintiff’s marriage was as follows:—
Robert Ferguson, Esquire, a Justice of the Peace, and one of 
the Commissioners for solemnizing marriage appointed under the 
Act of Assembly 8 G. 4, c. 9, proved that he solemnized marriage 
between the parties in the presence of several persons, after the 
notification of banns ; that the notification was given to his clerk, 
Thomas Barclay, to post up, (as was his usual custom a sufficient 
time before the marriage, unless openly proclaimed,) that there 
was a place of public worship in the Parish belonging to the Church 
of Scotland, in which it was customary to proclaim the banns of 
marriage on Sundays, if open for Divine Service.
Barclay proved that he was in the habit of publishing banns for 
the last witness; that if not openly proclaimed in Church he 
affixed a written notification signed by the Commissioner on the 
Church door and at two other public places in the Parish ; that he 
remembered so affixing a notification on the present occasion ; the 
notification stated the time when the ceremony would be per­
formed and was put up three weeks previous thereto; that the 
notifications were put up and left by him, but he could not say whe­
ther they were actually remaining up on three successive Sundays.
The Clerk of the Peace proved that the certificate required by 
Act 52, G. 3, c. 21, signed by the parties and two witnesses, and 
also by the Commissioner, was duly filed and registered in his 
office, and he produced both the original certificate and book of 
registrv Street,
Yl
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Street, for the Defendant, objected that there was no sufficient 
proof of a legal marriage having taken place—
1st. The publication of banns was not proved, as it should appear 
that the notification was actually remaining up on three successive 
Sundays.
2d. The certificate could not be received in evidence' without 
proof by the attesting witnesses.
3d. There was no proof that there was no Parson, Vicar or Cu­
rate in the Parish, and therefore the Commissioner’s authority to 
marry was not shewn, he having only authority under the Act in 
the absence of persons in Holy Orders of the Church,
4th. It was not proved that the marriage was celebrated accord­
ing tc the form prescribed by the Governor under Act 31, G. 3, c. 
5, s. 1.
The learned Judge overruled the objections and the case went to 
the jury, who, on clear evidence of the fact of adultery, and of the 
Defendant being possessed of some property, found a verdict for 
the Plaintiff with <£650 damages.
Street now moved for rule nisi to set aside the verdict on the 
objections taken at the trial, and also on the ground of excessive 
damages but the Court were clearly of opinion that there was 
sufficient evidence of a marriage having taken place, that it was 
not necessary to call the attesting witnesses to the certificate, and 
that the marriage might be proved by any person present, at the 
celebration ; and that it being shewn that Mr. Ferguson was duly 
commissioned to solemnize marriage, it would be presumed (at 
least in the absence of evidence to the contrary,) that he had duly 
performed the duties of such office.
As regarded the damages, there was nothing to shew that the 
jury had acted at all improperly so as to induce the Court to inter­
fere with wliat is their proper province, and most peculiarly so in 
an action of this ,iatur<=
Rule refused.
DOE DEM PEABODY, v. M‘KNIGHT
The title conveyed by a Sheriff to land sold by him under s.fi.fa. issued 
upon a Judgment in an action brought upon a former Judgment of the 
Court, cannot relate to the time of signing the first Judgment, although such 
first Judgment may have been a lien on the land.
A Judgment is not such a lien upon the land as to prevent the Defendant 
conveying the legal estate and seisin to a third person,
Ejectment for lands in Northumberland, tried before P irker 
J. at the last Circuit in that County.
The Plaintiff made out a case of title under a grant from the 
Crown to one Spencer Crane, dated March 8, 1813, and a deed 
of 
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of bargain and sale from Spencer Crane to the lessor of Plaintiff 
(and Edward Simonds, since deceased,) as joint tenants, dated 
August 23, 1814, and duly acknowledged and registered.
The following evidence on the part of the Defendant was admit­
ted by consent, viz. :—
1st. An exemplification of a judgment of the Supreme Court, 
Patrick Henderson v. Spencer Crane, of Hilarj Term 54 G. 3, 
and signed in March, 1814.
2d. An exemplification of a judgment of the Supreme Court in 
an act'“n brought upon the former judgment of Hilarj Term 58 
G. 3, (1818.)
3. A writ of fi. fa. de bonis et ter ris, issued on the last mentioned 
judgment; a levy and sale by the Sheriff of Northumberland under 
the said execution of the land in question ; and a deed of bargain 
and sale by the Sheriff to Henderson, dated September 17, 1829.
4th. A deed of bargain and sale from Henderson to the Defend­
ant, dated May 6, 1830.
A verdict was taken for the Plaintiff by consent, subject to the 
opinion of the Court on the whole case.
Street now moved for a rule nisi to set aside the verdict and enter 
a nonsuit, contending that the judgment of the Court in Hilary 
Term, 1814, was a lien upon the land, and as the same had never 
been satisfied and was prior in time to the conveyance from Crane 
to Peabody, that conveyance would not operate except subject to 
this lien.
That the tien remaining at the time of the recovery of the 
second judgment and execution thereupon, the sale and conveyance 
made by the Sheriff, by virtue of the Act of Assembly 26 G. 3, 
c. 12, would relate back to the time of the first judgment, and thus 
vest the legal title in the Defendant notwithstanding Crane’s con­
veyance to the lessor of Plaintiff.
But the Court were clearly of opinion that, whatever lien might 
have been created by the first judgment, the sale made by the 
Sheriff under a fi. fa. could not relate to a time anterior to the 
judgment on which such execution was issued, and that the legal 
estate and seisin were transferred by Crane’s conveyance to Pea- 




A Magistrate is liable to an action of trespass if he commit a party brought 
before him on a criminal charge to Gaol for trial, without proceeding to 
make an examination into the charge as bv law directed.
In this case a -barge of a criminal nature had been made bv one J. F. 
before
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before the Defendant as a Magistrate, upon oath, against the Plaintiff, 
upon which he had issued a warrant for his apprehension. The Plaintiff 
was arrested by virtue of the warrant at the Parish of Cambo Bello, and 
taken from thence to a steam boat lying ar a wharf in Eastport; in the 
United States, where the Defendant was. The Defendant administered an 
examination oath to J. F. in a store at Eastport, then took him on board the 
steam boat and questioned him as to the identity of the Plaintiff, when J. 
F. stated that the Plaintiff was the person against whom he had made tlie 
charge Held that this examination was a nullity, and afforded no justifi­
cation to the Magistrate for imprisoning the Plaintiff.
This was an action of Trespass and false imprisonment, tried 
before Parker J. at the Charli tte Circuit in April, 1838.
Plea—the general issue.
The Defendant was a Justice of the Peace and the resident pro­
prietor of the Island of Cambo Bello, with the exception of some 
small part in the possession of other persons. John Farmer acted 
as constable on the Island, and was also the agent of Defendant to 
look after trespasses in a certain part of the Island called Cran 
berry Point.
On the 3d February, 1837, Farmer made a complaint to the 
Defendant against the Plaintiff and charged him with riot, rout, 
and robbery of some wood off the Island. A deposition of the 
facts was made out and attested to by Farmer before the De­
fendant as a Magistrate, whereupon Defendant issued his warrant 
dated 4th February, 1837, for the apprehension of the Plaintiff, 
directing him to be brought before the Defendant at his office in 
Campo Bello. The warrant was delivered to one Greeno, a con­
stable, to be executed. On the 28th June following the Defendant 
being about to leave the Island, and being informed that Plaintiff 
might then be arrested, left directions that in case he should be to 
take him to Saint Andrews, as it was the nearest place where a 
Justice of the Peace might be found. On the day last mentioned 
the Plaintiff was apprehended by Greeno, and was taken by 
Greeno and Farmer from Campo Bello to a steam boat then lying 
at the wharf in Eastport, in the State of Maine, but on her way to 
Saint Andrews, and on board of which boat the Defendant also 
was at the time. The Defendant having previously taken Farmer 
to a store in Eastport, and in the absence of Plaintiff having admi­
nistered an oath to him to give evidence upon the charge against 
the Plaintiff upon his return to the boat, asked him if Plaintiff 
was the person against whom he had made the charge in the 
January previous, to which Farmer said—yes. Defendant their 
asked Plaintiff if he were the man who committed the trespass 
alleged against him—Plaintiff answered that he was not then in 
the country. These were all the words that passed, and nodeposi 
tion was produced. Without any further examination Defendant 
made out a warrant addres«ed to the constable to carry him to the 
gaol
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gaol at Saint Andrews, and a commitment to the gaoler to receive 
and keep him. The Plaintiff was taken to gaol and there remained 
confined five months, and until he was discharged after his acquit­
tal upon a trial for larceny at the Court of Oyer and Terminer 
in November, 1837. The requisite notice of action was given.
The learned Judge told the jury that the examination on board 
of the steam boat was an entire nullity, and that the Defendant 
was not justified in committing the Plaintiff to prison for trial 
without an examination, and was liable to an action of trespass 
and false imprisonment for so doing.
The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff for £50.
In Trinity Term last, the Solicitor General obtained a rule nisi 
for a new trial, upon the grounds—
1st. That no action would lie.
2d. That if an action would lie it should be case and not trespass.
At this Term Wilmot, for Plaintiff, shewed cause.
The duties of Justices of the Peace are twofold, judicial and 
ministerial, and when he in his ministerial capacity acts impro­
perly he will be civilly liable—1 Bl. Com. 354, note 30. The 
Defendant was acting in his ministerial capacity, and in his pro­
ceedings was bound by the forms of the law of the land—2 Burn. 
Jus. 113.
The Act of Assembly of 1st Wm. 4, c. 14, is imperative upon 
Magistrates, by which examinations must be taken upon oath and 
put into writing before a commitment is made or bail required. 
The Defendant has acted illegally in this case, there never having 
been any examination before him ; that in the steam boat being 
altogether a nullity. In actions on the case malice must be proved, 
and Magistrates might every day transgress the law, and the party 
aggrieved would be remediless, if action on the case only would 
lie. The Plaintiff being committed upon a charge of Farmer, 
upon which perjury could not be sustained, the commitment was 
therefore void and the acts of the Defendant illegal. The commis­
sion to J ustices is in general words and gives no power; their duty 
is clearly defined by the Act of Assembly. The Defendant should 
have required bail of Plaintiff; Plaintiff in fact had never in legal 
parlance been taken before a Magistrate—1 Chit. Cr. La. 56, 79 ; 
7 Car. & Payne, 546; 1 B. & Cr 163; 10 B. & Cr. 28.
The Solicitor General in reply.
The Defendant had not gone beyond his jurisdiction, and 
whatever errors there were in the proceedings were errors in 
form only, consequently trespass would not lie. No law 
makes it necessary that the commitment be in any par­
ticular form, and it is discretionary with the Magistrate to insert 
what he thinks necessary. The authorities are against a commit­
ment being void on account of omission. Magistrates having 
fuff
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full information it is not necessary to read tlie deposition to prisoner 
before making out the commitment.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—How is the party to get a knowledge of the 
charge against him ? It is the duty of the Magistrate not to wait 
for prisoner to enquire the nature of the charge, but to detail it fully 
to him.]
[Botsford, J.—He should have asked the party for his bail.]
[Parker, J.—Non constat whether the party were charged 
with felony or misdemeanour.]
The Solicitor General did not contend that the proceedings were 
not irregular, but there was no irregularity upon which to ground 
an action of trespass,—there was no excess of jurisdiction. If the 
commitment were null and void because it was founded upon pro­
ceeding had in a foreign country, then it follows that the Defendant 
would not be amenable to this Court for an Act committed with­
out its jurisdic ion. The following cases were cited by the Solicitor 
General in the support of his views.—2 Saun. Pl. & Ev. 613 ; 3 
Big. 78 ; 8 East. 113 ; 12 East. 67 ; 1 Lord Ray, 46.
Chipman, C. J.:
This is an action of trespass and false imprisonment.
The Plaintiff was committed to the Gaol of the County of 
Charlotte by rhe warrant of the Defendant, who is a Magistrate 
for that County, for an offence which purports on the face of the 
commitment to be a misdemeanour. A new trial was moved for 
on the ground that under the circumstances of this case, trespass 
will not lie, but that the action, if any, should have been an action 
on the case. And the first question is, whether the commitment 
was authorized by law, for if the commitment be void, it is clear 
from the case of Davis v. Capper, 10 B. & C. 28, that trespass 
will lie against the Magistrate who issues it. It appeared in evi­
dence that in the month of February 1837, a warrant was issued 
by the Defendant, who resided on the Island of Campo Bello, for 
apprehending the Plaintiff on the information of one Farmer for 
the alleged offence, and that he was not taken on this warrant 
until the month of June following, when he was arrested and 
brought before the Defendant on board a steam boat lying at the 
wharf in Eastport, in the State of Maine. On this occasion the 
Defendant administered an oath to Farmer, the informant, in a 
store in Eastport, the Plaintiff not being present, and thereupon 
proceeded on board the steam boat in the presence of the Plaintiff 
to ask Farmer whether the Plaintiff was the person against whom 
he had made the charge in the month of February preceding, 
which question Farmer answered in the affirmative, and the De­
fendant then asked the Plaintiff if he was the man who had com­
mitted the alleged trespass, to which the Plaintiff replied that he 
was 
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was not then in the country. The Defendant thereupon without 
any further examination of the matter, issued the commitment. 
All these proceedings at Eastport, the bringing of the Plaintiff 
before the Defendant, the administering of the oath to Farmer, and 
the subsequent examination, must be deemed mere nullities, having 
taken place within the limits of a foreign country; and what is 
most important with regard to the oath, no prosecution for peijury 
could have been sustained upon it, Any commitment founded on 
these proceedings must therefore be necessarily void. It was at­
tempted to sustain the commitment on the information given by 
Farmer in the month of February preceding at Campo Bello, under 
oath and in writing, upon which the warrant to apprehend was 
issued. But this cannot avail the Defendant, unless it would be 
lawful for a Magistrate to commit an offender for trial without the 
offender ever having been brought before him and charged with 
the offence. Now such a commitment would unquestionably be 
illegal and void. There are many other extraordinary circum­
stances in this case besides those to which I have adverted ; but 
the facts which I have stated are those upon which I found my 
judgment, and upon these facts I am clearly of opinion that this 
action must be sustained, and the rule for a new trial discharged. 
Botsford J.:
I quite agree with his Honor the Chief Justice This was a 
high handed act on the part of the Defendant. The offence was 
committed upon the Magistrate’s own property, and the complaint 
made by his own bailiff. The Magistrate should not have acted in 
the matter himself. If it were as aggravated atrespass as alleged 
the party should have had an opportunity of hearing the charge, of 
taking down the testimony of the witnesses, and of giving bail. 
There was no examination except at Eastport, out of the jurisdic­
tion of the Court, consequently the commitment was null and 
void.
Parker J.:
I have nev er entertained a doubt that the commitment of the 
Plaintiff was illegal, and that the Magistrate was liable in tres­
pass for the wrong he has committed. It is very much to be re­
gretted that he trusted himself to act at all in the case in the first 
instance, or that after the Plaintiff was arrested he did not send him 
before another J ustice at Saint Andrews, who could have obtained 
the advice and assistance of the Clerk of the Peace if necessary.
Rule discharged. 
Wilmot, for Plaintiff.
Solicitor General, for Defendant.
CLIFF
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DOE D CLIFF AND OTHERS v. CONNAWAY.
A party let into possession of Lands by the owner under an agreement of 
sale, has no greater estate than that of a tenant at will, unless there be some 
agreement also in regard to the occupation of the Lands before the sale is 
completed.
An agreement was made between A & B, by mutual bonds, for the sale 
and conveyance of Land by A to B on the payment of a certain sum on of 
before the 1st May, 1829, together with lawful interest for the first three 
years, and eight per cent, for the last two years,, as a consideration for the use 
of the land. Held that B, who was let into possession under this agree • 
ment, was not tenants will to A but tenant for years until the 1st May, 1829.
Before that day A died, and by his will devised the Land to his widow for 
life, and after her death to his children, (the lessors of the Plaintiff.) He 
appointed his widow his Executrix, and the Defendant, who was B’s assig­
nee, paid the purchase money of the Land to the widow, and received from 
her a deed ofbargain and sale. Held that the Defendant could not after 
this, set up a tenancy at will under the agieement, such tenancy, if any, 
having merged in the life-estate conveyed by the widow’s deed ; and that 
after the death of the widow an ejectment might be maintained by the chil­
dren without any notice to quit, or demand of possession.
Ejectment, tried before ClftPMAN, Ch. J. ar the sittings after 
Michaelmas Term last.
The facts of the case were as follows :—
The lessors of the Plaintiff were the sons of one John Cliff, 
deceased, through whom they claimed title; John Cliff died in 
September, 1835, leaving a will by which he devised the premises 
in question to his widow for her life, or until her marriage, and 
after her death or marriage, which should first happen, then to the 
lessors of the Plaintiff in fee. Sophia Cliff, his widow, was left 
the Executrix of the will, she died in March, 1835. On the part 
of the Defendant two bonds were put in evidence, bearing the same 
date. One from the said John Cliff to one James Duncan, con­
ditioned to give to the said Duncan a deed in fee of the premises 
in question, upon the performance by Duncan of the condition of 
the other bond from Duncan to John Cliff, which was to pay to 
the said John Cliff on the 1st May, 1829, the sum of £80, with 
lawful interest for three years and eight per cent, for the two last 
years. The latter bond contained three indorsements of several 
payments made thereon to the amount of £80 15s., the two last 
payments were received by Sophia Cliff in the years 1826 and 
1827. The conditions of these bonds are set out at large in Mr. 
Justice Parker’s decision. The date and execution of these bonds 
were antecedent to the date of the will of John Cliff. Duncan 
went into possession of the premises at the time the bonds were 
executed and remained in possession for the term of four years, 
when he transferred all his claim and title to the Defendant, who 
thereupon entered into possession and continued to hold it to the 
time of the action brought. Sophia Cliff on 28th June, 1831, gave 
the Defendant a deed in fee of the premises.
Wilmot,
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Wilmot, for Defendant, moved for a non-suit, on the ground that 
no demand of possession was proved.
The Solicitor General objected, that there was no privity be­
tween Cliff and Connaway, and therefore no tenancy.
The learned Chief Justice sustained the motion.
In Hilary last the Solicitor General obtained a rule, nisi to set 
aside the nonsuit and to grant a new trial.
In moving for this rule it was contended, that although, if the 
question had been between Cliff and Duncan, a demand of pos­
session would have been necessary, still, as between these parties it 
was not, because Duncan was merely a tenant at will under an 
agreement to purchase and could not make his assignee a tenant 
to Cliff without Cliff’s consent; that Duncan’s interest, whatever 
it was, having been destroyed by Cliff’s devise as aforesaid, and 
the Defendant having received a deed from Sophia Cliff, which under 
the will she might give, at least of her own life estate, and all his inter­
est having ceased at her death, there would be no privity of estate be­
tween the lessorsof the Plaintiff and the Defendant. That the agree­
ment was between Cliff and Duncan, and whatever might have 
been Duncan’s rights under it had he lived, it was a chose in action 
and could not be assigned to the Defendant; at all events the De­
fendant would have to defend in Duncan’s name, but in the present 
case he stood upon his own rights as assignee.—Right d. Dean 
& Chapter of Wells v. Bawden and others, 3 East. 259 ; Doe d. 
Parker v. Boulton, 6 M. & S. 148; Doe d. Knight v. Quigley, 
2 Camp. 504 ; Doe d. Moore v. Lawder, 1 Stark. 308; Dowl 
& Ry. 706.
In Trinity Term following Kerr shewed cause,—but upon 
Parker, J. suggesting that from the peculiar wording of the condi­
tion of the bonds Duncan’s estate might be deemed a tenancy for 
years,—
The rule nisi was enlarged to this Term.
Wilmot Kerr now shewed cause:—-
The Defendant is in the same situation that Duncan would have 
been, and Duncan’s possession having been lawful it rested with 
the lessors of Plaintiff to shew us trespassers, which they could 
not do without a demand of possession—2 Wm. Bl. 972. An agree­
ment to lease shall be a lease in presenti if the words of the agree­
ment shew the party’s intention that it should be so—3 Taunt. 65. 
There is no doubt that if under an agreement for sale a party is let 
into possession, the mere letting into possession creates a tenancy 
at will—1 M. & Weis. 790 ; Co. Lit. 70 ; 3 Term R. 13. There 
was no tenancy for years, it was merely an agreement to purchase. 
The bonds could not create a legal present demise. If it be not a 
tenancy for years without a putting into possession then there is no 
tenancy 
zl 
384 CASES IN MICHAELMAS TERM,
tenancy at all—1 Bar. & Ad. 498. No tenancy for years can be 
created when the lessee had no right to enforce it.
The Solicitor General was heard in reply, and the Court gave 
judgment as follows :—
Botsford, J.:
This was an action of ejectment for lands in the Parish of 
Queensborough, tried at the Sittings after Michaelmas last past, 
before His Honor the Chief Justice.
At the trial it appeared in evidence that John Cliff, deceased, 
the father of the lessors of the Plaintiff, by his bond bearing date 
the 1st of May, 1824, became bound to one James Duncan, in the 
penal sum of £200, with a certain condition that he, the said John 
Cliff, his heirs, executors or administrators, by a sufficient warranty 
deed, would convey to the said James Duncan, his executors, 
administrators or assigns, a certain lot of land (the premises in 
question,) when he, the said Duncan, should pay the consideration 
money for the same, agreeably to the conditions of a certain other 
bond therein referred to, and made by the said James Duncan in 
favor of the said John Cliff. By this bond, which was also in evi­
dence, and bearing date the 1st May, 1824, it appeared that the 
said James Duncan was obligated to pay to the said John Cliff the 
sum of £80 for the said lot of land on or before the 1st day of May, 
1829, together with lawful interest for the first two years, and 
eight pounds per cent, for the last two years, for the use of the 
land. That upon the bonds being made and passed, James Dun­
can took possession of the premises. John Cliff died in the month 
of August or September, 1825, leaving a widow and two sons, the 
eldest of whom is now about fifteen years of age. Cliff by his will, 
which was also in evidence, devised the premises in question to his 
widow, Sophia Cliff, for and during her natural life or until her 
marriage, then from her death or marriage, which should first hap­
pen, to his sons John Wilson Cliff and James B. Cliff, the lessors 
of the Plaintiff, their heirs and assigns forever. That Sophia Cliff 
was appointed executrix in and by the said will, and took upon 
herself the burthen of the execution of the same. That she was 
again married, and died in March, 1835. It appeared that three 
several payments had been made by Duncan upon his bond to 
Cliff,—one on the 27tb May, 1824, of £20 to Cliff himself; one of 
£30 on the 26th May, 1826, and another of £30 on the 6th Sep­
tember, 1827,—the two last were paid to Sophia Cliff, the execu­
trix. All the payments were indorsed upon the bond. There was 
no evidence of any further payments having been made upon the 
bond which had been given up by the executrix to the Defendant, 
and was considered as discharged. It appeared that Duncan con­
tinued in possession of the premises four years, when, he gave up 
his right to Connaway, the Defendant, who took possession and 
har 
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has continued in the same to the present time, with the exception 
of one year, when he put one John Colhoon upon the place, who 
was to clear three acres of land for the use of it. There was no 
evidence of the Defendant having paid anything to Duncan for the 
giving up of his right in and to the premises. There was in evi­
dence on the behalf of the Defendant a deed from Sophia Cliff, the 
widow of John Cliff, to the Defendant, dated the 28th June, 1831, 
by which she conveyed to him in fee all the premises in question, 
and all her right, title and interest in and to the same.
It was contended at the trial on the part of the Defendant, that 
having come lawfully into possession he could not be considered a 
trespasser, and be ejected without a demand of possession having 
been made and proved. In this His Honor the Chief Justice con­
curred, and the Plaintiff was nonsuited.
This case now comes up before the Court upon a motion for 
setting aside the nonsuit and for granting a new trial.
It is an acknowledged rule of law, that a person who has been 
put into possession under an agreement for the sale of land, cannot 
be ousted by ejectment before his possession is determined by a 
demand of possession or otherwise, the possession being in the first 
instance a lawful one, and the tenancy that of a tenant at will. 
This rule of law is fully supported by the cases that have been 
cited on the part of the Defendant—Right on the dem. of Lewis & 
others v. Beard, 13 East, 210; Doe ex Dem Newbyyu. Jackson, 
1 B. & C. 448; and Doe on the demise of Hiatt and others v. 
Miller, 5 Car. & P. 595. As the facts in the present case are such 
as to bring it within the rule of law that governed the decisions in 
the above cited authorities, to entitle the Plaintiff to recover it is 
incumbent upon him to shew the termination of the tenancy at 
will in the Defendant. To me it appears that this was effected by 
the Defendant's accepting of the conveyance from Sophia Cliff of 
the premises in question, and by relying upon the title in fee it 
conveyed on his defence to this action, it being a disclaimer of the 
title of the lessors of the Plaintiff. Should I not be correct in this 
view of the conveyance of the deed from Sophia Cliff to the De­
fendant, but have to confine myself to the more limited and legal 
operation of it, as a conveyance and transfer of all her estate for 
life, <in the premises to which she was clearly entitled under the will 
of John Cliff, then, by the operation of this conveyance, the De­
fendant would become the legal owner of the premises as tenant for 
life, or ratheras tenant per autre me, in which large estate his tenancy 
at will would be merged and become extinct. In either case, whether 
by the disclaimer of the title of the lessors of the Plaintiff or by 
the merging of the tenancy at will in the larger estate, a demand of 
the possession would not be necessary to sustain this action. I am 
therefore of opinion that the rule must be made absolute.
Parker
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Parker, J.:
This case does not appear to me to fall within the ordinary clas- 
of cases of persons let into possession under an agreement to pur 
chase, for there, was said by Parke B. in delivering the judg­
ment of the Court hi the late case of Doe d. Gray, v. Stanion, 1 
M. and W. 695,—“although the possession is lawful it amounts to 
a bare tenancy at will, and it is not the agreement but the letting 
into possession that creates such tenancy.—Ball?;. Cullimore, 2 C. 
M. & R. 120, may alse be referred to.
The case before us stands on a different footing ;—
John Cliff being seised in fee of the premises in question, makes 
an agreement with Duncan not only for the sale, but for the occu­
pation of such premises.
Two several bonds are executed, one by Cliff to Duncan in the 
penalty of £200, with a condition as follows :—
“ The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above boun- 
den John Cliff, Junior, liis heirs, executors or administrators, shall 
well and truly give or cause to be given to the above named Janies 
Duncan, his executors, administrators or assigns, a sufficient war­
ranty deed of a certain piece or parcel of land and premises k nown 
and distinguished as Jot number ninety three in the Parish of 
Queensbury, on the said James Duncan paying up and fully com­
plying with the conditions of a bond bearing the same tenor and 
date with this obligation, given by the said James Duncan to the 
said John Cliff, Junior'' then &c.
The other by Duncan to Cliff in the penal sum of £160, con­
ditioned as follows:—
“The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above boun- 
den James Duncan, his heirs, executors or administrators, shall 
well and truly pay or cause to be paid to the above named John 
Cliff, Junior, his executors, administrators or assigns, the full sum 
of eighty pounds, lawful money of New Brunswick, on or before 
the first day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and twenty nine, together with lawful interest for the 
first three years, and eight per cent, for the last two years, as a 
consideration for the use of a certain piece or parcel of land and 
premises as explained in the conditions of a bond given by the said 
John Cliff, Junior, to the said James Duncan, bearing the same 
tenor and date with this instrument; remembering that if the said 
James Duncan, his executors, administrators or assigns, should 
at any time before the time is expired, agreeable to this obligation, 
pay or cause to be paid any sum as a part of the eighty pounds as 
expressed in this obligation, the sum paid to be considered as an 
instalment, and per cent, to stop for the amount paid, then &c.”
The bonds are both dated the same day, viz. th< 1st May, 1824, 
and have a distinct and unequivocal reference to each other, therefore
I 
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I conceive, according to the rule laid down by Lord Eldon in 
6 Vez. 565, and cited in 2 Stark, Ev. 551, n. (i ) the clause in the 
condition of Duncan’s Bond (providing for the payment of “ lawful 
interest [on the sum of £80 the agreed amount of purchase money,] 
for the first three years, and eight per cent, for the last two years, 
as a consideration for the use of a certain piece or parcel of land 
and premises, as explained [described] in the condition of the bond 
given by Cliff,” namely, the premises in question,) is virtually 
incorporated in Cliff’s bond, and would give effect to it as a de­
mise for five years.
Neither the form of the instrument nor the form of the words 
would appear to be material, if the intention of the partie_s to create 
a demise is sufficiently signified. The rule is thus laid down in 
Bac. Abr. Tit. Lease K. :—
“ Here it may be laid down for a rule that whatever words are 
“ sufficient to explain the intent of the parties, that the one shall 
■“ dvdesl himself of the possession, and the other ciniie into it for such 
“ a determinate time, whether they were in the form of a license, 
“ covenant, or agreement, are of themselves sufficient, and will in 
“ construction of law amount to a lease for years, as effectually as 
“ if the most proper and pertinent words had been made use of for 
“ that purpose.”
As to the form of the agreement in this case we have the autho­
rity of Lord Mansfield in Collins v. Collins, 2 Burr. 226, that the 
condition of a bond is an agreement binding the parties, and one, a 
specific performance of which, will be enforced. There is also a 
very strong and recent case in 3 Bing. N. C. 508, where Tindal, 
C. J. referring to the recital of an agreement in the condition of 
a bond, quotes with approbation the words I have just repeated 
from Bac. Abr. as the production of Ch. Baron Gilbert, and adopts 
the principle there laid down—Wilkinson v. Hall.
That it was the intent of the parties that Duncan should occupy 
the land until the 1st May, 1829, by which time the w’hole purchase 
money was to be paid, is, I think, clearly manifested by the instru­
ments by them respectively executed on the 1st May, 1824.
But I can find nothing in the instruments extending the relation 
of landlord and tenant beyond that period; at that time the lessor 
•was to give to the lessee “ a sufficient warranty deed” of the pre­
mises, if the purchase money were paid, or his bond would be for­
feited ; if not paid, any legal right in Duncan to retain the property 
ceased. Beyond this period the law would not imply any other 
tenancy than that of tenancy at sufferance, except the lessee re­
mained in possession by the express or tacit consent of the owner. 
As no tenancy then after the 1st of May, 1829, is provided for in 
the original agreement of Cliff and Duncan, if any such is to be 
implied, the implication must be built on matters occurring at or 
after 
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after that period. Before however that time arrived other events 
took place to which I will now refer, as they appear to me to have 
a material bearingjon the case.
John Cliff died in September, 1«25, having by his will, duly 
executed and bearing date subsequent to the agreement with Dun­
can, devised the premises in question to his wife, Sophia Cliff, for 
life, and after her death to the lessors of the Plaintiff in fee. 
Whatever legal estate John Cliff had, passed by this devise, and 
we have to enquire what that estate was. It was this—
The reversion consequent on the term granted to Dunpan. This 
reversion then on the death of Cliff, became vested iij Sophia Cliff 
for her life, and in the lessors of the Plaintiff after her death.
At the termination of the five years tenancy the Defendant was 
in possession, holding under an agreement made with Duncan, and 
there is no doubt he remained in possession with the assent of Sophia 
■Cliff, and therefore may fairly be considered as tenant at will to 
her.
On the 28th June, 1831, by indenture of bargain and sale duly 
acknowledged and recorded, Sophia Cliff conveys the premises in 
fee to the Defendant.
This conveyance could not certainly operate to the extent in­
tended, and could pass no more than Sophia Cliff's life estate to 
the Defendant, but without doubt it terminated any tenancy at 
will. That a tenancy at will cannot co-exist with any greater 
estate there is a strong authority in 2 Lev. 88, and Raym. 224— 
Dinsdale v. Iles.
In March, 1835, Sophia Cliff died, and the remainder to the 
lessors of the Plaintiff took effect in possession. It is not pretended 
that any thing occurred by which a tenancy at will was created 
between them and the Defendant, or that any such existed by 
which they would be bound, unless created by the original agree­
ment between Cliff and Duncan. On the facts of this case I can­
not conceive that a tenancy at will existed at all before 1st May, 
1829, and that even if such were in the original contemplation of 
the parties, and not merely resting on the assent of Sophia Cliff, it 
terminated with her conveyance of June, 1831, and would not re­
vive at her death against those in remainder without their assent.
If Duncan or the Defendant, at the time of bringing this action, 
be tenant at will, he must be tenant at will to the lessors of the 
Plaintiff, which I think he cannot be for want of assent. There 
is no assent of the Plaintiff’s lessors, and so far from an assent in 
the Defendant, that he sets up the deed of Sophia Cliff to support 
his present possession against them, they claiming not under her 
but by the same title with her. Something was said at the argu­
ment of her being guardian in socage to her children, but this she 
could not be for they do not claim by inheritance but devise;
moreover 
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moreover the estate devised is not the same which would have de­
scended to them, therefore they could not claim by descent. Could 
the Defendant in law be considered as having a better right than 
Sophia Cliff and her heirs ?
immediately on her death the right of entry accrued to the re­
maindermen, and as is said in 6 Cruise. Dig. 9, quoting Co. Litt. 
“ The freehold is in the devisee before entry, and he may enter 
without the assent of the heir of the devisor. If heir of devisor 
enters devisee may bring ejectment.” “ It is clear,” says Lord 
C. J. Abbot, in 6 B. & C. 116, “that a devised interest vests in 
the devisee before entry.”
In considering this case I have treated the Defendant as identi­
fied with Duncan; no particular rights are claimed for him as dis­
tinct from the Defendant; indeed there is no doubt he abandoned all 
his interest to the Defendant and delivered up the possession to him 
and though the assignment might not be valid within the Statute of 
Frauds, he, the Defendant, made the payments to Sophia Cliff on 
his own account, and was treated by her as standing in Duncan’s 
shoes.
Duncan it appears is dead, and there is no person representing 
him in these transactions but the Defendant; I cannot therefore 
think he is in a situation to set up any possessory right in the heirs 
of Duncan (if any there be) against his, the Defendant’s, own acts; 
r.o such had been claimed.
On the whole then I come to the conclusion, that in law the 
Defendant had no defence to this action, and that the ground on 
which the nonsuit proceeded, namely, an existing tenancy at will 
in Duncan, or those claiming under him, cannot be supported.
The enforcement of a specific performance of a contract for the 
conveyance of land is a matter clearly for the cognizance of a 
Court of Equity, for the principles which wmuld govern there obvi­
ate the difficulties suggested in the argument as to the persons 
entitled to receive the money from Duncan. By the contract one 
person is appointed to receive the money, and another to convey 
the fee in case of the vendor’s death. The contract being made 
and subsisting at Cliff’s death Equity treats the whole as personalty, 
and will consider the money as properly paid to the executrix 
(though she may have to account to the legatees,) and direct a 
conveyance of the fee. Be that however as it may, we can only 
deal with legal rights, and I am very sorry to be obliged to say ! 
cannot find in the Defendant even a scintilla of legal interest at the 
time of bringing this action.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
At the trial I was governed by the position laid down in general 
terms in the cases of Right v. Beard, 13 East. 210, and Doe v.
Jackson 
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Jackson, I B. & C. 448,—that the possession of a purchaser un­
der an agreement to sell was lawful; and I considered the same 
doctrine as applying to the present case, in which Duncan had 
transferred his possession to the Defendant. The Defendant’s pos­
session also, it seemed to me, must be deemed lawful, and that he 
could not be treated as a trespasser and turned out, without this 
lawful possession being determined by a demand upon him to give 
it up. I did not closely consider the nature of the legal estate, 
which passes to a purchaser so let into possession, and the late 
cases of Ball v. Cullimore, 5 Tyrr. 753, & 2 C. & M. 120; and 
Doe d. Gray v. Stanion, 1 Tyrr. & Gran. 1071, and 1 M. & W. 
691, were not then brought to my notice. These cases establish 
that a purchaser so let into possession has, at law, the estate of a 
tenant at will, and thia not by virtue of the agreement, which is 
available only in a Court of Equity, (unless it contains matter 
which operates as a grant of a legal estate,) but by virtue of the 
act of letting him into possession. The legal estate which so passes 
being that of a strict tenancy at will, is attended with all the inci­
dents of such a tenancy, as well with regard to the circumstances 
which put an end to it as otherwise. This is a doctrine which 
will have a very extensive and important influence in this Pro­
vice, where it is so common a practice for purchasers to be put into 
possession under agreements, without conveyances of any legal 
estate. Such purchasers can have recourse only to a Court of 
Equity for remedies under their agreements, and it is for this, 
among other reasons, most fortunate that an efficient Court of 
Equity is at length established. In the present case I concur in 
the view taken by Mr. Justice Parker, of the agreement contained 
in the condition of the bond, that it created an estate for years, 
and that, at lawr, all right to the possession ceased on the expira­
tion of the term so created. I am also now satisfied, that even if 
this had been merely the common case of a purchaser let into pos­
session under an agreement, not containing a grant of any legal 
estate, the rules of law relatingto estates at will wouldhave applied 
to it, and that the circumstances given in evidence shewed that 
such a tenancy at will would have been determined before this 
action was brought, and on this ground also I am now of opinion 
that a demand of possession was unnecessary, and that the nonsuit 
was wrong.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
The Solicitor General, for Plaintiff.
Wilmot ty Kerr, for Defendants.
SHAW v. WILSON, AND ANOTHER.
f n an action of debt for the penalty of an arbitration bond, in which the 
Plaintiff assigns as the only breach the non-payment of a certain liquidated 
sum 
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sum awarded by the arbitrators to be paid t< him by the Defendant, a set 
off may be pleaded; and such set off is pleadable to the sum so awarded, 
and not to the penalty of the bond.
The Plaintiff declared in debt upon an arbitration bond, 
and set out for breach the non-payment of a certain sum of 
money which the award of the arbitrators had directed to be paid 
by the Defendant. The Defendant pleaded a set off, to which 
there was a general demurrer and joinder thereto, which, coming On 
to be argued last Term,
Kerr, in support of the demurrer, contended,—That as this was 
a bond within the Statute 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 11, and not conditioned 
for the payment of a certain sum, a set off could not be pleaded— 
Hutchinson v. Sturgis, Willes 261 rtthat in debt on arbitration 
bond the Plaintiff must assign a breach under 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 11, 
although the measure of damages be ascertained by the award— 
Welch u. Ireland, 6 East. 613 ; 2 Chit. Stat. 875, Tit. set off. 
(Note)—Howlett v. Strickland. 1 Cowp. 56 ; that as the Act of 
Assembly,‘6 Wm. 4, c. 14, s. 21, allows interest to be assessed on 
debts payable at a specified time, and as a jury might give iuterest 
by way of damages, it would necessarily follow that the demand is 
uncertain and not a subject of setoff. In Hardcastle <>. Netherwood, 
5 B. & Al. 93, the Court held a set off not sustainable because the 
Plaintiff might be entitled to recover special damages. That as 
the Court can only look at the bond, which shews a subsisting debt 
of £600, and the Defendant’s off-set is only £200, u is clear that 
the lesser sum can be no answer in law to the larger one—Wood­
ward v. Robinson, 1 Str. 306. That the Plaintiff’ was not bound 
by the particular sum stated in the declaration.
[Chipman, Gh. J.—He certainly is, he has set out the specific 
sum due, and it is a matter of proof on both sides. Such a posi­
tion would require the Defendant to traverse the penalty, which the 
Statute renders unnecessary.]
That the Defendant should have stated the set off to have ac­
crued subsequent to the award. But that, as a note of hand, paya­
ble before the award made, was one of the items of the Defendant’s 
set off, it followed as a matter of course that the award barred all 
claim thereon, by which the plea was rendered bad in part, and 
being bad in part was bad in the whole.
Berton, contra, urged that the award having ascertained the real 
amount due, and being set forth in the declaration, the Plaintiff had 
thereby rendered it strictly a debt to which a set off might be 
pleaded. That even if the argument of the learned Counsel were 
sound in considering the note of hand as barred by the award, still 
the Defendant’s off-set being divisible and there being other items, 
the consequence of the whole plea being bad would not follow; 
besides the fact of the note of hand being an existing debt after the 
award
A2 
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aw rd maderei.ia" ed to be proved upon issue joined; non. constat. 
but it was indorsed subsequently to the making of the award.
Curia advisari vult.
At this Term the Court gave judgment as follows:— 
Chipman, C. J.:
This appears to me to be a very clear case. The question raised 
upon this demurrer is in effect whether a set off can be pleaded to 
an action upon an arbitration bond where the award is for the pay­
ment of money ; and that question depends upon this, whether the 
award in such case in legal contemplation constitutes a debt, for it 
is to c ases of mutual debts alone that the Provincial Statute of set 
off applies. This Statute, 26 Geo. 3, c. 18, which embodies the 
provisions of the two English Statutes, 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, s. 13, and 
8 Geo. 2, c. 24, s. 4, in the second section, provides as follows:— 
“ Tha by virtue of this Act mutual debts may be set against each 
other, either by being pleaded in bar or given in evidence on the 
general issue in the manner hereinbefore mentioned, notwithstand­
ing that such debts are deemed in law to be of a different nature, 
unless in case where either of the said debts shall accrue by reason 
of a penalty contained in any bond or specialty ; and in all cases 
where either the debt for which the action hath been or shall be 
brought, or the debt intended to be set against the same hath ac­
crued or shall accrue by reason of any such penalty, the debt 
intended to be set off shall be pleaded in bar, in which plea shall be 
shewn how much is truly and justly due on either side, and in case 
the Plaintiff shall recover in any such action or suit, judgment 
shall be entered for no more than shall appear to be truly and 
justly due to the Plaintiff, after one debt being set against the other 
as aforesaid.” The Defendant has framed his plea according to 
the provisions of this Act, and if the cause of action stated in the 
declaration will admit of a set off, the plea is a good one Now 
that an award for the payment of money constitutes a debt, and is 
not, as contended on the part of the Plaintiff, in the nature of un­
liquidated damages, appears evidently from the circumstance, that 
an action of debt will lie on such an award. It is the better course 
however, as stated by Bayley J. in the case of Ferrer i?. Owen, 7 
B. & C. 427, in all cases to declare on the bond and not on the 
award. But in either case the substantial cause of action is the 
debt arising from the award, by which the sum “ truly and justly 
due” to the Plaintiff, which the Statute requires to be set forth in 
the plea, is ascertained. Another objection was, that one of the 
debts claimed by the plea to be set off is a note of hand given by 
the Plaintiff to a third person, and by him indorsed to the De­
fendants, which note became due before the submission to arbitra­
tion. But the answer to this objection is, first, that there are other 
debts alleged in the plea and claimed to be set off, and secondly, 
that 
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that with respect to all the debts mentioned in the plea it would 
be matter of proof, if issue were taken on the plea, whether they 
were existing debts at the time when the action was brought, and 
any debt that was merged in the award could not be deemed an 
existing debt at the time of action brought. For these reasons I 




I cannot find any express decision on the main question in this 
case, though the reason of the act respecting setoff seems clearly to 
apply to an action like the present, in which the Plaintiff, although 
he sues for the penalty of the arbitration bond, yet himself sets out 
the only breach of the condition of that bond, which is the non­
payment of a liquidated sum awarded to him by the arbitrators, 
anti for the recovery of which an action of debt would have lain, 
wherein without doubt the Defendant might avail himself of his 
set off.
The objections which have prevailed against the allowance of a 
set off in the several cases on the subject do not seem applicable to 
the present: to take them in order—
Willes 261, Hutchinson v. Sturges—“ To an action on a bond 
conditioned for appearance of Defendant in the Palace Court at 
Westminster, there cannot be a set off. Willes, C. J. said the 
Statute applied to mutual debts, that this was not a bond condi­
tioned for the payment of money, but a bail bond sued in the name 
of the officer.”
Cowp. 56, Howlett v. Strickland—“ To an action of covenant 
for damages, Defendant cannot plead by way of set off that the 
Plaintiff had committed breaches of the covenant by which he had 
sustained greater damage than the Plaintiff had sustained.”
Both demands here were for unliquidated damages—Lord Mans­
field said—“ The Act of Parliament and the reason of the thing 
relate to mutual debts only, these damages are no debtsand 
Aston J. adds- clearly an unliquidated demand or uncertain 
damages cannot be set off.”
6 T. R. 488, Weigall v. Waters—“Uncertain damages by reason 
of covenants in the lease cannot be set off to an action of covenant 
for the rent.” Lord Kenyon said—“ one objection to the plea isthat 
it does not set off any certain debt, but uncertain damages.”
5 M. & S. 439, Grant v. Royal Ex. Assurance Company—Cove­
nant on a policy of Insurance in which the Plaintiff claimed the 
whole amount of the policy. The Defendants averring that a less 
sum was due, which they set out, pleaded thereto a set off. To 
this plea the Plaintiff demurred. Lord Ellenborough—“ What 
liquidation has there been of the loss ? The question must go to a 
jury 
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jury to ascertain the quantum of loss. The Defendants assume to 
cut down the demand according to their own estimate of it. Why 
is the Plaintiff to be obliged to abide by the liquidation ?—it seems 
to me that this is a case of unliquidated damages.” For that rea­
son mdgment was given for the Plaintiff.
3 Camp. 329, Hutchison v. Reid—When goods are sold to be 
paid for by a Bill of Exchange at a given date, these cannot be a 
set off to an action for not giving this bill, brought within the time 
at which the bill would fall due.
Lord Ellenborough said—“ If the action had been commenced 
after the two months had expired, the set off must in his opinion 
have been permitted ; but there was no debt when the action wai 
brought, which isforarefusaltodo a collateral act. The Plaintiff’s 
demand is for unliquidated damages to which a set off is clearly in­
applicable.”
In Colson v. Welsh, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 377, which was special 
assumpsit for not paying over money pursuant to agreement, Lord 
Kenyon rejected a set off for the like reason, saying the Declara­
tion was not for a debt but for damages for breach of an agreement 
and that the Statutes of set off went only to cases of mutual debts.
5 B. & A. 93, Hardcastle v. Netherwood—Special assumpsit for 
not providing money to pay bills which Plaintiff had accepted for 
Defendant’s accommodation, nor indemnifying Plaintiff, by reason 
whereof the Plaintiff was obliged to pay the holders of the bills 
certain sums of money, with interest, charges and expenses.—Plea 
(among others) set off and demurrer thereto.
The Court, on the authority of Auber v. Lewis, E. T. 1818, 
cited Man. N. Pr. Dig. 261 (2d edition), decided that the contract 
declared on might entitle the party to recover special damages ; the 
Statutes of set off do not apply though no special damage be 
alleged. Here the jury might possibly give damages for the man­
ner in which Plaintiff had been forced to pay the amount of the 
bills. The Defendant might perhaps have pleaded a set off to that 
part of the count which charges the Defendant with amount of ac­
ceptance paid by Plaintiff.
In all these cases the great objection was that these were not 
mutual debts, but uncertain or unliquidated damages. Some of 
the J udges it is true say rather broadly that unless the bond is a 
money bond it cannot be the object of set off, but the expressions 
so used are to be taken with reference to the cases then before 
them, and are much qualified by the observations which accompany 
them. Graham B. in a case in the Exchequer—Gillingham v. 
Haskett, reported in 13 Price, 434, and M‘Clel, 198, lays down 
a rule which will reconcile the authorities—•“ This not being a 
money bond the particular sum due upon it must have been found 
and liquidated before a party could be entitled to set off a cross 
demand against it.” There
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There the bond was conditioned to re-in vest Stock, and the ex­
act measure of damages could not be ascertained without a jury, 
as it depended on the market value of the stock, which was fluc­
tuating from day to day ; and the Court considered a plea of set off 
inapplicable, and an issue joined thereon immaterial.
Ilullock B. after referring to the Statutes of set off said—“Still 
they must be mutual debts, and then the question in all cases of 
this sort is, whether when a demand is made both that and the sum 
claimed to be due on the other side soifght tol to be set off against it 
are such as to constitute mutual debts.” Ide adds, “ it is true the 
primary question in the case is, whether this isa money bond, for 
if it be not the plea of set off is bad,—on that point the case of 
Hutchinson v. Sturgis is conclusive.” The case in Willes, as is ob­
served in a note of the reporter, and as the decision itself plainly 
shews, did not go any such length. It was the case of a set off to 
a bail bond.
In the case before us mutual debts existed, and the exact sum 
recoverable by virtue of the bond is ascertained and liquidated be­
fore action brought, and set out on the Plaintiff's own declaration.
The effect of the Statutes of set off as declared by Lord Mans­
field in Collins v. Collins, 2 Burr, 820, is to make stoppage equi­
valent to payment. That was the case of a set off pleaded to an 
action on a bond conditioned for payment of an annuity, and his 
Lordship in delivering the judgment of the Court, after referring to 
the Statute 8 & 9, W. 3. c. 11, proceeds as follows :—
“ Before this Statute the actual payment of money in discharge 
of the demand was exactly upon the same foot as the set off is now 
put upon, and a plea of payment of a sum of money sufficient to 
discharge the whole demand was just the same then as d* set off of 
a debt large enough to balance the whole demand is now, that is 
to say, it was a full answer to the Plaintiff’s demand, and he could 
have no judgment at all against the Defendant. * * * *
But the payment here intended was to be an actual payment. 
For stoppage or setting o^’debt against debt was not then equiva­
lent to actual payment; but cross actions must at that time have 
been brought for the respective mutual debts Since these two 
very beneficial Acts of 2 G. 2, c. 22, & 8 George 2, c. 24.^stop­
page or setting off'of mutual debts is become equivalent to actual 
payment, and a balance shall be struck as in equity and justice it 
ought to be.”
The Defendant in the case before us might certainly have 
pleaded payment of the sum awarded, and if so why not set off?
In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 T. R. 32, a sum payable under the 
condition of a bond by way of stipulated damages for the delay in 
performance of work and labour, was held to be the proper object 
of set off, because the amount was not uncertain, but had been 
settled and liquidated. In
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In Brick v. Depeyster, 4 Camp. 385, Gibbs, C. J. extended the 
remedy beyond the previous decisions, for he held that a Plaintiff 
should not deprive the Defendant of his set off by declaring 
specially, and assigning a breach for not accounting when the 
money might have been recovered as money had and received.
On full review of all these cases and the remedial nature of the 
Act, I quite concur with the rest of the Court in thinking that a 
set off was properly pleaded in the present case.
I see no weight in the two other points made at the argument.
The penalty of the bond, so far as regards set off, is not to be 
considered the debt, but the debt is the sum actually due by virtue 
of the condition ; and if the subject matter of the set off has al­
ready been taken into consideration by the arbitrators, this may be 
shewn at the trial.
The demurrer is to the whole plea, and whatever may be said 
as to the promissory note, which would certainly seem to have 
been held by the Defendants at the time of the submission, and 
therefore properly within the submission ; there are other demands 
w’hich may have accrued subsequently, and the general demurrer 
cannot therefore be sustained.
Judgment for the Defendants.
Kerr, for Plaintiff.
Berton, for Defendants.




It is Ordered, That in future in Summary Actions tried at 
Nisi Prius, a copy of the Plea, instead of the original Plea, may be 
filed in the Court of Nisi Prius as a part of the Record.
IN THE
SECOND YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA.
QUEEN v. APPLEBY.
This Court by virtue of the Commission under which it was constituted 
may exercise the same jurisdiction in regard to the discharge of estreated 
recognizances in this Province as the Court of Exchequer does in England, 
under the Statute 33 Hen. 8. c. 39.—[Per Chipman, CT J., Botsford and 
Parker, J. J. ]
The Court has a general discretionary power under the Statute to examine 
into the sufficiency of the reasons alleged in excuse, and to discharge upon 
motion the recognizance of a party making default in appearing for trial at 
a Court of Oyer and Terminer, and to stay proceedings instituted upon 
such recognizance iu this Court. The grounds of excuse contained in the 
affidavits read upon motion in this case are sufficient to bring the case 
within the Statute. Per Chipman, C. J., and Botsford, J. Dissentiente— 
Parker J. as to the extent of the power conferred by the Statute, and the 
propriety of exercising it in the present case.
THIS was an application made in Michaelmas Term last for 
relief from the payment of a forfeited recognizance which had been 
estreated into this Court from a Court of Oyer and Terminer holden 
at Gagetown, in the County of Queen’s in March, 1838. Pro­
ceedings had been instituted by the Attorney General on the re­
cognizance by Scire Facias.
The application was made upon the following affidavits:—
Benjamin Appleby, of the Parish of Wickham, in the County 
of Queen’s, Farmer, maketh oath and saith, that at the last Court 
of Oyer and Terminer held for the said County of Queen’s in the 
month of March last, this deponent, together with Isaac Appleby 
and William Appleby appeared under recognizance to answer to a 
charge preferred against this deponent and the said Isaac Appleby 
and William Appleby, of having set on fire a Wood Boat belonging 
to one Isaac Barnes and Benjamin Barnes, and of having stolen 
sundry articles therefrom; that a Bill of Indictment was found 
against this deponent and the said Isaac and William Appleby ; 
that for eight weeks or thereabouts previous to the Sitting of the 
said Court this deponent was an invalid, confined the principal part 
of his time to his bed, and incapable of moving therefrom without 
assistance ; that at the time of the Sitting of the said Court this 
deponent 
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deponent was still confined to his bed, and was taken therefrom 
and laid upon a sled to be conveyed to the Court; that this depo­
nent was much harassed and his mind deeply affected by the 
charge made against him, and removed from the quiet of his home 
to the bustle of a crowded lodging house, this deponent was inca­
pable of collecting his ideas or acting for himself in any way ; that 
he was advised by his Counsel that the evidence which was 
detailed to him was wholly insufficient to support the charge, and 
that this deponent and the said other Defendants must be acquitted 
on the trial; that many persons attending the Court, actuated by 
friendly motives in some instances, and in others by curiosity, and 
in some as deponent believes by hostility, sought to converse with 
deponent, and detailed to him very exaggerated statements of the 
evidence in support of the prosecution, until this deponent, worried 
in his mind and weak in body, believed that he was the victim of a 
conspiracy determined to sacrifice him if possible, and being wholly 
unable from bodily and mental weakness to combat with the reports 
so industriously circulated, but subdued and broken down by what 
he thought a determined persecution, this deponent, without ad­
vising with his sons, the said Isaac and William Appleby, left 
Ga^btown and got upon a sled and was conveyed about nine miles; 
that this deponent there remained concealed and absent from the 
Court, and thereby forfeited his recognizance. That the trial of 
the said Isaac"Appleby and William Appleby took place, and they 
were wholly acquitted and discharged; that the sons of this 
deponent sought for this deponent and found him and surrendered 
him to gaol, and afterwards upon application to his Honor Judge 
Carter, an order was obtained to admit this deponent to bail, and 
this deponent is now under recognizance to appear to answer to the 
said indictment at the next Court of Oyer and Terminer for the 
said County of Queens. That proceedings have been taken by 
the Attorney General against this deponent, and also against 
James Gilchrist and Lewis’M'Donald, to recover the amount of 
their recognizance; that is to say, from this deponent the sum of 
two hundred pounds, and from each of his bail the sum of one hun­
dred pounds,—a copy of the process served upon the deponent is 
hereunto annexed. And this deponent saith, that he is wholly 
innocent of the charge preferred against him, and that he was in­
fluenced not by a sense of guilt, but by the causes before mentioned 
operating upon a mind weakened by long illness, in leaving and 
absenting himself from the Court as above mentioned. This depo­
nent is now fifty-two years of age, he was born and has always 
resided in the County of Queens, near to his present residence; 
he has been married nearly thirty years, and has a family of ten 
sons and daughters, and until the making of the charge before men­
tioned no offence of any kind against the laws was ever at any 
time 
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time made against tliis deponent, nor was this deponent ever en­
gaged even in a civil suit. That this deponent has always 
obtained his livelihood by farming, he owi^Stlie farm where he lives 
containing eight hundred acres of land, and all the property he 
possesses has been gained by patient industry, and now, unless the 
proceedings against this deponent and his bail are arrested, the 
property of this deponent must be sacrificed, as this deponent is 
unable otherwise to discharge the same.
George F. S. Berton, of Fredericton, Barrister at Law, maketh 
oath and saith, that he was retained as Counsel to defend the above 
named Benjamin Appleby and one Isaac and William Appleby, at 
the last Court of Oyer and Terminer held for the County of Queens, 
on a charge of setting fire to a Wood Boat and of stealing articles 
therefrom. That this deponent made diligent and careful inquiry 
into the facts, and advised the parties that the evicjencg was so 
loose and vague that they must be acquitted ; that the said Ben­
jamin Appleby was at the time exceedingly weak and miserable, 
and when called on his recognizance before the bill of indictment 
was preferred, was brought on a sled from the Inn to the Court; 
he and his sons stated to this deponent that the said Benjamin Ap­
pleby had been for a long time confined to his bed, and had been 
removed therefrom to be brought to y'ourt; that the said Benjamin 
Appleby frequently sent and sought for this deponent to detail to 
him statements of what he had been informed would be proved on 
the trial, but the accounts were generally so absurd that this depo­
nent paid little attention to them, and advised the said Benjamin 
Appleby not to listen to such stories. That this deponent was 
surprised to hear of the flight of the said Benjamin Appleby, and 
verily believes that it was occasioned by nervous excitement, —that 
being weak and miserable in health his mind became oppressed 
and unable to bear up against the reports in circulation on the sub­
ject of the charge against him, and this deponent believes that the 
sons of the said Benjamii Appleby were ignorant of the flight of 
their father, and they expressed their apprehensions to this depo­
nent that he had destroyed himself. And this deponent saith that 
the evidence for the prosecution was so insufficient that this depo- 
9 nent would not enter into any defence, and the prisoners were ac­
quitted, and His Honor, Mr. Justice Carter, in directing the jury, 
told them he did not think there was sufficient evidence before 
them to justify the hanging of a cat. And this deponent further 
saith, that the said Benjamin Appleby did not appear when called 
on his recognizance, and therefore on motion of the Solicitor Gene­
ral, who conducted the prosecution, the said recognizance was 
ordered to be estreated. And this deponent further saith, that 
he first heard of the absence of the said Benjamin Appleby 
from Lewis M'Donald, one of the bail, who thereupon desired 
b2 to 
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to surrender the said Isaac and William Appleby, and the bail 
were permitted to do so. And this deponent further saith, that 
there did not appear any cause of suspicion that either the bail or 
the sons of the said Benjamin Appleby had connived at the depar­
ture of the said Benjamin Appleby.
The Court, having taken time to consider, delivered their 
opinion this Term.
Chipman, Ch. J.:
This recognizance has been estreated into this Court as the Pro­
vincial Court of Exchequer, possessing, by the express terms of the 
Commissions to the Judges, the powers not only of the Justices of 
either Bench, but also those of the Barons of the Exchequer in 
Westminster Hall.
For a description of the Court of Exchequer as a Court for the 
recovery of the King’s debts, I refer to the following extract from 
an opinion given by Lord Redesdale in the House of Lords in the 
case of Watt and others v. the Attorney General—11 Price, TOO: 
“ The original proceedings” says his Lordship “being by the com­
mon process of the Court of Exchequer for the purpose of recover­
ing debts due to rhe Crown the first question is from what side of 
the Court that process issued. It issued from a Court which is a 
Court of Record at Common Law, constituted for the purpose of 
the recovery of the King’s debts. * # * Under the Act of King 
Hen. 8, which was made for the relief of the subject, he was enti­
tled, on any equity whatever, either to plead that equity, if it could 
be received in the form of a plea at the Common Law. If it could 
not be so received then he was entitled to have the benefit of it by 
what is called an English hill, that is by an application by petition 
to the Court, the same Court of Exchequer, but not to the same 
branch of the Court of Exchequer', but still to the same Court with 
this difference only, that as in in the Law Court of the Exchequer 
the Barons Are the Judges, so, in what is called the Equity side of 
the Court, the application is to the Chancellor and the Barons. 
But the result would be that upon such an English bill he would 
be afforded relief if he should be in a condition to prove, to the 
satisfaction of the Court, that he was entitled to it. This jurisdic­
tion of the Court of Exchequer is laid down with great clearness 
by Sir Edward Coke in his fourth Institute, ch. 2. He describes 
the Court from which the writ of extent Issued as a Court of Re­
cord, constituted for the recovery of the King's debts, as described 
by one of the most ancient writers on the subject, Britton Fol. 2, b. 
who is supposed to have lived about the time of Edward the First 
or Second. It if rather uncertain at what time he lived, but his 
work is supposed to have been written in the reign of Edward the 
First. He describes this Court of Exchequer as a Court of Com­
mon Law and Record, touching the King's debts,—in the old 
French, 
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French,—' de choses que touchent lour office a oier et determiner 
touts les causes que touchent nous dettes.” Now my Lords, of 
this Court of Record as a Court of Common Law, the Barons of 
the Exchequer are the sole Judges, as laid down by various autho­
rities.”
The recognizance now in question has been brought into this 
Court as the Court corresponding to the Law branch of tlie Court 
of Exchequer in England, for the purpose of process being issued 
upon it in the ordinary course of proceeding at Common Law. A 
Scire Facias has accordingly been issued and the party has applied 
for a discharge of the recognizance upon motion supported by affi­
davits. The Crown officers did not resist the application, but 
doubts were expressed from the Bench as to the power of the 
Court.
1 shall in the first place er uire into the nature and foundation 
of the jurisdiction which the Barons of the Exchequer in England 
exercise in cases of estreated recognizances. I find this jurisdic­
tion treated of with great particularity by Mr. Price in his “ Trea­
tise on the Exchequer,” a book, which contains the most systematic 
and detailed account of the constitution, powers and various offi­
ces of the Court of Exchequer I have any where met with.
Mr. Price, in page 375 of this book, states as follows :—“ As 
soon as the estreats are once recorded in this Court, the Barons of 
the Exchequer have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of them, as 
being from thenceforth under their authority and controul as part 
of the King’s certain or determined revenue, for which the Sheriff’s 
become accountable before them. That jurisdiction is exercised 
on the one hand in judicially enforcing the collection and payment 
for the Crown, and on the other, in discharging or mitigating and 
compounding the respective charges on the part of the subject. 
It is said that this latter part of the jurisdiction of the Barons was 
first (1) committed to their discretion by the Stat, of 33 Henry 8, 
c. 39, ss. 55, 60, 61, 62. By that Statute the Lord Treasurer, Chan­
cellor and Baron of the Exchequer, were given power and autho­
rity, (in the words of Sir Edward Coke, 4 Inst. 118,) to discharge, 
cancel and make void all and singular recognizances and bonds 
made to the King for payment for any debt or sum of money orfor 
performance of conditions <jc. upon shewing the acquittance <&p., 
or any proof made of payment and performance. Also to cancel 
and make void by their discretion all recognizances made for ap­
pearance, or other contempt. And see Sec. 79, permitting parties 
to plead in their discharge. Until the passing of that Act, conse­
quently, it seems to be considered that the Court of Exchequer 
could not of their own authority, discharge such recognizance and 
bonds, even though the subject could shew to the Court on his be­
half matter which would oe in law a plea in bar, as an acquittance, 
of 
402 CASES IN HILARY TERM,
or payment of the money on performance of the condition, without 
the especial authority of the King’s writ, or his express command­
ment, under the great or privy seal. In the Treatise of Chief 
Baron Gilbert also, p. 191, it is said—‘ By 33 Hen. 8. c. 39, the 
Court of Exchequer have power to discharge all debts and duties 
due to the King upon any Equity disclosed, &c.; and it is by virtue 
of this Act that they discharge recognizances, and it seems by the 
same Act that they may discharge penal laws, (q. penalties) made 
before this Statute, but no penal law made after the Statute can be 
discharged but must be compounded. At the present day, what­
ever may have been the origin of this extensive discretionary 
power of the Barons, it is more explicitly and definitely established 
from time to time by “ express (general) commandment” of the 
Crown issued regularly. At the commencement of every reignsince 
that of Queen Elizabeth, inclusive, therAhasbeen issued, as matter 
of grace, a writ of privy seal dormant (as it is termed) empowering 
the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, the Treasurer, Chan­
cellor and Barons of the Exchequer, and the Attorney General, to 
“ discharge, mitigate, lessen or compound the forfeiture of recog­
nizances,. (penalties, fines, issues and amerciaments, and other 
sums in the nature of recognizances &c. estreated into the Court of 
Exchequer" from any other Court or Commissioners) “ according 
to the truth or equity of each respective case, by narration in open 
Court." A third source of authority in tlie Barons xii respect of 
that part of the Green Wax, which is derived from certain forfeited 
recognizances is given by an Act of Parliament passed in the 
fourth year of the late reign “ for the more easy discharge of re­
cognizances estreated into the Exchequer."1 The Barons are 
thereby expressly empowered to discharge by order, upon affidavit 
and petition to be presented to them, any poor and ignorant per­
sons imprisoned or liable to be imprisoned under the Exchequer 
process, on the forfeiture of any recognizances estreated against 
them “ for not appearing as parties or witnesses at the Courts of 
Record at Westminster, or at the Assizes and General Quarter 
Sessions, or other Courts of Record, or for not prosecuting indict­
ments there, or otherwise not performing the conditions, and that 
without any quietus."
To that part of tlie foregoing extract which states that the juris­
diction in discharging recognizances, was first derived from the 
Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, Mr. Price adds the following note:—
“ This however may well be doubted, although it appears 
from the very early records that discharges were generally founded 
on the authority of the King’s writs, yet it also appears that the 
Treasurer and Barons discharged charges without express authority, 
and that long before the reign of Rich. 2d. As has been before 
observed, the King’s name and authority, and even the Legislative 
enactments, 
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enactments, appear to have had for object the exaction of a duty 
(in some cases perhaps of a doubtful nature),' and not the creation 
of a new authority.”
And with regard to the Statute 4, Geo. 3, c. 10, Mr. Price adds 
the following note :—
“ The authority given to the Court of Exchequer by this 
humane Statute, worthy the auspicious commencement of a long 
and prosperous reign, should perhaps he considered a^pmounting 
to somfething more than a mere power conferred on the Barons. It 
may even be not too much to regard the Statute as a direction to 
the Court to discharge all persons in such cases where the applicant 
is poor and ignorant and in prison. The* Court had alreacly the 
power to do so by the Statute of ffenhy 8, and also by the privy 
seal dormant; and that power they had bedn constantly and un­
ceasingly exercising in practice when this Act passed, as appears 
from frequent instances in the Minute and Order Books.”
It is thus seen that Lord Coke and Lord Chief Baron Gilbei-t, 
names of theWery highest authority, attribute the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Exchequer in discharging recognizances altogether to 
the provisions of the Statute, 33 Hdn. 8, d. 39. Mr. Price indeed 
refers to the w r.t of privy seal dormant, as one source, but only as 
an additional source, of this authority.
In Ashe’s case, as reported in llardres 334, in the reign of 
Charles II. the authority of the Court in this respect is expressly 
put upon the same Statute. That case is there reported as fol­
lows :—“ Mrs. Ashe hiid obtained of the King a privy seal, whereby 
was granted to her the forfeiture of certain recognizances for ap­
pearing at the Sessions, amounting in the whole to <£800, and it 
w s made a question whether the Court might compound those 
forfeitures by virtue of their privy seal, which was before the privy 
seal and grant to Mrs. Ashe ? And it was doubted whether this 
latter privy seal did not take away and revoke the powers given to the 
Court in this particular: but it was clearly held per C&riam that 
the Court might, upon good matters in equity discharge these 
debts by virtue of the Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39.” And a composition 
of the recognizance was accordingly made upon the facts of the 
case.
There is a subsequent notice of the same case in page 395 of 
the same book, in the case of Whitehill v. Attorney General, Ashe 
and others, as follows:—“Upon an English bill to be relieved 
against the forfeiture of a recognizance for not appearing at the 
gaol delivery of Newgate, the forfeiture having been granted over 
by privy seal, and the Barons here having compounded for it after 
the privy seal granted, and the grantee prosecuting upon the re­
cognizance, notwithstanding it was doubted whether the forfeiture 
of such a recognizance be within the Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, for 
relief 
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relief n Equity against the King: and whether this composition 
made by the Barons by vfirtue of their privy seal be a good com­
position, being made1 after the privy seal granted to Ashe &c. 
But becau^ the privy seal granted to iXslie &c. misrecited the 
date of the Sessions at which the recognizance was taken nihilinde 
factum fuit. But the Bill was dismissed, and the composition 
made by the Court confirmed.”
Here it is true, that the reporter states the former proceeding of 
the Court in cjoiilpounding the recognizance, as having been founded 
upon the writ of privy seal. But if the point depended on this 
case alone, I should certainly be inclined to rely upon the original 
report as containing the most correct account of the opinion of the 
Court.
We find in the most modern times that the Barons of the Exche­
quer still ascribe to the Stat, of Hen. 8, the authority which they exer­
cise in this respect I refer to the cftSd of ex-parte Williams, reported 
in 8 Price’s Exchequer Reports, page 3. The marginal note of the 
case by the feporrer is as follows : — “ This Court has jurisdiction 
over recognizances entered into under the 28 Geo. 3. c. 52, (pro­
viding for petitions against undue return's of Members of Parlia­
ment) upon their being certified into the E"xchequerby the! Speaker 
of the House of Commons, upon the report of the Select Committee, 
and in a case of sufficient merits they will interfere to discharge 
such recognizance so entreated upon a summary pplication by 
rule to shew cause.”
The learned Barons in giving their opinions in this case, express 
themselves as follows:—“Richards, Lord Chief Baron—‘■'•The 
generaljunsdictioii''tn cases of this sort is founded on the 33 Hen. 
8, c. 39, and unless there be any thing in the 28 Geo. 3, c 52, or 
the 53 Geo. 3, c. 71, which takes away that jurisdiction, there is 
no doubt that the Court may interfere in this case if satisfied that 
the application is founded on sufficient merits.”
Graham, Baron— ‘ The recognizance being once brought here, 
the jurisdiction of the Court over it attaches.”
Wood, Baron—“ The question is not whether this recognizance 
has been forfeited or not, but whether we have a right to relieve 
the party; I think we have that right under the 33 Hen. 8. and 
that the 28 Geo. 3, does not affect it.”
Garrow, Baron—“ Tlie Speaker is obliged to return the recog­
nizance here, and if this Court has not jurisdiction to relieve the 
party in a fit case it would be a lamentable thing, as a man in con­
sequence might be imprisoned for life ; and to tell him he might 
bring an action would be absurd.”
Per Curiam.—Rule absolute (for vacating the recognizance on 
the merits of the application.)
These authorities are quite sufficient to satisfy my mind that the 
Barons 
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Barons of the Exchequer in England consider themselves as acting 
under the provisions of the Stat. 33 Hen. 8, when they dispense 
relief in cases of estreated recognizances. But to complete the 
view of the subject it will be well to refer to the Statute itself.
There are two sections of the Statute under either of which, it 
seems to me, this jurisdiction may be supported, viz. the 62d and 
79th sections. The 62d section runs as follows :—
“ And be it further enacted, by the authority afoi esaid, that the 
same several head officers for the time being, in every of their said 
several Courts (intent alias the Court of Exchequer) shall have full 
power and authority to discharge, cancel, or make void, by his or 
their discretion, all and singular recognizances now made or here­
after to be made in the said Court, for any appearance or other 
contempt; and that the same head officer or officers, and the par­
ties so bounden and to be bounden, to be discharged against the 
King our Sovereign Lord, his heirs, executors and successors, for 
the cancellation ol the same recognizance.”
This clause of the Statute, it is true, is in terms confined to re­
cognizances made in the respective Courts to wdiich authority is 
gi' en to .vacate them. But as it is a .remedial law it is, according 
to a very common rille of construction, to extend the benefit of the 
Act to cases which are within the same mischief though not within 
the words. The clause therefore may well be held to apply to re­
cognizances estreated into the Court of Exchequer, as well as to 
those made in the Court. Lord Coke, in the passage above quoted 
by Mr. Price, evidently refers to this Section of the Act as giving 
the general power to the Court of Exchequer to cancel “at their 
discretion recognizances for appearance or other contempt.”
The 79th section of the Act is as follows : —
“ Provided always, and be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, 
That if any person or persons\ci whom any such debt or duty is, 
or at any time hereafter shall be demanded or required, allege, 
plead, declare or shew, in any of the said Courts, good, perfect and 
sufficient cause and matters in law, reason or good conscience, in 
bar or discharge of the said debt or duty, or why such person or 
persons ought not to be charged or chargeable to or with the same : 
and the same cause or matter so alleged, pleaded, declared or 
shewed, sufficiently proved in such one of the said Courts as he or 
they shall be impleaded, sued, vexed or troubled for the same; 
that then the said Courts, and every of them, shall have full power 
and authority to accept, adjudge and allow the same proof, and 
wholly and clearly to acquit and discharge all and every person 
and persons that shall be so impleaded, sued, vexed, or troubled 
for the same ; any thing in this present Act before mentioned to 
the contrary- notwithstanding.”
Here there is a general power given to the Court to discharge any 
person 
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person from any debt or duty upon good cause in law, reason or good 
conscience, alledged, pleaded, declared or shewn. The matter of­
fered in discharge must be sufficiently proved, but the manner of 
shewing and proving such matters is not prescribed, and why may 
it not be by pleading, or by a summary application on the Common 
Law side of the Court, in cases in which the practice of this branch 
of the Court admits of these modes of proceeding, as well as by 
English Bill on the Equity side of the Court ? This is evidently 
the view taken of this part of the Statute by Lord Redesdale, in 
the case of Wall v. the' Attorney General, above referred to. 
This also being a remedial provision of the Statute must have an 
extended and liberal construction.
The doubts which have been expressed on this subject appear 
to have originated in what is said by Mr. Price, in a note to the 
case of Pellow’s recognizance in the 13th volume of his reports, 
page!'.‘102. Mr. Price there states as follows :—“There can be no 
doubt, however, that whenever a recognizance becomes on?e 
estreated into the Exchequer, that Court has jurisdiction over it. 
The Statute 4 Geo. 3, c. 10, has given the Court of Exchequer 
only a 1 nited authority to discharge estreated recognizances ; for 
that Statute appears both from the recital to the preamble and the 
enactment, to be confined to the cases of poor persons imprisoned 
ordiablS to be imprisoned’, in other words such persons as are inca­
pable of paying the amount. But the great source of the general 
authority is a writ of privy seal which is issued at the commence­
ment of every reign, by virtue of which the Court is fully empow­
ered in their discretion, according to the equitable circumstances of 
each particular case, generally to compound, mitigate, or discharge 
estreated ivcAgnizances.”
“ It will be observed, however, that the writ recites the existence 
of doubts-as to the power of the'Xiowrt to do this without the Royal 
authority, and therefore the Crown gives them jurisdiction as a 
matter of grace in ease of the subject.”
There is indeed no reference in this note to the Statute of 33 
Hen. 8, but even if Mr. Price’s^opinion were alone to govern the 
point, his distinct and repeated ascription of the jurisdiction to the 
Statute of Henry 8, in his Treatise on the Exchequer, which I 
have quoted so much at large, would be conclusive. In one of the 
notes which I have before quoted he seems inclined to go further, 
and to consider this jurisdiction as inherent in the Barons of the 
Exchequer without the King’s writ, and antecedent to the Statute.
Upon the whole I cannot entertain any doubt that the Statute 
33 Hen. 8, c. 39, does confer full authority upon the Court of Ex­
chequer to afford relief upon recognisances estreated into that 
Court. There is also no doubt that the clauses of the Statute 
N which I have above referred to must be considered as extending to 
this 
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this Province. It has already been expressly decided by this 
Court, in the case of the King v. M'Laughlin, Michaelmas Term, t 
1830, that the 50th Section of this Statute which raises bonds to 
the King to the rank of debts of record, does so extend as being ap­
plicable to our Colonial condition. Those clauses of the Statute 
which are remedial in favor of the subject, are at least equally ap­
plicable.
It remains to enquire upon what side of the Exchequer it is that 
the Barons in point of fact exercised the jurisdiction we are speak­
ing of.
It seems to me indisputable that this jurisdiction is exercised on 
the Common Law side of the Court. The estreats are brought 
into and remain in the appropriate office for revenue matters on 
that side of the Court, viz. in the office of the Lord Treasurer's 
Remembrancer, from which office it is that the Common Law pro­
cess upon estreats is issued, and in which it is that orders for vaca­
ted recognizances are made up. Whereas the proceedings on the 
Equity side of the Court are all conducted in the office of the 
King's Remembrancer. For these positions I again refer to 
Price’s Treatise on the Exchequer. The several cases which I 
have before cited, viz. Ashe’s case, Hardres, 334, Williams’ case, 
8 Price, 3, and Pellow’s case, 13 Price, 299, are reported as having 
occurred on the Common Law side of the Court. The same re­
mark applies to Bick’s case, 6 Price, 102, Dibbin’s case, Parker, 
165, and to the case of Muilman and another, Parker, 241, in 
which last case the party defended by plea to an estreated recog­
nizance.
Whether the jurisdiction, in matters actually relating to Crown 
debts, which is exercised on the Equity side of the Court of Ex­
chequer, in proceedings on which side of the Court it seems that 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer is still deemed and named as one 
of the Judges (Price’s Tre. of Exch. 39, Wall and others v. the 
Attorney General, 11 Price, 700,) can be exercised by this Court, 
it is not necessary now to consider. There could never be any 
pretence for this Court holding the jurisdiction which the Court of 
Exchequer in England, either On the Common Law or Equity side, 
exercises by fiction, in cases between subject and subject.
It seems to me to be clear that the matter with which we are 
now dealing would, by virtue of the Statufe 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, be 
within the jurisdiction of the Barons of the Exchequer in England 
sitting on the Common Lau> side of the Court, and therefore, I 
conceive, without any question, falls within our jurisdiction by vir­
tue of our Commissions as Judges of this Court
I feel great satisfaction that the careful and anxious attention 
which I have bestowed upon this subject has conducted me to this 
result, because it is in unison with the conclusion to which this 
c2 Court 
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Court came upon a similar question, although without all the light 
now before us, in the case of the estreated recognizance of Morse 
and Nevers, decided in Easter Term, 1826, and because I consider 
it to be a most beneficial authority for us to possess, and in the 
words of one of the Barons in Williams’ case, “ it would be quite 
lamentable if we were without it.”
The affidavits upon which this application is founded are as fol­
lows: \here His Honor stated the substance of the affidavits.] 
These affidavits in my opinion make out a case fully sufficient for 
the Court to exercise its discretion in granting the relief prayed 
for upon payment of all cost incurred by the Crown in this matter, 




After the strong opinion expressed by His Honor the Chief Jus­
tice on so thorough a research and full consideration, and the con­
currence of Mr. Justice Botsford therein, it is with reluctance and 
diffidence that I venture to state my dissent from the conclusion 
to which they have arrived in this case.
I do not, 1 must confess, feel myself embarrassed by the former 
decisions of this Court, which have been alluded to by His Honor, 
for they were given without argument or opposition, and certainly 
without any notice of the privy seal which has been for so long a 
period granted by each successive Monarch to the Court of Ex­
chequer in England, and under which I conceive relief, in most of 
the cases which have occurred, to have been afforded.
At the establishment of this Court, combining as it may do the 
Common Law jurisdiction of the Barons of the Exchequer as well 
as that of the Justioes of either Bench at Westminster, we find the 
Court of Exchequer exercising a power over recognizances estreated 
into that Court, and two sources are referred to for that power, 
namely, the Statute of Henry 8, and the writ of privy seal dormant, 
issued at the commencement of each reign from the time of Queen 
Elizabeth.
Now admitting that the Court may exercise the power granted 
to the Barons of the Exchequer by the Statute of Henry 8, and 
may grant relief by discharging recognizances in proper cases, on 
motion made on the Common Law side of the Court, I cannot 
think the present case falls within the meaning of the 79th Section 
of the Statute, under which part of the Act alone it appears to me 
the Court interferes on recognizance estreated from other Courts.
That Section does not provide for any mitigation or compounding 
of the penalty, but simply gives power to the Court to acquit and 
discharge, where “ a good, perfect and sufficient cause and matter 
in law, reason or good conscience, is alleged, pleaded, declared or 
shewn 
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shewn in bar or discharge of the debt or duty, or why the party 
ought not to be charged or chargeable to or with the same, the 
same cause or matter so alleged, pleaded, deelared or shewed 
being sufficiently proved in the Court in which the party shall be 
impleaded, sued, vexed, or troubled for the same.”
The writ of privy seal goes farther, and gives express power not 
only to discharge, but to mitigate or compound where a case for 
such relief is made out in equity and good conscience, and makes 
particular reference to recognizances estreated into the Court of 
Exchequer, and provides for relief on petition as well as suit.
In many of the cases cited from the Exchequer Reports, and 
especially in that styled Mrs. Aslie’s case, in Hardres, the Court 
clearly proceeded under the privy seal, and it is rather doubtful 
whether that was not considered the real source of authority in the 
other cases.. The only instance I can find where it distinctly ap­
pears that relief was granted upon the Statute, independently of 
the privy seal, is recited in Price’s Ex. Pr. 381, in the time of the 
Protectorate, where, to a recognizance estreated from the Sessions, 
there was a plea under the Statute shewing an impossibility for 
the Defendant’s appearing, he being imprisoned in another place. 
At this period we may presume no privy seal was in existence, 
and the matter in bar or discharge would be certainly good in reason 
and good conscience, if not in law
It is stated distinctly by Mr. Price, in the note to Pellow’s case, 
“ that the great source of the general authority of the Exchequer is 
the writ of privy seal, by virtue of which the Court is fully em­
powered in tlieir discretion, according to the equitable circum­
stances of each particular case, generally to compound, mitigate or 
discharge estreated recognizances.”
In 2 Ch. Gen. Pr. 397, treating of the Court of Exchequer, it 
is said in a note quoting from Man. Ex. Pr. Appx. that the 
writ of privy seal which is issued ex gratia at the commencement 
of each reign, allowing the parties to apply in a summary way to 
the Court of Exchequer to compound or discharge any fines, issues, 
amerciaments and recognizances, according to the circumstances 
of each case is the source of the jurisdiction of the Court to hear 
motions on these subjects.
No one can, I think, carefully examine the cases w'hich have 
occurred, without feeling that there has been no disposition in the 
Court to enlarge the remedy under the Statute, and I cannot hear 
of any case where the Courts in any of the other Colonies have 
acted under it so far as to discharge a recognizance.
These considerations, although they certainly ought not to pre­
vent the Court from giving effect to the Statute in a case brought 
properly before it, and supported by sufficient proof, yet suggest 
caution in the application of the law to cases which would seem more 
fit
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fit objects for the g/ace and favour of the Crown to mitigate, 
than the exercise of a judicial discretion to discharge the penalty 
incuri ed.
I have carefully examined the affidavits on which this motion 
Las been made, and supposing that the proof is sufficient of the 
facts which have been alleged, yet the grounds laid for the dis­
charge of the recognizance do to my mind appear wholly insuffi­
cient.
Here is the case of a person committed to prison on the charge 
of a capital felony, and let out on bail, coming to the Court at 
which a true bill is found against him and two others by the Grand 
Jury, and voluntarily going away so as to avoid being tried, and 
making his appearance again after a trial of the two others had 
resulted in an acquittal, with a strong opinion of the learned Judge 
as to the insufficiency of the evidence
For the Court to declare that these affidavits contain good, per­
fect and sufficient matter in law, reason, or good conscience for the 
discharge of this recognizance, appears to me, I must confess, 
rather dangerous.
I should feel more reluctance in declining to interfere if the De­
fendant would, in such an event, be deprived of all relief; but that is 
not the case, he my still apply in the proper quarter for the inter­
position of the prerogative. The grace and favour of the Crown 
are not withheld or denied, although we may not be the dispensers 
thereof.
It is not, moreover, at all essential to the exercise of our judicial 
functions that we should possess this power, and there may have 
been very good reasons not applicable to us for giving it to the 
Court of Exchequer in England, concerned as it is in man y fiscal 
matters which do not at all fall within the province of this Court. 
If it is thought advisable that we should possess it, a writ of privy 
seal might have issued, or a legislative enactment passed similar to 
that lately made in England relative to recognizances at the 
Sessions.
For these reasons I am unwilling to interfere in the present case. 
Rule absolute for vacating the recognizance 
upon payment of costs.
THE QUEEN v. 162 PIECES OF WHITE PINE TIMBER-
Thomas E. Perley—Claimant.
On motion for a prohibition to the Court of Vice Admiralty,—Held that 
that Court has jurisdiction under the Statutes 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, and 2 Geo. 2, 
c. 35, to entertain a suit in rem. instituted by the Crown against Pine 
Timber seized as cut on Crown Land without licence, and to proceed to 
adjudge the forfeiture and condemnation thereof, although there has been 
no prosecution for the pecuniary penalties imposed by the said Acts on per­
sons cutting or carrying away the same. A prohibition was accordingly 
refused. IN
in the Second Year of VICTORIA. 411
In Michaelmas Term last, a rule was obtained on behalf of the 
claimant, calling on the Advocate General to shew cause why a 
prohibition should not issue to the Court of Vice Admiralty of this 
Province, to prohibit it from holding plea of the matters there de­
pending in a suit«instituted for the forfeiture and condemnation of 
certain white pine timber, seized by officers of the Crown under 
the Statutes 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, and 2 Geo. 2. c. 35.
The rule was moved for by Street and Berton, on the grounds 
that the timber in question was cut within the body of a County, 
and that the Court of Vice Admiralty had no ordinary jurisdiction 
in such a case, and that the Statutes above mentioned gave juris­
diction to the Judge of the Admiralty only in proceedings to recover 
the penalties thereby imposed on persons cutting or carrying away 
the white pine trees growing on Crown Land; or that at all events 
if that Court had jurisdiction as to the question of property it could 
only be incidentally in the proceeding for the penalties.
It was urged that this Act, giving jurisdiction to the Judge of 
the Admiralty, was a very great abridgment of the right of the 
subject in depriving him of a trial by jury, and should be construed 
strictly, and that it could not have been the intention of Parlia­
ment that the right of property in timber, as between the Crown 
and an innocent holder or purchaser, should be tried in any other 
than the ordinary tribunals of the country.
There were no express words in the Acts giving the jurisdiction 
now claimed for the Admiralty, and the power of Inferior Courts 
ought not to be extended by implication.
Affidavits were read stating the facts relied on, and shewing the 
proceedings in the Court below; these are however so fully de­
tailed in the learned and elaborate judgment of the Judge of the 
Vice Admiralty Court (the Honorable W. B. Kinnear,) that it is 
unnecessary here to repeat them. The minutes of that judgment, 
as furnished by the learned J udge himself, are as follow :—
Court of Vice Admiralty, New Brunswick,
Friday, tlie 31s£ day of August, 1838.
The Queen v. 65 pieces containing 112 tons White Pine Timber, 
Thomas E. Perley, Claimant;-—and against 47 pieces contain­
ing 75 tons Whitft Pine Timber, Richard Ketchum, Claimant.
In these cases monitions were issued, founded on proper affida- 
davits, and after their return Mr. Berton appeared for the owners, 
under protest, objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, on the 
ground that the alleged cause of seizure of the timber having arisen 
within the body of the County of Carleton, in the Province of 
New Brunswick, this Court has no jurisdiction therein, but is con­
fined to matters arising on the High Seas, and out of the bodj of 
any County. On which, the Advocate General having joined 
issue, 
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issue, the question arose for the decision of the Court, and is now 
decided on this point, viz, whether the Statute 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, 
s. 5, gives jurisdiction to this Court to proceed in this or in any 
case to the condemnation of timber seized as having been cut on 
Crown Lands within this Province without the Royal licence, con­
trary to the provisions of that Act, and a subsequent one of the 2d 
Geo. 2, c. 35, p. 714.
It is on the one hand admitted by Mr. Berton, that such con­
demnation may perhaps necessarily follow when there is a convic­
tion for the penalties duly proceeded on, but denied that the Act 
authorizes a direct proceeding against the timber. On the other 
hand the Advocate General admits that unless the first mentioned 
Act confers the authority, there is nothing in the law which sanc­
tions it. The jurisdiction therefore of this Court must stand or fall 
upon the terms, or a legal construction of the terms of the Act.
The first clause of the Sth Seg^ion expressly clothes the Court 
with jurisdiction over the person of any individual who may in­
fringe its provisions, with full power to proceed to sentence and 
execution against him for heavy penalties; but the Etter part of 
the Section which declares the forfeiture of the timber, neither 
mentions the Court before which the proceeding is to take place for 
condemning the property seized, nor gives any directions concern­
ing it.
A doubt then naturally arises, and it seems has for many years 
existed, whether the Court of Admiralty can exercise jurisdiction 
for any thing arising out of the Act but a proceeding for the 
penalties.
Now it is laid down in Cornyns Dig,, 7th vol. Tit. Pari. 318, 
(R. 10, 6,) “ that every Statute ought to be construed according to 
the intent of the Parliament.” And in another place under the 
same head, “ not according to the letter, but according to the in­
tent.” And further, “in the construction-of Statutes the ends 
contemplated are to be considered.” And under head of R. 11, 
“ the preamble is a good means for collecting the intent.” So the 
ground and cause of the making of a Statute explains the intent.
In the same book R. 22, it is also stated that a Statute made 
for the benefit of the King shall be construed most beneficially for 
him; as the Stat. J7th Ed. 2d de Proear Regis, which says, that 
the King shall have the ward of his tenant seized in fee, extends to 
his tenant seized in tail.
It is at the same time to be distinctly kept in view as a general 
principle of Law, that a penal Statute is to be construed strictly, 
but a remedial Statute beneficially.
Under the head of R. 21, in the same book, it is laid down, that 
a penal Statute may also be a remedial one—1 Wils. 126 ; and a 
Statute may be penal in one part and remedial in another part— 
Doug. 
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Doug. 702; which last case is very strong and clear on this 
point.
Taking these authorities with us let us see whether the intent, 
scope and object of the Act was or was not to give to the Court of 
Admiralty jurisdiction as well to proceed directly to the condem­
nation of timber seized, contravening its provisions, as to a suit for 
the penalties.
The preamble shews the object of the Act to be the preservation 
of white pine trees in the Colonies for the masting of the Royal 
Navy, an object confessedly of great general and public benefit. 
Then the intent, of the proceeding, so far as the seizure and con­
demnation of the timber extend, was evidently not to disturb any 
British subject in the enjoyment of his property, but to protect the 
property of the Crown against a wrong doer, which, it is agreed, 
might be done m a Certain way by the ordinary course of Law ; 
and as the rights of the Crown are for the benefit of the whole body 
politic, it can scarcely berurged that additional sanctions ought not 
to be made for the accomplishment of so beneficial an object, sanc­
tions which in fact have surrounded and guarded the fights of the 
Crown from the earliest period of the British Constitution. Can it 
reasonably be doubted then that the whole design of the Act was 
to add to the Common Law remedies of the Crown, and to throw 
obstacles in the way of the trespasser on Crown Lands by penal­
ties, and by casting the onits probctridi on the trespasser, and by 
giving a more summary method of proceeding against the property 
illegally obtained than could be had in the Courts of Common Law ? 
I certainly am unable to construe this Act in any othdr way.
From some of these considerations also we may very safely infer, 
in accordance with one of the rules of Law already stated, that the 
latter part of the Sth Section of the Act is decidedly remedial, 
while at the same time it is as freely admitted that the proceedings 
in the former part of it against the person are highly penal.
The latter part then beiilg remedial and in favor of the King is 
entitled to a most liberal and beneficial construction, a construction 
which could not by any means be bestowed on the penal part, so 
that were the clauses of the Section in fact reversed, by the very 
same rules which are now adopted to expound this Act as being 
intended to authorize this Court to condemn timber seized on a 
proceeding direct for the purpose,UI should feel myself obliged to 
hold there was no jurisdiction in the Court to proceed for the 
penalties.
Would it not also appear very extraordinary that by one Section 
of an Act authority should be given to a Court, which proceeds 
out of the course of the Common Law to convict a party for the 
heaviest penalties and suffer sentence to be passed on him, extend­
ing not merely to his property but to the imprisonment of his person 
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for a length of time, and much of that time at the discretion of 
the Judge; and yet use words in the very same Section which 
were not intended to sanction a proceeding by the same Court for 
the condemnation of property, which by the very Act or sentence 
itself must be considered the property of the Crown, and is but the 
resumption by means of a Court of what had been wrongfully, ille­
gally and unjustly taken from the Crown?—Would not such a 
construction amount to this—you may proceed for the penal part 
of the Act before a Court where only a single Judge presides, and 
where there is no jury; but for the remedial part you must apply 
to a Court composed of four Judges, who, with a jury, will mete 
out the justice which the case requires? In the one Court the 
alleged owner will require you to prove that he has taken the 
King’s property, and may succeed in defeating the rights of the 
Crown under the shield of that difficulty, at the very time perhaps 
that he has failed in shewing in the other Court that the property 
is in any other party than the Crown, and has been sentenced ac­
cordingly.
It was objected in argument to such a construct’on as that con­
tended for by the Advocate General, that the latter clause of the 
5th Section did not enact but merely declared such timber &c. to 
be forfeited. It does not however appear to be material in what 
form an Act is made, if the intent is apparent—7th Com. Dig. 314, 
(R. 3.) The words “It is hereby declared that all logs&c. shall 
be forfeited and seized,” appear to me to mean the same thing as, 
“ It is hereby enacted,” the usual words in an Act not declarative 
of the Law. The first expression proclaims to be law what the 
second decrees or establishes.
It was also asked, could such a proceeding, grounded on a seizure, 
take place after the six months, the time limited for prosecution on 
the penal part of the Act—could it even be before that time ? I 
answer, the Act evidently distinguishes between the infliction of 
a penalty for the wrongful Act, which because it is so highly penal 
must be proceeded in within six months, and the case of tlie pro­
perty seized, as cut contrary to the Act, which it declares to be 
absolutely forfeited. And if a time were limited for proceeding to 
procure its condemnation it would even compel the giving up of 
any quantity of timber seized although clearly with n the Act, 
when by some accidental delay or late seizure, the case could not 
be brought before the Court within six months after the offence 
committed.” Besides, if the timber should have been wrongfully 
seized and the officer does not proceed to its condemnation, an 
action of Trespass or Trover will lie against him which will speedily 
bring the point to issue.
In deciding this day against tli'e protest, and in favour of the 
Turisdiction of this Court, had I felt far less satisfied than I do feel 
of 
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of the correctness of the conclusion to which I iiave come, I should 
still have hesitated very long indeed before I could have brought 
my mind to believe that the judgment of such eminent men as the 
late Lord Eldon, Chief Baron M‘Donald, and Lord Stowell, when 
holding high official situations at the English Bar, together with 
two other Counsel, given in 1792, in answer to a question proposed 
on this very point, in favour of that conclusion, could be erroneous. 
Had it been a decision by either of them as a Judge, this issue 
would not have been joined. Had the opinion contained the rea­
sons on which it was founded, this lengthy discussion might not 
have been necessary. It runs emphatically as follow’s:—
“ Case.—Whether the Vice Admiralty Court of Nova Scotia is 
competent to try the legality of seizures made in pursuance of the 
Sth Geo. 1, c. 12, s. 5.
Opinion.—We think the seizure may properly be tried in the 
Vice Admiralty Court of Nova Scotia, and that it ought to be 






For these reasons I feel myself bound to over-rule the protest, 
and assign the party Defendant to appear absolutely.
W. B. KINNEAR,
Judge of the Vice Admiralty.
The Solicitor General and Wright, Acting Advocate General, 
here shewed cause, and supported the judgment of the Court be­
low in favor of the Jurisdiction, contending that it had been exer­
cised without dispute for the last forty years in this Province ; and 
had been expressly sanctioned by the Crown Lawyers in England, 
even of the first eminence and highest character.
That by the Common Law the property in all trees is in the 
owner of the land. That all timber in the forests belongs to Iler 
Majesty, and the said Statute declaring all timber cut without 
licence to be forfeited, the onus of proving licence was necessarily 
thrown upon the party claiming. That Parliament^ by giving a 
power to the Crown which it had not before, plainly intended 
thereby to relieve the Crown of that onus which, if proceedings 
wrere had in a Court of Common Law, would have remained . 
and to effect this, created by the said Statute a new jurisdiction in 
the Court of Vice Admiralty.
J. A. Street, in reply, urged the objections made on obtaining 
the rule, and contended that the Crown should have proceeded first 
in personam for the penalties before proceeding in rem.—Bac. 
Abr. Tit. Court of Admiralty; Kent’s Com. 375. 
d2 That
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That it was a new question, and although similar proceedings 
may have taken place before, yet this was the first time the objec­
tions had been raised; and the former practice, if erroneous, could 
not influence the present decision.
That it was a case in its effects of the utmost importance, and 
the Court ought to consider well before they gave such a construc­
tion to an Act of Parliament as was not called for by its terms, 
and would so materially abridge the rights of the subject.
Before the close of the Term the Court gave Judgment. 
Chipman, C. J.:
In this case a rule nisi for a prohibition to the Court of Vice 
Admiralty was obtained at the last Term. The question depends 
upon the 5th Section of the Statute of 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, which is as 
follows: —
“ And whereas the Laws already made, and still in force, for 
the preservation of White Pine Trees in His Majesty’s Colonies of 
New Hampshire, the Massachusett’s Bay, and Province of Maine, 
Rhode Island, and Providence Plantation, the Naraganset Country 
or King’s Province, and Connecticut, in New England, and New 
York and New Jersey, in America, for the masting the Royal 
Navy, have been found insufficient for that purpose, so that a fur­
ther provision is necessary to be made therein : And forasmuch as 
there are great numbers of White Pine Trees, fit for masting the 
Royal Navy, growing in Ills Majesty’s Province of iNova Scotia, 
in America, Be it therefore enacted by the autlioi ty aforesaid, 
that from and after the twenty first day of September, one thou­
sand seven hundred and twenty two, no person or persons within 
the said Colonies or Plantations of Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, 
the Massachusett’s Bay and Province of Maine, Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantation, the Naraganset Country or King’s Pro­
vince, and Connecticut, in New England, and New York and 
New Jersey, in America, or within any of them, do or shall pre­
sume to cut, feil or destroy any White Pine Trees, not growing 
within any Township, or the bounds, lines or limits thereof, in any 
of the said Colonies or Plantations, without His Majesty's Royal 
licence for so doing first had and obtained, on pain that every per­
son so cutting, felling and destroying such Pine Trees, or who 
shall be aiding and assisting therein, or in draining away such 
Pine Trees after the- same shall have been so cut, felled or de- 
4 siroyed, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the several 
and respective sums following, that is to say, for every White Pine 
Tree of the growth of twelve inches diameter and under, at three 
foot from the earth, the sum of five pounds ; for every such Tree 
from twelve to eighteen inches dia meter, the sum of ten pounds ; 
for every such tree from eighteen inches to four and twenty inches 
diameter, the sum of twenty pounds; and for every such tree from 
four 
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four and twenty inches diameter and upwards, the sum of fifty 
pounds; which several penalties and forfeitures shall and may be 
sued for within six months after the offence committed, by plaint 
or information upon the oath of one or more credible witness or 
witnesses, before the Judge of the Admiralty or his deputy, within 
the 'Colony or Plantation where such Pine Tree shall be cut, felled 
or destroyed, one moiety of such penalties and forfeitures to be to 
His Majesty, lus heirs or successors, the other moiety to the infor­
mer who shall sue for the same, and in case any dispute shall 
arise whether such Tree when cut, felled or destroyed was growing 
within any Township, or the bounds, lines and limits thereof, the 
proof shall be upon the owner; and on conviction of such offender 
for such offence as aforesaid, if he shall refuse or neglect to pay 
the penalty and forfeiture thereby incurred, by the space of twenty 
days after such conviction, that then such Judge or his deputy 
shall and may, by warrant under his hand and seal, cause the 
same to be levied by distress and sale of the goods of the offender, 
rendering the overplus, if any be, to the owner; and where no 
sufficient distress can be found, such Judge or deputy shall commit 
the offender to prison within the Colony or Plantation where such 
offence shall be committed, there to remain without bail or mam- 
prize during such time as such Judge or deputy shall appoint, not 
exceeding twelve months nor less than three months, or until such 
offender shall pay the penalty or sum of money so recovered, and 
after such payment made shall likewise find sufficient security for 
his good behaviour during the space of three years, to be accounted 
from the term of such his conviction; and it is hereby declared 
that all White Pine Trees, Masts or Logs made from such Trees, 
which from and after the one and twentieth day of September, one 
thousand seven hundred and twenty two, shall be found cut or 
felled without such licence as aforesaid in any of His Majesty's said 
Colonies or Plantations, shall be forfeited and seized for the use 
of His Majesty, his heirs and successors, any former law, usage, 
or custom to the contrary notwithstanding
The 1st Section 2d Geo. 2, c. 35, was adverted to in the argu­
ment, and is as follows:—-
“ Whereas by an Act passed in the eighth year of His late Ma­
jesty's Reign, intituled ‘ An Act giving further encouragement for 
the importation of Naval Stores, and for other purposes therein 
mentioned, it is enacted, That no person or persons whatsoever 
in any of His Majesty's Colonies of Idoa. Scotia, New Hampshire, 
the Massachusetts Bay, the Province of Maine, Rhode Island, 
and Providence Plantation, the Naraganset Country or King’s 
Province, and Connecticut, in New England, and New York and 
New Jersey in America, or within any of them, do or shall pre­
sume to cut, fell or destroy any White Pine Trees, not growing 
within 
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within any Township, or the bounds, lines or limits thereof, in any 
of the said Colonies or Plantations, without His Majesty's licence 
for so doing first had and obtained: and whereas, since the passing 
of the said Act, great tracts of Land where Trees fit for Masting 
grow, have been, in order to evade the provisions of the said Act, 
erected into Townships; Now for the better preservation of White 
Pine Trees in His Majesty’s said Colonies, for masting His Royal 
Navy, be it enacted by the King’s most excellent Majesty, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and 
Commons, in. this present Parliament assembled, and by the autho­
rity of the same, that from and after the twenty ninth day of Sep­
tember next, no person or persons within the said Colonies of 
Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, the Province of Maine, the Massa- 
chusets Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantation, the Nara- 
ganset Country, or King's Province, and Connecticut, in New 
England, and New York and New Jersey, in America, or within 
any of them, or in any other Province or Country in AmericathM, 
now belongs or shall hereafter belong to the Crown of Great 
Britain, do or shall presume to cut, fell or destroy any White Pine 
Trees, except only such as are the property of private persons, 
notwithstanding the said Trees do grow within the limits of any 
Township, laid out or to be laid out hereafter in any of the said 
Colonies or Plantations, without His Majesty’s Royal licence for 
so doing first had and obtained.”
The object of these Laws is the preservation of White Pine 
trees on the Crown Lands in these Colonies for public purposes. 
To effect this object Parliament has imposed penalties on persons 
who cut such trees without licence, and has also expressly enacted 
a forfeiture of all trees, masts and logs made from such trees which 
shall be found cut and felled without licence. Jurisdiction in re­
gard to the penalties is expressly given to the Court of Admiralty. 
In respect to the forfeiture of the timber cut without licence the 
law is silent as to the Court in which the forfeiture shall be prose­
cuted. But it seems to me in “ trying out tlie right intendment” 
of this law, as Lord Coke expresses it, to be the fair if not neces­
sary implication, that Parliament intended that the Court to which 
it had expressly given jurisdiction over the penalties, should as a 
part of the same subject matter have power to adjudicate a for­
feiture of the timber cut without licence. It was conceded in the 
argument that this implication was necessary with respect to any 
timber for the cutting of which the personal penalties were pro­
ceeded for, but as the Statute expressly creates a forfeiture of all 
timber found cut without licence without exception, whether the 
penalties for cutting it are prosecuted or not there is no good rea­
son for not making the jurisdiction co-extensive with the forfeiture. 
It has been the constant course of the Parliament of the Mother
Country 
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Country to give tlie Court of Admiralty in the Colonies jurisdic­
tion over penalties and forfeitures under the laws of trade and navi­
gation, and there is at least equal reason for withdrawing the sub­
ject matter of the Statute we are now considering from the popular 
tribunal of a jury. It is a far less departure from the privilege of 
trial by jury to take away that privilege in mere questions of pro­
perty which arise in proceedings in rem for the forfeiture, than in 
questions of personal delinquency which the proceedings for penal­
ties would involve, and these too, attended with the imprisonment 
of the person if not paid. In construing this Statute, even if the 
point were more doubtful than I conceive it to be, I should place 
great reliance upon the opinion, cited at the Bar, of the eminent 
Counsel in England in the year 1792. This opinion is in point of 
authority but a degree below that of a judicial decision, having 
been given by Crown officers for the regulation of the proceedings 
of a public Department. Upon the whole I entertain no doubt that 
the Court of Vice Admiralty has jurisdiction over the case in 




If this were the only instance of the Parliament of the Mother 
Country vesting in the Colonial Vice Admiralty Courts a juris­
diction more peculiarly belonging to the Court of Exchequer, or if 
the practice of the Admiralty Instance Court, in the exercise of its 
ordinary functions, were inapplicable to proceedings in rem, I 
might entertain some doubt on the question before us ; but as the 
reverse is notoriously the case, and as the power of deciding on the 
right of property is necessarily incidental to an adjudication of the 
penalties, where the penalties are proceeded for, it appears to me 
also that the true construction of the Act has been given in the 
Court below, and that the question as to the forfeiture of the pine 
timber which has been seized as cut on Crown Land without licence 
may there be decided.
Rule for prohibition discharged.
Solicitor General and Advocate General for the Crown.
J. A. Street and Berton for the Claimant.
The ATTORNEY GENERAL ex relatione B. ROBIN- 
SON, Provincial Treasurer, v. 250 Barrels PICKLED 
FISH.
C. M‘Lauchlin, Claimant.
The Act of Assembly 6 Wm. 4, c. 4, s. 4, imposes a forfeiture of all 
goods which shall be landed before they are reported at the Treasurer’s office, 
anda permit obtained in the manner prescribed in the Act. Held that an 
information 
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information charging that the goods in question “ were imported and brought 
into this Province from the territories of the United States of America con­
trary to the Acts of the General Assembly of this Province of New Bruns­
wick in such case made and provided,” did not contain a sufficient allegation 
of an offence under the aforesaid Act of Assembly, and judgment arrested 
on this ground.
This was an information filed by the Attorney General ex rela­
tione Beverly Robinson, the Provincial Treasurer, against 250 
barrels of Pickled Fish, as having been ’ nported and brought into 
this Province from a Foreign country contrary to th? Acts of As­
sembly of this Province made and provided, whereby the same be­
came forfeited ; to which information the claimant pleaded that 
they were not forfeited in manner and form, &c. This issue 
came on tobe tried before CHIPMAN, Ch. J. at the Circuit Court in 
Saint John in January, 1838, and the jury found a verdict for the 
Crown.
In Hilary Term last Parker moved in arrest of judgment, upon 
the following grounds,—
1st. That as the importation into the Province of pickled fish 
had been prohibited by the Imperial Statute of 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 
59, s. 7, no duty or regulation could be imposed thereon by any 
Provincial Act, and that consequently there could be no breach of 
any Act of Assembly ;
2d. That the information does not set forth any specific offence.
The learned Counsel contended that as pickled fish was not 
enumerated amongst the dutiable articles in the Provincial Act, 
and as the Imperial Statute had prohibited their importation, the 
Provincial Act could not be intended as referring in any way to 
articles which were mentioned in the said Statute.
The following cases were cited in support of this motion,—2 
Haw. Pl. Cr. 309, 312 ; Tidd. Pra. 167-8; Israel v. Middleton, 
1 Ch. Rep. 319; Thomson v. Pheney, 1 Dow. Pr. Ca. 441.
Rule Nisi granted.
In Trinity Term last cause was shewn by the Attorney General 
and Solicitor General,—
Although the Imperial Act prohibits the importation of pickled 
fish, still the 4th sec. of the Provincial Act of 6 Wm. 4, c. 4, (un­
der which this proceeding is sought to be sustained) directing that 
all goods shall be reported &c. is not contrary to, but in aid of, the 
Imperial Statute. That the information is sufficiently explicit, 
stating that the articles were imported from the United States 
contrary to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, the same Acts 
throwing the onus of their being properly imported upon the owner. 
That even jf every thing necessary to be proved be not properly 
stated upon the information, the verdict will cure the defect, as 
every thing will be presumed to have been proved at the trial 
which was necessary to sustain the action.
Mansel
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Manseion Demurrer, 162; Lord Raymond,427; 4 Burr, 2020; 
Avery v. Hoole, 2 Cowper, 825 ; 2 Vin. Abr. 399 ; Clark v. King 
& others, 3 T. R. 147; Macmurdo & othersft Smith, 7 T. R. 518; 
Ward v. Harris, 2 B. & P. 265.
Wright, in reply,—
The 60th Section of the Imperial Act which directs the forfeiture 
of articles, also points out the perrons who are to seize them, so 
also the Provincial Act directs that certain officers are to seize 
goods forfeited under it; so that if the Act of Assembly had refe­
rence to such articles as were dealt with by the Imperial Act, then 
it would follow that two several officers would be entitled to seize 
at the same time, which on the score of repugnancy, would clearly 
render the Act of Assembly void, even if by a legal construction 
it would be said to attach to articles not dutiable.
Curia advisari vult.
At this Term the Court delivered their opinions seriatim. 
Chipman, Ch. J.:
In this case the information states that the “ Relator, on tlie 
seventh day of July, 1837, did, pursuant to Acts of Assembly &c., 
seize &c. 250 barrels of pickled fish, which were since the first day 
of April, 1837, imported and brought into this Province from the 
Territories of the United States of America, contrary to the Acts 
of the General Assembly of this Province of New Brunswick in 
such case made and provided: By means whereof the said 250 
arrels &c. have become forfeited &c.”
The claimant pleads that the articles mentioned in the informa­
tion are not liable to forfeiture in manner and form as in the infor­
mation is alleged.
Upon this plea the Attorney General joined issue, and the jury 
have found a verdict for the Crown.
A motion in arrest of j udgment has been made on the part of the 
claimant upon two grounds,
1st. That the articles being prohibited from being imported into 
this Province by an Act of the Imperial Parliament, the Act of 
the Provincial Legislature upon wdiich this prosecution is founded 
does not take effect;
2. That there is no allegation in the information of any offence 
under the Provincial Statute.
The Act of Assembly upon which the Attorney General founds 
the forfeiture in this case, is the 6 William 4, c. 4. and the mate­
rial Sections are the 2d, 3d and 4th, which are as follows:—
“ II. And be it further enacted, That all goods subject to du­
ties under any Act or Acts of the General Assembly of this Pro­
vince, and which have been or shall be imported or brought by sea 
or inland navigation, or by land carriage into this Province from any 
port or place abroad beyond the seas or out of this Province, or which 
being 
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being so subject to duties shall be carried and transported by sea 
from one port or place within this Province to another port or place 
within this Province, shall be and the same are hereby made liable 
and subject to the several rules, restrictions, conditions, regulations, 
penalties and forfeitures in this Act contained, in respect to such 
importation and the payment or security of the duties tlieroon, or the 
warehousing the same goods.”
“ III. And be it further enacted, That the Master, Com­
mander or person in charge of every Ship or Vessel arriving at 
any port or place in this Province shall, within twenty four hours 
after such arrival, and before bulk be broken make due report of 
such Ship or Vessel to the Treasurer of the Province^ or to the 
Deputy Treasurer at or nearest the place of such arrival, under 
oath subscribed by him ; and such report shall contain an account 
of the particular marks, numbers and contents of all the different 
packages or parcels of the goods on board of such ship, and the 
particulars of such goods as are stored loose, to the best of his 
knowledge, and of the place or places where such goods were 
respectively taken on board ; and shall in the same report state on 
oath as aforesaid, the name of each and every owner and consignee 
of such cargo, and where the same is intended to be landed, and 
whether any, and what part thereof, has been landed and taken 
from such Ship or Vessel after arriving within the Province ; and 
the Master of any Ship who shall fail to make such report, or who 
shall make a false report, shall forfeit the sum of one hundred 
pounds.”
“IV. And be it further enacted, That the owmer, consignee, or 
person entering any goods inwards, (whether for payment of duty 
or to be warehoused upon the entry thereof, or for payment of duty 
upon taking out of the warehouse, or whether such goods be free of 
duty,) shall deliver to the Treasurer of the Province or to the 
Deputy Treasurer, as the case may be, a report in writing by him 
subscribed, under oath, of all articles belonging to or consigned to 
hi?n on board of such Ship or Vessel; and any part of such cargo 
which shall be landed before the report of the Master or Com­
mander of such Ship or Vessel, and the report of the owner, or 
consignee or other person entering the same, and a permit obtained 
from the said Treasurer or Deputy Treasurer, as-the case may be, 
for landing the same, such goods, so landed shall be forfeited, and 
+he person or persons concerned in concealing such articles, or in 
landing them without a permit for that purpose, shall each respec­
tively forfeit and pay the sum of one hundred pounds.”
The Act of Assembly 7 W. 4, c. 1, imposes duties, either spe­
cific or ad valorem, on all foreign articles imported into the Pro­
vince, and under this Act pickled fish imported from a Foreign 
Country being a non-enumerated article would be liable to an ad 
valorem duty of ten per cent. Among
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Among the articles prohibited to be imported from any foreign 
Country into any of the British Possessions in America, by the 
Act of Parliament, 3 & 4, W. 4, c. 59, s. 7, are “ Fish dried or 
salted,” of which latter description are the fish mentioned in this 
information.
It is contended on the part of the claimant that by reason of this 
prohibition, the provisions of the Acts of Assembly above stated, 
are not applicable in the present case, and the 56th section of the 
Imperial Statute, 3 & 4, W. 4, c. 59, is referred to, which declares 
all Provincial laws which are repugnant to an Act of Parliament 
to be null and void.
Now the Provincial Statute, 7 W. 4, c. 1, which imposes duties 
on foreign articles, does not authorize or justify the importation of 
any articles prohibited by this Act of Parliament; it only imposes 
duties on articles which are actually imported.
The particular provision of the Provincial lawr which the Crown 
relies on, as working a forfeiture in the present case, is the clause 
in the 4th section of the 6 W. 4, c. 4, which enacts, that any goods 
which may be landed before the reports, required by the Act, are 
made at the Treasurer’s Office and a permit obtained from that 
Office to land them, shall be forfeited.
The preceding clauses of the Act require that the report, both 
of the Master and Consignee shall contain an account of all the 
goods on board the vessel, whether liable to, or free of duty without 
any exception. As the words of the Act do not make an excep­
tion of prohibited goods, so neither do I think that reason or policy 
requires us to imply that such goods are excepted from the opera­
tion of this provision of the Act. Requiring all goods, even if 
prohibited, to be reported at the Treasurer’s Office, does not con­
travene the effect of the Act of Parliament which contains the 
prohibition, but on the contrary has a tendency to aid the enforce­
ment of it, by leading to a discovery of prohibited goods. And 
there is no incongruity in the goods being liable to a forfeiture on 
the two distinct grounds of idegal importation, and of being landed 
without having been reported at the Treasurer’s Office. The right 
of seizing and prosecuting for the forfeiture, it is true, is vested in 
the two respective cases in different Officers. But no question 
arises in this case on a conflict of right between the Officers of the 
Customs and the Provincial Treasury. The Provincial Legisla­
ture seems to have had an eye to remedying the difficulties which 
might arise on this account between the two deDartments, in the 
provisions of the 43d section of the Act 6 W. 4, c. 4, which makes 
the distribution of the proceeds of goods seized and condemned 
under the provisions of any Prov icial Revenue Act, to be similar 
to the ^distribution of forfeitures contained in the Imperial Act, 
that is to say, one third to the Crown, one third to the Governor, 
and one third to the Seizing Officer. On
e2
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On the first ground therefore, upon which this motion in arrest 
of Judgment was made, I am of opinion that it cannot be sustained.
As to the second ground, I take it to be a clear rule of pleading 
under penal laws, that the facts which constitute the offence to be 
charged, shall be alleged in the Indictment or Information. 
(2 Hawk. p. c. 342.) In the present case the fact which con­
stitutes the offence, which the Attorney General is actually pro­
ceeding for, is, that the goods were landed without having been 
reported at the Treasurer’s Office, contrary to the Provincial 
Statute, 6 W. 4, c. 4, s. 4, and this is the only ground of forfeiture 
to which these goods are liable under the Provincial Laws. The 
offence, allegedin the Information, is that they were imported into 
the Province from the territories of the United States, contrary to 
the Acts of the General Assembly of this Province. Now the 
offence intended to be prosecuted, and the offence actually charged 
are so entirely different from each other, that I cannot reconcile 
them. The importing of goods is one thing; landing them without 
having reported them at the Treasurer’s Office is another thing, 
which takes place after the fact of importation is complete. In 
order to constitute an importation, says Sir W. Scott, in the case 
of the Mary (1 Dods, 72,) “it is not necessary that the goods 
should have been actually landed. It is sufficient if they are 
brought into the harbour with an intention of importing them.” 
The allegation in this Information might have been a good mode 
of charging the offence of being imported contrary to the prohibition 
of the Imperial Statute ; but I cannot admit that it may be substi­
tuted for an allegation of the specific fact which constitutes the 
offence uuder the Provincial Statute.
But then it is argued if there be a defect in the information, it is 
cured by the verdict. The rule on this head, as laid down in 1 
Ch. on Pl. 6th Ed. 673, and as supported by the cases cited at 
the Bar, is as follows:—“ The expression cured by verdict signifies 
that the Court will, after a verdict, presume or intend that the 
ticular thing which appears to be defectively or imperfectly stated, 
or omitted in the pleadings was duly proved at the trial." Now 
under a charge of illegal importation, which would be fully estab­
lished by proving the fact of bringing into port with intention to 
land, it can never be intended that an actual landing without report 
at the Treasurer’s office was proved. The truth is, that this case 
does not fall within the rule. It is not an instance of a defective 
statement of title, but an instance of a statement of a defective 
cause of action or ground of forfeiture, which is never aided by a 
verdict,—1 Chit, on Pl. 621. The ground of forfeiture alleged 
is the specific fact of importation contrary to the Provincial 
Statutes, whereas those Statutes do not contain any prohibition of 
importation. “ A verdict” says Lord Mansfield, in one of the cases 
cited 
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cited at the Bar, (Avery v. Hoole, Cowp. 826,) “ will not mend 
the matter where the gist of the action is not laid in the declara­
tion.”
On this second ground I am of opinion that the rule for arresting 
the judgment must be made absolute.
Botsford J.:
I am of the same opinion.
In Rex v. Holland, 5 T. Rep. 607, which was an Information 
filed by the Attorney General against the Defendant, for malver­
sations in Office, during the time he was one of the Council in 
Madras, it was stated by Mr. Adam in the course of his argument, 
that three things ought to concur in every criminal proceeding, 
viz.: 1 st. “ that the party accused should be apprised of the charge 
he is to defend ; 2d. “ that the Court might know what judgment 
was to be pronounced according to Law: and 3d. “that posterity 
might know what Law is to be derived from the Record. These 
general propositions were assented to by Lord Kenyon, C. J., and 
were afterwards recognized as Law by Garrow B. in Rex v. Mor­
ley, 1 Y. & J er. 224. In this case it was laid down that a crimi­
nal charge should be direct, positive, single, and definite, and 
judgment was arrested on the ground that the allegation was in 
the alternative, it having been laid in the Information, that the 
Defendant had imported, or caused to be imported certain foreign 
Silks, &c. So ii the case ex parte Pain, 5 B. and Cres. 251, the 
Prisoner having been convicted under the 6 Geo. 4, c. 108, s. 3, it 
was held that the allegation although laid in the express words of 
the Statute, that the Casks of Wine, “ of the sort or description 
used, or intended to be used for the smuggling of Spirits,” being in 
the alternative was bad.
From these authorities, it is clear that every criminal charge, 
whether by Information or Indictment, should be direct, positive, 
single and definite. The Information in the case before the Court 
alleges that the Pickled Fish, were imported and brought into this 
Province from the territories of the United States of America, 
contrary to the Acts of the General Assembly in such case made 
and provided; by means whereof and by force of the Act of Assem­
bly of this Province, the same became forfeited and liable to con­
demnation. Now it is not stated whether they were imported and 
brought into this Province by sea, by inland navigation, or by 
land; whether they were prohibited, or were liable to duties on im­
portation, nor is it alleged under what particular provisions of the 
Acts of the General Assembly they became liable to forfeiture and 
condemnation.
In the argument it was stated by the Counsel, on the part of the 
prosecution, that this Information was founded on the Act 
of the General Assembly, (6 W. 4, c. 4,) for a violation of 
the 
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the fourth section, in landing the Pickled Fish before a report had 
been made, and a permit obtained from the Treasurer or Deputy 
Treasurer of the Province for that purpose. It was contended 
that this Act did not contravene, but was aiding and subsidiary to 
the Act of the Imperial Parliament, Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 59, 
which prohibits the importation of Pickled Fish into this Province. 
I am not prepared to say that this is not the case, but I must con­
fess that there appears to be some incongruity in proceeding against 
a prohibited article, on the ground that the same had been landed, 
before a report had been made, and a permit had been obtained for 
landing the same.
Parker, J.:
As there is an affinity between the Province Treasurer and 
myself, I have not taken part in the deliberations of their Honors 
on this case ; but as it is one, which involves questions materially 
affecting the Public, I have considered it apart, and may perhaps 
without impropriety now say, that [fully concur in the Judgment 
which has been pronounced.
Rule absolute for arrest of judgment.
Attorney General and Solicitor General, for Crown
Parker and Wright, for Claimant.
DOE D. THOMSON and WIFE, v. BARNES
When at the time of the execution of a deed of conveyance from A to B 
of certain lauds, A is actually disseized thereof, no estate passes to B.
AU the facts which constitute a disseizin should be clearly made out, and 
no presumptions should be allowed in favour of a disseizin.
The doctrine of descent cast tolling the entry enures only to the benefit 
of heirs and not to strangers.
A demise in the name of husband and wife of the wife’s property, laid 
previous to the marrage, is not good.
Where it is doubtful whether certain acts amount to a disseizin or are 
m are acts of trespass, or whether the occupation was adverse or permissive, 
the question should be left to the jury.
This was an action of Ejectment tried at Charlotte Circuit in 
November 1839, before Carter, J.
The declaration contained two demises, one on the 3d of Au­
gust 1836, the other the 26th August 1829 ; tli action was brought 
to recover a place called Currie's Island, on behalf of the lessors of 
the Plaintiff. The original grant of the premises in question to 
one John Currie, bearing date 1st June, 1792, was produced, also 
a deed poll from the said John Currie to James, John, Patrick, 
and Daniel MlMaster, dated the 17th August, 1795, also an in­
denture of release and quit claim from Daniel MiMaster, the sur­
vivor of the aforesaid grantees, James, John, Patrick, and Daniel, 
to John, Charlotte, and Angus Master, children of the said 
James M‘Master, deceased, and to James Allanshaw, the Widower 
of Janet, another of the children of the said James MlMaster, 
deceased 
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deceased, bearing date the 20th June, 1824, also a release from the 
last mentioned John M'-Master, Angus M‘Master, and James 
Allanshaw, to Charlotte M‘Master, dated the 1st September, 
1829. Charlotte M‘Master, one of the lessors of the Plaintiff, 
was married to Thomson, the other lessor, on the 7th July, 1836.
Patrick M‘Master died in 1798, James M'Master in 1804, 
and John M'Master the elder in 1809.
Daniel M'Master diedin 1830. It was proved also, that in the 
year 1809, Daniel M‘Master had visited the island and some 
fishermen who were there, put some fish into his boat, and that he 
was in the habit of calling it his island.
On the part of the defendants it was proved that in the year 
1797, one Sprague lived on the island, and built a frame house 
and barn, and cultivated sufficient ground to raise provisions for 
his family, that he died there, leaving his wife and six children in 
possession, that he lived there seventeen or eighteen years, that he 
built also a log house on the place, in which one David Laskey 
lived two years by permission of Sprague, that Sprague’s family 
left the island shortly after his death, that one Joseph Conolly then 
went into possession, but under whom it did not appear, not claim­
ing it however as his own, that Conolly remained three years in 
possession, that after he left one Estey took possession and kept it 
for ten or eleven years, that after Estey left, the defendant re­
mained in possession, he having been living in part of Estey’s 
house previous to Estey’s going away, that defendant has been 
there five or six years since Estey left.
It was in evidence also that Estey, in the year 1815, had stated 
that the island had been granted to Currie, and was now owned by 
ATMaster, and that he (Estey) was going to buy it.
L. A. Wilmot, for the Defendant, insisted at the trial that the 
lessors of the Plaintiff had failed in making out their case,—
1st. The second demise was ill, it being laid in 1829, when 
Thomson had no interest;
2nd. As there was an adverse possession at the time of giving 
the deeds of 1824 and 1829, nothing passed thereby;
3rd. Entry was tolled by descent cast at the death of Sprague, 
who died seized.
But His Honor reserved the points and directed the jury that the 
Plaintiff’s case was made out, subject to the points reserved ; that 
there was no continuous possession sufficient to bar the Plaintiff’s 
right; that no adverse possession of twenty years in any one occu­
pant was shewn, and no connection or privity between the several 
occupants.
The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff.
Chipman, Ch. J. cited a case where, at the Saint John Circuit, 
Simonds, the Plaintiff, was nonsuited, not having proved a posses­
sion within twenty years. In
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In Hilary Term last Wilmot, for Defendant, obtained a rule 
m'sz for a new trial, on the several points reserved. There was 
also another point mooted as to there being no proof of any entry 
within 20 years.
In moving for the rule nisi, Wilmot, in support of his third point, 
cited Ad. Ej. 41; Ros. Rea. Pro. 81, 83; 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev. 
175, 2 Prest. Ab. Descents Cast; and contended, that as Sprague 
had died seized leaving his heirs in possession, the descent tolled 
the entry of the Plaintiffs.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—This doctrine is only for the benefit of the 
heirs,—you do not hold under the heirs. This does not enure to 
the benefit of strangers.]
In Trinity Term, 1838, Solicitor General shewed cause,—
1 he doctrine that a man cannot convey lands when out of pos­
session is founded upon the principle that a mere right of entry 
cannot be conveyed, but there must be an actual disseizin to bring 
a case within the reason of the doctrine. Where there is an ac­
tual disseizin it deprives a person of that title which must be 
regained before he can convey ; but that does not apply to every 
adverse possession, but only to such as works a disseizin, which 
must be by tortuous entry and an actual ouster. If one takes pos­
session of my estate, not claiming it as his own, his possession 
enures to my benefit, unless I allow him to remain 20 years, at the 
end of which period I would be barred by the Statute of Limitation, 
and not by the original taking operating as a disseizin ; but at 
any time within the 20 years I remain seized, unless by some open 
and notorious act he sets me at defiance. Sprague’s possession 
then could not affect Daniel M‘Masters’ right.
The doctrine in 4 Cruis. 98, cited on the other side, and stating 
that a right of entry cannot be assigned is exemplified by the case 
of a grantor disseized, and all the authorities on the same point go 
upon that principle. The doctrine of disseizin is extensively laid 
down by Lord Mansfield, in Taylor v. Horde, 1 Bur. 78 ; a mistake 
has crept into the definition of disseizin, by reason of a party’s 
right to elect to be disseized, that would make him a disseizor if he 
gave notice of his intention.
[Parker, J.—Can a person give livery of seizin, if out of posses­
sion?]
At the common Law if he came to give livery and was pre­
vented, that would be an ouster and disseizin, but non constat that 
such would be the case, and the Law presuming such holding to 
enure to the owner’s benefit, the estate would pass by the registry 
of the deed, livery of seizin not being necessary ; Doe v. Hartt and 
others,—2 Dow and Ry. 38, was a devise of an estate out of pos­
session,—3 Price, 575. By the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, 
s. 10, the execution and registry of a bargain and sale passes all 
the estate, right, title, and interest, of the grantor to the grantee, 
and 
in the Second Year of VICTORIA. 429
and unless in the case of an actual disseizin, the estate would pass 
under the Act, and it would not be necessary for the grantor to oust a 
person who might be considered as a tenant at sufferance; livery of 
seizin is an act of the grantor, but registry of the deed is an act of 
the grantee, and so far as the grantor is concerned, the estate 
passes by the execution of the deed,—Doe v. Pike and another, 3 
Bar. Ad. 738; 3 M. and S. 271, Doe tu Perkins.
Wilmot, in reply, supported the views taken by him at the trial, 
and contended that there was a disseizin. That it was evident 
from Butler’s note on the case of Taylor v. H >rde, that Lord 
Mansfield had founded the doctrine in relat n to election of disseizin 
upon false premises,—Co. Lit, 153 b. A party being out of pos­
session cannot convey, for that you shall not convey a right of 
entry is a clear and common Law principle of universal application : 
that Sprague took all the rents and profits, and never recognized 
the title of any other person, and having built houses and made 
improvements on the property, must be considered as claiming it 
as his own, and therefore holding an adverse possession ; that as to 
the release of 1829, there was no foundation upon which it could 
operate, inasmuch as at the time it was given, B irnes was in the 
adverse possession of the premises; that the Plaintiff should have 
shewn himself in possession within twenty years which he has 
not done.
[Chipman, Ch. J.—The possession would be deemed to be in 
accordance with the title, unless you shewed an adverse possession.]
The acts of Sprague and in fact of all the subsequent occupiers, 
shewed that their possession was adverse. That as to the Act of 
Assembly which was cited by the other side, it was clear that land 
could pass by a deed and registry only in such cases and in like 
circumstances, as the grantor would be enabled to give actual 
seizin, registry by that Act being substituted for livery of seizin,— 
3 Bl. Com. 324 ; Lit. Ten 5, see 445 ; 1 Taunt. 578 ; Goodright v. 
Forrester, 1 Cruise, Dig. 58 ; 4 Cruise, Dig. 98 ; Ad. Ej. 87; 4 
Mod. 48; 9 B. & Cr. 864 ; 2 Salk, 563; 2 Ad. & El. 14; Doe 
v. Gregory, 12 East. 154; 1 Burr, 107.
Curia adversary vult.
At this Term the Court gave judgment. 
Chipman, C. J.:
This case comes up upon points reserved at the Trial.
One point was that the entry of the lessors of the Plaintiff, or of 
those under whom they claim, was taken away by descent cast 
from one Sprague to his heirs, Sprague having died many years 
ago, in the occupation of the premises or apart of them. On this 
point it need only be remarked, that this doctrine of descent cast 
is one which obtains only for the protection of the possession of the 
heir, and will not enure to the benefit of a stranger, and therefore 
cannot 
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cannot avail the Defendant in tlii s case, even if it had been proved 
that Sprague had such a seizin of the inheritance as would have 
cast the descent upon his heirs.
Another point was, that the conveyan ces of June 20tli, 1824, 
and September 1st, 1829, given in evidence on the part of the 
Plaintiff, were each of them made, when there was a possession of 
the premises adverse to the grantors in those deeds respectively, 
and therefore no estate passed by either deed.
There are two demises laid in the declaration, one on the demise 
of Samuel Thompson and Charlotte his wife, on the 3d x'Yugust, 
1836, the other on the demise of several persons including Thom­
son and wife! on the 21st August, 1829. Thomson was proved 
to have been married on a day subsequent to the day of the second 
demise, viz.: on the 7th July, 1836, and therefore on this demise, 
the Plaintiff must fail.
On the first demise, which is laid on a day subsequent to both 
deeds, an objection to either deed is available.
It is doubtless a doctrine of the common Law, that a person who 
is disseized of land cannot, while he remains so disseized, make a 
valid conveyance of the land to a third person. This doctrine is 
found in Co. Litt. 214, a. Plowd. 88, and is repeated in the modern 
text writers (1 Cruise 428, Ros. on Real Property 128.) The 
reason given by Lord Coke as the foundation of the doctrine is, 
that under such conveyance, “pretended t'Hes might be granted 
to great men, whereby right might be trodden down and the weak 
oppressed.” This reason certainly does not apply to modern times, 
and has called forth the following observation from Mr. Evans : 
“ The Law upon this subject, was originally instituted upon the 
most wise and salutary principles, and as a guard against judicial 
corruption. Whether there is equal necessity for continuing such 
a Law in the existing state of the community, is a question which 
may admit of a very different consideration. The possession which 
has the benefit of the protection of the Law, is by the very suppo­
sition of the case a possession founded in wrong, and the practical 
eflect of prohibiting any contract with relation to the right which 
is withheld, is to render that right nugatory and unavailing, unless 
the party in whom it is vested, has in his own hands the means of 
resorting to legal remedies for its infraction.” (2 Evans, Statutes 
335, note.) Nevertheless I am compelled to acknowledge that the. 
doctrine itself still remains a part of the Law of the land, and must 
be enforced where it is applicable.
In applying the doctrine it is most material to consider the na­
ture of a disseizin. It is thus defined by Lord Coke, Co. Lit. 153, b 
“ a disseizin is where one enters intending to usurp the possession 
andto oust another of his freeholdf and he adds that the Judge is 
to ask “with what intent the entry is made.” If the entry be 
made 
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made without an intent to claim the freehold it will be a bare 
trespass. Actual disseizin is described by the Judge in Blundel 
v. Baugh, (Sir W. Jones, 315,) as follows:—“ it never shall be a 
disseizin unless there be a claim of a Stanger by entry to have the 
freehold.” Again in Jarrett v. Weave, 3 Pri. 599, Graham 
Baron says “ there must be a manifest, intention to oust, as well 
as an actual ouster, and we must look well to see what it was the 
intention of the party to do before we hold the fact done to be in 
point of fact a disseizin.” Chancellor Kent following the words 
of Lord Coke expresses himself as follows : “ every disseizin is a 
trespass, but every trespass is not a disseizin, A manifest inten­
tion to oust the real owner must clearly appear in order to raise 
an act which may be only a trespass to the bad eminence of a 
disseizin.”
It is also laid down that “ a disseizin of part of a manor, rent, 
&c. if there can be a severance, will not be a disseizin of the whole,” 
—Com. Dig. Seizin F. 2.
I apprehend also that the doctrine of disseizin, as it crea tes estates 
by wrong, should be taken strictly, and the facts which constitute 
it should be clearly made out, and no presumption oe admitted in 
favour of it, but on the contrary that every legal presumption will 
be in favor of the rightful title. Disseizin moreover must be a 
question of fact to be found by a jury! ~
In the present case the question waS not submitted to the jury, 
whether at the time of making either of the deeds given in evidence 
the grantors were actually disseized of the premises, or any and 
what part of them. For tnis reason I am of opinion that there 
should be a new trial.
When the rule was moved for a question was made upon the 
Statute of Limitations, but notmuch urged afterwards. Upon this 
point I will only remark, that this action having been commenced 
before the recent Statute of Limitations 6 W. 4, c. 43, came into 
operation, the law as it stood before that Statute must, in this re­
spect, be the law applicable to this case.
Botsford, J. concurred.
Parker, J.:
I should not have been disposed to grant a new trial in this case 
had the points of disseizin and adverse possession been left to the 
jury by the learned Judge, and they had then found in favour of 
the Plaintiff. The evidence would, I think, have justified such a 
finding, but the questions should have been put to them for their 
consideration, which does not appear to have been done.
If Daniel M‘Master was actually disseized by Estey at tlfe time 
of the conveyance in 1824, there can be no doubt he could have 
passed, no estate, and the title of the lessors of the Plaintiff would 
f2 wholly 
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wholly fail. It is a main principle of the Common Law of Eng­
land, and has been acted on also repeatedly in the United States, 
that he who is disseized cannot, while such disseizin lasts, convey 
to a third person ; his deed, if he makes any, gives no estate, or no 
right of entry to his grantee. This, until altered by the Legisla­
ture, must be considered the law of this Province, however inap­
plicable some of the reasons on which it is founded may be to the 
present times and circumstances,—1 Taunt. 578, Goodright v. 
Forrester.
Admitting the principle then, we have to consider how far it is 
to govern the present case; we must look to the character and in­
tent of the possession, and observe the' circumstances under which 
it has been taken and held, and the declarations of the party in 
possession, in order to ascertain the intention,—Co. Litt. 153, b; 
William v. Thomas, 12 East. 155 ; Jarrett v. Weare, 3 Price, 575. 
And whether there be a disseizin or not is a matter of fact. It may 
often be a mixed question of law and fact, and there are some cases 
in which doubtless the jury ought to conclude a disseizin and should 
be so directed by the Judge, but in the present case I think the 
evidence was such as to require it to be left to the jury to deter­
mine on the nature and intention, and also the extent of Estey’s 
possession.
They have held in the United States that to constitute a dissei­
zin of the true owner, (and particularly in the case of uncultivated 
land) the possession of the disseizor must not only be adverse to 
the true owner, Imtopen, notorious, continued and exclusive. This 
seems a very sensible rule.
In 9 Vin. Abr. 163 it is said, “ there is nothing plainer in the 
law than that rights and the purging of wrongful acts are always 
favored, therefore where the Plaintiff has recovered his estate and 
an entry is found by the jury, that entry purges the disseizin, and 
the continuer in possession afterwards is but a trespasser ; though 
there was a disseizin it is now purged.”
In 2 Bac. Abr. 679, “an entry by sufferance without claim is no 
disseizin.”
There was nothing to connect Estey’s possession with that of 
Sprague or Sprague’s heirs, and on that account, as has already 
been said, there was no descent cast to bar the entry as against 
Estey; but beside that it is very questionable whether Sprague’s 
possession was adverse ; under the evidence it might fairly be con­
sidered as permissive. As to the question under the Statute of 
Limitations, Barnes, the present Defendant, has not a sufficient 
adverse possession unless he can avail himself also of the time that 
Estey held, and treat that also as adverse; now whether Estey’s 
possession was adverse or not, and if so, whether Barnes’ is a 
continuation 
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continuation of that of Estey, are proper matters for the consideration 
of a jury,—8 B & C. 717, Doe v. Clark.
I do not think it necessary to say anything at present as to the 
operation of the deed of 1829.
There must be a new trial, and it is but fair under the circum­
stances, as the Judge was not asked to leave the questions to the 
jury, that the costs should abide the event.
Rule absolute.
Solicitor General, for Plaintiffs
Wilmot, for Defendant.
SPRAGUE v. MATTHEWS.
There is no arbitrary rule thai two Terms or two Assizes should pass 
after issue joined in order to sustain a motion for judgment, as in case of a 
non-suit, but the Plaintiff is bound to proceed to trial at the first Nisi Prius 
holden next after the Term immediately succeeding that in which issue is 
joined, provided there be sufficient time to give notice of trial.
THIS was an application made in Michaelmas Term last for 
judgment, as in case of a non-suit for not proceeding to trial, ac 
cording to the practice of the Court. Issue was joined of Hilary 
Term, 1838.
At this Term judgment was given.
Per Curiam.
The Court have taken time to consider this case, in order to 
look particularly into the practice and lay down a general rule for 
future observance.
The question here arising has undergone full discussion in seve­
ral recent cases in England, and until the last decision, viz. that 
of Evans v. Barnard, 6 Dow, Pra. Rep. 367, could hardly be con­
sidered as settled ; the case of Smith v. Miller, in 6 Dowl. 154, 
being at variance with Robi.ison v. Taylor, 5 Dowl. 518, and Wil­
liams v. Edwards, 3 lb. 183.
The observation of Lord Abinger, in Smith v. Miller, that a 
party should have two opportunities of going to trial and therefore 
a motion could not be made for judgment, as in case of a nonsuit 
in a town, cause, until two Terms had elapsed, and in a country 
cause until two Assizes had elapsed, is evidently not correct. The 
rule is laid down by Parke B. (after consultation with the other 
Judges,) in Gough v. White, 2 M. & W. 363.
On the whole of the cases it appears that there is no arbitrary 
rule as to the passing of two Terms or two Assizes, but that the 
Defendant may move whenever the Plaintiff has omitted to try 
the cause at a Term or Assize for which he ought by the practice 
of the Court to have given notice of trial.
The words of the Statute (14 Geo. 2, c. 17) are as follow: “ when 
any 
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any issue is or shall be joined in any act ion or suit at law in any 
of Her Majesty’s Courts of Westminster &c. and the Plaintiff or 
Plaintiffs in any such action or suit shall neglect to briug such 
issue to be tried according to the course or practice of the said 
Courts respectively, it shall and may be lawful for the Judge or 
Judges of the said Courts respectively, at any time after such ne­
glect, upon motion made in open Court (due notice having been 
given thereof), to give the like judgment for the Defendant or De­
fendants in any such action or suit, as in cases of nonsuit, unless &c.”
By the old practice of the Court, which is to be adopted in the 
interpretation of the Act, there was a step subsequent to the join­
ing of issue which the Plaintiff was not compelled to take during 
the same Term in which issue was joined, viz. that of entering the 
issue ; he had the whole of the next Term for entering the issue 
and was nor bound to give notice of trial until that had elapsed. 
It will be borne in mind that joining issue in the vacation of any 
Term is the same as joining issue in the Term next preceding. 
After the Term for entering the issue has passed, which in all 
cases is the Term next after that in which issue is joined, the 
Plaintiff is not allowed to wait until the expiration of another Term 
before giving notice of trial, but should proceed to trial at the ntjxt 
succeeding Nisi Prius if there be sufficient time between the Term 
and the Court of Nisi Prius for giving notice of trial.
If there be not sufficient time for this purpose before the first 
Court of Nisi Prins, the Plaintiff in that case, and in that case 
only, may defer giving notice of trial until the second Court of 
Nisi Prius after the Term in which the issue ought to be entered, 
without subjecting himself to a proceeding for judgment as in case 
of a nonsuit. This affords a plain and intelligible rule as well for 
causes triable at the Circuits as at the Sittings for the County of 
York.
In the case now before us which is one arising in the County 
of Northumberland, issue was joi led in the Hilary vacation and at 
the end of Trinity Term the cause was ripe for trial, and it was 
the Plaintiff’s duty to have gone] to trial at the Circuit in Sep­
tember ; the Defendant therefore did not come too soon at the last 
Term, and is entitled to his rule for judgment as in case of a non­
suit.
Rule absolute.
DOE D. PARKINSON, v. HAUBTMAN.
Where a tenant under a parol lease for 7 years holds over the term, (no 
rent having been paid) no notice to quitis neecssary before ejectment brought 
by the landlord.
Ejectment, tried before Carter, J. at Charlottte Circuit, Octo­
ber, 1837, At the trial it appeared that the Defendant had 
entered 
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entered upon the premises under a parol lease for seven years from 1 st 
August, 1828, which term had expired before action brought.
A verdict was taken by consent for the Plaintiff with leave for 
Defendant to move to enter a nonsuit should the Court be of opinion 
that a notice to quit was necessary.
No notice to quit had been given, and it was contended at the 
trial that under the construction of the Act of Assembly 26 Geo. 
3, c. 14, such a parol lease would enure as a tenancy from year to 
year, and that a notice to quit should have been given. Evidence 
was given that Defendant, when called upon in the fall of 1835, 
refused to pay rent, and that when the possession was demanded of 
him he made no reply.
In Hilary Term last W. Chandler obtained a rule nisi to set 
aside the verdict and enter a nonsuit upon the grounds reserved at 
the trial.
In Trinity Term last R. M-, Andrews shewed cause.
This being a tenancy at will no notice to quit was necessary, 
but only a demand of possession, which was clearly proved at the 
trial; but if a tenancy exist which requires a notice to quit before 
action brought, then there is sufficient evidence of disclaimer to do 
away with the necessity of notice,—Doe v. Williams, Cowp. 622; 
Doe d. Lewis, v. Cawdor, 1 Cr. M. R. 398; Doe d. Gray, v. 
Stanion, 1 M. & W. 695; Roe d. Rigge, v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471.
Kerr, contra,—Whenever a party recognizes a person in any way 
as a tenant, he must give a notice to quit,—1 T. R. 159, Rights. 
Darby. In the present case there has been nothing to take it out 
of the general rule, such as disclaimer &c.
Per Curiam
We entertain no doubt upon the part of disclaimer, there is no 
evidence of the fact, and as to the first point,
Curia advisari vult.
At this Term the Court gave judgment.
Chipman, C. J.:
In this case the first question is, whether a notice to quit was 
necessary. It appeared that the Defendant held the premises 
under a parol lease for seven years from the 1st August, 1828, and 
the Ejectment was brought after the expiration of the seven years; 
it was contended on the part of the Defendant, that the Courts had 
construed such a tenancy under the Statute of Frauds, as an ab­
solute tenancy from year to year, and that the Landlord could 
therefore in no case recover possession without giving a regular 
notice to quit at the end of a year. If the Landlord had sought to 
dispossess the Tenant within the period for which the parol lease 
was given, there would have been no doubt of a notice to quit 
heing necessary, and the cases of Clavton r Blakey, 8 T. R. 3, 
and 
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and Doe v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471, were both cases where the principle 
of tenancy from year to year was applied within the term for which 
the parol lease was given.' Blit no case was cited, and I have not 
found any one where the question arose after the termination of 
the period for which the parol lease was given. If the agreement 
under which the tenant held be in writing, there is no doubt that 
if he holds over, after the expiration of the term mentioned in the 
agreement, he may be treated as a wrong doer and a trespasser, 
and dispossessed without any notice to quit. And it does appear 
to me that it is subversive of the spirit of the Statute of Frauds, 
the great object of which is to encourage and require instruments 
n writing, to hold that a tenant under a parol lease, is in this re­
spect in a better condition than if his estate were conveyed by 
writing, and that he cannot be dispossessed, even after the expira­
tion of the stipulated term without a regular notice to quit; the 
words of the Statute of Frauds are as follows : “ All leases, estates, 
or terms of years, made or created by parol, and not put in wiiting, 
&c. shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only, 
and shall not either in law or equity be deemed or taken to have 
any other or greater force or effect,”—Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 
3, c. 14, s. 1. It is to be observed that the Statute does not make 
any lease void, but directs the character which the estate created 
by parol shall have, and it seems to me that the Court have gone 
quite far enough in protecting the tenant, when we consider the 
positive expressions of the Statute, by deciding that the tenancy at 
will created by it, shall enure as a tenancy from year to year within 
the term originally stipulated by the parties. To allow such a 
tenant a greater privilege after the expiration of the term to wdiich 
his right was by his owm agreement limited, than if the agreement 
had been in writing, seems to me so great a contravention of the 
principle of the Statute of Frauds, that I want some positive au­
thority on the point before I can yield to it; and in the absence of 
any such positive authority, I cannot bring myself to think that a no­
tice to quit in this case was necessary. If the estate were to be con­
sidered according to the words of the Statute an estate at will, there 
was evidence in the case of a demand of possession wdiich would 
put an end to ail estate at will, although it was not a regular notice 
to quit at the end of a year.
Another point was made, viz.: that there was in this case suffi­
cient evidence of a disclaimer. The law’ on the subject of dis­
claimer, is stated by Baron Parke, in a very late case, as follows : 
“ In order to make a verbal or written disclaimer sufficient, it must 
amount to a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and 
tenant, or to a distinct claim to hold possession of the estate upon a 
ground wholly inconsistent, "with the existence of that relation, 
which by necessary implication is a repudiation of it,”—1 Tyr. and 
G. 1071, 1 M. and W, 695. I
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I do not think that the evidence in this case shewed such a 
repudiation of the title of the lessor of the Plaintiff, as would amount 
to a disclaimer, but upon the first ground I am of opinion that the 
rule for entering a nonsuit should be discharged.
Botsford, J.:
Tn the case of Doe v. Bell, which was one of the authorities re­
lied upon by the Defendant, and in that of Clayton v. Blakey, 8 
T. R. 3, where a holding under a parol demise for twenty one 
years was held by Lord Kenyon to be a tenancy from year to year, 
the rent had been paid, which distinguishes them from the present 
case where there was no payment of rent. Bythewood, in speak­
ing of tenancies from year to year, says—“ where a person is let 
into possession under a parol demise, which is void on account of 
its being for a longer period than is allowed by '•’the Statute of 
Frauds, that is for more than three years, he is tenant from year 
to year ; such at least is the rule where rent has been paid. What 
is the nature of the tenancy before any such payment has been 
made seems to be a debateable point.”
J am not aware of any case in the Books where length of occu­
pation under a parol lease void by the Statute of Frauds, inde­
pendently of the payment of rent, has been held to const itute a 
tenancy from year to year.
Parker, J.:
This is a new point and I am glad time has been taken to con­
sider it, as I was much prbssed with the argument of the Defend­
ant’s Counsel, and was for some time disposed to adopt the view 
taken of it by the learned Judge at the trial; that this being 
clearly only a tenancy from year to year could not be put an end 
to without due notice, and 1 cannot say now that my mind is free 
from doubts.
On full reflection, however, I concur in the opinions already de­
livered by His Honor the Chief Justice, and Mr. J. Botsford, that 
the verdict should stand.
It is quite true that the agreement between the deceased John 
Parkinson and the Defendant would only operate as a lease from 
year to year, and they must be taken to have been aware of this 
when they entered into it, and therefore it might have been put an 
end to by either party by proper notice at the termination of the 
first or any subsequent year. But it does not appear to me to 
militate against the provision of the Statute of Frauds to give this 
much effect to the agreement, that the tenancy from year to year 
should not extend beyond the seven years. Why may not. this 
stipulation as to the seven years be taken to operate as a notice to 
quit at the end of that period, made by both parties at the incep­
tion of the tenancy ? True, the notice might here have been 
superseded 
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superseded by notice to quit at an earlier period, but this not having 
been done, and the Defendant having had the full benefit of the 
parol lease ought not to seek to extend it.
There is no evidence of any recognition of the tenancy by either 
party after the seven years, by the payment and receipt of rent or 
otherwise; indeed there was no evidence of any payment of rent at 
all, which, as has already been observed, makes this case differ 
from others which have been quoted. Neither is there any ap­
pearance of surprise, and although the evidence has failed to make 
out an actual disclaimer, and therefore on that ground the Plaintiff 
can not recover, yet the circumstances are such as to raise a 
strong suspicion that the Defendant did not desire to continue his 
holding as a tenant, if he could have disputed the Plaintiff’s title.
We shall do no injustice by allowing the verdict to stand, and 
we certainly do not overrule any decided case.
Rule discharged.
R. M. Andrews, for Plaintiff.
W. Chandler, <j‘- Kerr, for Defendant.
Note.—Carter J. was absent during the whole of this Term.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.
Hilary Term, 1st Victoria, A. I). 1839.
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PRISONERS.
I. It is Ordered, That from and after the first day of this Term, 
in all cases where a Prisoner is or shall be taken, detained or 
charged, in custody by mesne process thereafter returnable, issuing 
out of this Court, and the Plaintiff shall not cause a Declaration 
against such Prisoner to be delivered to such Prisoner, or to the 
Sheriff in whose custody such Prisoner is or shall be detained or 
charged, within three Calendar months after the return of the Pro­
cess, by virtue whereof such Prisoner is or shall be tab en, detained 
or charged in custody ; and cause an affidavit to be made and filed 
with the Clerk of this Court, of the delivery of such Declaration, 
and of the time when, and the person to whom the same was deli­
vered, before the last day of the Term next after the delivery of 
such Declaration, the Prisoner shall be discharged out of custody 
by writ of supersedeas to be granted by this Court, or one of the 
the Judges thereof, upon tiling common bail; unless upon notice 
given to the Plaintiff’s Attorney, good cause shall be shewn to the 
contrary ; and in case of a commitment or render in discharge of 
bail, after the return of process, and before a Declaration delivered, 
unless the Plaintiff shall cause a Declaration to be delivered, and 
an affidavit thereof made and filed; before the end of the Term 
next after such commitment or render shall be made, and due no­
tice of such render given, the prisoner shall be discharged out of 
custody by writ of supersedeas to be granted as aforesaid, upon 
filing common bail; unless upon notice given to the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney good cause shall be shewn to the contrary
II. It is further Ordered, That on every Declaration so to be 
delivered against a prisoner as aforesaid, a rule to appear and plead 
shall be indorsed according to the form following, that is to say : 
“ The Defendant C. D. is to appear and plead hereto at the suit of 
the Plaintiff A. B. within twenty days after service of this Decla­
ration ; otherwise judgment will be entered againsr him by default ”




and that J udgment shall not be entered against such Defendant by 
default until the expiration of the said rule.
III. If is further Ordered, That the Sheriff who shall have re­
ceived a copy of a Declaration against any prisoner in his custody, 
shall indorse thereon the time of his so receiving the same, and 
shall forthwith deliver the same to the said prisoner, and shall also 
enter in a book to be by him kept for that purpose, the time of 
receiving such Declaration, and of delivering the same to the 
prisoner.
IV. It is further Ordered, That where the Plaintiff declares 
against the prisoner, it shall not be necessary to make more than 
two copies of the Declaration, of which one shall be served, and 
the other filed with an affidavit of service, and a copy of the Rule 
to appear and plead indorsed thereon.
V. It is further Ordered, That upon application made by the 
Plaintiff before the time at which the Defendant may be supersede­
able, and good and sufficient cause shewn by affidavit; further 
time to declare may be given by Rule of Court or order of a J udge.
VI. It is further Ordered, That upon every application for a 
supersedeas for want of declaring in due time, in addition to the 
certificate of the Sheriff that no Declaration has been delivered to 
him for the Prisoner, there shall be an affidavit of the Defendant, 
that he has not been served with such declaration.
VII. It is further Ordered, That unless the Plaintiff shall pro­
ceed to trial or final judgment within three terms next after the 
delivery or filing of Declaration, if by the course of this Court the 
Plaintiff can so proceed; of which three terms, the term wherein 
such Declaration shall be delivered shall be taken! to be one ; or if 
by the course of the Court the Plaintiff cannot so proceed to trial 
or final judgment within the time above limited; then unless the 
plaintiff shall proceed to trial or final judgment as soon after as by 
the course of this Court he may so proceed; the Prisoner shall be 
discharged out of custody by writ of supersedeas to be granted as 
aforesaid, upon filing common bail, unless upon notice given to the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney good cause shall be shewn to the contrary.
VIII. It is further Ordered, That in all cases after final judg­
ment obtained against a Prisoner unless the Plaintiff shall cause 
such Prisoner to be charged in execution within three calendar 
months next after the day on which such final judgment shall be 
signed ; in case no writ of error shall be depending nor injunction 
be obtained for stay of proceedings ; and if any writ of error shall 
be depending or injunction be obtained, then within three calendar 
months next after judgment shall be affirmed, the writ of error be 
nonprossed or discontinued, or the injunction dissolved, the Prisoner 
shall be discharged out of custody by supersedeas to be granted as 
aforesaid; unless upon notice given to the Plaintiff’s Attorney good 
cause shall be shewn to the contrary. IX
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IX. Ii is further Ordered, That after trial had unless the Plain­
tiff do proceed to have his judgment entered up and signed as soon 
as by the course and practice of the Court he may so do, or within 
one calendar month thereafter ; in case no injunction shall be ob­
tained or order made, then within one calendar month after such 
injunction shall be dissolved or order discharged: the Prisoner shall 
be discharged out of custody, in like manner as in the last preced­
ing Rule is provided.
X. It is further Ordered, That in case of a render in discharge 
of bail after final judgment obtained, unless the Plaintiff shall cause 
the Defendant to be charged in execution within three calendar 
months next, after such render and due notice thereof given, and 
in case of render after trial and before judgment, unless the Plain­
tiff do proceed to have his judgment entered up and signed within 
the time limited by the last preceding Rule, or within one calendar 
month after such render and due notice thereof, the Prisoner shall 
be entitled to his discharge in manner aforesaid, unless good cause 
be shewn to the contrary.
XI. It is further Ordered, That no treaty or agreement shall 
be sufficient cause to prevent any Prisoners having the benefit of a 
supersedeas, unless the same be in writing signed by the^Prisoner 




Writ of Scire Facias under Act 26, Geo. 3, c. 24.
It is Ordered, That the writ of Scire Facias to be issued under 
the Act of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 24, shall be in the form fol­
lowing, or to that effect; adding in the body of the same any spe­
cial matter which in particular cases may be deemed requisite.
FORM OF WRIT.
Victoria, &c. To the Sheriff of Greeting.
Whereas A. B. lately in our Court before us at Fredericton, im­
pleaded C. D. and E. F. in a plea of , (the said C. D.
having been duly taken and brought into Court by virtue of process 
issued in the said suit against the said C. D. and E. F., and the 
said E. F. not having been taken and brought into Court by virtue 
of such process,) and did afterwards by the judgment of the same 
Court recover as well against the said E. F. as the said C. D. 
[state the recovery,] in the same manner as if they had both been 
taken and brought into Court, pursuant to the Act of Assembly in 
such case made and provided, whereof the said C. D. and E. F. are 
convicted as by the record and proceedings thereof still remaining 
in our same Court manifestly appear :
And
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And now on behalf of the said A. B. in onr same Court, we are 
informed that although judgment be thereupon given, yet satisfac­
tion of the [debt ano ] damages aforesaid still remains to be made 
to him ; and he is desirous of executing an Execution for such 
[debt and] damages against the body, or the lands or goods the sole 
property of the said E. F. wherefore the said A. B. hath humbly 
besought us to provide him a proper remedy in this behalf: And 
we being willing that what is just in this behalf should be done, 
command you that by honest and lawful men of your Bailiwick, 
you make known to the said E. F. that he be before us at Fre­
dericton, on to shew if he has or knows of any thing to say for 
himself, why the said A. B. ought not to have execution for the 
[debt and] damages aforesaid, to be executed against the body or 
the lands or goods the sole property of him the said E. F. according 
to the force, form and effect of the said recovery, and pursuant to 
the said Act of Assembly in such case made and provided, if it 
shall seem expedient for him so to do; and further to do and receive 
what our said Court before us shall then and there consider of him 
in this behalf: and have you there the names of those by whom 





I. It is Ordered, That in future where the Defendant in any 
action shall plead one or more special pleas, and serve copies on the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney, writh rule to reply in twenty days, the Plain­
tiff shall file and deliver his replication in twenty days from the 
time of such service of plea and rule, and in default thereof the 
Defendant shall be entitled to judgment of non pros a replication 
being first demanded after the said twenty days; and in like man­
ner twenty days shall be allowed for every subsequent pleading, 
and the opposite party shall be entitled to judgment by default or 
non pros, as the case may be, for not rejoining, surrejoining, &c. a 
rule to rejoin, surrejoin &c. being served and demand made as 
aforesaid, unless the Court or a Judge shall think proper to allow 
further time. Provided that no such judgment of non pros or de­
fault shall be signed until ten days after demand of replication, re­
joinder, &c.
II. It is further Ordered, That all such rules to reply, rejoin,
surrejoin, &c. may be taken out in vacation and entered as of the 
preceding Term, the Attorney delivering to the Clerk a prtecipe 





T1R> fITT TERM, 2«1 Victoria, 183®.
Rules for the payment of Money into Court under the 
Act 1st Victoria, c. 13, s. 3.
I. Whereas by an Act passed in the first year of Her Majesty’s 
Reign, intituled “An Act for the further amendment of the Law,” 
it is enacted “ that it shall and may be lawful for the Defendant 
in all personal actions pending or to be brought in the Supreme 
Court of this Province, (except actions for assault and battery, 
false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious arrest or prosecution, 
criminal conversation or debauching of the Plaintiff’s daughter or 
servant,) by leave of the said Court or a Judge of such Court, to 
pay into the said Court a sum of money by way of compensation 
or amends, in such manner and under such regulations as to the 
payment of costs, and the form of pleading, as the said Court, or 
any three of the Judges thereof, shall, by anv rules or orders by 
them to be from time to time made, order and direct”:—
It is Ordered, That when money is paid into Court under the 
said Act, such payment shall be pleaded, and as near as may be in 
the following form, Mutatis Mutandis.
“ C. D. i And the said Defendant comes by E. F. liis Attorney,” 
ats. > (or “ in person, &c.”) and says (or incase it be pleaded
A. B. S as Pal’t onbr> a<ld “ as t°------being part of the sum
in the Declaration or------Count of the Declaration mentioned” or
as to the residue of the sum of------) that the Plaintiff ought not
further to maintain his action, because the Defendant now brings 
into Court the sum of------ready to be paid to the Plaintiff, and
the Defendant further says that the Plaintiff has not sustained da­
mages (or in actions of debt “ that he is not indebted to the Plain­
tiff”) to a greater amount than the said sum of &c., in respect to 
the cause of action in the Declaration mentioned” (or “ in the in­
troductory part of the plea mentioned) and this he, the Defendant, 
is ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment, if the Plaintiff 
ought further to maintain his action thereof against him and no 
other plea shall be pleaded to the said action or to so much thereof 
as the said plea of payment into Court is applicable.
II. It is f urther Ordered, That upon a Rule or Judge’s order 
being made for paying money into Court under the said Act, the 
money shall be paid to the Clerk at the time of filing the plea, 
together with his poundage thereon, and the Clerk shall make a 
minute of such payment in the margin of the plea, and shall also 
give a memorandum of such payment to be delivered with the copy 
»of the plea to the Plaintiff’s Attorney ; w'hich sum shall be paid 
out to the Plaintiff’s Attorney on demand.
III. It is further Ordered, That the Plaintiff, after delivery of 
a plea of paj ment of money into Court, shall be at liberty to reply
to 
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to the same, by accepting the sum so paid into Court in full satis­
faction and discharge of the cause of action, in respect of which it 
has been paid in, and he shall be at liberty in that case to tax his 
costs of suit, and in case of non-payment thereof within ten days, 
to sign judgment for his costs of suit, or the Plaintiff may reply 
“ that he sustained damages” (or “ that the Defendant was and is 
indebted to him” as the case may be) to a greater amount Ethan 
the said sum, “ and in the event of an issue thereon being found 
for the Defendant, the Defendant shall be entitled to judgment and 
his costs of suitProvided that if the sum of money paid into 
Court in any action not summary would have been recoverable 
under the summary form, the Plaintiff, if he take the money out of 
Court in discharge of the action, shall not be entitled to more than 
summary costs, unless he obtain the order of the Court or a J udge 





Note.—The Reports of Trinity and Michaelmas Terms, 1839, will be made 









1. The Court have no power 
under 26 Geo. 3, c. 13, to 
grant a supersedeas of a war­
rant of attachment issued a- 
gainst the goods of a concealed 
debtor, unless it appears that 
all the creditors consectthereto 




In an application by one of two 
defendants for relief under the 
insolvent Act, 1 W. 4, c. 43, 
the affidavit was entitled in 
the name only of one of the 
defendant the applicant. The 
entitling was held sufficient. 
Wilmot v. Cornwell, et al. 31
AGENTS.
A right to retain for agency f >r 
commission is exercisable onlj 
on the specific monies received 
for which the charge is made. _ 
Quebec and Halifax Steam 
Boat Company v. Cunard and 
Aden 47
AMENDMENT.
1. The Court will allow amend­
ment in pleading upon pay­
ment of costs after demurrer 
argued. Strangv.Bell. 287
2. Afterdemurrerbooksdeliver- 
ed, &c. Prac. 14
3. The Sheriff’s endorsement on 
a writ returned may be amen­
ded. Writ. 2
ARBITRATORS
1. As to power of.
vide Awards 1
2. When a verdict was taken 
for the Plaintiff for £1000 
subject to the award of Arbi­
trators to be agreed upon, and 
a rule of reference, subsequent­
ly drawn up which, after re­
citing the agreement directed 
that the award should be en­
tered on tixepostea as a verdict 
of the jury, held that the 
award could not be made in 
favor of the Defendant, and 
that the power of the Arbitra­
tors was confined to the quan­
tum of damages only. Held 
alsothatasthe submission was 
“all matters in the cause” 
they could not give the
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Defendant credit for an item 
which could not come under 
the head of payment or set 
off in the cause.—Campbell v 
Wilson. 104
3. Where a cause is referred to 
three Arbitrators whose award 
or that of any two of whom is 
to be final, two of these can­
not proceed to make an award 
without giving notice to the 
third—Raymond and another 
v Luke. 116
ARREST.
A Defendant discharged from 
custody by one of several 
Plaintiffs, cannot be again 
arrested by a co-Plaintiff.— 
Executors of Andrews v 
Clarke. 32
ASSUMPSIT.
1. Where the verdict is under 
Lb it is considered prima 
facie the amount of the de­
mand for which the action is 
brought and the Court will 
allow a suggestion to be en­
tered to deprive the Plaintiff 
of costs underfiO Geo. 3, c. 17. 
Dickenson v Balloch. 24
2. Where an Executor declared
upon promises to himself and 
upon an account stated with 
him as Executor as well as 
upon promises to the Testatrix 
and was nonsuited, the Court 
allowed Defendan t her costs.— 
Executors of Grosvenor v 
Agnew. 29
3 In Assumpsit the verdict of 
the jury is not in all cases 
conclusive upon the Court to 
depri' e Plaintiff of costs when 
the jury find for less than £5. 
— J/‘ ilhanny y Wiswall. 67
4. Assumpsit for money had and
received will lie by one tenant 
in common against another 
for the price of common pro­
perty sold by Defendant with 
the consent of Plaintiff.—Shaw 
v Grant. 110
5. Where a contract was en­
tered into by eight persons 
with the Defendant for build­
ing a ship, and six of these 
against the will of the other 
two, afterwards agreed with 
Defendant to put an end to 
the former contract, and ac­
tually received pay for their 
work done under it, it was 
held that the remaining two 
might maintain Indebitatus 
Assumpsit against the Defen­
dants in the name of the whole 
eight for their share of the 
work done.—Palmer et al v 
Long. 29
6. Where goods in the posses­
sion of B in which A is tenant 
in common with B have with­
out A’s. authority been de­
livered to C held that A 
cannot maintain Assumpsit 
against B for goods sold and 
delivered nor money had and 
received to recover the value 
of his interest in them their 
being no proof of a sale from 
B to C.—Doyle v Taylor et 
al. ' ' 201
Semb. Otherwise if a safe had 
taken place, and in such case 
the produce of the sale would 
be the measure of damages, id.
7. When A delivered goods to 
B upon the understanding that 
B should deliver other goods 
in exchange, but subsequently 
A renders an account to B of 
the same which B acknow­
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ledged to be correct and pro­
mised to pay, A may recover 
therefore under an account 
stated notwithstanding his bill 
of particulars gives the items 
as the ground of his demand. 
Grant v Aiken d‘- Shaw. 259
8. When the Session under an 
authority to sappoint for an 
unlimited time displaced an 
officer without a reasonable 
cause and appointed another 
in his stead, the former can 
maintain an action for money 
had and received against the 
latter for the profits received 
subsequent to his removal.— 
Joplin v Davidson. 308
9. When A sold and delivered 
to B a lot of Timber subject 
to a resurvey by Mr. Scott, 
and it appeared that there 
were two Mr. Scotts, one a 
sworn Surveyor under the act 
of Assembly, 1 W. 4, c. 45, 
and the other not, and the 
latter made the survey but not 
according to the provisions in 
such act, in an action for the 
deduction and expenses al­
lowed upon such resurvey, and 
upon a verdict for the Plain­
tiff. Held that the learned 
Judge put it rightly to the 
jury to find which of the two 
Scotts the parties intended by 
their agreement; but that 
prima facie the resurvey must 
be presumed to be according 
to the provisions of act, 1 W. 
4, c. 45, and it should have 
been left to the jury to say 
whether the parties intended 
such survey, or a resurvey 
according to the discretion of 
the Surveyor; the onus pro- 
bandiof winch intention lies
upon the party seeking the 
benefit of it.—Rankin and 
others v Emery. 330
10. When goods were delivered 
under an agreement to be paid 
for by endorsed notes payable 
in — days after delivery, the 
vendor recovered in assumpsit 
before the expiration of the 
time of credit for a breach of 
the agreement in not giving 
the said notes.—Brown v 
Frink. 363
ATTACHMENT.
1. Delay sufficiently accounted
for, is not a cause for setting 
aside an attachment against 
a Sheriff where he has not 
been preju iced by such delay. 
—Rex v Sheriff of Glouces­
ter. ’ 187
2. An Attachment will not be 
granted for net obeying a Sub­
poena when the witness is in 
custody at the time of service. 
—Regina v Wetmore. 244
3. An Attachment against a 
witness for contempt must be 
applied for at the next term 
after the contempt committed. 
Doe dem. Howe v Mealley. 121
ATTORNEY.
1. An Attorney is liable over to 
a Sheriff who sustains dama­
ges by proceeding under what 
purports to be a Writ of the 
Court bi’.t is not, when the 
same is put into the Sheriff’s 
hands by him.—Johnston v 
Winslow. 53
AVERMENT.
1. In an action by payee vs. ac­
ceptor of a Bill of Exchange 
payable at a particular place
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it is not necessary to aver 
presentment at the time it 
falls clue it is sufficient to prove 
it.—Chandler v Beckwith. 268
AWARD.
1. Arbitrators are competent to 
determine matters of law.— 
Fowlis v Kinnear, et al. 26
2. The Court will not entertain 
an application to set aside an
award made under rule of re­
ference where the award was 
to be entered on the postea as a 
verdict of a jury when the ap­
plicant has been guilty of 
laches.—id.
3. An award made under a rule 
of reference set aside on ac­
count of arbitrators exceeding 
their power.— Vide Arbitra-' 
tors. 2
4. An award will not be dis­
turbed where the witnesses 
were examined without being 
sworn, although the rule of 
reference required them to be 
sworn if the party objecting to 
the award were present and 
consented to such examina­
tion.—Reilly v Gillan. 120
5. Under a submissiri at Nisi
Prius to the award of it, B 
and C or any two of them, 
they agreed upon an award 
and it was draw up, signed by 
A and B and delivered to C. 
to be signed by him and han­
ded to the parties ; C disco­
vered a mistake to which A 
and B consenting the award 
was corrected and signed by 
all three but not within the 
time limited. The Court re­
fused to give effect to either.— 




1. Special Bail discharged, al­
though indemnified when they 
had been prevented from sur­
rendering Defendant by tlie 
Plaintiff’s procuring his ab­
sence from the Province.— 
Pollock et al v. Short. 279
2. Bail discharged for delay in 
Plaintiff to proceed.—vide 
Prac. 27
BAIL PIECE.
1. Exoneretur on.—vide Prac­
tice. 13, 26, 27
BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
1. In an action by the payee 
against the acceptor of a Bill 
of Exchange, payable at a 
particular place, which became 
due on the 3d of Nov., the 
Plaintiff averred presentment 
for payment on the 2d. It 
appeared in evidence that the 
Bill had been presented on the 
2d, and that on the 3d, the 
day it became due, the De­
fendant expressly refused to 
pay it to the Plaintiff’s Agent, 
who called again, but it did 
not appear that the Note was 
again produced ; held that 
proof of presentment on the 
3d was admissible and that 
the refusal to pay on the 3d, 
rendered the actual present­




1. In an action of Debt brought 
by a Sheriff upon a Limit 
Bund under 10 & 11 Geo. 41 
INDEX. v.
c. 30, it is! a good defence to 
shew that the Sheriff had re­
ceived the Defendent again 
into close custody.—Camp­
bell v. Henan, et dl. 72
2. Non Damnifieatus is a good 
plea only where the Bond is 
merely to indemnify.—id.
3. In an action brought on a
limit bond against the princi­
pal and sureties for an Escape, 
it appeared that the Plaintiff 
let the Defendant go, upon the 
understanding that the De­
fendant should pay all costs, 
the Court refused relief to the 
sureties under 6 W. 4, c. 41, 
s. 13, it not appearing that 
all costs had been paid.—/>'o- 
bertson, Assignee of Sheriff v. 
Currie et al. 190
C
CONTRACT.
1. By Infant when voidable,
void or valid.—Fisher v. Jew­
ett, et al. 35
2. A contract can only be re­
scinded by the consent of all 
the contracting parties.— 
Palmer, et al v. Long. 1'29
CONVEYANCE.
1. A deed wherein the vendor 
for a valuable consideration 
“ remised, released and quit 
claimed” unto the vendee all 
right, &c. to have and to hold 
to him and his heirs, &c. hav­
ing been duly executed, proved 
and registered, pursuant to 
the Act of 26 Geo. 3, c. 3, 
was held a good conveyance 
of lands under the 10th sec­
tion of said Act.—Doe dem 
Wilt v. Jardine. 142
2. When at the ti le of the ex­
ecution [of a conveyaifce 'of 
lands from A to B, A is ac­
tually disseized thereof, no 
estate passes to B.—Doe dem 
Thompson and JUfe v. 
Barnes. 426
3. When A, the owner of a Mill 
and of the Stream from the 
Mill to a navigable1 River, 
sells the Mill ands<>me laud, 
including a part of the1 stream, 
to B, the: right to lift* the 
stream through A’s land for 
the purpose of taking logs to 
and from the Mill, will not 
pass by the words privileges 
and appurtenances, nor-as in­
cident to the Mill, although 
A, previous to the sale, had 
used it for that purpose.— 
Bogers v Peck others. 318
COSTS.
1. Under 50 Geo. 3,'c. 17.
Vide Assumpsit 1
2. Executors liable for, when
">,««<$? Assumpsit 2
3. On discharging a Rule nisi.
Vide' Practice 4
4. Demand of security by Post.
Vide Practice 6
5. When on several issues join­
ed and some are found for 
Plaintiff and some for De­
fendent, in Replevin costs al­
lowed to'both parties.—Dick­
enson v Ketchum: 63
6. Court will not deprive Plain­
tiff of costs in all cases where 
verdict is below £h.—MlIlha- 
ney v Wiswell. 67
7. Where the verdict was but 
£4 in Assumpsit, but the 
Judge reported that the ma­
terial question in the cause 
was on the construction of a
I N DEX.
Deed under which the Plain­
tiff sought to recover for use 
and occupation, the Court re­
fused to deprive Plaintiff of 
costs. —Black et al v Kirk. 81
8. Costs of a commission to ex­
amine witnesses are under 5 
W. 4, c. 34, costs in the cause. 
—Fergus v.JK'Intbsh. 91
9. When the verdict was for 
£1 1 the Plaintiff was allowed 
full costs, notwithstanding he 
had by an account rendered 
to the Defendant shewn a ba­
lance due to him under £20, 
it appearing that by the De­
fendant’s own conduct the 
Plaintiff was compelled to 
bring his action for the full 
amount of his account.— 
Douglas v Hanson. 121
10. W here in an action brought 
to recover upon a Note or 
memorandum for the sum of 
£22 payable in timber, tlie 
amount was reduced by the 
price of an Ox, which had 
been delivered by Defendant 
to the Plaintiff, to the sum of 
£14, the Court allowed full 
costs to be taxed upon a mo­
tion for an order to review, 
the Clerk having taxed only 
summary costs, under 4 W. 
4, c. 41.—Holland n Close.
344
COURTS.
1. Courts of Judicature in this 
Province have no authority 
to pronounce an act of the 
Legislature to be invalid, or 
to declare it null and void 
after it has been passed by 
the Legislative Council and 
Assembly, and received the 
Governor’s assent, either on 
the ground that such act in­
terferes with the exercise of 
of private rights and is there­
fore unconstitutional, or that 
under the Royal Instructions 
to the Governor, the act 
ought not to have been passed 
without a suspending clause. 
The Queen v John Kerr. 367
2. On motion for a prohibition
to tl'.e Court of Vice Admi­
ralty. Held that that Court 
hasjurjsfliction under the Sta­
tutes 8 Ged. 1, c. 12, and 2 
(too. 2, c. 35, to entertain a 
suit in rem, instituted by the 
"Grown against Pine timber 
seized as cut on Crown Land 
without License, and to pro­
ceed to adjudge the forfeiture 
and condemnation thereof, 
although there has been no 
prosecution for the pecuniary 
penalties imposed by the said 
acts on persons cutting or 
carrying away the same. A 
prohibition was accordingly 
refused.— The Queen v 162 
pieces of timber, Perley claim­
ant. 410
3. This Court by virtue of the
Commission under which it 
was constituted may exercise 
the same jurisdiction in re­
gard to the discharge of es­
treated recognizances in this 
Province as the Court of 
Exchequer does i England 
under the Statute, 33 Hen. 8, 
c. 39, and has a general dis­
cretionary power under the 
statute to examine into the 
sufficiency of the reasons al­
leged in excuse, and to dis­
charge upon motion the re­
cognizance of a party making 
default in appearing for trial 
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at a Court of Oyer and Ter­
miner, and to stay proceed­
ings instituted upon such re­
cognizance in this Court.— 
The Queen v Appleby. rg97
D
DAMAGES.
1. In an action brought in this 
Province for the value of 
goods sold and delivered in 
England, the Plaintiff’ is en­
titled to recover such a sum 
currency as would be equiva­
lent to the demand in ster­
ling at the actual rate of Ex­
change at the time of trial.— 
Compbell v Wilson, 265
2. In an action of trespass for 
taking goods, &c. the expense 
of attending an enquiry be­
fore a Sheriff’s Jury will not 
be evidence of damages under 
an allegation of special dama­
ges in regaining the goods by 
the Plaintiff.— Wilson v Eills.
y'j25 
DEBT.
1. Will not lay by a Sheriff on
a limit bond when he had re­
ceived the prisoner into close 
custody after taking the bond. 
— Campbell v Henan, 73
2. A bequeathed a legacy to B
to be paid to C in trust, to be 
put at interest until B should 
attain the age of 18 years, 
and then principal and inter- 
esttobepaidtoB. The legacy 
was not paid to C, held that 
B might maintain an action of 
debt against the Executor for 
this legacy after he had arri­
ved at the age of 18.—Living­
stone v Powell, et al Execu­
tors. 225
DEFAMATION.
1. In calling a woman a Whore, 
what is a sufficient averment 
in the, declaration.— Tide 
pleading., 2
DESCENT CAST.
1, The doctrine cf descent cast 
enures to the benefit of the 
heirs only and not to stran­
gers.—Doe det/fa Thompson 
ayd Wife v B/yrnff. 426
DISSEIZIN.
1. All the acts which constitute 
a disseizin should be clearly 
made out and no presumption 
should be allowed in favor of 
a disseizin, and when it is 
doubtful whether certain acts 
amount to a disseizin or mere­
ly acts of trespass or whether 
the occupation was adverse or 
permissive, it should be left to 
the jury.—Doe dem. Thomp­
son and Wife, v Barnes. 426
E
EASEMENT.
1. 1 he words privileges and 
appurtenances in a Deed do 
not create a right of way.— 
Rogers v Peck, et al. 318
EJECTMENT.
1. Where B being put into pos­
session of premises by A under 
an agreement for purchase, 
continued to hold such pos­
session for upwards of 21 
years, and receive the rents, 
profits, &c. the Court consi­
dering B strictly a tenant at 
will, held in an action of 
ejectment brought by the 
heirs of A against B’s grantee, 
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that the Plaintiff’s right of 
sttfion was barred by the 7th 
’■ Section of the Act of Assem­
bly of 6 W. 4, c. 48.—Docd.
Purdy, et al. v Peters, 350
2. Ejectment was sustained bv
a lessor of the Plaintiff under 
a Deed of bargain and sale 
from A-against the Defendant, 
who claimed under a pur­
chase from the Sheriff by vir­
tue of an Execution issued 
upon a judgment which had 
been obtained upon a former 
judgementof the Court against 
A, which latter judgement was 
prior to the deed of bargain 
and sale to the lessor of the 
Plaintiff, the ■ Court holding 
that the Execution could not 
have relation back to the first 
judgement.-—Doe d. Peabody, 
v M. Knight. 376
3. An agreement was made by
A and B by mutual bonds, 
for the sale and conveyance of 
lands by A to B on payment 
of a certain sum on or before 
the 1 st of May 1829, together 
with lawful interest for the 
first three yearsjt and 'eight 
per dent for the last two years, 
as a consideration for the use 
of the land. Ileid that B, 
who was let into possession 
under this agreement was not 
tenant at will to A, but tenant 
for years until the 1st Mav 
1829.
Before that day A died, and 
by his will devised the land to 
his widow for her life, and after 
her death to his children (the 
lessors of the Plaintiff.) He 
appointed his Widow his Ex­
ecutrix, and the Defendant 
who was B’s assignee, paid
the purchase money of the 
land to the Widow, and re­
ceived from her the dqed of 
bargain and sale. Held that 
the Defendant could nofi after 
this, set up a tenancy at will 
under the agreement, such 
tenancy if any having merged 
in the life estate conveyed by 
the Widow’s Deed ; and that 
after the death of the Widow 
an ejectment might be main­
tained by the children without 
any notice to (juit^pr demand 
of possession.—Doe d. Cliff, 
et al. v Connaway. 382
4.. Jfide descent cast. 1
5. In ejectment against a tenant 
under a parol lease for 7 years 
(no rent being paid) who holds 
over, no notice to quit was 
considered necessary.—Doe a. 
Parkinson v Haubtayan. 434
EVIDENCE.
1. Admissions under the Great
Seal of the Province, evidence 
against the Crown.—Rex v 
Wilson, et al. 1
2. A plan produced by the heir 
of one of the original grantees 
which had been in his pos­
session for 25 years, and which 
he had seen in his fathers pos­
session 15 years before, but 
which he never saw annexed 
to tlie grant, although found 
and kept together with it, was 
held to be sufficiently authen­
ticated to be given in evidence 
as to the plan referred to in 
the grant as being^j annexed''' 
thereto.—Rex v. Wilson etal. 1
3. An altered fieri facias not re­
ceivable as evidence.— Vide 
Writs. 1
4. A promissary note though 
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made payable at a particular 
place is evidence under the 
common counts in action by 
the payee against the maker. 
■—Merritt v Woods. 261
5. In action for Oral Slander, 
an affidavit made by the De­
fendant before a Magistrate 
as the foundation of a criminal 
proceeding against the Plain­
tiff which is still pending, is 
not admissible evidence to 
shew malice in the Defendant. 
—Rankin v Clarke. 303
6. Secondary evidence of a Will 
devis'ng real property in this 
Province not admissible where 
it appeared that the original 
Will was in the possession of 
the Surrogate General of N ova 
Scotia, and no proof was 
given of any law of Nova 
Scotia prohibiting its removal 
from such possession.—Doe 





1. Liable to costs, when— Vide
Assumpsit. 2
2. An Executor may be sued in 
an action of debt for a specific 
or certain legacy.— Vide 
Debl. 2
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
1. A Magistrate is liable to an 
action of trespass for false im­
prisonment if he commit a 
party to goal, brought before 
him on a criminal charge 
without proceeding to make 
an examination into the charge 
as by law directed, and an ex­
amination taken under an 
oath administered by the Ma­
gistrate without the jurisdic­
tion of the Province was held 
anullity.—Naryv Owen. 337
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
1. A license to cut a quantity 
of Timber within certa.. pre­
scribed limits and to remove 
the same does not convey any 
interest in lands under the 
statute of Frauds or give any 
property in the standing trees.
The Liceacee has no right to 
timber cut by a stranger 
within the limits of his license 
without authority, and the 
timber so cut remains the 
propertv of the owner of the 
land, bat as against all other 
persons the possession of the 
timber and the labor bestowed 
upon it gives the maker, al­
though a wrong doer, the right 
to it.-—Kerr v Connell. 133
2. A mere delivery of goods by 
the vendor without an actual 
acceptance by the vendee of 
some part thereof, is not suffi­
cient within the statute of 
Frauds.—See Provincial Act, 
26 Geo. 3, c, 14, s. 14.
The receipt of the goods by a 
common carrier from the ven­
dor, without any specific di­
rection or authority from the 
vendee, will not amount to an 
acceptance by the vendee 
within the statute.—Daley v 
Marks. 346
HIGHWAYS.
1. Within the meaning of the 
act 50 Geo. 3, c. 6, a return
B
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of the Commissioners is not in 
itself a laying out of a Road. 
The road must be feza? out be­
fore it is recorded.—Rex v 
Sterling. 22
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
1. In an action of trover, the 
wife is a good subscribing wit­
ness to a bill of sale of her 
husbands, through which the 
Plaintiff claims title.—Fla­
herty v Sayre. 83
INDICTMENT.
1. For obstructing a Highway.
■—Vide Highways. 1
2. After an acquittal no copy of
an indictment should be fur­
nished without the order of 
the Judge or the fiat of the 
Attorney General.—Heaney 
v Lynn. 27
3. The Court will quash an in­
dictment for forcible entry and 
detainer, brought up from the 
Sessions by certiorari after 
plea pleaded, upon its appear­
ing that the prosecutor was 
one of the Grand Jury who 
found the bill ; nor will the 
Court receive affidavit of the 
absence of the prosecutor from 
the Jury Room when the bill 
was found, his name being 
mentioned in the caption of 
the indictment.—-Regina v 
Cunard et al. 326
INFANTS.
1. A person after he comes of 
age is liable in assumpsit upon 
a note of hand made by him 
when an infant, if alter coming 
of age he promise to pay it.— 
Fisher v -Jewett, et al. 35
INFORMATION.
1. Judgement was arrested upon 
an information where the of­
fence was not sufficiently al­
leged.—Attorney General ex 
relatione Robinson v 250 bar­
rels Piekled Fish. 419
INQUIRY, WRIT OF.
1. Where a jury under a writ of
inquiry gave no verdi it and 
were dismissed, damages as­
sessed by a jury under a se­
cond writ were held regular. 
— Ward v Dow. 21
2. When a writ of inquiry was
directed to the Sheriff and the 
Justices of Assize, and com­
manded the Sheriff to sum­
mon the jury and the parties 
to certify the inquisition, held 
that the writ and inquisition 
returned under the seal of the 
Judge were defective and void 
and not merely an irregularity 
which could be waived by the 
Defendant.—Fowlie v 3&ro- 
nach and another, Adminis­
trators of English. 57
INROLLMENT.
1. The Statute of Inrollment 
27, II 8, c. 16, in force in this 
Province.—Doe d. Hanning­
ton v McFadden. 153
INSOLVENT AND CONFINED 
DEBTORS.
1. An affidavit for relief under 
1 W. 4, c. 43, must account 
for all the property the De­
fendant may appear to have 
possessed.— Wilmot v Corn 
well and Babine. 31
2 Applications for relief are ab­
solute in the first instance 
INDEX. xi.
when notice and copies of af­
fidavit are given.—Id.
3. To entitle a debtor to a dis­
charge on the ground of having 
been confined for a year, it 
must explicitly appear that he 
has been in confinement for 
the whole time in the suit to 
which the application refers. 




1. Judgement set aside for.— 
Vide Prae. 20
2. Irregularity in not swear­
ing witnesses waived.— Vide 
Award. 4
3. A ca sa differing in the
amount only from the judg­
ment upon which it is issued is 
not void but only irregular.— 
Spence v Stuart and Thomp­
son. 219
4. It is not sufficient to set aside 
proceedings for irregularity, 
that the Defendant was not 
personally served with pro­
cess where it appeared that 
the service of the Writ was ac­
cepted by one who, whilst in 
the Defendants employment, 
had a general authority to ac­
cept service of process for De - 
fendant although such accep­
tance was made after having 
left Defendants employment, 
the Defendant not having ex­
pressly denied any authority 
so to act, or taken any steps 
to set aside the proceedings. 
—Farley v Phillips. 347
JURISDICTION.
1. Vide Courts, 1, 2, 3.
LEGATEE.
1. A Legatee may maintain an 
action of debt against an Exe­
cutor for a certain Legacy 
given by his testator.—Li­
vingstone v Powell, et al. 
Executors of Powell, 225
LETTERS PATENT.
1. Letterspatent described lands 
as extending from the point of 
departure 32 chains, or to a 
certain road leading between 
certain lands, and the tract 
described in the grant, and 
thence to run a certain course 
on said road. Held that the 
latter alternative should be 
the one by which to construe 
the grant. Held also that the 
subsequent mention of quan­
tity contained could not coun­
teract the previous definition 
of boundary described by metes 
and bounds.-—Rex v Wilson,
et al. 1
2. Two grants issued the same 
day mutually referring to 
each other, must be consider­
ed together to discover the in­
tention of the Crown in re­
gard to premises contained in 
each respectively.—Id.
LICENSE.
1. A license to cut timber and 
remove it from lands does not 
enure as a grant of the trees 
until cut under the license.-—- 
Kerr v Connell. 133
LIEN.
1. A judgement is not such a 
lien upon lands as to prevent 
the Defendant conveying the 
legal estate and seizin to a 
third person.—Doe dem. Pea­
body v McKnight. 376
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
1. When a feme sole was pre­
vious to her coverture in the 
actual occupation conjointly 
with her brother of lands 
which descended to them from 
their father, and upon her 
marriage left the possession in 
her brother, who occupied it 
for more than 40 years, pay­
ing during that period all 
taxes and charges thereon and 
receiving all the rents and 
profits, in an action of eject­
ment brought by her heirs on 
the death of A and her hus­
band. The Court held that 
under 14 section of 6 W. 4, 
c. 43, the question of advers 
possession should be left to 
the jury to determine, and 
that it should be decided ac­
cording to the law as it stood 
when the said act came into 
operation.—Doe dem. Cole, 
et al. v Harper and Wife. 289 
21 When B was put into pos­
session of lands by A under 
an agreement to puruhase, and 
remained thus for 21 years, 
receiving all rents and profits, 
the heirs of A were barred by 
7 section of 6 W. 4, c. 43, in 
an action of ejectment against 
B’s grantee.—Doe dem. Pur­
dy, et al v Peters. 350
MAGISTRATE.
Vide False Imprisonment. 1
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. A copy of an indictment cer­
tified by the Droper officer 
though iniDroperly obtained is 
admissible in evidence in an 
action of malicious prosecu­
tion.—Heanyv Lynn. 27
MANDAMUS.
1. A mandamus to the Justices 
of an Inferior Court requiring 
them to enter up judgement 
for the Plaintiff for an action 
on a recognizance of bail in 
that Court when such Justi- 
tices had in the exercise of 
their discretion set aside the 
Plaintiff’s judgement and al­
lowed the render of the prin­
cipal, although their proceed­
ings might not have conform­
ed to the rules or practice of 
this Court was refused.—Led- 
den v Russel et al. 217 
Semb. The Courts of Common 
Pleas have the same controul 
over recognizances of bail as 
this Court, and are not bound 
by the rules of this Court.—Id.
MARRIAGE.
1. In an action for crim con. the 
fact of the Plaintiff’s marriage 
may be proved by any person 
present at the ceremony, and 
if performed by the commis­
sioner under the Act of As­
sembly, 8 G. 4, c. 9, it will 
be presumed (at least in the 
absence of evidence to the 
contrary) that he was act­
ing within his authority, and 
followed the requisition of the 
acts as to the notification and 
form of the solemnization. 
The certificate made under 
the Act 52 G. 3, c. 21, and 
registered with the Clerk of 
the Peace, is admissible in 
evidence without proof by the 
attesting witness.—Montgo­
mery v McLeod. 375
NEW TRIAL
1. Where Plaintiff' in trespass
INDEX. XIII.
q c f had it in his power to 
shew definitive bounds but re­
lied on the uncertain lines of 
another grant and the jury 
found against him, the court 
refused to disturb the verdict. 
--Bates v Lyon. 63
2. Notice of motion to the Judge
for new trials applies equally 
to causes where points are 
reserved as to others.-—Fla­
herty v Sayre. 83
3. The court will not set aside a
verdict to enable the Defend­
ant to set up a release from 
the Plaintiff given prior to the 
trial where it appears that the 
meritorious cause of action is 
in the wife and the defence is 
unconscionable.—Clarke v 
Robinson. 86
4. The court will not grant a 
new tr°l on the grounds that 
nominal damages should have 
been given when the point 
was not raised at the trial.—- 
—Rogers v Peck, et al. 318
5. A new trial will not be grant­
ed for imaginary damages.— 
Wilson v Eills. 325
6. When a new trial is to be
moved for on the ground of 
improper reception of evidence 
counsel should take care that 
the question is correctly en­
tered on the Judges notes.— 




1. W dl not be granted upon a 
point reserved at the trial 
where no verdict was taken.— 
Doe dem. Duncan v Chris­
topher. 83
2. Judgment as in case of vide. 
--Practice. 23 25
3. Rule for judgement as in case
of a nonsuit will be discharged 
with costs, when the Plaintiff 
after giving notice of trial 
was induced by the Defendant 
to submit the cause to refer­
ence.—McDonald v McIn­
tyre. 280
4. It is not necessary that two 
terms or two assizes should 
pass after issue joined to sup­
port an application for judge­
ment as in case of a non suit. 
—Sprague v Matthews. 433
6. Non suit will be granted 
though the objection appear 





1. An appointment to an office 
without limitation is an ap­
pointment for life.—Joplin v 
Davidson. 308
PARTICULARS.
1. A bill of particulars which
gives substantial information 
of the Plaintiff’s demand and 
does not confine the claim to 
any particular count, or mis­
lead the Defendant is suffi­
cient to let in evidence under 
any count to which the same 
may be applicable.-—Grant v 
Aiken and Shaw. 259
2. The Plaintiff’s bill of parti­
culars was dated at Liverpool, 
England, and made up in 
sterling money, held that with­
out an affidavit of the De­
fendant’s being misled by it,
XIV. INDEX.
A was sufficient to warrant 
the j ry giving a sum suffi­
cient to cover the difference 
of exchange.—Campbell v 
Wilson. 265
PARTIES.
1. When some of a number of 
joint contractors had settled 
w ith Defendant and avowedly 
rescinded the contract the re­
maining parties may sue in 
the nameof all.—Palmer et al. 
v Long. 122
PEREMPTORY UNDERTAKING.
1. Not discharged by Defend­
ant leaving the Province.— 
—Leslie v Rae. 32
2. A peremptory undertaking
will not be enlarged on the 
ground that the record was 
withdrawn because a witness 
who resided in town was not 
in court when the cause was 
called on.—Doe dem. Kinnear, 
v Wiswell. 127
PLEADING.
1. In an action by the Sheriff 
on a limit bond after Oyer the 
Defendant pleaded Secondly— 
That the prisoner had been 
surrendered by his bail and 
received into custody by the 
Sheriff. Thirdly,—that the 
prisoner had surrendered him­
self, and been received by the 
Sheriff into his custody, and 
Fifthly,—-non damnificatus
held upon demurrer that the 
second and third pleas were 
good and an answer to the 
action, but that the fifth was 
bad, as it could not be pleaded 
except when the condition 
was solely to indemnify.-—• 
Campbell v Henan et al, 73
2. In an action of defamation 
for calling a woman a Whore 
it is sufficient to aver in the 
declaration that the Defend­
ant intended to impute unchas­
tity.—Martindale and Wife, 
n Murphy and Wife. 85
3. A plea justifying an entry 
upon Plaintiff’s land to retake 
Defendant s timber carried 
there by a sudden rise of water 
in a river, in which it was 
being floated to market, held 
bad because it was not shewn 
that Defendant’s were not in 
fault. -Readv Smith ,etal. 173
Semb. Under such circumstan­
ces even the care and dili­
gence of the Defendant to 
prevent the accident would 
not justify an injury to the 
herbage and soil by the haul­
ing or removing of the tim­
ber.—Id — Vide Index, p. 17 
PRACTICE.
1. Vide Inquiry as to writ of
2. Where an award is to be en­
tered on the postea as a ver­
dict of a jury, a motion to 
disturb the award must be 
governed by the same rules as 
motions for new trials.—Fow- 
lis v Kinnear et al. 26
3. Title of affidavit, vide Insol­
vent Debtor.
4. Where a Defendant was dis­
charged by one of several 
Plaintiff’s he cannot be ar­
rested a second time at the 
instance of co-plaintiff, and a 
rule nisi obtained by consent 
of Defendant’s counsel in order 
to file affidavit to get licence 
of the court to issue a second 
ca sa was discharged with 
costs.—Executors of An­
drews v Clarke. 32
INDEX. xv.
5. A peremptory undertaking
will not be discharged on ac­
count of the defendant having 
gone out of jurisdiction of the 
Court.—Leslie v Rae. 32
6. Demand for security for costs
sent by post held sufficient.—• 
Abbott v Ledden. 33
7. Where a party has no right 
in law to recover, a non suit 
will be ordered though the ob­
jection may appear upon the re­
cord. —Fisher v Jewett, etal. 35
8. In an exemption of an execu­
tion the endorsement of the 
Sheriff as to the time of the 
receipt of the writ was held 
not amendable by parol evi­
dence, although it was a mis­
take.—Johnston v Wins­
low. 53
9. Where points are reserved at 
the trial, notice to the J udge of 
a motion for new trial is neces­
sary. — Flah erty v Sayre. 83
10. Applications for relief of 
confined debtors when notice 
and copies of affidavits have 
been served are absolute.— 
Wilmot v Babino, et al. 62
11. In replevin where some of
the issues were found for the 
Plaintiff and others for the 
Defendant, both parties are 
entitled to costs, and the court 
will direct the postea to be 
given to the Plaintiff for a 
given time to enter up the 
judgment, and in case he ne­
glect to do so then to be given 
to the Defendant.—Dickenson 
v Ketchum 63
12. Where the affidavit in shew­
ing cause contradicts the one 
on which the rule nisi was ob­
tained, the former must pre­
vail.—Ellis v Newton. 77
13. Where two writs for the
same cause of action were 
simultaneously issued to two 
Counties, and the Defendant 
was arrested under both and 
put in special bail in both 
Counties, the Plaintiff’s At­
torney having apprized the 
Defendant’s Attorney that 
there was but one cause of 
action and having filed a de­
claration therein, judgement 
of non pros signed upon one 
of the writs was set aside for 
irregularity. The Defendant 
should have applied to the 
court for relief. An exonera­
tion was ordered to be entered 
on the bail since last given, 
and the Plaintiff directed to 
pay to the Defendant his costs 
upon entering the same, and of 
the appearance.—Johnston v 
Bransfield. 78
14. After demurrer books are
delivered to the court and the 
cause set down on the special 
paper the Plaintiff may amend 
liis declaration upon payment 
of costs.—Pine et al. v Mc- 
Lauchlan. 81
15. Where no verdict has been
given, a non suit will not be 
granted upon a point reserved 
at the trial v ith leave to move. 
—Doe dem. Duncan v Chris­
topher. 83
16. Attachment against a wit­
ness for contempt in not at­
tending on a subpoena must be 
applied for at the next term 
after the contempt committed. 
-Doedem.Howev Meally. 121
17. When the verdict for the 
Plaintiff was evidently the 
result of compromise and the 
weight of evidence was in fa-
xvi. INDEX.
vor of the Defendant, the 
court set it aside.—Keys v 
Flynn. 125
18. When a peremptory under­
taking will not be enlarged. 
—Fide peremptory under­
taking. 2
19. Service on a clerk is insuf­
ficient unless at the office or 
dwelling house of the Attor­
ney.—Moulton v Dibblee. 128
20. A judgment having been
signed on the 16th October, 
the rule nisi being entered on 
the 13th, was set aside as ir­
regular, the four day rule not 
having expired.—Hatton v 
Flaherty. 129
21. A supersedeas under the 26
Geo. 3, c. 13, will not be 
granted by the court unless 
with the consent of all the cre­
ditors.— Ex parte Gove. 187
22. Service of a declaration of
ejectment on a daughter on 
the premises not sufficient 
secus if on the wife.—Doe 
dem. Disbrow v Fen. 234
23. An affidavit by an attorney
of the absence of a material 
witness and of his belief that 
the testimony would be pro­
cured at the next circuit, not 
sufficient to oppose a rule for 
judgment as in case of a non 
suit.—Mitchell v Cuppage 
and White. 277
24. A plaintiff is bound to try
his cause at the first circuit 
after issue joined unless issue 
be joined of the term imme­
diately preceding—Samuel v 
Saunders. 278
25. An affidavit stating the tem­
porary mental derangement 
and subsequent recovery of a 
witness held sufficient to dis­
charge a rule for judgment as 
in case of a non suit upon a 
peremptory undertaking and 
payment of costs.—Id.
26. The court ordered an exon-
eretur to be entered on the 
bail piece where the Plaintiff 
procured the Defendant to go 
without the limits of the Pro­
vince.—Pollock et al. v 
&W. 279
27. Where the Defendant ob­
tained a stay of proceedings 
until security for costs were 
given, after sufficient time had 
elapsed and no further pro­
ceedings in the cause taken 
by the Plaintiff, the court or­
dered in exoneretur to be en­
tered on the bail piece.—Hill 
v Rind. 281
28. Where a surplus remained
in the hands of a Sheriff from 
the sale of goods taken under 
an execution against A ats of 
B, the court would not order 
him to pay the same over to 
the Coroner upon an execu­
tion in his hands against A at 
the suit of C.—Stevenson v 
Douglas. 281
29. The declaration in an ac­
tion on the case contained 
counts for oral slander and 
also for libel, the jury found 
for the Plaintiff with general 
damages, the court refused to 
allow the verdict to be enter­
ed on the slander counts only, 
the Plaintiff not having re­
quested to have the verdict 
corrected before the jury were 
discharged, and not being sa­
tisfied that the jury had limit­
ed the damages to these counts. 
—Rankin v Clarke. 303
30. A Plaintiff is bound to pro- 
INDEX. XYll.
cetd to trial at the first Nisi 
Prius holden next after the 
term .mmediately succeeding 
that in which issue is joined, 
provided there be sufficient 
time to give notice of trial.— 
Sprague v Matthews. 433
31. After a case had gone to the 
jury on the whole evidence, 
and a general verdict found 
for the Plaintiff in trespass, 
the court would not allow the 
verdict to be entered upon one 
count only, on the ground that 
the damages were not more 
than adequate compensation 
for the inquiry complained of 
in that count, unless all the 
evidence was admissible under 
that count, and the court could 
be satisfied that the damages 
were assessed wholly on the 
cause of actioncontained there­
in.—Leonardo Hanson. 373
32. Where a demand of plea 
was sent by Plaintiff’s attor­
ney in a letter to his agent, a 
student in the office of the 
Defendant’s attorney, and was 
admitted to have been in the 
office of the latter before sign­
ing interlocutory judgment, 
the court set aside the judg­
ment upon an affidavit of 
merits and payment of costs.
—Estey v Newcomb et al. 343
pleading.
4. In an action to recover in this 
Province for goods sold and 
delivered in England it is not 
necessary to aver in the decla­
ration that the debt was con­
tracted in sterling money,or the 
relative value of sterling and 
currency; and the difference 
of exchange may be recovered 
under the Common Counts.— 
Campbell v Wilson. 265
5. It is not necessary to allege
in the declaration the place 
where the debt is payable when 
it is not required to support 
the action but only to regulate 
the amount. id.
6. Rein en arrear is not a good
plea in an action for double 
value.—Strang v Bell. 287
7. In an action of assumpsit the 
Plaintiff averred part per­
formance by the Defendant, 
and demand as to the residue 
which was not necessary, and 
failed in proving both, held 
that both averments were sur­
plus age. -Brown v Frink. 363
8. The allegation that the goods
were imported into this Pro­
vince from the territories of 
United States of America con­
trary to the Acts of the Gene­
ral Assembly of this Province 
of New Brunswick in such 
case made and provided was 
not a sufficient allegation of an 
offence under 6 W. 4, c. 4, 
s. 4, which imposes a forfeiture 
of all goods which shall be 
landed before they are reported 
at the Treasurer’s Office, and 
a permit obtained, tyc. and a 
judgement obtained on an in­
formation filed by the Attorney 
General was arrested thereon. 
— The Attorney General ex 
relatione Robinson v 250 Bar­
rels Fish. 419
9. A demise in a declaration of
Ejectment in the name of hus­
band and wife of the wife’s 
property laid previous to the 
wife’s marriage is not good.— 
Boe d. Thompson and Wife 
v Barnes. 126
10. On nul tiel record pleaded 
to a judgement of an Inferior
c
xviii. INDEX.
Court a variance between the 
ca sa and the judgment or in­
consistency between the teste 
and issue thereof cannot be 
taken advantage of.—Spence 




1. The Imperial Statutes of 1 
Vic. c. 33, s. 12, and c. 36, 
do not except Postmasters 
from Highway Labor imposed 
by an Act of the Assembly of 
this Province.—Commissioner 
of Highways v Phair. 371
PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. Made by an Infant voidable 
only.—Vide Infant 1.
2. In an action by the payee
against the maker of a promis­
sory note although it is made 
payable at a particular place, 
yet it is admissible evidence 
under the Common Courts.— 
Merritt v Woods. 261
RECOGNIZANCE ESTREATED.
1. Vide Courts, 3.
REFERENCE
Vide Award and Arbitrators. 
RELEASE.
1. A general release “ excepting 
a certain judgment” sufficient 




1. When a jury is discharged 
from giving a verdict by the 
court, the cause stands as a 
remane t.-Doe exd. Duncan v 
Christopher. 83
REPLEVIN.
1. Goods mentioned in the writ 
cannot be taken unless in the 
possession of the Defendant 
named in the writ.— Wiggins 
v Garrison and Wood. 17
2. When in Renlevin some of 
the issues were found for both 
parties.— Vide Practice 11.
SCIRE FACIAS.
1. Every writ of scire facias 
should state the particular cir­
cumstances which entitle the 
party to the remedy sought, 
so that in the case of an ordi­
nary scire facias under the 
statute of Westminster the 
party would not be entitled to 
an execution against a joint 
debtor under the Act of As­
sembly, 26 Geo. 3, c. 24, and 
nothing which might have 
been pleaded to the original 
action can be pleaded to such 
ordinary scire facias.—John­
ston v Tibbettts, et al. 356
SECURITY FOR COSTS.
1. Demand of security by post 
sufficient.-/W;o<7 vLedden. 33
2. Security for costs will not be 
granted when the Defendant 
knew of the Plaintiff’s absence 
previous to the term preceding 
the one in which application 
was made.-Gibbs\ Deveber 78
SERVICE.
1. Service on a clerk insufficient
unless at the office or house of 
the Attorney.-Moulton v Dib­
blee. 128
2. An affidavit of service of no­
tice of motion “on a Student 
in the office of Plaintiff’s At­
torney,” not sufficient, in not 
INDEX. xix.
stating it to have been at the 
(A'ite.e.—Calif’\ Robertson. 342
3. Service of a declaration in
Ejectment on the daughter of 
tenant in possession not suffi­
cient, but otherwise if on the 
wife at his dwelling house.— 
Doe cl. MlBricle v Roe, Doe 
d. Peabody v Roe. 347
SET OFF.
1. In assumpsit upon promises 
to an intestate, a note of hand 
made by him and after his 
death endorsed to the Defend­
ant cannot be pleaded as a set 
off to an action by the Admi­
nistrator.—Curry and Orr, 
Administrators, n Hibbard.
183
2. In an action of debt for the
penalty of an arbitration bond, 
in which the Plaintiff assigns 
as the only breach the non 
payment of a certain liquida­
ted sum awarded by the arbi­
trators to be paid to liimby 
the Defendant, a set off may 
be pleaded ; and such set off 
is pleadable to the sum so 
awarded, and not to the penalty 
of the bond.—Shaw v Wilson 
and another. 390
SHERIFF
1. Cannot justify the taking of 
goods mentioned in the writ of 
replevin if he take them from 
a third person who is not 
named in the writ.— Wiggins 
v Garrison and Wood. 17
2. In an action of trespass
against Sheriff for taking 
goods, he cannot justify under 
an altered fieri facias re-issu- 
ed as an alias.—Johnston v 
Winslow. 53
3. A Sheriff who sustains da­
mage by proceeding under an 
improper writ given to him by 
an attorney, has his remedy 
over against such attorney. 
—Id.
4. As to the effect of taking into 
custody a prisoner at large 
upon a limit bond.— Vide 
Bond 1.
5. Where the Sheriff levies on
real property under a fi fa 
and omitting to advertize and 
offer it for sale, returns that 
“ the lands remain unsold for 
want of buyers" such omis­
sion is a breach of duty on his 
part and the return a false re­
turn, nominal damages only 
given however, unless actual 
damage be proved.—Jarvis 
v Miller. 191
6. A Sheriff is bound to proceed 
under a fi fa and is not at li­
berty to wait for a venditioni 
exponas.—
7. A Sheriff has no right to ap­
ply any surplus remaining in 
his hands from a sale under a 
prior execution to one receiv­
ed after such sale.—Stevenson 
v Douglas. 281
Quere—Whether it is necessary 
to direct any other but jury 
process to a Coroner, when 
the only objection to the She­
riff is, that he is related to the 
Defendant.—Id.
STATUTES.
1. The court would not act un­
der the sec. 2, W. 4, c. 26, 
without >t being shewn that 
tlie “ corporation deemed the 
lands absolutely necessary." 
—Ex parte St. John Water 
Company. 128
XX INDEX.
2. The statutes of uses and in­
rollments, 27, H. 8, c. 10, 
and 27 H. 8, c. 16, are in 
force in this Province.—Doe 
dem. Hannington v McFad­
den.
STATUTE LABOR.
1. Postmaster notexcepted from. 
—Commissioners of High­
ways v Phair. 371
SUMMARY PRACTICE.










1. Where persons jointly manu­
factured timber which it was 
agreed should be divided be­
tween them they are not part- 
nersbut tenants in common 
and each has aright to dispose 
only of his own share.— Wig­
gins v White, et al. 97
2. —Whether any and what acts 
short of the destruction of 
joint property will enable one 
tenant in common to sustain 
trespass against his co-tenant. 
—Id.
3. A tenant in common is liable 
in assumpsit to his co-tenant 
when he sells more than his 
share of the common property 
with the consent of his co- 
tenant.—Shaw v Grant. 110
4. When two persons cut and
haul timber made under an 
agreement that such timber 
is to be got on the halves they 
are tenants in common.—Kerr 
v Connell. 133
5. One tenant in common can­
not recover in assumpsit 
against his co-tenant for the 
value of his share of common 
property unless a sale by the 
co-tenant be actually proved. 
—Doyle v Taylor, et al. 201
TRESPASS.
1. A Sheriff is liable in trespass
for taking goods under ‘&fifa 
which had been once returned 
and re-issued as an alias.— 
Johnston v niaklow. 53
2. Where a person having au­
thority by a statute abuse 
such authority by some posi­
tive act contravening the 
same, he will be liable as a 
trespasser ab initio.— Califf v 
Wilson. 79
3. W’here personal property of 
»|he Defendant is in the actual
possession of the Plaintiff un­
der an agreement between 
them, the latter may sustain 
trespass against the former 
for taking it away.—Holmes 
v Clarke. 87
4. An admission by the Defend­
ant that he had killed the 
Plaintiff’s Ox and ought to 
pay for it, 'will not support an 
action of trespass against him 
for the act,- Bransfield v 
Bishop, et al. 89
5. Quer\—Whether any acts 
short of the destruction of 
property will enable one ten­
ant in common to sustain 
trespass against his co-tenant. 
— Wiggins v White, et al. 79
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6. Trespass for entering upon 
and injuring the soil of the 
Plaintiff cannot be justified on 
the ground that the Defend­
ant’s timber being floated 
down a river to market, was 
by a sudden rise of water and 
wind carried upon the Plain­
tiff’s land against the will 
and despite the care and dili­
gence of the Defendant.— 
Head v Smith, et al. L73
Qvere.—Whether a mere entry 
under such circumstances 
could be justified.—Id.
7. A under a claim of fijlt en­
tered upon land in the pos­
session of C and without his 
consent or privity surveyed 
and fenced off a part of C’s 
enclosure but did not remain 
thereon ; B pulled down and 
destroyed the fences for which 
A brought trespass q cf 
gainst him. Held that A 
failing to shew title to the 
land or the actual expulsion 
of C therefrom, had not suf­
ficient possession to sustain 
the action.—Merritt v Quin­
ton. ‘ y
What is a sufficient possession 
is a question for the court and 
not for the jury.—Id.
8. In trespass q c f by A against 
B, one count of the declara­
tion described the locus in quo 
by abuttals as lot No. 135, 
held that B, the occupant un­
der a verbal agreement for 
purchase with C, the owner of 
the adjacent lot No. 134, 
could not justify an entry on 
any part of the land in A’s 
possession in order to contest 
the true boundary between 
the lots, neither B nor C 
having actual possession, and 
there appearing no Command 
or distinct authority from C 
for such entry.
A Defendant in trespass may 
justify his entry by the Com­
mand but not by the mere 
licence of the person entitled 
to the possession.—Parent, 
et al. v Corneilison;et al. 235
9. Where the respective owners 
of adjoining lands'screed by 
parol to asurvey-and marking 
of their division line, the court 
in an action of trespass q c f 
held that such agreement was 
not within the statute of fraud 
and that the Plaintiff mightre- 
cover although the trespass 
was committed on a part of 
the premises which the De­
fendant previous to such sur­
vey, had actually occupied 
according to a boundary which 
had existed for a number of 
years between the Plaintiff 
and Defendant.—Lawrence 
and Hill v McDoioall. 283
10. In an action of trespass for 
improperly taking the goods of 
the Plaintiff under an execu­
tion, the declaration alleged 
as special damage, loss of 
time and expenditure of money 
in recovering the possession, 
&c. The court hdld that the 
expences attending a trial be­
fore a Sheriff’s Jury (upon 
whose finding the goods were 
returned to the Plaintiff,) were 
not recoverable.
Quere—Whether under any cir­
cumstances or allegations in 
pleading, such expences could 




1. A licence of the Crown to
ent and carry away timber 
from off a certain described 
portion of Crown Lands can­
not maintain Trover against 
a wrong doer for timber cut 
and carried away by the latter 
from off tlie same limits.— 
Kerr v Connett. 133
2. Quere—As to Trover by one
tenant in common against his 
co-tenant.- -Wiggins \ White, 
et al. 97
TRUSTEES.
1. The President and Directors 
of a Ejavin^s Bank duly elected 
for one year under an Act of 
Incorporation, and filling the
1 office of Trustees thereunder, 
remain in office until others 
are appointed and are liable 
to a deposit—or in an action of 
debt for the amount of his de­
posit.—Gilchrist v Wyer et al, 
Trustys, ^p.\' 219
x'tSES.
1. The 27 H. 8, c. 10, Statute 
of uses in forcein this Province. 
—Doe d. Han ington v U/‘ Fad- 
den. 153
VERDICT.
1. Although in assumpsit the 
verdict w 1 be taken as evi­
dence of the amount of the 
original debt due yet it is not 
conclusive or binding on the 
Court to deprive the Plaintiff 
of costs in all cases where it is 
under £5. —Mflhaney v Wis- 
wall. 67
2. When the verdict is the result 
of a compromise. — Vide Prac­
tice 17.
3. When verdict is general the 
Court will not give leave to 
enter it on some particular 
counts.— Vide Practice 29.
4. In an action on the case for 
special damages the Court will 
not disturb a verdict for defen­
dant when no permanent rights 
are bound by it unless the 
evidence is all on one side or 
very greatly preponderates. 
—Rogers v Peck, et al. 318
WITNESS.
1. A general release “ except­
ing a certain judgment in the 
releasors favor” held suffi­
cient to make a person a com­
petent witness, it not appear­
ing that the judgment referred 
to the matter in question.-Tur­
ner n Elliot, (in error.) 117
2. Vide Husband and Wife.
WRITS.
1. A returned fieri facias was 
altered and re-issued by the 
Attorney as an alias, the writ 
was held void and not recivable 
in evidence in an action of 
trespass against the Sheriff 
for taking goods under it.— 
Johnston v Winslow. 53
2. A mistake in the indorsement 
of a writ by the Sheriff may 
be amended.—Id.
3. A writ against two persons 
was returned by the Sheriff 
“ cepi corpus” held that it ap­
plied to both Defendants.-Rex 
v Sheriff of Gloucester. 187

